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This dissertation contributes to Brazilian public security studies from the perspective 
of critical criminology. It examines public experiences of insecurity and the social 
impacts of security programmes that aim to address violence in one Brazilian city: 
Recife. Between 1982 and 2007, Recife had one of the highest homicide rates in 
Brazil. Between 2008 and 2012, homicide rates declined in Recife in tandem with the 
implementation of a public security intervention entitled Pacto pela Vida or Pact for 
Life (PPV). However, few studies have examined this programme, the relations 
between urban marginalised communities and the public security system in Recife, or 
how the daily experiences of the urban poor in Recife are affected by violence and 
public security provision. This dissertation addresses this gap in the literature drawing 
on ethnographic methods to examine existing interactions between residents of low-
income communities and institutions of the public security system, especially the 
police and the prison. The research is based on data gathered through interviews, 
observations, focus groups and secondary sources, such as official data about levels of 
incarceration and homicide. It poses questions about the social effects of existing 
security policies, arguing that the emulation of mainstream criminological theories of 
crime control from the Global North produces large-scale perverse effects in the 
context of countries of the Global South. The findings are based on interviews with 
the police and data gathered in two low-income communities, one of which is located 
around a large prison. The data show that managerial police reforms and security 
programmes have not addressed long-standing issues of sexism, racism, classism and 
brutalising training in the police force. Moreover, through the increasing use of 
policing and hyper-incarceration as methods of crime control, security programmes 
have failed to inhibit diverse forms of violent and organised crime and exacerbated 
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CHAPTER 1 – Introduction 
 
‘We have tightened security inside and outside the prison. We discovered 
sixteen tunnels connecting the prison to the outside and we closed those. The 
problem used to be people throwing parcels over the walls, so as we increased 
surveillance around the walls, prisoners started to build tunnels. Now, as we 
found the tunnels, they started to blow up the walls.’ (Delegado, 27th January 
2016, government meeting at the secretariat of planning and management) 
 
During my last visit to Recife, the capital city of the state of Pernambuco in the 
northeast of Brazil, prisoners used explosives to blast a hole in one of the walls of the 
Complexo do Curado prison, leading to the escape of forty prisoners on 23rd January 
2016. One of the largest prisons in Latin America, the Complexo do Curado currently 
houses approximately 7,000 inmates (four times its capacity). A few days before the 
explosion, on 20th January 2016, over fifty prisoners had escaped from another prison 
in the state of Pernambuco1. The police recaptured many escapees and killed some, 
raising concerns about the routine disrespect for human rights in overcrowded prisons 
and in Brazilian society more widely. The prison breaks increased public fear, 
feelings of insecurity and doubts about the sustainability of the existing public 
security system.  
During a government meeting, attended on 27th January 2016, the delegado 
quoted above expressed his concern, arguing that the way to solve the situation would 
be to build more prisons, as long as they were smaller and more manageable: ‘we 
need smaller prisons but it is going to take years to build enough prisons for all the 
inmates we already have’. Perhaps because I was trained as a critical criminologist, to 
me this seemed to be a catch 22 situation: whatever the police tried to do, the police-
criminals pursuit would be unending. Incarcerating suspects and increasing 
surveillance did not seem sustainable or efficient methods for creating or maintaining 
public safety, especially when deeper structural, institutional and societal problems 
are inadequately addressed.  
I start with the anecdote about the prison escapes because it illustrates and 
epitomises some of the limits of managerialism in crime control and the limits of 
policing and incarceration in Brazil’s context. It is one anecdote on the salient 
Roxana Pessoa Cavalcanti 
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symptoms of multiple failures to generate and implement meaningful and 
transformative public policies.  
Most prisoners in Brazil are incarcerated for drug-related offences rather than 
violent crime2. Studies show that less than 10% of cases of violent crime, such as 
homicide, are even investigated3. Prisoners and organised criminals in overcrowded 
inhumane conditions continue to operate over, under and through the prison’s walls. 
Many young people are faced with a highly competitive employment market, 
precarious work and living conditions, inadequate opportunities, poor schooling and, 
among other issues, ontological insecurities. Some of the young people facing these 
problems will continue to be attracted to the power and income that can be obtained 
with a gun, through the drug trade or dealing with organised criminals inside and 
outside prisons. In light of this, the central research question of this thesis is: how do 
public security policies aimed at reducing violence affect young people in Recife’s 
low-income communities? 
This thesis makes a contribution to criminology and public security studies in 
Brazil, arguing that existing public security programmes in Pernambuco have not 
been the panacea to crime problems. Existing or ‘new’ security programmes 
perceived as a success and aimed at reducing violent crime have not inhibited diverse 
forms of violence and crime. Instead they have exacerbated the inequalities that affect 
the most marginalised populations through the increasing use of policing and hyper-
incarceration as methods of crime control. Moreover, managerial police reforms and 
new security programmes have not addressed long-standing issues of sexism, racism, 
classism and brutalising training in the police force. The model of policing has 
remained relatively unchanged despite the implementation of new security 
interventions, insofar as the police continuously fail to adopt democratic principles, 
such as equality before the law and accountability, especially when interacting with 
people in low-income communities. Young people and residents in these communities 
are under-protected, exposed to organised criminals and security racketeers, and 
continuously treated as suspects and criminals by the police.  
1.1 Homicide and violence at the margins 
A significant literature has begun to emerge identifying the issue of youth violence in 
poor urban communities around the world (Feltran 2011, Hagedorn 2007, Hagedorn, 
Roxana Pessoa Cavalcanti 
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Davis, and Ebrary 2008). These communities, described in Brazil as favelas4 and 
periferias (‘peripheral areas’), are typically neighbourhoods far from the city centre, 
perceived as undesirable places in which to live. Periferias (the plural is used to 
indicate heterogeneity) are known in Brazil as working-class neighbourhoods, the 
spaces where workers such as labourers, service-sector employees, domestic workers 
and housewives live. They are seen as communities in which family, hard work and 
social mobility are valued, and as neighbourhoods replete with community 
associations, organisers and leaders (Feltran 2011). Yet, they have come to the 
attention of some analysts and the wider public as very violent places, known for their 
high murder rates and cinematographic images ingrained in public consciousness 
from films such as City of God (2002) and Elite Squad (2007).  
Sometimes this violence is associated with ‘gangs’ (Jones and Rodgers 2009, 
Fernandes 2013), or with other forms of organised crime – especially drug dealing 
and trafficking (Arias 2006, Bourgois 2003, Denyer Willis 2015). Sometimes it takes 
the form of political or community resistance (Scheper-Hughes 2004, Davies 2006). 
Sometimes violence is perpetrated by young people, but often it is perpetrated against 
them, by police and security agencies (Arias 2006, Chevigny 1995, Huggins 1997, 
Zaluar 2010).  
Since the 1980s both the homicide rate and the use of firearms in homicides 
have been rising in Brazil. The country has the highest homicide rate among the 12 
most populous countries in the world (Waiselfisz 2013). In 2010, the rate of youth 
homicide (15-29 years old) with a firearm in Brazil reached 42.5/100,000 of the 
population, as compared with 9.1/100,000 (ibid 2013, 13) in 1980: almost a fivefold 
increase in thirty years. Overall levels of lethal violence continue to grow, although at 
a slower rate in recent years. Brazil’s overall homicide rate grew by 1.6% between 
2000 and 2009 (Souza et al, 2012).  
There is, however, an unequal distribution of deaths in the country, with the 
North and Northeast regions seeing much higher increases. The southeast region of 
the country (e.g. Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo) was the only region to register a drop in 
the homicide rates. In the Northeast, the homicide rate per 100,000 inhabitants went 
from 19.4 in 2000 to 33.5 in 2009 (Souza, Ribeiro, and Valadares 2012, 52). While 
there is a geographical aspect to this phenomenon, there are also gender, ‘racial’ and 
class dimensions to it. According to a large-scale national survey (Waiselfisz 2011), 
the violent mortality problem disproportionately affects young, non-white males. The 
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likelihood of death for a young, non-white man aged 15- 25 in 2008 was 127.6% 
greater than for a white male in the same age bracket (ibid, p. 60).  
Pinheiro (2006, XVIII) suggests that our failure to listen to young people has 
led to a failure to respond to their needs. Thus this research proposes to examine how 
urban violence and insecurity affect young people’s daily life in Recife’s ‘at risk’ 
communities. How do residents of these communities employ practices and 
discourses to comprehend, explain and live in a context of high violence and 
insecurity? And, ultimately, what role does the State and its policies play in the 
fluctuation – continuation, expansion or reduction – of violence in the most socially 
excluded communities?  
Neocleous (2000) criticises the discipline of Criminology for leaving out the 
theorisation of the State, despite its crucial importance for understanding control over 
the exercise of force. As he puts it: 
 
‘The history of the police is the history of state power, and the overlapping 
consensus that this power is rooted in the control of the exercise of force – a 
consensus stretching from Hobbes to Webber – should suggest that the police 
as one of the institutions which has been granted the right to exercise this 
force, needs to be understood in the wider context of the State. As a 
consequence, any theory of police must involve a theory of state power; 
conversely, any theory of state power must necessarily consist of a theory of 
police’ (Neocleous 2000, xi) 
 
The State is a blurry and contested category. It can be constructed as an abstract 
imagined category as well as a real entity that manifests itself in multiple spheres of 
social life (Gupta 2006). It is not intended here to equate the State with the 
government. Governments shift and change in periodical intervals (at least in 
democracies), and govern populations in delineated territories and nation states. This 
difference helps delineate some of the boundaries that separate members of the 
government from other state actors, such as the police. The police are state actors but 
are not the government or the State itself. Brenner et al. (2003) deploy the metaphor 
of a container to define the State, with a geographical focus, as a territory or spatial 
entity differentiated from other States by the borders that they patrol, which divide 
domestic politics from international relations. While this definition emphasises the 
Roxana Pessoa Cavalcanti 
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importance of spatiality to state theory, it leaves out the significance of a key function 
of the State, as defined by Max Weber. For Weber (1946), the State is an entity that 
‘claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a territory’ (78).  
Both frameworks have relevance with different foci, one on the territorial 
aspects and the other on the attempt to legitimately monopolise the use of force 
(whether successfully or not). But rather than discussing its contested definitions, this 
thesis focuses on how the State affects populations.  In line with Neocleous’ (2000) 
critique of criminology, this thesis considers the role of the State by asking how state 
actors, security policies and practices affect young people in poor communities.  
The stereotype of the favelas and peripheries portrays their residents as 
homogenous, uncivil and violent, requiring repression or a tough approach on the part 
of the authorities. In popular stereotypes, violence is often simplistically explained as 
an outcome of poverty or individual ‘evil’ (Caldeira 2000). However, ethnographic 
studies have begun to reveal profound heterogeneity in the causes and political 
meanings of violence in these regions (Feltran 2011). A key aim of this research is to 
explore the heterogeneity in the dynamics of security practices and the relations of 
violence within which young people in the periferias are often involved. 
1.2 Security 
Studies conducted in Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo have indicated that policing and 
security, especially private security, are often provided in rich and upper-class parts of 
the city, while in low-income communities policing tends to be sporadic and reactive 
rather than preventive, with police responses limited to periods of crises (Arias 2006, 
Cubas 2002, Soares 2000). Security policies have continuously changed in different 
parts of Brazil, often this depends on the ethos of the state (as opposed to the federal) 
government in place; and results in diversified outcomes.  
For instance, in the state of Rio de Janeiro, a programme known as pacifying 
police units (Unidades de Polícia Pacificadora or UPPs) has been implemented in 
recent years. The programme, which has already been studied by other researchers 
(Machado da Silva 2010, Menezes 2014, Torresan and Cunha 2013, Wolff 2014), has 
marked differences to security programmes elsewhere in Brazil and its effects are 
contested. The UPPs intervention is centred on the notion of ‘policing by proximity’, 
which means foot patrols, the attempt to develop positive or non-adversarial 
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relationships between the police and the community being policed, and the permanent 
occupation of favelas by the police. A new security intervention, an innovative 
programme known as Fica Vivo (Stay alive), was also implemented in the state of 
Minas Gerais in the 2000s. Brazilian researchers have evaluated Fica Vivo (Andrade 
and Peixoto 2007, Beato Filho 2013, Silveira et al. 2010), which is a programme that 
combined methods of social crime prevention with criminal justice and policing 
interventions, drawing on the famous American violence reduction programme 
‘Operation Ceasefire’ (Beato Filho 2013, 1). Unlike the security programmes in other 
parts of Brazil, the Fica Vivo intervention offered central roles to methods of social 
crime prevention, such as conflict resolution, youth sports activities and workshops. 
The effects of violence reduction programmes are hard to measure. Lethal 
violence and fear fluctuate according to place, reducing, increasing, and sometimes 
remaining stable. In some communities residents feel more marginalised and 
criminalised by these programmes, while in others they have welcomed interventions. 
Sometimes the impact of security interventions relates to speculation and rumours 
about reduction in local income and the negative effect on local economies or to new 
insecurities with ‘changing patterns of crime and conflict’ (Menezes 2014, 675). 
These are not homogenous or omnipresent outcomes. It is also important to state that 
this dissertation is not focused on understanding or evaluating homicide reduction 
programmes across Brazil. The point made here is that there is much heterogeneity in 
different communities, in security policies and in their social effects, which needs to 
be studied, and contextualised. This is a task that a number of researchers have 
undertaken, as illustrated above.  
Various organisations and institutions, such as the State, non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) and churches, have at times assumed an active role with the 
aim of reducing violence, occasionally working together in partnership. In some 
communities, drug traffickers control local organisations, such as residents 
associations and local NGOs, thus directly impacting political life in the area. In some 
cases, communities have become complicit with the drug trade through coercion; in 
others trafficking has become a welcome source of financial support. In others, 
militias formed by ex-policemen have influenced the governance of the area, 
sometimes with the double-edged effect of reducing local theft while increasing 
mortality rates (through killings of petty criminals) and practising extortion for the 
supply of services (e.g. charging residents for security). Thus violence, security 
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policies and interventions have taken distinctive forms and have had diverse effects in 
different parts of Brazil. 
Large sporting events, such as the football World Cup of 2014 and the 
Olympic Games in Rio de Janeiro in 2016, have led many Brazilian states to take a 
more proactive role in the field of public security in low-income communities. Some 
researchers have begun to examine the effects of new security programs and policies 
in Rio de Janeiro (Monteiro 2013, Torresan and Cunha 2013) and in Salvador 
(Gledhill 2013). These changes and new policies have generated new concerns and 
revived some old ones, such as: the provision of services to slum or informal 
communities (e.g. sanitation, access to health and education), which in some cases has 
accompanied the security agenda; the issue of land title, housing and gentrification of 
‘securitised’ communities; and the impact of increased policing on the country’s 
already large prison population. It remains to be seen whether recent changes in 
public security policies will be durable and sustainable or if they will fall into the 
traditional Brazilian pattern of fragmentation and politicisation (Macaulay 2007, 
Pereira 2008).  
In terms of security and violence, this study grasps some of the heterogeneity 
of the situation in Brazil, and the differences that exist between different communities 
and regions. In particular, it focuses on case studies in the northeast of the country, on 
which fewer Brazilian and foreign academics have focused. Brazil is a continental-
sized country; it has different histories, cultures and socio-economic contexts within 
each of its regions. Furthermore, numerous paradoxes permeate Brazilian society in 
different ways. The return to democracy in 1985 progressed in parallel with debt 
crises, the restructuring of production, and the winding down of industrialisation in 
cities such as Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo (Perlman 2010, Feltran 2011).  
Yet, in some parts of the country, such as the Northeast, industrialisation and 
job creation have become more intense in recent years. In some regions the expansion 
of credit has occurred alongside the stagnation of salaried employment, the upsurge of 
neo-Pentecostalism, the consolidation of low-income communities in peripheral urban 
areas, rising crime and increasing incarceration rates (Feltran 2011). Despite this 
changing context and differences, most studies have focused on the peculiarities of 
places like Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo, which are unlikely to be representative of 
all of Brazil (Garmany 2011b, 45-46). Each region of the country has developed 
differently and thus there is much diversity that needs to be accounted for. Some 
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policies and interventions can be unanimously applied to the benefit of the country’s 
population (e.g. expanding education), while others can have contradictory effects or 
simply not succeed in different locales.  
Since the 2000s Brazil has seen a reduction of labour informality (Comin, 
Barbosa, and Carvalhaes 2012) and poverty (Barros et al. 2010, Neri 2009). These 
improvements have been fuelled by new state interventions and policies, including 
increased spending on education, health, conditional cash transfers and increases in 
the minimum wage. These advances have been particularly noticeable in the north and 
northeast of the country. Paradoxically, there has been a reduction in the number of 
victims of homicide in the southeast of Brazil and an increase in homicides in the 
north-eastern region of the country (Pita 2012). This suggests a need to look beyond 
the hypothesis of ‘State abandonment’ (Wacquant 1996, 2003, 2008) often applied to 
the poorest communities in the region. The State is often part of the problem (Arias 
2006, Gledhill 2013). Instead of examining ‘State abandonment’ per se, it might be 
preferable to look at the State’s sporadic interventions and analyse how they take 
place, their dynamics, the barriers that are faced, and ultimately, how they are 
interpreted and experienced by those at the receiving end.  
Some ethnographic research in the northeast has pointed to the link between 
growing violence and the establishment of the crack-cocaine trade (Garmany 2011a). 
This is similar to developments in the US, as documented by anthropologist Phillippe 
Bourgois (2003) in his study of crack dealers in the 1980s-1990s in East Harlem. 
Bourgois showed how neoliberal policies of free trade and insecure precarious work 
impacted local social dynamics by contributing to the establishment of underground 
economies, such as the drug trade and its accompanying cycles of violence. In his US 
study, policies of free trade led to deindustrialisation and the relocation of 
manufacturing jobs to other parts of the world, and the rise of a service economy (e.g. 
customer services, call-centre work) perceived as the ‘feminisation’ of jobs, which 
became increasingly temporary, part-time and insecure. All these changes contributed 
to a ‘crisis of masculinity’. Some of the most disadvantaged, socially excluded and 
marginalised men were attracted to the underground economy – in search of ‘respect’, 
some form of income and a position of relative power.  
Although this was the case in the US, much is yet unanswered about what is 
taking place in Recife. The Brazilian context bears some similarities to the US, but 
also presents some paradoxical differences. For example, one of the state 
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government’s mottoes in Pernambuco, where Recife is located, is Pernambuco está 
em obras (my translation: ‘Pernambuco is under construction’), meaning there is 
much economic growth and development taking place. 
What are the impacts of recent political and socio-economic changes? What 
can be learned about violence and its context, causes, lessons, alternatives, 
facilitators, consequences and cycles? Few international and ethnographic studies 
have focused on Recife, one of Brazil’s largest capital cities. This study proposes to 
examine what ethnographic methods can contribute to our thinking about violence 
and security in one contemporary Latin American city. 
While homicide rates were going up in most of Brazil, especially in the states 
of the north and northeast, the state of Pernambuco in the northeast of Brazil, where 
Recife is located, experienced declining homicide rates from the second half of the 
2000s (Ratton, Galvão, and Fernandez 2014, Waiselfisz 2014). In the media and even 
in some academic circles, this decline was attributed to a programme of public 
security and police reform called the ‘Pact for Life’ (Pacto pela Vida – PPV), created 
and implemented during the administration of state governor Eduardo Campos (2007-
2014), who was re-elected and subsequently became a candidate in the presidential 
elections in 2014. A large part of Campos’ campaign was based on his success in 
‘saving lives’ or reducing homicide rates through the PPV. 
By and large, the PPV was based on influential mainstream ideologies and 
theories of crime control developed in the Anglo-Saxon world, such as situational 
crime prevention, deterrence through incarceration, and police performance 
technologies such as the controversial New York COMPSTAT. The details of the 
PPV as a programme of securitisation, and the narratives of professionals involved 
with or exposed to its implementation, are examined in more detail in Chapter 5, 
alongside a theoretical critique of the theories on which it is based. For now, it 
suffices to say that this thesis poses challenges to the ways in which dominant or 
mainstream criminological theories developed in the Global North have been 
emulated and adapted by crime-fighting institutions in the Global South5. This thesis 
explores the impacts or effects of the adaptation of security agendas in the lives of 
people who are most exposed to their methods, namely, young people living in low-
income communities and the marginalised spaces of large cities in the Global South. 
In doing so, this study explores the hidden perspectives of the north-eastern 
marginalised, who have been largely neglected in the context of emerging public 
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security interventions by the Brazilian literature on public safety and by the 
international criminological literature.  
1.3 Contribution to criminology and Brazilian public security studies 
The most prominent topics of interest to criminologists, namely crime, crime policy, 
prevention, policing and punishment, have come to impact and interrelate to major 
social transformations of our time (Garland and Sparks 2000, 189). As a result, 
criminologists of a sociological tradition, with which I identify, have sought to 
develop analyses that transcend disciplinary boundaries to develop nuanced 
understandings ‘beyond the confines of criminology’ (ibid, 190).  Situating this thesis 
within criminology, a field of inquiry that is inter-disciplinary, requires an 
engagement with a variety of subjects, not least social anthropology and urban 
studies, and an examination of two conflicting branches of criminology – mainstream 
criminology and critical criminology. It also necessitates an examination of the 
meaning of these schools within criminology, and of the main critiques directed at 
them.  
Mainstream criminology refers to academic criminological theories that focus 
on State-defined conceptualisations of crime, criminals and criminal justice (for 
example Bratton 2005, Clarke and Felson 2004, Wilson and Kelling 2013). 
Mainstream works often focus on establishing causal relationships adopting a 
pathological or deficit approach in which either an individual, a context or a situation 
are seen as the cause of crime – especially those categories of crimes that the State 
tends to focus on. These studies6 do not challenge power relations, social inequalities 
or authority. It is a version of criminology that justifies, enables or is made to fit in 
with the State’s definitions and purposes.  
As argued by David Sibley (1995) in Geographies of Exclusion, power 
relations determine the ideas and the types of knowledge that gain value, define what 
is accepted as knowledge and exclude what is seen as threatening. In line with this, 
the mainstream school of thought tends to deploy quantitative methods in a very 
narrow way, to suit State practice and dominant State definitions of deviance, and to 
theorise and justify them, oversimplifying social phenomena by selecting data to fit 
favoured models or interpretations (seeYoung 2011 for a wider discussion). This is 
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not to say that criminology does not need numerical analyses, but rather, as Young 
(2011) puts it, it should not be ‘restrained and defined by them’ (224). 
The managerial trend in policing observed in Pernambuco in the 2000s has 
been seen in the Anglo-Saxon world – for instance in the United Kingdom – since the 
1980s, and directed at all of the public sector, the police especially from the 1990s 
(Loader 1996) aiming to make these institutions more ‘business-like’. In this 
framework, the problem of police accountability has been superseded by a focus on 
effectiveness via the establishment of performance targets (ibid). Loader’s (1996) 
study of youth-police relations in Edinburgh critiqued the impacts of this 
managerialist turn: 
 
‘The managerialist turn – in policing and elsewhere – is part of a process in 
which the values associated with democratic citizenship such as justice, 
equality, representation and participation are marginalised, and public services 
are restructured and relegitimated according to administrative criteria of 
economy, efficiency and effectiveness’ (22)   
 
Loader revealed the implications of this trend for the democratic character of policing 
and for social groups who are marginalised from channels to influence police practice. 
He depicted the deterioration of youth-police relations, the under-protection of highly 
victimised groups of young people, and the excessive control of those groups. 
However, while Loader’s study in Edinburgh unveils an important critique of 
criminological developments – and the significance of police practices such as 
moving young people on from street corners due to petty disturbances and nuisance – 
it presents a situation that is markedly different from Brazil and the experiences of 
young people in Recife’s poor communities. This thesis examines the Brazilian case 
in detail and address gaps in the criminological literature, such as that pointed out by 
Loader (1996, 26) when he argued that the criminological literature had largely been 
concerned with studying juvenile delinquency and youth as trouble, and had little to 
say about young people as victims and as recipients of a public security service. 
Criminological literature has also, for the most part, neglected the developments, 
context, regional differences and the people of the Global South. The hierarchy of 
criminological knowledge production, like the social sciences more generally 7 
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(Connell 2007), has privileged ideas, theories, concepts and assumptions grounded in 
the particularities of the Global North (Carrington, Hogg, and Sozzo 2016). 
This thesis critiques mainstream criminological ideologies and theories and 
builds on a radical branch of criminology known as 'critical criminology', which 
emerged in opposition to mainstream, managerial or standard criminology. Critical 
criminology moves away from State-defined conceptualisations and narratives about 
crime, questioning official discourses and statistics or the ways in which data are 
created, defined and deployed for narrow purposes. It challenges dominant analyses 
of crime and criminal justice and is influenced by the work of socialist historians such 
as E. P. Thompson, Eric Hobsbawm, Christopher Hill and Sheila Rowbotham (Young 
2011), who emphasised the importance of ‘writing from below’ by voicing the 
material experiences of ordinary people instead of the hegemonic discourses and 
narratives from above. It focuses on the significance of voices from below and on 
scrutinising the discourses of the powerful. 
Critical criminology, also known as The New Criminology (Taylor, Walton, 
and Young 2013), was influenced by C. Wright Mills’ work The Sociological 
Imagination (1959), which stressed the importance of critical thinking, social 
structure and historical context. As argued by Young (2011), it developed the notion 
of the dyad, that is, the need to further knowledge beyond explaining deviancy, and 
also to theorise the reactions against deviance. The new criminology stresses the 
significance of the ‘silences’, the unspoken ideas hidden in the technocratic rhetoric 
of much criminological theory (ibid). It is a counter-narrative to conservatism, 
deconstructing rigid definitions, and narrow understandings in the field of 
criminology. The flourishing of critical criminological produced works too numerous 
to mention, but some examples are Stuart Hall’s Policing the Crisis (1978); Stanley 
Cohen’s Folk Devils and Moral Panics (1972); Nils Christie’s Crime Control as 
Industry (1993); David Garland’s The Culture of Control (2001); Nicholas Rose’s 
essay Government and Control (2000); Loic Wacquant’s Prisons of Poverty (2009); 
Jayne Mooney’s Gender, Violence and the Social Order (2000); John Lea’s Crime 
and Modernity (2002). 
This thesis contributes to this critical school of criminology by extending its 
debates to the Global South and by: 1) presenting a critique of the 
importation/exportation and adaptation of mainstream criminological theories; 2) 
addressing gaps in the literature, namely the fact that criminology has little to say 
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about policing and criminal-justice issues outside the Anglo-Saxon world and even 
less to say in relation to the lives and perspectives of young people in poor 
communities and how security issues and the security apparatus (not just the police 
but also informal extortion groups) affect and interact with them; 3) engaging with 
literature produced in Brazil that is of interest to criminologists and related to this 
research.  
As such, this thesis questions whether theory can be extrapolated from one 
region of the world to another, and it argues that while theory does ‘travel’ 
(particularly mainstream approaches), it does not necessarily make for a good guest – 
it might not prove to be very useful upon arrival – at least not in the case of Brazil. 
This story builds on a body of work about the increasing importation of political ideas 
and criminal justice policies from abroad (Garland 2001, Wacquant 1999), which is 
referred to as ‘policy transfer’ and is more widely used by political scientists (Jones 
and Newburn 2007). Criminological debates about policy transfer have focused on the 
US-European experience and to a lesser extent on Australian and Canadian cases 
(ibid), with few researchers focusing on the Latin American case (Blaustein 2016, 
Macaulay 2013). However, rather than focusing on the study of policy-making, or the 
process of policy transfer, this dissertation focuses on the effects or unintended 
consequences of these imported ideas on the field of crime control in Brazil. It is 
argued that the application of mainstream theories developed in the North have been 
counterproductive and detrimental to existing problems in Brazil, such as police 
violence, prison overcrowding, and the symbiotic relationship between prisoners and 
organised crime. 
1.4 Outline of the chapters 
The chapters that follow provide an initial scientific enquiry into the effects of new 
public security policies and the problem of violence in Recife. The chapters are 
outlined in the following way. Chapter 2 provides the background for the thesis, 
focusing on three key themes: the structural context of the study; the theoretical 
misconceptions of any direct connection between crime and poverty; and the 
theorisation of marginalisation. It also discusses the genesis and theoretical rationale 
of new security interventions in Pernambuco. Chapter 3 reviews the literature on 
drugs and violence that centralises institutional issues. Chapter 4 examines some of 
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the methodological approaches and their dilemmas. It explains the methods of data 
collection, including observations, interviews and focus groups with residents in two 
case study communities; and with police officers, public officials, and community 
activists across the city. Chapter 5 examines the promises, alleged strengths and 
weaknesses of Pacto pela Vida (PPV) by analysing documental and secondary data 
about its interventions and first-hand data from interviews with state actors directly 
involved with the implementation of PPV, including police officers and state officials 
(e.g. policy-makers, practitioners). While interviews with high-ranking government 
officials and high-ranking practitioners tended to elicit positive accounts of PPV, this 
section also begins to highlight police critiques of the programme and indeed some 
self-criticism on the part of the police themselves.  
Critiques of the security apparatus and its methods were most evident in 
interviews with low-ranking police officers explored in Chapter 6 and with civil 
society experts (such as community activists), explored in Chapter 8. Chapter 6 
focuses on this self-criticism by the police, highlighting issues around the inadequate 
and brutalising training and treatment of low-ranking officers. Chapter 7 provides 
some background information about the case study communities and examines 
themes emerging from interviews conducted at ‘the receiving end’ with young people 
and residents of low-income communities about security. These interviews focused on 
the impact of public security policies, insecurity, violence and perceptions of the 
police. This section epitomises the counter-arguments of resistance and disaffection 
with government policies and practices. Several contradictions, dilemmas and 
uncertainties permeate the narratives provided by the research participants.  
Chapter 8 further discusses some of the common themes emerging from both 
case study communities, including the coexistence of the drug trade with repressive 
policing; the existence of protection rackets and death squads; and the lack of police 
accountability and oversight. Chapter 8 explores these issues from the perspective of 
community residents and community activists, who were also interviewed, due to 
their knowledge about PPV and their role in mediating between the public (e.g. 
residents and young people in low-income communities) and state officials. These 
interviews focused on the development, practices, effects of and challenges to Pacto 
pela Vida. 
Chapter 9 offers some conclusions. It argues that security and public safety are 
contested fields of inquiry. Public safety and security interventions are experienced 
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and perceived in diverse ways, depending for example on one’s gender, social class 
and ethnicity. These diverse perceptions and experiences are rooted in existing and 
enduring social inequalities. It is salient that there are a number of disparities between 
what experts claim and what people in low-income communities say about security 
interventions. While government technocrats and academics associated with the 
development of PPV perceived the statistical reduction in homicides as a success, 
evidence from low-income communities showed a diverse set of problems with this 
project of state building8. Some issues were connected to the silences of the policy in 
relation to violence that does not necessarily lead to death, such as violence against 
women and rape, but also in connection to the type of policing that is provided in low-
income communities. The police’s practices and approach remain militarised, with 
residents complaining of abuses of human-rights abuses and disrespect; managerial 
reforms have not addressed long-standing issues related to the democratisation of 
policing; and youth and community relations with the police have not improved. 
Paradoxically, poor communities want more policing, just not the type of policing that 
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CHAPTER 2 – The Background 
 
Since the 1980s Brazil has seen a significant growth in urban violence, which placed 
the nation in the ranking of countries with the world’s highest homicide rates (Adorno 
and Salla 2007, Arias 2006, Goldstein 2003, Rangel and Bourgois 2005, Ratton et al. 
2011, Wacquant 2003, Zaluar 1998). This growth of lethal violence and of the fear it 
provokes have been one of the most alarming and devastating changes for Brazilian 
society since the 1980s. This thesis examines how public security policies aimed at 
addressing this violence have impacted on marginalised communities and poor young 
people in Recife. To contextualise the research, this chapter examines two significant 
sets of debates: (1) the literature about the concept of marginality and crime, and (2) 
the debates about violence that influenced the developers of new public security 
interventions. It argues that the genesis of the new security agendas is partly 
influenced by the context of high levels of armed violence in Pernambuco (mostly 
affecting marginalised groups) and partly by debates at times implicitly, at times 
explicitly, influenced by criminological theories of the Global North.  
Half of the world’s people under the age of 25 live in developing regions, such 
as Latin America, the region with the highest levels of youth homicide in the world 
(Pinheiro 2006). In 2004, Brazil’s rate of 27 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants placed 
it in fourth position out of 84 countries; and the homicide rate among adolescents and 
young people was much higher, at 57.1 homicides per 100,000 (UNESCO 2013). 
Homicide has become the leading cause of death in Brazil for young people and 
indeed the country ranks as the sixth most dangerous in the world for the young 
(Waiselfisz 2011). Murder accounts for approximately one in every three deaths of 
young people in Brazil (Rangel and Bourgois 2005). Even more concerning, is the 
disproportionate percentage of black and mulato (mixed ethnicity) young people who 
are murdered. In 2002, the state of Pernambuco had the second highest homicide rate 
of black and mulato youth in the country: 71.4 per cent of victims of homicides in the 
state were young (aged 15-24) and not white (Waiselfisz 2004, Rangel and Bourgois 
2005). Although by 2012 the rate of homicide among black and mulato youth had 
declined by over 30% from 161.6/100,000 in 2002, it was still high at 112.2/100,000 
(Waiselfisz 2014). 
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Low-income communities have been disproportionately affected by this 
violence and by the drug trade. These communities have become attractive locales for 
the drug trade, providing spaces for large shipments to be broken down into smaller 
packages before either being sold locally or trafficked to other parts of the globe. This 
is because of their narrow alleys and multiple hiding spaces, alongside a high 
proportion of unemployed and out-of-school young people – all of which make an 
ideal setting for the establishment of underground economies (Arias 2006, 53, 
Perlman 2010). According to sociologist and former president Fernando Henrique 
Cardoso, thirty years ago the main fear in the lives of people living in informal 
communities (e.g. favelas) was fear of displacement and eviction. Now, they mostly 
fear for their lives, ‘never knowing when they may be caught in the crossfire of drug 
gang violence or shot indiscriminately during a police raid’ (see Perlman 2010, X).  
This chapter begins by examining the socioeconomic context in which these 
phenomena take place. Second, the chapter scrutinises some of the theoretical 
connections made between marginality and violence. Third, it synthesises key 
analytical debates about the relationship between poverty and crime in Brazilian 
public security studies. The final section of this chapter examines the ways in which 
the local material context coupled with broader discourses about crime control 
influenced the emergence of a new public security programme in Pernambuco. 
2.1 Context 
A large part of Brazil’s population lives in squatter settlements, in conditions either of 
poverty or extreme poverty (Perlman 2010). However, in the 2000s, the country 
experienced drops in poverty and extreme poverty. The proportion of people living 
below the extreme poverty line (R$70, seventy Brazilian reais per month per capita, 
equivalent to $1.25 per day) fell from 4.2% in 2011 to 3.6% in 2012, when 6.5 million 
Brazilians lived in this situation (IPEA 2013).  
In a recent study IPEA considered 4 different poverty lines: two refer to the 
UN Millennium Development goals (US$1.25 and US$2 per person per day) and the 
other two refer to the income that entitles a person to conditional cash transfers in 
Brazil (R$70 and R$140 monthly, from July 2011). According to these four lines of 
measurement poverty declined between 1992 and 2012, as shown in the graph below: 
 
Roxana Pessoa Cavalcanti 
 25 
Percentage of the population living in poverty, 1992-2012 
  
Source: IPEA (2013, 17). The four categories are: blue – poverty defined as living on 
under $1.25 a day; red – living on under $2 a day; green – extreme poverty; black – 
overall poverty.  
  
The north and northeast of Brazil are widely known to be the poorest and least 
developed parts of Brazil, with higher concentrations of poverty. These are significant 
socio-economic aspects when situating a study conducted in under-studied regions 
(Garmany 2011b). As Garmany points out, while most Brazilian studies and Brazilian 
theories are developed in the Rio de Janeiro-São Paulo corridor, these cities are the 
exception and have contrasting contexts in comparison with the majority of Brazil. 
The theories developed outside Brazil and in the more developed southeast of the 
country are not necessarily representative or applicable to the northeast context. The 
state of Pernambuco, where the fieldwork for this study was conducted, has deeper 
structural issues than the southeast, with larger proportions of its population living in 
poverty and low incomes. Data from the World Bank illustrate this issue: 
 
‘Despite being the second largest economy in Northeast Brazil, Pernambuco 
lags behind the rest of the country. In 2010, the Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) per capita was US$ 5,411, half the national average, and the share of 
the population below the poverty line was twice that of Brazil as a whole.’ 
(World Bank 2013) 
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Income inequality also remains widespread throughout Brazil. According to Rocha 
(2003), in the 1990s, the richest quintile of Brazil’s population earned thirty times 
more than the poorest fifth. Although there have been improvements insofar as this 
ratio has become less unequal (in 2007 it reduced to 20 instead of 30 times) income 
inequality remains high and half of the country’s total income is concentrated in the 
pockets of the richest ten per cent of the population (Perlman 2010, 48-49). Brazil 
continues to be one of the most polarised countries in the world in terms of income 
(ibid, 151). So even though the country experienced mild declines in income 
inequality in the 2000s, inequality remains high (IPEA 2013, 9). While the richest 1% 
in Brazil earned R$10,891 reais per month per capita in 2012 (approximately £2,871), 
the monthly income of the poorest 40% was R$241.81 per capita (roughly £63.54) 
(see table 1 below). The latter income, R$241 reais per month, is simply insufficient 
to cover basic needs, such as adequate shelter, food, health, education and transport 
costs for one person.  
 
Table 1: Household income per capita by section of the population 
        Average income in Reais (R$)  Annual income variation (%) 
 1992 2002 2012 1992/2002 2002/2012 2011/2012 
Richest  
1% 
6,217.01 8,133.86 10,891.49     2.72    2.96    16.11 
Richest  
5% 
3,070.02 4,075.25 5,178.37     2.87    2.42    9.43 
Poorest 
40% 
101.25 130.31 241.81     2.55    6.38    9.87 
Source: adapted from IPEA (2013), data from PNAD 2012, 2002, 2011 and 2012 
Note: Rural areas in the north region were excluded (except for Tocantins) 
 
Another important socio-economic concern, as illustrated by Kingstone and Comin 
(2013), is deindustrialisation in Brazil. Scholars have argued that some Brazilian 
cities have moved from a manufacturing based economy to a service and knowledge-
based system (e.g. Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo, see Perlman 2010; Feltran 2011). 
According to these academics, this has had large implications for the unskilled 
population, who have become increasingly reliant on the informal economy, not only 
because of decreasing industrial jobs, but also because they face discrimination when 
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competing for jobs and lack the education and skills necessary to compete for service 
sector jobs. 
Added to the problems of poverty, inequality, and labour informality is 
inadequate public education provision. The quality of public education provided 
especially in low-income communities has been an enduring problem in Brazil 
(Marschner 2013). Most Brazilians are well aware that the quality of State-provided 
education is a far cry from what is necessary to obtain approval in university entrance 
examinations. In this context, private school becomes ‘the gateway to university and 
professional jobs’ (Perlman 2010, 4). This places severe barriers to the social mobility 
of, and access to professional and high skilled jobs for those most economically 
disadvantaged populations who cannot pay for private schooling, making 
underground economies more appealing or accessible as a source of income. This 
context is a defining factor in analyses of violence and security in these places 
(Feltran 2011, Perlman 2010). 
 This thesis is as much about the impact of public security policies on poor 
youth, as it is about urban life at the margins in the Global South. Most of Brazil’s 
population lives in cities and large sections of this urban population live in informal 
communities. The country has one of the world’s highest urban populations, its cities 
account for 90% of GDP and contain half of its poor (WorldBank 2006). Recife, one 
of the largest Brazilian metropolitan regions, has followed the rapid urban growth 
trend seen in most of Brazil with high growth rates in the post-World War II period 
followed by a gradual decline in growth from the 1970s to the present. Recife’s 
population more than quintupled in the latter part of the twentieth century (see Table 
2 below). 
Data from the 2010 census show that nearly 11.5 million people (11,425,644 
people) live in informal settlements in Brazil (5.57% of the total population). The vast 
majority of this population (59.3%, a total of 6,780,071 people) is concentrated in the 
metropolitan regions of São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Belém, Salvador and Recife. This 
study was conducted in two low-income communities, considered informal 
settlements in the official government discourse, in Recife’s metropolitan region. 
These settlements are located in areas prone to significant geographical and spatial 
disadvantages that cause difficulties in residents’ lives and in the provision of 
security.  
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Population of Brazil’s metropolitan regions in 1950 and 2000 with estimates for 2007 
(regions ranked by size in 2000). Adapted from Perlman (2010) 
 Population  














São Paulo 2,334 17,099 7.33 19,226 1.12 
Rio de 
Janeiro 
2,950 10,803 3.66 11,381 1.05 
Belo 
Horizonte 
412 4,659 11.31 4,925 1.06 
Porto Alegre 488 3,505 7.18 3,897 1.11 
Recife 661 3,230 4.89 3,655 1.13 
Salvador 403 2,968 7.36 3,599 1.21 
Fortaleza 264 2,875 10.89 3,437 1.20 
Brasília 36 2,746 76,28 3,508 1.28 
Curitiba 158 2,494 15,78 3,125 1.25 
Table 2: Population of Brazil’s metropolitan regions.  
Largest Brazilian metropolitan areas. Source: IBGE (2011) censo 2010 
RANK Metropolitan Area State Population 
1 São Paulo São Paulo 19,889,559 
2 Rio de Janeiro Rio de Janeiro 11,902,701 
3 Belo Horizonte Minas Gerais 5,397,438 
4 Porto Alegre Rio Grande do Sul 4,200,413 
5 Recife Pernambuco 4,150,004 
Table 3: Largest Brazilian metropolitan regions.  
Most of the Recife’s Metropolitan Region (RMR) is flat and has a tendency to high 
rainfall, so floods are not uncommon and residents in these communities often face 
difficulties in moving around the city, with some of them even loosing their homes 
during the rainy season. There are few hills in the RMR, but those areas also suffer 
during heavy rain, for example, from the risk of mudslides. Around 45% of the 
households can only be accessed on foot, by bicycle or by motorbike through 
alleyways; an environment often disliked by police patrols. However, unlike in Rio de 
Janeiro and São Paulo (where most studies about violence and security have been 
focused), the vast majority of these communities in Recife’s metropolitan region are 
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concentrated in small and medium-sized geographical areas (IBGE 2011, 77), as 
shown in the map below (Figure 2), which somewhat facilitates access to these 
communities. 
Inadequate housing is one of the most visible social problems in urban Brazil. 
At the federal and state level, housing programmes have been limited and recent 
interventions such as the programmes Favela-Bairro and Minha Casa Minha Vida 
have made a very small dent in terms of addressing the housing gap (McCann 2008, 
67-68). Informal settlements that have existed for over a century, since the end of 
slavery (Zaluar and Alvito 2006) remain one of the main forms of housing for a large 
proportion of Brazil’s population. Whichever way these communities are labelled 
(low-income communities, periferias, or favelas) they are difficult to pigeonhole, 
classify and define.  
 
 
Figure 2: Map of informal settlements in RMR. Source: IBGE (2011) 
For Perlman (2010), the single most salient distinction between favelas and the rest of 
the city is the stigma attached to the people who inhabit them. This stigma is 
associated with living in a space that is defined as undesirable: a place where the 
quality of schools and education is precarious, where many people report having no 
leisure activities and where access to services is insufficient to fulfil basic social 
needs (Perlman 2010, 104). Furthermore, favela residents are increasingly 
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criminalised, portrayed as ‘bandits’ and persecuted by police, although often merely 
on the basis of criminal stereotypes (Feltran 2011).  
Unsurprisingly, residents describe well-grounded mistrust of government and 
public institutions. There has not been a sustained commitment to promoting peace 
and public services in favelas (Perlman 2010, 118), and so residents have had to come 
up with creative responses to adversity, including through political bargaining via 
community associations (Arias 2006), the few benefits of precarious employment and 
the provision of a variety of informal, sometimes illegal (e.g. drugs), products and 
services (Zaluar 2004a). The next section examines the existing debate about the 
interconnections of marginalisation, violence and security. 
2.2 Violence and marginalisation 
High levels of violence, the associated marginalisation of stigmatised territories and 
greater fear of violent death are three of the most dramatic changes in Latin America 
post-democratization. A recent ethnographic study by Saunders-Hastings (2013) 
shared familiar themes with studies conducted in Brazilian cities (cf. Perlman 2010; 
Zaluar 2010 in Rio de Janeiro). Saunders-Hastings (2013) argued that violence and 
extortion in Guatemala have become more widespread and unpredictable. Gangs have 
become more established in the country, and firearms have become more easily 
accessible. As a consequence, residents of the most affected communities have found 
it harder to deploy strategies to avoid violence. They describe a loss of trust and social 
unity in the community. They also face discrimination, stigma, reduced job 
opportunities outside the community and decreased economic opportunities within it. 
All of these factors perpetuate the cycle of violence by encouraging more young 
people to seek protection and financial gains in gangs and in the criminal economy.  
The inability or unwillingness of the Brazilian state to provide public security 
in favelas has led to a deterioration of trust, community unity, freedom of movement 
and social capital (Perlman 2010). Perlman’s original ethnographic book, The Myth of 
Marginality (1976), challenged the dominant ideology that conflated poverty with 
criminality and that portrayed the urban poor as only ‘marginal’, outside or irrelevant 
to the system of production9. The book was a critique of development theories of the 
1960s that had deployed the concept of marginality in academic and public policy 
discourse to depict the poor as immoral, deficient, responsible for their own poverty 
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and unable to become integrated into the formal labour and housing markets. In the 
1970s, this victim-blaming ideology had been deployed to justify favela removal and 
today in Brazil the term ‘marginal’ is still commonly used to mean ‘criminal’. 
Perlman (1976, 2010) contested this pathological view of the poor, that is, the notion 
that they are socially disorganised breeding grounds of crime, violence, prostitution 
and family breakdown. Nevertheless, even some academics still deploy the term 
‘marginal’ to refer to offenders, for instance see the evaluation of the security 
programme Fica Vivo by Beato Filho (2013, 7-8). Thirty years after her original 
study, Perlman (2010) relocated and re-studied her original random sample of 
participants and found some dramatic changes, many of which were fuelled by the 
increase in violence. People were not ‘marginal’ to the system but they felt more 
marginalised than ever.  
Since the time of these original critiques in the 1960s and 1970s, the term 
‘marginality’ has been deconstructed, re-constructed and returned to academic 
discourse in the 1990s, starting with an article by Wacquant (1996). Wacquant 
developed the concept of ‘advanced marginality’ to describe how global capitalism in 
recent years has provoked the warehousing in prisons and territorial segregation of 
groups of the population who are seen as irrelevant to the city. In the United States, 
for the most part this refers to the black ghettos and in Europe to impoverished and 
migrant communities. Wacquant argued that this new form of marginalisation that 
emerged in post-industrial societies, symbolised by the interfaces of colour, class and 
place, generates new stigmas, forms of dependency on welfare, long-term joblessness 
and territories of urban relegation. He argues that the current dynamics of global 
capitalism enable social inequality to persist in a context of economic prosperity. His 
thesis is that in the time of neoliberal capitalism, social welfare has been rolled back 
while punitive and criminalising aspects of the State have been rolled forward.  
However, as a case study, Brazil does not fit neatly into Wacquant’s concept 
of advanced marginality for a variety of reasons. Brazil never had a well-developed 
welfare state that could be rolled back. In fact in recent years, there has been an 
increase in state investments in welfare, particularly in the form of conditional cash 
transfers such as Bolsa Família (Hall 2008, Molyneaux 2008). Despite these recent 
improvements, Brazil has suffered from high levels of inequality over decades (pre 
and post-neoliberalism). Deindustrialisation has been geographically uneven; some 
European and North American countries have seen the outward migration of 
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manufacturing industries, while the countries referred to as BRICS (Brazil, Russia, 
India, China and South Africa) have received an influx of investment and industrial 
development in recent years (Naudé, Szirmai, and Lavopa 2013). Furthermore, most 
households in favelas contain active people in the labour market (Perlman 2010). 
Thus Brazilian favelas are not the jobless ghettos that they may appear to be. 
Wacquant proposes that ‘advanced marginality’ is characterised by spatial and 
racial segregation, the stigmatisation of territories and a diminishing sense of 
community life.  While some of these characteristics are visible in Brazilian favelas, 
particularly the stigmatisation of residents and a diminishing sense of community life 
as a result of the fear of violence (Perlman 2010, Zaluar 2013), it is important to note 
that favelas, the peripheries and/or low-income communities in Brazil are highly 
heterogeneous places. For example, in Rio de Janeiro favelas are racially mixed, with 
almost half of all residents identifying themselves as white, 30% as mulato (mixed 
‘race’) and 20% as black (Zaluar 2013). This is not to say that these demographics are 
matched in the rest of the city, but they do indicate that favelas are not racial ghettos. 
Furthermore, although there is a higher concentration of low-income communities in 
Brazilian peripheral urban areas, favelas in cities like Rio and Recife are spread 
across the city instead of being concentrated in one area.  
Perlman’s conclusions support a conceptualisation of marginalisation as a 
state of exclusion, human tragedy and limited opportunities for a fulfilling life. The 
lives of the poor have been increasingly devalued in the context of drug and arms 
traffic, their mortality rates are far higher in comparison with the rest of the city and 
this new violence is ‘the ultimate manifestation of the marginalisation of the poor, the 
reality of marginality’ (Perlman 2010, 162). It is in this sense, that this thesis deploys 
the terminology marginalised. Yet while the terms ‘trapped’ and marginalisation 
convey some of the living realities of many Brazilians, they fail to allow for an 
analysis of agency and heterogeneity. These are some of the aspects of the dynamic 
interactions in neighbourhoods of relegation that this study captures in the context of 
Recife. 
2.3 Violence, crime and poverty nexus: mistaken theories  
Much of the discussion about violence in Brazil in the 1980s and 1990s was centred 
on the debate about the correlation between poverty and crime. A review of this 
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Brazilian literature can benefit from a discussion of the work of key academics, such 
as Alba Zaluar, Michel Misse and Luis Eduardo Soares – all of whom have conducted 
research in Rio de Janeiro. It is important to examine some of the theoretical 
frameworks that have already been developed in this field, including the causes of 
violence and its potential connections– or lack of – with poverty, so as to make 
possible an analysis of public security interventions that are intended to address these 
problems. Moreover, this thesis shows that these debates about the connections 
between poverty and crime remain central in the public sphere and in the narratives of 
members of the public security system as seen in Chapters 5 and 6. 
There is a body of research that shows an implicit connection (albeit not a 
casual connection) between poverty and crime, insofar as it reveals that homicide 
rates are higher in low-income communities and that most victims of homicide are 
poor young black and mixed-race males (Waiselfisz 2014, Zaluar 1999). However, 
most Brazilian academics rejected the thesis that poverty and crime or poverty and 
urban violence are directly correlated or even that there is a causal relationship 
between poverty and violence10 (Adorno and Bordini 1989, Coelho 1978, Misse 1995, 
2011a, Paixão 1982, 1983, Zaluar 1994, 2004a). 
These academics argue that there are no empirical grounds for explaining 
violence as the consequence of poverty per se. They suggest that the popular 
discourse that associates violence with poverty is based on a stereotype of poor 
populations, which criminalises poverty. This does not mean that there is no 
connection between poverty and crime, or that the connection is only a stereotype. 
Moreover, they rightly point out that crime happens among all social classes, although 
there is historical evidence that certain populations tend to be targeted and designated 
as ‘criminal’. Causality is difficult to establish and there are numerous compounding 
factors that cannot always be accurately controlled for (e.g. gender, accessibility of 
firearms, opportunities to commit crime). The paradox of rising crime, for instance, in 
the 2000s when economic conditions have improved and poverty levels decreased in 
Brazil, although not central to this thesis, illustrates the complexity of this debate and 
the invalidity of any simplistic causal association of poverty with criminality11.  
This theoretical debate of discourses that directly link poverty and crime, led 
to the challenge of the idea that without significantly reducing poverty and inequality, 
public security interventions could not succeed in reducing violence (Soares 2000, 
Ratton 2012). This contestation seeks to avoid determinism and defeatist approaches, 
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since addressing poverty and inequality could take a lifetime while there are other 
shorter-term measures that can be taken to curb violence, such as increasing the 
control of firearms.  
Rather than directly linking poverty to violence, researchers have emphasised 
the multifaceted and complex causes of various forms of violence and the 
connections, for example, since the 1980s between the proliferation of firearms and 
the increasing rates of violence in Brazil (Briceño-León and Zubillaga 2002, Beato 
and Marinho 2007, Dreyfus, Lessing, and Purcena 2005, Rangel and Bourgois 2005).  
 
‘Firearm-related mortality in Brazil has increased significantly for all age 
groups since 1991, but death rates due to firearms have risen the most among 
children and adolescents aged 10 to 19. In 1991, 55.7% of homicides 
involving 15–19-year-olds were firearm-related, while in 2000 the proportion 
amounted to 77%. In the state capitals with the highest adolescent firearm-
related mortality rates (between 102 and 222 per 100,000), rates are 5 to 11 
times those of the overall rate for all age groups’ (Pinheiro 2006, 302). 
 
In the state of Pernambuco, in 2002, the proportion of deaths of young people caused 
by homicide was over 50%, a rate of 111.3/100,000 (Cerqueira, Lobao, and Carvalho 
2007). For some academics, the expansion of the global economy, revolutions and 
improvements in technology, transportation and communication, and free-market 
reforms such as deregulation, privatisation, and liberalisation, have all heightened 
opportunities for legal and illegal international economic activities and consequently 
enhanced the flow of illegal goods and services (Penglase 2008, 121), including 
firearms and drugs. The growth of the international trade in firearms has increased the 
likelihood of people resorting to armed violence to settle private disputes (Kruijt and 
Koonings 1999).  
It was in this context of high levels of armed violence that debates about the 
aetiology of this phenomenon and about what needs to be done to curb it emerged. 
Such debates concerned with how best to control crime – whether through long-term 
structural changes (such as poverty reduction) or short-term measures (such as 
controlling firearms) – set the milieu in which a new security programme was 
developed in the state of Pernambuco. The next section examines the genesis of, and 
theoretical influences behind, this security programme.   
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2.4 The adaptation of criminological theories from the Global North 
‘Public policies result from a mix of leadership intention, bureaucratic 
groping, organisational slippage, practical trial-and-error and electoral 
profiteering’ (Wacquant 2012, 252) 
 
This section explores the context in which the emergence of the programme of police 
reform and public security Pact for Life (PPV) took place. The section also examines 
PPV’s inherent theoretical influences, highlighting some of the ‘electoral 
profiteering’, as Wacquant puts it, associated with it.  
Pernambuco’s case is worth examining for a number of reasons, not least 
because, putting aside all the issues of quantification12, this state accounts for a large 
proportion of Brazil’s and the world’s homicides. In 2005, approximately 10% of the 
world’s homicides – 47,578 deaths – happened in Brazil (DATASUS 2015). In 2007, 
approximately 10% of Brazil’s homicides happened in Pernambuco: a total of 4,592 
deaths (ibid). PPV was created with the aim of reducing these extraordinarily high 
levels of homicide in the state of Pernambuco. It was launched in 2007, when violent 
mortality was at its highest in this state.  
Government data show a gradual decrease in homicide rates in this state 
between 2008 and 2013. The average homicide rate in the state of Pernambuco 
between the years 2000 and 2005 was 54.13/100,000 (DATASUS 2015) then it 
dropped to 46.67/100,000 between the years 2006 and 2011 (ibid). To provide a 
context for comparison, Pernambuco’s average homicide rate was over five times 
higher than the world average homicide rate in the year 2000, which was 8.8/100,000 
(Bailey and Dammert 2006). For high-income countries the average homicide rate 
was 2.9; for low and middle-income countries it was 10.1 (ibid). Although focusing 
on homicide figures does not provide a complete understanding of crime and 
violence, these figures illustrate the gravity of these issues in Brazil and suggest an 
important decline in lethal crime in tandem with the implementation of PPV.  
PPV has become a high-profile intervention for the reduction of homicides. It 
received international awards from the Inter-American Development Bank in 2014 
and from the United Nations in 2013 (see Ribeiro 2014, GEPE 2013) as well as 
extensive media coverage in Brazil. Its creators and supporters have travelled to other 
states in Brazil and other countries in Latin America to share their expertise. It has 
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been promoted as a model by Brazil’s federal public security secretariat (SENASP) 
and some Brazilian states have developed programmes inspired by it, for instance 
Pará, Bahia and Alagoas (Macedo 2012). The intervention was one of the main 
marketing points in the political campaign of the state governor of Pernambuco 
Eduardo Campos (2007-2014), who was also a candidate in the 2014 presidential 
elections. As argued by Wolff (2014), highly publicised reductions in violent crime 
associated with PPV facilitated Campos’ re-election for a second term in office and 
launched his political career at the national level13.  
Despite the historical, political, social and discursive significance of PPV, 
very few studies have examined its impact. Ratton (see Ratton, Galvão, and 
Fernandez 2014) – an academic who was involved with the development of PPV, 
while employed as advisor to Eduardo Campos, and who therefore is not a fully 
independent evaluator – has published a small-scale study (N= 25) focusing on the 
views of actors involved in the policy’s development at the government and civil 
society level. He portrays a very positive image of the policy that he was involved in 
designing, claiming PPV is a ‘success’ 14  (ibid, 26).  This thesis presents an 
independent analysis of PPV drawing on the experiences of marginalised people in 
Recife, especially (albeit not exclusively) the young. The thesis analyses the effects 
(intended and unintended) of this new security programme, enabling a deeper 
discussion of the hegemonic discourse of success. 
Nóbrega (2012) and Wolff (2014) have dedicated very small sections in their 
studies to PPV and have not gone into much depth in their analysis of the program. 
Macedo (2012) has conducted the most extensive critical study of PPV so far, 
focusing on the governance of the policy. She attended PPV-related official meetings 
and interviewed policy-makers and actors involved with the project. However, none 
of these studies examined the underlying theories that inform PPV’s ideologies or the 
discourses of state actors and civil society actors in recipient communities in any 
depth. Neither did they examine the wider impacts of changes in policing with the 
implementation of PPV. This dissertation addresses this gap in the literature. 
The genesis and theoretical rationale of PPV 
The governor of the state of Pernambuco, Eduardo Campos (2007-2014) contracted a 
sociologist from the federal university of Pernambuco (UFPE), Professor José Luiz 
Ratton, to work as his public security advisor. Between March and April 2007, an 
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initial set of consultations and events was organised as part of a forum of public 
security (Fórum Estadual de Segurança Pública) where the topic of public security 
was debated and the plan that informed PPV was drawn up. ). For Ratton, Galvão, and 
Fernandez (2014, 2) PPV was the first institutional reform of the Pernambucan police. 
They describe in more detail the process of developing the policy. The initial security 
plan proposed over one hundred projects (PESP-PE 2007) organised into six lines of 
action: ‘qualified repression; institutional enhancement; information and knowledge 
management; training and capacity-building; crime and social violence prevention; 
and democratic management’ (Ratton, Galvão, and Fernandez 2014, 2). However, 
only some of those were implemented. The interviews and observations in the 
communities studied revealed that the social crime prevention measures initially 
proposed and the mediation of conflicts in communities (PESP-PE 2007, 124) do not 
seem to have been implemented. These are significant issues that future research 
could examine. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to examine why such projects had 
not yet been implemented. The implemented changes focused, for the most part, on 
the governance of police work (interview with Ratton, July 2013, see also Macedo 
2012).  
In two separate interviews in July 2013, sociologists involved with the design 
of PPV explained that the rationale for the programme emerged from successful 
homicide reduction programmes implemented elsewhere, such as Bogotá, Minas 
Gerais and New York. A book edited by Veloso and Ferreira (2008a) based on a 
seminar in Rio de Janeiro in 2007 about what violence reduction programmes work 
around the world, puts forward the idea that cities such as Bogotá, Medellín, Minas 
Gerais, New York and São Paulo have experienced reductions in homicide because of 
the implementation of new security policies based on managerial police reforms (p. 
18, p. 20). The authors clearly state their admiration and support for police 
performance management programmes such as COMPSTAT from New York (p. 26-
28).  
Proponents of managerialism in Brazil, unlike those in the US and UK, are 
among critical social scientists from the ‘left’ who also propose ideas around social 
justice. They perceive managerial reforms not only as a tool to reduce violence, but 
also to make police accountable to the most disadvantaged sectors of society (Soares 
2008, 12-15). Whether the latter is possible through those means – managerial police 
reforms – is yet unclear in practice. This thesis will consider whether these proposals 
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are well founded. In particular, Chapter 5 discusses the New York miracle and 
research that challenges crime reduction claims grounded in COMPSTAT, managerial 
reforms, Broken Windows theory and Zero Tolerance policing. This is not to say that 
managerial reforms have no value, but rather that they have limits and risks.  
The Minas Gerais programme known as Stay Alive, for example, was 
explicitly influenced by US violence-reduction programmes, such as Operation 
Ceasefire and hotspot policing (Beato Filho 2013, 1 and 5). Nonetheless, it combined 
managerial police reforms with important social crime prevention measures (e.g. 
youth sports programmes and conflict mediation). PPV’s design also has clear 
similarities with US homicide reduction programmes, including similarities with the 
(in)famous American police performance management programme known as 
COMPSTAT (Macedo 2012). For instance, both the New York programme and PPV 
territorialised police work by enforcing responsibility for policing particular 
geographical areas. In the PPV case, these areas are known as AIS (Áreas Integradas 
de Segurança) and the state of Pernambuco now has 26 of them. Other similarities are 
the emphasis placed on police performance targets, monitoring levels of homicide and 
demanding reductions. This does not mean a clear and simple re-production of US 
models but rather the emulation of some aspects of these security programmes.  
Ratton’s academic work before the initial design of PPV was influenced by 
situational crime prevention (SCP) theories (Ratton et al. 2011). The situational 
approach that he adopts, which emerged initially in the work of Felson (2002) and 
Clarke and Felson (2004) in the Global North, focuses on perceived environmental 
causes of crime such as increased opportunities for crime (as defined by the State) and 
has been widely criticised by theoretical criminology on a number of grounds (see 
Raymen 2015 for an extensive review). As Raymen puts it, the majority of these 
critiques pull to pieces the idea of the wholly rational criminal actor, questioning the 
foundations of classical criminology on which these notions are centered (p. 1). SCP 
approaches offer ‘false promises of their ability to control much crime and deviance’ 
(ibid).  
According to Ratton et al. (2011) traditional studies about violence and 
homicide have focused on the individual characteristics of perpetrators and victims, 
leaving aside important interactional and situational factors. He rightly argues that 
individualistic analyses are unable to account for temporal and spatial changes in the 
context of high rates of lethal violence and that such analyses fail to explain why 
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certain homicide situations are more common than others. While these are valid 
criticisms of individualistic causal accounts, Ratton’s emphasis on situational factors 
does also neglect important aspects of the theorisation of violence and homicide.  
The study conducted by Ratton et al. (2011) was based on an analysis of 78 
homicide inquéritos (police investigation registers) between 2002 and 2007, and 
argued that, among other things, in over 88% of cases victims and perpetrators were 
known to each other. There is a clear bias in the study in that it deployed only data 
produced by the police (homicide investigation registers). The study argued that 
homicides in Recife happen more often in routine daily interactions in socially 
disorganised and deprived environments; it most frequently involves young males 
(93% of victims were male and 98% of perpetrators were male) who are black or 
mixed, know each other and have easy access to firearms; and more often occurs at 
night, at weekends, in public spaces. The key motivation is the resolution of conflicts 
through violence, invariably using a firearm and resulting in the death of at least one 
of the individuals involved. 
A significant limitation of the study is that it does not consider the impact of 
institutional factors on the ‘diagnosis’ of homicide. Firstly, while many homicide 
cases may occur between people who know each other, it is important to acknowledge 
that these data look at cases where a suspect was identified and sometimes convicted. 
As such, it neglects data and cases where the police were unable or unwilling to 
adequately identify the accused. Easy-to-accuse and ‘usual suspects’ are more likely 
to be included in the data.  
Secondly, such interactional studies fail to acknowledge the structural, 
institutional and systemic disparities that contribute to their conclusions. They make 
claims of a diagnosis of where and who the victims and perpetrators of homicide are, 
concluding that these are mostly poor young males. They claim to reveal how and 
when these homicides occur. However, most cases of homicides are not resolved, so 
the actual groups of perpetrators are difficult to label. The evidence emerging from 
police records is also unlikely to suggest that the police perpetrated most homicides. 
Moreover, inequalities in the field of security can fuel a cycle of ‘rough justice’, 
vigilantism and vengeance for those who cannot access formal means of justice. 
While educated middle- and upper-class individuals in Brazil often benefit from 
private security15 and better access to the formal justice system, the poor and less 
educated are left to provide security and conflict resolution with ‘their own hands’. 
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These dynamics reveal, among other issues, a lack of adequate public security 
provision. That is not to say that it is the middle-class that is responsible for crimes 
such as homicide, but rather that, situational studies can portray a blame-the-victim 
view, failing to acknowledge the significance of unequal security provision.  
When justice is administered, the overwhelming use of the prison as a form of 
punishment tends to exacerbate inequalities and social exclusion through the 
application of the law against the poorest, most marginalised and stigmatised groups 
in society (Cavadino, Dignan, and Mair 2013, Wacquant 2009). Non-violent means of 
conflict resolution and restorative justice (Braithwaite 1989, 2002, 2004) are therefore 
important parts of any intervention that aims to reduce violence without generating 
more prison overcrowding and more social inequality.  
The initial plan of public security in Pernambuco proposed some conflict 
resolution programmes (PESP-PE 2007, 124) but it is unclear whether such projects 
were implemented, at least according to interviews with members of the public 
security system, as will be seen in Chapter 5. Instead of proving conflict resolution, 
the situational crime prevention approach is centred on state interventions such as 
increased surveillance through CCTV cameras and increased policing and control of 
those marginalised populations perceived as criminal. As such, it ignores important 
definitional limitations of crime: the adopted definitions do not focus on the crimes 
perpetrated by the State and the powerful (such as police abuse of force or deaths 
caused at work). The criminal is perceived as a rational actor who has calculated the 
risks against the gains of committing criminal actions, thus the emotive (bravado, 
anger, impulsivity and immaturity) and uncalculated aspects of crime explored in 
other studies (Drybread 2014, Hayward 2007, Katz 1988, Lyng 1990) are neglected.  
The interventions that are justified under the situational crime prevention 
framework have had perverse social control effects elsewhere (Raymen 2015). These 
include the reproduction of inequalities in the criminal justice system, as seen in the 
overrepresentation of poor people in prisons, the deterioration or continuation of poor 
police-community relations, the displacement of certain crimes to areas that are 
unsupervised, to the further disadvantage of the most marginalised groups.  
Some studies address the limitations of situational and managerial criminology 
by engaging with the cultural and emotive aspects that lead a conflict to result in 
death. These include attempts to maintain a sense of masculine honour (Bourgois 
2003, Drybread 2014, Polk 1994, Zaluar 2010) and fear of victimisation when faced 
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with a situation where all those involved are armed, leading one of the individuals to 
‘pull the trigger’ first (Wilkinson and Fagan 2001). In such circumstances violence 
and fear become key elements of daily life, a currency of survival (Fagan and 
Wilkinson 1998, Zubillaga 2009, Rodgers 2009) and one means by which people 
negotiate their place and identity. Managerial criminology, and its emphasis on target 
monitoring, surveillance and arrests, is not able to capture or address these cultural 
and emotive aspects of a society with high levels of violence.  
Monitoring police statistics and focusing on performance evaluations based 
solely on statistics fail to acknowledge the profoundly socially constructed nature of 
what is defined as a crime and who is defined as a criminal, a critique which is well 
elaborated by Young (2011). Statistical counts (even when they emerge from 
victimisation surveys) often fail to capture harmful practices (Raymen 2015, 14) and 
hidden crimes such corporate crimes, domestic violence and police misconduct. 
Social constructions of criminals tend to reinforce conventional stereotypes and the 
criminalisation of those perceived as undeserving ‘others’ (Garland 2001, 175)16.  
These criticisms of the theoretical rationale underpinning PPV do not mean 
that there were no positive aspects of this public security programme. The emphasis 
on monitoring certain police targets offers potential benefits to society as a whole. For 
example, PPV monitors firearms apprehensions by police, which encourages the 
control of firearms. As firearms are widely acknowledged as a key element in the 
increase of lethal violence (Cavalcanti 2016, Dreyfus, Lessing, and Purcena 2005, 
Rangel and Bourgois 2005, Squires 2000), this aspect of PPV can be seen as having 
beneficial effects to society. The same could not be said about PPV’s emphasis on 
monitoring the amount of drugs apprehended by police. The latter tends to reinforce 
issues associated with the war on drugs, such as old problems of criminalisation of the 
marginalised, while having no proven effect on the reduction of violence (Simon 
2007).   
 A key limitation of the few criminological and public security studies, 
including those conducted in Pernambuco such as Ratton et al.’s (2011), is the lack of 
consideration of the ways in which institutional inadequacy in the public security 
system and the type of policing provided, can affect the dynamics of multiple forms 
of violence in Recife’s low-income communities. These studies have not engaged 
with the ways in which safety and security interventions affect these communities 
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from the perception of the marginalised themselves. This thesis addresses these 
issues. 
2.5 Conclusion 
This chapter’s contribution has been three-fold. First, it provided a glimpse into the 
structural context of low-income communities in Brazil. This literature focused on 
demographic data about housing and income and on debates about the 
conceptualisation of the marginalisation affecting low-income communities and 
favelas (Perlman 2010; Wacquant 1996). Second, the chapter began to explore the 
theoretical critique of the link made in everyday discourses about crime and poverty 
or marginality and violence. It showed that while the very term ‘marginal’ in Brazil, 
which often connotes poor, has come to signify ‘criminal’, very few people in poor 
communities become criminals – they are often criminalised and, rather than 
marginal, poor communities are central to Brazilian society, economy and culture. 
These communities are, however, marginalised in that they are often neglected by the 
State, having the worst access to housing and public services including security. They 
are over-targeted and under-protected by the criminal justice system. The 
‘crime/violence and poverty/marginality’ link remains embedded in policy-making 
and in the practices of the security apparatus, as will be shown in Chapters 5 and 6.  
Finally, the chapter began to examine the limitations of the theories that have 
been influential in the development of new security interventions. Far from vilifying 
these theories and approaches to crime control (e.g. Situational Crime Prevention and 
managerial criminology) or the work of well-meaning academics that deploy their 
rationale, my intention here was to point out the limitations and dangers posed by the 
adaptation of Global North theories. Of course, it is not argued here that policy 
transfer or emulation, or SCP and managerial criminology, are the cause of crime or 
police violence. Instead, it is argued that there are key limitations in this literature, 
which mar the provision of security, such as the failure to take into account emotive 
aspects of crime, the cultural context of societies with high levels of violence and the 
Brazilian institutional context. It is argued that these Global North criminological 
theories have been contested outside Brazil, on multiple grounds, not least because 
they exacerbate inequalities through the division of societies along class and ethnic 
lines, especially because of the process of ‘othering’ suspects and individuals 
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perceived as undeserving. Moreover, these theories are also inadequate in the 
Brazilian context due to its deeply ingrained inequalities, widespread issues of 
discrimination and criminalisation, and the lack of appropriate public security 
provision. Such issues are illustrated by an already problematic overrepresentation of 
poor indigenous and afro-descendant people in the criminal justice system. There is a 
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CHAPTER 3 – The criminological study of public security in Brazil 
 
This chapter moves beyond theories of marginality and poverty to include some of the 
institutional aspects of the research problem. It synthesises some of the analytical 
literature about crime and violence that has emerged in Brazil in the last thirty years. 
During that period, the steady flow of academic work concerning violence, 
criminality, public security and criminal justice has made this one of the most 
important fields of research in the Brazilian social sciences. There has been a growing 
concentration and consolidation of academic works about these themes from the 
1990s, half of which have been produced by research groups in the country’s 
southeast, especially Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo (Kant de Lima, Misse, and 
Miranda 2000).  
The chapter argues that the ways in which new security interventions and 
policing affect marginalised communities and the young in northeast Brazil have been 
overlooked in the criminological and Brazilian public security literature, in spite of 
the fact that the demographic and spatial concentration of multiple forms of violence 
have impacted primarily upon the marginalised, the urban poor and the young. How 
have institutions and communities responded to this context? The focus of this thesis 
is on the ways in which new government security agendas impact people in low-
income communities, how these communities, and their young people respond to this 
agenda and what effects these programmes of state building and social control have 
on the poorest subjects of these interventions. 
This chapter is structured in the following way. First, it presents the lack of 
balance in the production of studies about urban violence and crime. This literature 
has understudied the effects of the State’s crime control interventions in the northeast 
Brazil. Second, it examines some of the problems and challenges of the State’s 
attempt to monopolise violence. Some of those challenges relate to issues of gender 
and age inequities. Third, this debate leads on to the question of whether or not, or 
how, the State is present in certain Brazilian communities. Fourth, the chapter reflects 
on the notions of democracy and security, examining from a social democratic 
viewpoint why these concepts should not be perceived as incompatible. Finally, this 
theoretical reflection provides a backdrop to examining the emergence of public 
security as a field of study in Brazil and exposes important gaps in this literature.  
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3.1 Brazil’s internal knowledge production inequalities 
Most studies about the increase in urban criminality, tend to identify a shift in the 
patterns of crime from the end of the 1970s, notably suggesting that a greater degree 
of criminal organisation emerged in cities like Rio, São Paulo and Belo Horizonte, as 
well as rising use of violence in criminal actions, leading to higher homicide rates. 
This shift was consolidated in the 1980s with the expansion of the drug trade, 
particularly cocaine, and with the increasing use of sophisticated weapons of greater 
lethal power (Velho 2000, Paixão 1983, Zaluar 1994, Caldeira 2000, Adorno 1992, 
Machado da Silva 1993, Misse 1997, Kant de Lima, Misse, and Miranda 2000). None 
of these studies have focused on how the State has responded to increasing concern 
with urban criminality in the northeast of Brazil, or on the impact this response has 
had on people in low-income communities. However, these issues are the focus of this 
thesis. 
Misse’s (1999, 84) perspective focuses on the continuous growth of ascribed 
social causes of violence and on those represented as ‘social danger’. The social 
accumulation of violence is a social process characterised by the social representation 
of violence, which is measured by the number of deaths, fights, conflicts, thefts, 
robberies and kidnappings, and by the insecurity felt by the population. The statistical 
methods employed in measuring violence are significant in this project, as is the way 
in which suspects are represented. A sea of numbers and the measurements of those 
numbers fail to engage with developments at ground level. For instance, many crimes 
are not reported, and numerical data cannot show in any detail how and whether these 
crimes have been dealt with or how the State, through the police, has interacted with 
suspects and residents of low-income communities.  Ethnographic methods can 
counter this issue by providing insight into perceptions and voices from below. 
Although most of the studies examined so far help to contextualise and 
analyse the issue of violence in Brazil, most of them refer to empirical cases based in 
Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo where crime has become very organised. They risk 
missing out contextual differences in relation to other parts of Brazil. Moreover, some 
of the key issues that emerge from this literature are the institutional problems 
entangled in the context of violence. This raises questions, which this thesis addresses 
drawing on ethnographic methods, about the work of state institutions such as the 
Roxana Pessoa Cavalcanti 
 46 
police and the context in the northeast of Brazil; it raises questions about how public 
security policies have changed and what has been their impact.  
3.2 State building and the monopoly of violence 
A key issue in the production and maintenance of high levels of violence is the 
failure, inability and even unwillingness of the Brazilian state to legitimately 
monopolise the use of force: 
 
‘Institutionally, for a civilized or pacified society to exist it is necessary that 
the   State has the monopoly of the use of violence, that is, citizens should not 
be able to use guns as a means of solving private conflicts’ (Zaluar 2013, 5).  
 
State attempts to monopolise the use of force are key in state building, as shown in the 
work of Charles Tilly (1992). Before the emergence of modern European states, 
multiple social actors took part in violent interactions. State control of and monopoly 
over violence was essential for the formation and establishment of these nation states. 
This essentially is a crucial theme in this thesis, as it reveals that the development of 
new public security policies, such as Pacto pela Vida, is part of an attempt at state 
building, while also a part of efforts to promote electoral interests. 
Alba Zaluar – who is one of the Brazilian pioneers in the study of urban crime 
and its relations with state institutions (such as the police) – argues that Brazil is 
characterised by an ambivalent domain of social processes and practices that are not 
controlled by the formal institutions of the rule of law (Zaluar 2004a, b). She argues 
that a mixture of factors has enabled the rise of new forms of violence, especially 
directly related to the spread, distribution and consumption of illicit drugs. These 
include the accelerated urbanisation and persistent poverty that has left many poor 
young men in a state of vulnerability, while organised crime has offered them 
opportunities for what she calls  'perverse integration' (Zaluar 2004a). Zaluar’s 
analysis examines three main dimensions of violence: the institutional (which relates 
to persistent civil rights violations), the importance and limits of macro social 
explanations (poverty and social exclusion) and micro social factors that involve 
young men in drug trafficking (issues such as bravado and interpersonal power 
struggles over women, weapons and dope). All of which shape a society where the 
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rule of law is deficient. These issues, she suggests, are connected to, for instance, the 
practice of acerto de contas (settling the bill or reckoning), which entails some form 
of bribery to ensure impunity – such as payments made to the police to secure the 
release of an arrested criminal. The acerto can also refer to the settlement of debts 
between traffickers, where the debtor may pay with his life if he does not have 
sufficient money. 
Although some of the processes and practices in Zaluar’s analysis may 
resemble those in other Brazilian cities, including the spread of firearms, drugs and 
violence, this does not mean that these processes are homogenously occurring 
throughout Brazil. It is important to note that her research was conducted in the 
context in Rio de Janeiro, where crime has become very organised. However, the 
level of criminal organisation varies throughout Brazil. This has implications for the 
development of security policies and for the ways in which policing is conducted. 
Freitas (2005), for instance, found that national policies to address youth violence 
were not applicable to the particular context of Recife. In his case study, violence was 
often associated with interpersonal and family disputes, and crime (including small-
scale drug trade) in Recife at that time was more disorganised and less business-like 
in comparison to cities like Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo. These regional differences 
in social practices are central challenges to state building and the monopoly of 
violence in Brazil. Other challenges relate to local cultural and gender dynamics and 
the social construction of gender roles, more specifically to the dominant roles and 
meanings ascribed to masculinity.  
Gender 
Through a gender lens, Zaluar’s (1985, 1995, 2013) ethnographic studies in Rio de 
Janeiro’s favelas contextualise the social milieu in which the risk of violence becomes 
widespread and in which the culture of violent masculine honour and bravado 
becomes the norm. She explains this culture as the seductive warrior ethos, which is 
enmeshed with masculine discourses, ideals and practices, easy money and 
consumerism. Although Zaluar’s studies were conducted in Rio de Janeiro, she 
engaged with low-income communities that are largely developed and inhabited by 
north-eastern migrants. As a consequence, she offers some insight into patriarchal 
cultural norms and the dominance of certain forms of violent masculine identity in the 
northeast region of Brazil.  
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 An exceptional ethnographic study by Drybread (2014) conducted in a 
juvenile detention centre in northeast Brazil focused on the performance of gender 
roles by young people. Drybread’s study illustrates that violence is not necessarily the 
outcome of the rational calculation of risks as a situational crime prevention or 
managerial criminology would portray (as discussed in chapter 2). Rather, Drybread’s 
study explores cultural and emotive elements, such as vengeance, honour and virility 
(p. 753) that were motives of violence. She argues for an understanding of gender that 
moves beyond the investigation of relations between males and females. Manhood 
among her participants was constructed in relation to age rather than femininity. In 
this context, the act of murder and the ability to enact violence were exercised to 
affirm the autonomy and manliness associated with masculine adulthood. The 
importance of understanding gender relations and cultural norms in different regions 
in Brazil is illustrated by the fact that: 
 
‘In more industrialised and wealthy areas of the country, there are arguably 
styles of manly self-presentation and behaviour that are still uncommon in 
northeast, where historical circumstances and socioeconomic pressures have 
given rise to regionally particular ideals of manhood and masculine honour 
that admit no place to men who are considered weak or cowardly’ (Drybread 
2014, 756) 
 
These hierarchical gender roles and violent forms of masculinity are key challenges in 
the reduction of violent relations in the city and cannot be easily addressed by 
policing or PPV’s methods of police performance monitoring. One of the important 
points made by Drybread is the need for a space for teaching inmates (although this 
could be extended to the wider population) that ‘there are several ways for an 
individual to enact and preserve his manhood – and violent crime need not be one of 
them’ (p. 760). This suggestion would be more easily applied if, in practice, Brazilian 
society and its institutions – e.g. prisons, juvenile centres, the police, schools – could 
provide safer, inclusive spaces that encourage more hospitable social relations so that 
sustaining the social performance of strength and bravado is not needed to provide a 
sense of security. In theory, but not necessarily in practice, Brazil has advanced 
important legislation attempting to ensure the safety of young people, as discussed 
below.  
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Youth 
In 1990 Brazil replaced the discriminatory, repressive and segregationist legislation 
known as ‘Minors’ Code’ with the Children’s and Adolescent’s Act (Estatuto da 
Criança e do Adolescente or ECA). The Minor’s Code in operation from 1927 to 
1990 had discriminated between the definitions of ‘child’ and ‘minor’ (Rizzini 1997). 
Children were constructed as deserving innocent individuals in need of adult 
protection while minors were constructed as undeserving young wrongdoers from 
poor and morally deficient families (Drybread 2014, 757). This code made it legally 
possible to institutionalise children indeterminately whether or not they had broken 
the law (Drybread 2009). ECA redefined childhood by including all children and 
adolescents as rights-bearing citizens and forbidding the institutionalisation of young 
people, unless they commit a heinous offence of violence such as rape, murder or 
kidnapping with a maximum sentence of three years (Drybread 2014, 758). Young 
people under the age of 12 were considered children incapable of committing crimes 
and those between 12 and 18 years old were considered adolescents, who could not be 
held criminally responsible.  
ECA became a reference for Latin America because of its emphasis on human 
rights and the respect for the development of children and adolescents (UNICEF 
2015). This legal change developed a new discourse that constructs young people as 
bearing rights instead of as objects of intervention (Moore 2015, 273). However, it is 
still unclear how much the law has changed discriminatory practices (ibid). As it will 
be shown in Chapter 7, police practices are embedded in misconstructions that portray 
young, poor, afro-descendant males as criminals and young, poor, afro-descendant 
females as morally dangerous. These discriminatory practices resonate with wider 
inequalities in Brazilian society, revealing its racist and classist discrimination that 
conflate crime with poverty. 
Despite the legal gains Brazil made with the establishment of ECA over 25 
years ago, Brazil’s interim government, at the time of writing, has announced its 
support for the reduction of the age of criminal responsibility and support for the 
increase of sentences for young offenders from 3 to 10 years. Those issues have been 
increasingly debated and proposed by the ultra-conservative political right (Amaral 
2016). Young people, while being one of the most victimised groups in Brazil (as 
argued in Chapter 1), continue to be under-protected and continuously constructed as 
criminals in need of tougher penal sanctions. Misconceptions about crime, and the 
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intersections of, race, class, age and gender inequalities operate to limit the 
development of fair and legitimate state institutions that could attempt to monopolise 
and curb violence, thus hindering the best interests of Brazilian people.      
3.3 Absence of the State? 
In 1993, O’Donnell (1993) published a paper that argued that human rights violations 
were linked to the absence of the State in certain geographical areas. He classified 
territories into blue, green and brown areas, according to the degree to which the State 
was present and the effectiveness of its institutions. Brown areas had the worst 
conditions, where the State, or more specifically the rule of law, was absent and 
institutions were ineffective. He argued that countries like Brazil and Peru are 
dominated by brown areas (O’Donnell 1993). His thesis embodies a common fallacy 
that Brazilian cities are divided between accessible and no-go areas. In the former the 
State is supposedly present; in the latter, allegedly the territory of criminals, it is 
absent. 
A book by Zuenir Ventura (1994), Cidade Partida (‘The Divided City’) 
focuses on this dualistic ideology. Ventura’s journalistic account focused on the case 
of Rio de Janeiro, where he saw the rich ‘zona sul’ (south zone) as separate and 
segregated from the poor favelas in the ‘zona norte’ (north zone) and peripheries of 
the city. Brazilian cities are indeed segregated territories with acute social divisions. 
However, the emphasis on ‘division’ and on ‘dual’ cities ignores the connections that 
do exist between different areas of the city. It becomes tempting to perceive favelas as 
not only poor but also dysfunctional areas, which have failed to integrate with the rest 
of the city; areas in which traffickers impede the progress and development of civil 
society because they do not tolerate forms of social or political organisation that 
might challenge their power. This common misconception fails to acknowledge the 
ways in which the State is present in different territories and the ways in which poor 
areas are connected to the political system and to the rest of the city. 
While it is widely accepted that the ‘rule of law’ (as opposed to the ‘State’) is 
underprovided in many parts of countries like Brazil, the view that the State (all 
together) is entirely absent has been contested. In fact, some scholars have argued that 
the State is a key player in violent social relations in O’Donnell’s so-called brown 
areas. Some scholars have argued that criminal violence is actually a facet of politics 
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(Feltran 2011) and that it has played a role in a system of clientelism, which has 
existed at least since the period of military rule (Arias 2006). The relevance of the 
work of Arias is examined in more detail in this section. 
 Machado da Silva (1995) was one of the first critics to argue against the thesis 
that crime and violence in poor areas were associated with the absence of the State. 
He suggested that social scientists needed not only to focus on the institutional 
dimensions of the object of study but also look at societal dimensions of the 
phenomena. Elizabeth Leeds (1996) had also observed that rather than being absent, 
the State is entangled in violent relations through 'patron-client' relations with favela 
residents. Local politicians standing for election to the city government would attempt 
to establish a relationship with the leadership of the residents’ association (Associação 
dos Moradores, or AM) in Rio’s favelas. They would promise increased resources to 
the community in exchange for the AM organising votes. Additionally, they 
established informal agreements with drug traffickers to allow certain candidates to 
conduct their election campaigns in the favelas under the control of the gangs (Leeds 
1996, 75). Furthermore, the Brazilian police, one of the State’s most visible 
institutions, is often involved in drug deals and have an established ‘role in escorting 
shipments of drugs and guns to favelas as well as in killing other corrupt police and 
blaming favela drug dealers for those murders’ (ibid, 65). 
The political scientist Desmond Arias (2006) expanded this critique, by 
deploying ‘social network’ theories to argue that violence in poor urban areas was in 
fact not caused by the absence of the State, but rather by an intricate network 
involving a variety of social actors: civil society (e.g. NGOs, residents’ associations), 
the police, corrupt politicians and favela residents. His study of three of Rio’s low-
income communities revealed that violence worked as a 'lubricant' that enabled the 
existence of a network of clientelist relations involving these social actors. Violence 
was a resource, a way of maintaining a certain kind of social order, a currency that 
maintained the status quo. Politicians would access vote-buying opportunities through 
residents’ associations, which were often controlled by traffickers and their approved 
representatives. Traffickers too could bargain with residents for their complicity with 
trafficking by offering them financial support or even enabling community festivities 
and providing security, especially against rape and theft in the community.  
The police were avoided where possible, to avoid attracting attention to drugs 
and arms trading in the community. The police only became involved in cases of 
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corruption, by extorting money from traffickers or in providing reactive policing after 
events had spiralled out of control (e.g. disputes between drug gangs). While this 
network functions to line the pockets of corrupt police and to increase the number of 
votes for corrupt politicians, it has damaging consequences for the favela: fear, 
segregation, lack of trust in official institutions and the State, impunity, escalation of 
mortality and bereavement. From Arias’ perspective, the State is therefore deeply 
entangled in this network, both through its corrupt institutions such as the police and 
through politicians who interacted with the favela, its residents and associations to 
seek and buy votes. Arias demonstrated that rather than being a place left behind, 
favelas are deeply connected to the city, the State and the political system.  
The data emerging from this thesis corroborate his findings, insofar as the 
State was present in the communities studied and residents were connected in 
multiple ways to the rest of the city, especially through work. What this thesis 
contributes to this literature is the emphasis on the ways in which the State was 
present in these communities in the northeast regions and on the effects this has on the 
communities from the perspective of young people. 
In Rio’s favelas, Leeds (1996) concluded that drug traffickers had become a 
‘parallel power’ to the State. Traffickers gained some form of acceptance (not 
necessarily legitimacy) among local residents for providing services that the State had 
failed to deliver, including cash loans, medication and access to work (often of an 
illegal nature). Goldstein’s (2003) study echoed some of these findings. Often, 
however, this parallel power and support from traffickers compromised residents in a 
number of ways, such as requiring them to be complicit with the drug trade, or to hide 
suspects and illegal merchandise in their homes (Penglase 2008, 2009). The different 
forms that violence and coercion have assumed in different communities are essential 
to any analysis of public security. It is important to note the diverse relational aspects 
of the interactions between various social actors. Viewing the favela as a separate or a 
parallel system diverts attention away from an analysis of its actual complex 
relationships with the State and local political elites. 
As argued by Andreas and Martinez (2012) the illicit trade, violence and 
corruption are all interconnected issues that impact on public security and on the 
boundaries of state power, however, questions about the dynamics of public security, 
about how the State’s actions and policies affect areas seen as violent, remain 
understudied. The lack of adequate data as well as insufficient comparative and 
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theoretical analysis makes this area of scholarship uneven and limited (Andreas and 
Martinez 2012).  
3.4 Some reflections on democracy and security 
Nearly three decades ago, Petit (1987) sketched a social democratic theory of the 
State, defining social democracy as a ‘philosophy for policymaking’ (p. 543), a 
political movement. Social democracy questions and challenges the destructive 
excesses of capitalist societies, and their systemic inequalities. Instead, it proposes the 
ideal of the public or common good, organised around the principles of equality, 
solidarity and social justice (Loader and Sparks 2015, 16), including promoting the 
well-being and safety of the most vulnerable in society. In line with this, this thesis 
draws on and supports Robert Reiner’s (2010, 2011) proposal for a social democratic 
criminology that acknowledges that there is no peace without justice. Alongside other 
critical criminologists (Bowling et al. 2016, Currie 1991/2013, Jones, Newburn, and 
Smith 1996, 1994, Loader and Sparks 2015, Reiner 2010), I take the values and the 
philosophy of social democracy as critically important in crime control, public 
security and policing theory. This is not to say that the notions of democracy, security 
or even democratic policing are not contested. It is not the place here to detail all that 
is disputed in this debate, some of which is discussed elsewhere (Harkin 2015, Jones, 
Newburn, and Smith 1994, 37-48), but a few points are in order to clarify the 
viewpoint and argument of this thesis. 
 First, as Petit points out, democratic theories share one important element, that 
is, that the ‘social ideal of equal respect for all persons ought to be central to the 
organisation of society’ (1987, 538). There are caveats to this ideal. A key difference 
for example between the liberal democratic and the social democratic points of view 
is the focus on the individual or the State. For social democrats, it is inconceivable to 
imagine ‘all individuals as equal partners in the organisation of social and political 
life’ (ibid, 542). The social democrat perspective is grounded in the historical 
condition within which the State is a reality. It does not ask what equally valued 
individuals should require of institutions and of the State if they are to enjoy equal 
respect (ibid). Instead, the social democrat considers ‘what the state should do in the 
world as it is now in order to promote this ideal’ (ibid).  
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The second point to be acknowledged is that public services are affected by 
the incorporation or rejection of democratic ideals. As Jones, Newburn, and Smith 
(1994, 1) put it, ‘the protection of liberty, social and economic opportunities, and the 
ability of individuals to shape and develop their lives are crucially affected by a range 
of public services. The police are arguably the central public service in a modern 
state’. Policing is ambiguous and has the potential to affect different social groups in 
unequal ways, especially the most marginalised, often exacerbating inequalities by 
bringing the most disadvantaged into contact with the criminal justice system as 
suspects and perpetrators rather than as victims (Bowling et al. 2016, Loader 1996). 
Selective targeting and discretionary practices of stop-and-search can 
disproportionately affect arrests, convictions and incarceration (Bowling et al. 2016, 
140). The police and penal institutions mediate identity and status since their acts and 
omissions have the power to distinctively constitute people as part of the polity or 
define their place within hierarchical social structures (Loader and Sparks 2015, 38). 
For these reasons, improving policing as a public service requires the adoption of 
fundamental democratic values (Bowling et al. 2016, 151). Since the police are 
supposed to protect essential freedoms, and monopolise the legitimate use of force, it 
is important to consider ‘democratic policing’, in some proposed definition, as 
‘preferable to other arrangements’ (Jones, Newburn, and Smith 1994, 3) such as 
militarised policing (Huggins 1998). Democratic policing is the proposal that policing 
as a public service should follow democratic principles. In summary, as Jones, 
Newburn and Smith (1994, 44) outline, these criteria relate to:  
 
1) Equity, that is, fair distribution of service and law enforcement. 
 
2) Effective and efficient delivery of service. 
 
3) Responsiveness, that is, the choice of policing methods and allocation of 
resources. Policing needs to be responsive to some expression of the 
public’s wishes. However, it must be emphasised that this principle must 
be balanced against the ideals of justice and equity so that the will of the 
majority is not favoured if it is discriminatory. As the authors argue, ‘it 
would be undemocratic for the police to adopt a highly discriminatory 
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policy of law enforcement, even if a local majority favoured such a policy’ 
(ibid, 47). 
 
4) Distribution of power, that is, the power to decide which policing policies 
are adopted needs to be distributed. 
 
5) Information needs to be published on funding, expenditure, activities and 
outputs. 
 
6) Redress, which means that it should be possible for a representative body 
to dismiss unlawful, incompetent or corrupt officers or those who abuse 
their power. 
 
7) Participation, that is, as far as possible, citizens should take part in 
discussions of policing policy with police managers. This last criterion, as 
the authors outline, is less of a priority than equity because of the 
difficulties in getting people together to discuss policy-making. The right 
not to participate is central to contemporary democracy as ‘it is not the 
case that every literate or sane person expects or wishes to actively 
participate in public policy-making’ (ibid, 45).     
 
The final point to clarify is that in spite of the inevitable task of social control with the 
threat or potential use of coercive force, the police’s role is secondary in maintaining 
order and security (Bowling et al. 2016, Reiner 2011). That is to say that the police 
are not single-handedly able to control crime and promote order, neither is policing all 
about law enforcement. ‘The police are, in fact, an all-purpose emergency service 
charged with responding to a wide range of different urgent social problems’ 
(Bowling et al. 2016, 129). As Bowling at al note, much of the police function is, and 
should be related to peacekeeping and deploying dialogue, for instance mediating 
conflict, looking for missing people, persuading suicidal people not to jump off a 
ledge, dealing with accidents, escorting drunks and asking young people not to disturb 
the elderly (ibid, 131).  
While radical Marxists perceive the police as repressive agents of the State, 
protecting the class interests of elites (Cohen 1979/1997, Storch 1976), this approach 
Roxana Pessoa Cavalcanti 
 56 
can also be perceived as deterministic and structurally fatalistic in that it does not 
recognise important and positive peacekeeping aspects of public security institutions. 
Indeed, the police can act as repressive agents of the State, protectors of classed 
interests to the disadvantage of the weakest. But the police can also be understood as 
a public service, which is needed by all social classes (Lea and Young 1993). Class 
and social justice are absolutely important in this debate, hence my proposal of a 
social democratic approach, foregrounding a ‘general’ order rather than the privilege 
of ‘particular’ classes or forms of order that privilege certain interests over public 
interests. The police as a public service can be understood as a necessary ‘all-purpose 
emergency service’ (Bowling et al. 2016, 129), which can be achieved with ‘good 
communication skills and the personal and institutional authority vested in the police 
uniform’ (ibid, 131) as well as the power to use force, with limits and when absolutely 
necessary.   
3.5 Issues of public security 
The term public security emphasises the protection of people, property and 
democratic political institutions from internal or external threats (Bailey and Dammert 
2006). As such, it differs from the term national security, often used in the Cold War 
period, which focused on the protection of a state and its territorial integrity from 
other state actors and political opponents. In the Brazil, the study of public security 
emerged from research about the prison system (Lima and Ratton 2011). However, 
this field of study has moved on to acknowledge the interconnections between the 
State, institutions of criminal justice, public security policies, and civil society. In line 
with this, this thesis puts forward an analysis of the dynamics of security in the city of 
Recife, in the northeast of Brazil.  
Understanding the dynamics of the interactions of citizens and security 
institutions in a society that is exposed to rapid change is paramount for the 
promotion of justice and public security. For instance, the type of policing 
implemented by governments has direct impacts on the prison population – since the 
police have a high degree of control over who goes to prison, and who is targeted or 
not by their work, thus delineating boundaries between perceived criminals and non-
criminals, reinforcing marginalising relations: ‘us’ and ‘them’. So beyond the issue of 
increasing incarceration and its perverse impacts, another key institution of the public 
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security system, central to this thesis is the police. The police are the most visible, 
albeit not the only, State presence in Brazilian poor communities. There seems to be a 
consensus, in most studies in this field, that policing is a key problem in any 
understanding of the barriers to the establishment of the legitimate monopoly of force 
by the State in Brazil.  
The two main police forces that interact with poor communities are the polícia 
civil (PC, civil police) and the polícia militar (PM, military police). The former is 
responsible for investigations while the latter patrols the streets and apprehends 
suspects before passing them over to the civil police. Both forces are part of the 
public security apparatus, respond to the state governor, and are heavily armed. The 
PC tends to be overtly bureaucratic, distanced from the communities they are meant 
to serve and too focused on paperwork, while the PM is mostly precariously and 
insufficiently trained. Its military training is also inappropriate for establishing good 
relations with civil society and dealing with the communities they interact with. 
The military police has a strict hierarchy (Soares 2000) and its military 
training is a central feature of police culture in Brazil. Police culture in Brazil 
resembles the logics of Brazilian culture, as synthesised by Roberto da Matta: when 
personal relations are established, they supersede formal and institutional norms and 
associations, allowing for every kind of benefit, potentially opening the way to 
various forms of discrimination and the giving and receiving of illicit favours (Soares 
2000, 62). The rigid military hierarchy and structure of the PM limits interaction with 
the public and distances them from the communities they patrol. The PC on the other 
hand spends most of its time in police stations (delegacias) dealing with paperwork 
(Pereira 2008) and supposedly conducting investigations. This structure contributes to 
the ineffectiveness of both forces and causes difficulties when it comes to cooperation 
between them. 
Most of the police violence in low-income communities is committed by the 
military police (Perlman 2010, 168). The slowness of the Brazilian courts and the 
inadequacy of mechanisms of police accountability prompt the military police to act 
coercively in the streets instead of arresting suspects (Pereira 2008). They are key 
contributors to the cycle of violence by their use of extrajudicial violence, violent 
raids/aggressive incursions and lethal force.  
According to Perlman (2010) a key contributor to rising violence in favelas 
has been the rise of armed militias formed by self-appointed, off-duty or retired police 
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officers who take law-and-order problems into their own hands. Militias have also 
been known to extort money from favela residents, demanding regular payments for 
the delivery of goods, taxing taxi and motorbike-taxi businesses, and even charging 
people for entering or leaving the favela (Perlman 2010, 168). As argued by Scheper-
Hughes (2004) and Pinheiro (2006), this contributes to the disproportional mortality 
of poor, non-white males, since they are the main victims of death squads and police 
violence: 
  
‘Victims of police violence and summary executions tend to be young Afro-
Brazilian males between the ages of 15–19 years, who are often involved in 
criminal gangs’ (Pinheiro 2006, 298) 
 
The police force is deeply resistant to change (Soares 2000). Some studies, based on 
data about death occurring in conflict with the police, particularly autos de resistência 
(‘resistance to arrest’, cases of lethal police violence which are not registered as 
homicide) have shown that the degree of police violence is still very high and hard to 
measure (Bueno and Lima 2012). For instance in Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo, 
Bueno and Lima estimate that 22,525 people were killed in confrontation with the 
police between 1993 and 2011. There is still no standard register for data about cases 
of police violence in the country, and since the restoration of democracy in Brazil, 
basic civil rights such as safety remain insufficiently consolidated (Possas 2012), both 
in practice and in the public perception. For instance, despite the difficulty in 
accessing this type of data, there is ample evidence that human rights violations, 
including by the State continue to happen routinely in Brazil (Possas 2012).  
A study of ten Brazilian state capitals (Cardia 2012) found that 47% of 
participants thought it appropriate for a police officer to be violent towards an 
incarcerated person who tried to escape; 62% thought that the criminal justice system 
overprotects the rights of the accused; and 29% thought it acceptable for courts to 
accept evidence extracted via torture. The ‘paradox of democracy’ is that violations 
continue to occur routinely in large numbers, despite emerging in different forms 
when compared with the period of military rule (Possas 2012). The persistence of 
extra-legal violence is fuelled by the population’s fears and sense of insecurity. As 
argued by Garland (1996, 2001), over the last thirty years high crime rates have led to 
this sense of insecurity and fear that engenders punitive attitudes towards the ‘other’ – 
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the offender – and provides support for regressive policies and practices which are 
incompatible with a human-rights agenda, such as mandatory and arbitrary 
sentencing, and the excessive use of imprisonment.  
Ethnographic studies of policing and judicial practice in Rio de Janeiro have 
argued that the deviance and distortions of these institutions are not merely occasional 
or isolated cases of staff and institutional failure, but rather that they reveal mass 
adherence (even if not explicitly) to a deviant system of conflict management typical 
of segregated and hierarchical societies (Kant de Lima 1989). Brazil’s justice system 
is replete with loopholes that aggravate impunity, perpetuate inequalities and generate 
widespread dissatisfaction. Those who have access to good lawyers can manipulate 
endless and innumerable delays in prosecution (Kant de Lima, Misse, and Miranda 
2000). Extrajudicial punishment is routinely applied both by the agents of the public 
security apparatus and by the population, which, according to existing studies, largely 
condones the humiliation, torture and even the killing of those considered criminals, 
before or after their official sentence (Singer 2000, Feltran 2011). 
In this context, Tavares dos Santos (2009) suggests that contemporary policing 
in Latin America has tended to face a crisis of effectiveness and legitimacy. 
According to him, despite the creation of new police institutions, and the formation of 
some community policing initiatives and programmes of police education organised 
by public universities, reforms have been partial. The impact, extent and suitability of 
public security initiatives in Brazil remains under-studied and it is unclear whether 
they are appropriate to address the ‘security gap’, truly reform the police, and provide 
lasting results. Public security studies also need to consider how marginalised young 
people in the northeast of Brazil respond to these issues. As the main victims of lethal 
violence, and the least protected group in society, how do young people respond to 
the context of fear, anxiety and increasingly repressive crime control? This thesis 
addresses these gaps in the literature, examining some of the effects of the recent 
policing and security initiatives in Recife.  
3.6 The dynamics of public security as object of study 
Brazilian academics have made efforts to research and understand the area of study 
that has come to be loosely labelled ‘public security’ (Lima and Ratton 2011). Until 
the late 1990s, the topic of public security in Brazil was generally studied from a 
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juridical or a military perspective, leading to fragmented, mainstream and normative 
accounts (Kant de Lima, Misse, and Miranda 2000, Macaulay 2007). As a research 
topic, public security policies have not yet become as consolidated as other themes 
such as delinquency, violence, policing and the criminal justice system.  
Public security policies (also known as ‘public safety policies’) are actions, 
strategies and programmes managed and sometimes developed by the State to address 
crime and violence. Sapori (2007) explains that there are many theoretical gaps in this 
field of study in Brazil. He argues that there is a need to deepen the knowledge about 
the dynamics of criminal justice since the field of public policies of crime control and 
public security policies remain under researched. There is thus a need to produce 
knowledge about governmental actions aimed at providing the collective good of 
public safety in Brazil. Growing insecurity and fear of crime affects trust in the State 
and its agents, therefore even the State’s legitimacy depends by and large on its 
capacity to maintain order and some degree of safety for the citizens subject to its 
authority (Sapori 2007). Consequently, as a topic, public security has become 
paramount in academic, practical, policy and political terms. 
While there is a discourse in Brazil that the problem of violence cannot be 
resolved without profound reforms in the penal system or a change to the socio-
economic structure, scholars such as Soares (2000) and Sapori (2007) argue that 
changing policies and the governance of public security institutions can reduce crime. 
The focus is thus on tangible measures of crime reduction as opposed to addressing 
the deeper inequalities or the multitude of (often contested) causes of crime in Brazil. 
The latter could take far longer to produce results and would require shifts in various 
long-term social policies, such as those in the field of education and development. 
This is not to say that these researchers fail to understand or promote a more equal 
society, but rather that they perceive the need to take specific measures to promote 
public safety, beyond and in addition to long-term policies to address structural 
inequalities. For Adorno and Salla, public security policies need to adapt to rapid 
societal change and turbulence: 
 
‘Crime has increased and become more violent; organised criminality has 
spread through society reaching economic activities far beyond traditional 
crimes against property, increasing the homicide rates, above all among 
adolescents and young adults, and disorganising forms of social life and 
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standards of inter- and intra-class sociability. Nevertheless, public safety 
policies continue to be formulated and implanted according to conventional, 
aged models, which are incapable of accompanying the quality of the social 
and institutional changes underway within society’ (Adorno and Salla 2007, 
10). 
 
Adorno and Salla suggest that while crime has become more widespread and 
innovative, making use of new technologies (e.g. telecommunications, transport, 
modern firearms), the application of law and order continues to consist largely of old, 
militarised police models of chasing known criminals. Understanding the dynamics of 
public security in Brazil demands engagement with the continuities and changes in 
this field of study. 
Despite investments in public security by federal and state governments in the 
equipping of police forces, the overall model of policing and training of human 
resources remains unsatisfactory. Until the late 1990s there were no national official 
statistics on criminality, a problem that has only recently begun to be addressed. The 
data available from the National Secretariat of Public Safety (SENASP), part of the 
Ministry of Justice, for the years 1999-2001 reveal that the rates of violent crime – 
homicide, theft followed by death, extortion by kidnapping, rape – are generally 
higher in Brazil than in other countries with similar socio-economic characteristics 
(Adorno and Salla 2007, 12-13). 
Rates of violence and inequality remain high and impede the consolidation of 
civil rights. At the national level the Brazilian state has been shy in its initiatives to 
address these issues. A new agency was established at the federal level, Secretaria 
Nacional de Segurança Pública (SENASP), which translates as National Secretariat 
for Public Security, part of the Ministry of Justice. SENASP has introduced national 
public security policies with modest incentives for state governments to collect data 
and endorse reforms, but a number of barriers have hindered its progress (Pereira 
2008).  
As explained by Pereira (2008), SENASP has lacked continuous leadership, 
which has impacted adversely on its activities. Pereira argues that the key barriers to 
the improvement of public security include the fragmentation of the public sectors, 
the politicisation of the police and the privatisation of security, all of which constrain 
the effectiveness of public security organisations in preventing violence. The issue of 
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fragmentation is ingrained in the Brazilian federalist system, electoral regulations and 
the party system, which prevents presidents from having a majority in Congress. This 
means that in order to rule, elected presidents must negotiate a multiparty coalition in 
Congress, and negotiate (sometimes through bribery) with congress, state governors 
and mayors their support for legislative initiatives. A further issue is that since public 
security provision remains mostly a responsibility of each state, the funds invested by 
SENASP have often been used for different purposes. 
Fragmentation is also seen in the Brazilian policing system, as discussed 
above. The division of labour between two main police forces, one civil and one 
military, and their disjointed training, limit the possibilities for implementing the 
community policing models proposed by SENASP. Moreover, the division between 
the two police forces often results in competition, rivalry, poor communication and 
inadequate information sharing (Pereira 2008).  
The second issue – politicisation – affects both policing and the policy-making 
apparatus. Part of the problem is that most high-ranking positions in the police and 
even in SENASP are staffed with political appointees, so political patronage and 
loyalty continue to be a problem (Pereira 2008). This also leads to a discontinuation in 
policies and practices when new governments are elected. Members of the police are 
also able to deploy their contacts and police associations to run for office and despite 
it being illegal, the police often use strikes as political weapons. Thus the 
politicisation of the security system obstructs its effectiveness in curbing violence. 
Finally, in relation to the privatisation of security, Pereira argues that it 
challenges the notion that security is a public good. Commercial and private interests 
rather than the collective good are prioritised. Private security is a thriving industry in 
Brazil (Cubas 2002). It is widely tolerated, although illegal, for police officers to 
supplement their income by taking second jobs in the private security sector. Public 
resources are therefore employed to protect private interests. Some contractors have 
even been known to perpetrate massacres so as later to be able to sell their security 
service to the affected communities demonstrating how the industry can be parasitic 
in nature (Pereira 2008). It is a business that thrives on the failures of the public 
security system and profits from the context of an intense fear of crime, while itself 
generating yet more inequalities (e.g. in access to safety), mistrust, and segregation in 
society. 
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Researchers have observed that increasing spending on public security has not 
necessarily led to reductions in the level of violent mortality (Caldeira 2000, Turollo 
and Guimarães 2013). As Pereira (2008) neatly puts it: 
 
‘If resources are being poured into a system in which collusion between State 
agents and organised crime is common, in which corruption and illegal 
violence by State agents is widespread, in which basic sharing of information 
and cooperation between different agencies is often impossible, in which 
partisan political loyalties are more important than technical skill and 
diligence in police promotions and the implementation of State policy, and in 
which private security interests cream off public intelligence and personnel for 
profit – then much of these resources will be wasted’ 
 
Furthermore, much of the official data about violence and public security issues, do 
not always reflect the real situation of crime and violence in the country (Kahn 1998, 
Kant de Lima, Misse, and Miranda 2000) – official data are frequently poorly 
recorded, inaccurate or corrupted and research is also often fragmented. The Brazilian 
public security system has thus been described as a ‘bureaucratic labyrinth’ replete 
with ‘corporative immobility’ (Soares 2000, 88) – an ineffective system with intense 
resistance to change. Furthermore, while the country has one of the world’s largest 
prison populations, only 8% of homicides have actually resulted in successful 
convictions (Soares and Balestreri 2012, unpaged). Part of the problem, is that Brazil 
lacks an effective federal system of public security and as Soares and Balestreri argue, 
another concern is that military models continue to be reproduced in the (poorly paid 
and trained) police force: 
 
‘The police are not valued. Overall, wages are insufficient. Working 
conditions are inadequate. As a consequence the police adopt illegal second 
informal jobs in private security. The authorities do not interfere to prevent the 
collapse of the government’s budget. They prefer to live with the illegality in 
the underlying system. The outcome is that irrational working shifts cannot be 
adjusted, the dual loyalty precludes the execution of routines; internal 
discipline is contaminated by binding with unlawful activities; and impunity 
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encourages the formation of interest groups whose extreme expression are the 
militias.’ (Soares and Balestreri 2012, unpaged) 
 
Specialists have raised questions about the mechanisms that link enforcement and 
violence; about the policing strategies that are least or most likely to prevent or 
aggravate the violence related to the illicit trade; and argued that more research is 
needed about how law enforcement shapes the nature and level of organised violence 
(Andreas and Martinez 2012, 385). These questions are crucial since certain policing 
methods and public security policies can increase perverse effects, and even 
unintentionally fuel further violence.  
For instance, as some actors are removed from the drug trade, new ones 
emerge to claim their market share while violent competition continues. Moreover, if 
social actors are simply removed from this context, for example by imprisonment, 
new questions may nevertheless emerge about the incarceration system, its 
sustainability, and what happens after those actors’ eventual release from prison. 
Thus, considering how the State and society respond to and interact with the context 
of violence raises fundamental questions for this field of inquiry. Moreover, there is a 
need for research that takes these questions to geographical areas that have not so far 
been widely studied (Andreas and Martinez 2012, Garmany 2011). 
In Recife, since the government of Eduardo Campos (2007-2014), these 
policies have been grouped together under the project Pacto pela Vida (‘Pact for 
Life’). Over one hundred projects were proposed as part of Pacto pela Vida, 
including: police reforms; the creation of specialised police stations for certain groups 
(e.g. the elderly, women, LGBT, children and young people); disarmament projects; 
social and educational projects. Their alleged aim is to reduce mortality in the state of 
Pernambuco, but there are currently no studies examining the extent to which these 
projects have been implemented, nor their effects.  
Among Brazilian states, Pernambuco remains near the top of the ranking in 
terms of homicides committed with guns, occupying 6th position behind Alagoas, 
Espirito Santo, Pará, Bahia and Paraíba (Waiselfisz 2013). However, there has been 
an improvement, considering that the rate of homicides committed with firearms in 
Pernambuco dropped from 50.3/100,000 in 2001 to 30.3/100,000 in 2010 (ibid, 19). 
In Recife, the state capital, the rate of homicides committed with a firearm17 remains 
high but it did also decline from 2000 to 2010 (Ibid, 25): 
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Recife’s rate of homicides committed with a firearm per 100,000 of population:  
2000  2001 2002 2003  2004  2005  2006  2007 2008 2009  2010  Δ% 
88.1  86.9  81.6  80.9  79.2  76.9  79.0  76.0  70.5  61.0  47.8  -45.8 
Table 4: Homicide rate with firearms  
Source: Mapa da Violência (Waiselfisz 2013, 25)  
 
Recife has seen declining numbers of homicides with a firearm – unlike other cities in 
the Northeast such as Salvador and Fortaleza: 
 
Number of homicides with a firearm in Brazilian state capital cities 
 2000 2009 2010 Δ% 
Fortaleza 346  819  1,159  235,0 
Salvador  619 1,921  1,596  157,8 
Recife 1,254   941  735  -41,4 
Table 5: Number of homicides in three cities  
Source: Mapa da Violência (Waiselfisz 2013, 23)  
 
Although the data above refer only to homicides committed with firearms – and do 
not include homicides committed with other means such as white weapons – this 
illustrates the saliency and level of the issue of armed violence in Brazil. It is 
important to note that homicide rates in one city are one narrow measure of the 
changes that have occurred in the context of hyper-violence. Violence occurs in many 
forms and lethal violence is only one of those. These figures do not necessarily mean 
that people feel safer or that they are safer in reality. Sometimes crime is simply 
displaced to other areas (Machado da Silva 2010). Sometimes security measures can 
improve the quality of life of the population, but they can also have no noticeable 
effect, or even have perverse impacts on people’s daily lives. It is therefore necessary 
to study these effects in more depth. This was the main objective of this thesis.  
3.7 Conclusion 
This chapter has outlined the birth of a field of study – public security – in the 
Brazilian literature. It has discussed the focus of these studies, geographically, in 
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terms of objects of study and theoretically and the gaps in this emerging body of 
literature. It argued that studies about violence and security have neglected the issues 
affecting, and the voices of, the marginalised and the young in the northeast of Brazil. 
There are a few exceptions, for example the ethnographies conducted by Zaluar, 
Drybread and Morris, examining important regional, emotive and gendered aspects of 
violent relations that prominently affect young people in the northeast of Brazil. The 
chapter has also discussed key international debates about the role and presence or 
absence of the State and the rule of law in areas perceived as marginalised and highly 
unsafe. It has outlined some of the intricate problems of public security provision and 
the challenges faced by any group, State or civic, that aims to curb high levels of 
violence and insecurity.  
The chapter drew on critical criminological theories proposing that security 
and democratic ideals, in particular social-democratic ideals, should not be conceived 
of as exclusive and incompatible. It acknowledged some of the problems and 
ambiguities in this debate, such as the issue that security measures can lead to the 
excessive criminalisation of some populations. This chapter provided the background 
and gaps in knowledge production that inform this thesis, which considers the forms, 
ideals and effects of public security policies in contemporary Recife. Academics have 
not examined how the policy and programme Pacto pela Vida has been perceived or 
what impacts it has had on the communities where lethal violence and sporadic 
policing are most common. This thesis examines this public security project and its 
effects. In particular, the research focuses (albeit not exclusively) on issues that affect 
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CHAPTER 4 – Methodology 
 
‘Sometimes I question how anyone could do research that is not ethnographic 
in a low-income community in Brazil. Anything strict, or to a schedule, seems 
to fall to pieces. But you can observe and gather valuable data from naturally 
emerging conversations or by just hanging around. In fact, you need lots of 
hanging around to get people’s trust and to get them to open up. It was only 
towards the end of my first fieldwork trip (four months in the field) that I 
noticed people truly opening up and trusting me enough to talk to me. Being 
pregnant has helped. People have been more empathetic towards me since my 
bump became noticeable. Suddenly we had something more obviously in 
common: family. I had arranged to meet a participant at 4.30pm today for a 
walk around his community, Tourinho. I rang him at 4.45pm as he had not 
arrived. He said he was on his way. By 5pm he arrived. The walk was really 
interesting and useful. I will write about it in my data chapters. We had to go 
back to the NGO by 6pm for a focus group, and I made sure we were on time 
but none of the participants arrived until 7pm. When will I learn that nothing 
starts on time here? I had to re-arrange other commitments as we didn’t finish 
till 8.30pm. I brought some cake, biscuits, crackers and soft drinks. I donated 
some money towards the collection that was going around for the birthday 
cake for one of the NGO’s members of staff. But the group was reluctant to 
accept it. They are more motivated by other forms of support rather than 
money. For example, if you become a friend or if you are friendly – 
charismatic – and you run workshops (such as sports, arts, educational or 
training courses), then you are “in”. Solidarity brings you in; money doesn’t 
necessarily have the same effect. The focus group was like a casual 
conversation in a circle; people gradually started sharing their experiences, 
asking questions and showing black humour, laughing about stories of police 
violence. They laughed at each other’s impressions of beatings and brutal 
encounters with the police. On the way back home I saw another incident. The 
police were there but there were no cordons; a mulato male body was on the 
ground, he appeared to be dead.’ (Field note, 28th October 2013). 
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Most studies in the field of public security and violence in Brazil point to a lack of 
adequate official data and problematic statistical information, all of which make it 
difficult to develop appropriate policies to address these issues. Often researchers 
resort to the strategy of employing a variety of sources, such as police records, the 
media, official government documents (e.g. from the Ministério Público), medical 
registers, judicial documents and a variety of qualitative methods (Possas 2012, 17). 
This thesis is a qualitative study employing ethnographic methods. The data 
collection entailed field observations, focus groups, semi-structured interviews and 
unstructured interviews (Ball 1981). The participants were mostly young people (aged 
16-29) who lived in two low-income communities – Tourinho and Vitoria 
(pseudonyms to protect participants’ anonymity) – in Recife, northeast Brazil18. 
However, other participants included: older residents in the two communities studied, 
active members of community and non-governmental organisations (NGOs); 
professionals working with young people; and state actors involved with public 
security provision (e.g. members of the police force, secretaries of security, policy-
makers).  
These methods were used to gain an in-depth, qualitative understanding of the 
ways in which public security interventions affect the everyday lives and experiences 
of people in low-income communities, particularly young people. The study 
examined the heterogeneity of experiences, resistance and meanings that emerge from 
these communities. Furthermore, it analysed the ways in which new public security 
policies implemented in Pernambuco since 2007 (starting with the government of 
Eduardo Campos and continuing through the current government of Paulo Camara) 
have affected the groups participating in the research. What are the effects of these 
interventions? How do the groups considered most marginalised in Brazilian society 
perceive them? How do agents of the public security system relate to the new policies 
and the context in which they are working? A rich and contextualised understanding 
of these questions facilitates an assessment of the current state of violence and 
security in Recife. As well as allowing for hidden or marginalised views and agendas 
to emerge, fostering a plural debate, this facilitates an analysis of the barriers, 
challenges, successes and possibilities for change and improvement in the field of 
public security. As such, this thesis addresses the following question: “How do public 
security policies aimed at reducing violence affect young people in Recife’s low-
income communities?” 
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Questions about public security policies and the effects of violence have 
become paramount in contemporary Brazil, because Brazilians continue to experience 
numerous and persistent social inequalities, including inadequate access to safety and 
justice. Therefore, there is a need for detailed research on the existing workings and 
the systematic relations that constitute the field of public security, where the 
democratic system and the law guarantee rights which are not fully accomplished in 
practice (Pereira 2000). The data collection and analysis were guided by four sub­
questions looking at different aspects of public security and violence:  
 
1. How have recent state strategies to address violence developed? 
2. How do public security policies affect local interactions and economies (e.g. 
community interactions, local enterprises, gendered relations)? 
3. How do communities suffering long-term social exclusion respond to these 
strategies? (e.g. Are these interventions welcomed? How do residents perceive them? 
Do residents perceive them as beneficial or counterproductive? Why?)  
4. How do these communities respond to everyday forms of violence? (e.g. Are 
people ‘silenced’ by local criminals and violent policing practices or do they react? If 
so, how? How are community interactions and residents’ daily lives affected?) 
5. Why do (or don’t) young people feel that recent public security policies are 
beneficial (or harmful – e.g. in terms of stigma, marginalisation and criminalisation) 
to their communities? 
 
The following sections of this chapter examine and discuss the rationale of the 
research design and the methods of data collection employed. The chapter also 
discusses the use of ethnographic methods in the context of the study of public 
security and draws on feminist research to debate the dilemmas surrounding the 
representation of the voices of marginalised groups in society. Finally, the chapter 
vindicates the deployment of two case studies and the thematic method of analysis of 
the rich data gathered.  
4.1 Research design 
This section discusses the methods of data collection used in the study (interviews, 
focus groups and participant observations) and how they were employed. A 
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discussion of ethnographic methods, case studies and methods of analysis follows. 
For the purpose of comparing data and analysing whether or not the findings may be 
extended as to generalise about the city as a whole, two case studies have been 
selected and three fieldtrips were conducted to Recife, in the northeast of Brazil. 
Correspondence with local contacts began prior to the first fieldtrip (June-October 
2013), with a view to choosing potential case studies and identifying gatekeepers. 
Face to face meetings were held with gatekeepers shortly after arrival in Recife in 
order to confirm the research plans and agree upon terms for carrying it out. The 
second and third fieldtrips (December 2014; January-February 2016) were scheduled 
with the aim of maintaining contact with the communities and following up local 
developments. Contact was maintained virtually, especially through social networking 
sites (e.g. Facebook), with organisations, young people and community residents that 
participated in the research. This process enabled me to become acquainted with the 
communities, gain trust and conduct interviews with ‘expert’ local respondents and 
employ informal ethnographic methods and observations in each of the communities.  
Initially, contacts were approached through involvement with local 
organisations and local institutions. After establishing contacts I was able to arrange 
and conduct semi ­ structured interviews, and unstructured interviews and 
conversations with residents identified through snowballing techniques. Contacts and 
participants in the police and public security system were accessed through Professor 
J.L. Ratton of the Universidade Federal de Pernambuco (UFPE), who had direct 
experience working with the government’s security programme Pacto pela Vida. 
Further participants were identified through recommendations, using the snowballing 
method. An outline of which methods were used with which groups is summarised in 
Figure 3. 
 
Community residents, activists and young 
people (aged 16 and over). 
Interviews (unstructured and semi-structured), 
observations and focus groups. 
 
Police, agents of the public security 
system and experts (e.g. local 
academics). 
Semi-structured interviews. 
Figure 3: Research groups  
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Before returning to the UK the initial findings of the research were presented at an 
event in each community, where participants could provide feedback and discuss the 
initial analyses and preliminary findings. These meetings provided rich discussions 
and data. 
4.2 Interviews 
In this study, interviews with residents, young people and community activists 
focused on discussing topics such as the neighbourhood, issues around safety, the 
relations between the community and the State, opinions about the police and the 
government, including its security policies (such as Pacto pela Vida), and socio-
economic data (e.g. regarding employment and education). In these cases, I initially 
deployed unstructured ethnographic interviews, which bear a resemblance to informal 
conversations with a purpose (Ball 1981). These conversations occurred in a number 
of contexts, even while just ‘hanging out’ with participants, walking around the 
community, in their local ‘hang out’ (a non-governmental organisation that resembles 
a youth club), in their homes once I had got to know them, while waiting for a bus, or 
in local bars and restaurants. This type of interview avoided intimidating participants 
in situations of urban marginality and lack of familiarity with formal research, thereby 
allowing them to express themselves in naturally occurring conversations. They also 
enabled me to build rapport with participants and learn about new topics, which were 
not predicted in the initial research design. As a result, unstructured interviews also 
enabled the development of semi-structured interview scripts. Unstructured interviews 
were onerous at times, as they required extensive field notes working from memory, 
when it had not been possible to use audio recording, after encounters with 
participants. This way of working can consequently be very time consuming (Bernard 
2002). 
Once familiarity was established with participants and the research field, semi-
structured interviews were conducted. Semi-structured interviews are open-ended but 
are guided by a schedule and a list of topics. Interviews with the police and agents of 
the public security system were semi-structured. This type of interview is useful in 
formal settings and when it is unlikely that the researcher will have a second chance 
to interview participants, so it is important to ensure that certain topics are covered 
(Bernard 2002). Interviews with this group focused on their experiences at work, their 
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opinions about the training they receive, about the adequacy of the security policies in 
place, and the challenges that they face. This approach allowed the contextualisation 
and understanding of their lived experiences and of the impact of public security 
policies and violence in their lives and in the communities. Denscombe (2007) 
suggests that ‘when the researcher needs to gain insights into things like people’s 
opinions, feelings, emotions and experiences, then interviews will almost certainly 
provide a suitable method’ (174). Those interviews included open and closed 
questions to enable issues of relevance to be established and to allow for the 
emergence of themes which were important to participants (Bryman 2001). 
4.3 Focus groups 
Focus groups can be a useful complementary method to discuss the workings of a 
research question and to gain insights from participants in a group debate. They can 
provide additional details to other methods and information about the ‘why’ questions 
in relation to people’s options (Bernard 2002). According to Bernard, focus groups 
produce ethnographically rich data. They can provide insights into diverse 
perspectives about a research problem in addition to enabling the researcher to 
observe group dynamics and allowing for unanticipated issues and topics to emerge 
(Hesse-Biber and Leavy 2006). Research studies involving young people have 
benefited from this method (Lyon, Dennison, and Wilson 2000). Similarly, in this 
research, two focus groups were conducted during the first field trip in both case 
study communities and resulted in rich discussions.  
Twelve residents and young people attended the first focus group in the 
community of Vitoria. Twenty-five people, mostly residents and young people, 
attended the second focus group in the community of Tourinho. Five of these people 
are also community activists and youth workers. It was difficult to organise the focus 
group events at a time that suited all potential participants and the process required 
patience and a culturally informal approach to adapt to the schedules of late comers 
and early goers. In this part of Brazil in particular, it was also important to allow at 
least one hour for participants to arrive and gather, since they tended not to expect 
that events start at the scheduled time. Despite these minor difficulties, the 
discussions allowed for rich data and insights to emerge. The focus groups discussed 
the following topics:  
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 - Community life (e.g. shared spaces and interests etc.) and leisure activities - Urban services, infrastructure and the community’s main needs  - The development of violence, the drug traffic and existing interventions to 
address violence (and potentially also the drug trade) - Policing, (in) security and the program Pacto pela vida. 
 
These interviews and focus group sessions enabled me to become familiar with the 
communities and to continue building the necessary rapport with participants to 
access data that could help answer the research questions. They provided data 
regarding: 1) The context of the community; 2) How residents participate (or don’t 
participate) in State and community strategies to address violence; 3) How they are 
affected by security strategies (or the lack of adequate strategies/interventions) and by 
policing methods; 4) How public security policies affect young people in poor 
communities.  
In the focus groups, young people and community residents surprisingly 
discussed these topics openly and even gave numerous examples of their personal 
experiences of police brutality, feelings of insecurity and disconnection from state 
institutions. Many people felt that they could not rely on the State and that state 
policies and strategies had not ‘reached them’ or had any impact in their community, 
other than reinforcing common stereotypes about them, such as the idea that young 
black or mulato (mixed ethnicity) males in poor communities are criminals. When 
people were questioned about the main needs of the community they often mentioned 
a lack of public spaces and leisure opportunities. However, the topics that dominated 
our discussions were fear of crime, the drug trade, violence and insecurity – these 
seemed the most prominent issues from residents’ perspectives. People were very 
secretive about the drug trade, many chose not to go into detail about this topic and 
some people during interviews quietly whispered their views and experiences of the 
drug trade. These are only preliminary findings, Chapters 5, 6, 7 and 8 outline and 
discuss the empirical data in more detail.   
4.4 Participant observation 
A participant observer engages in activities appropriate to the social situation to 
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observe the surroundings, people and events that occur (Spradley 1980). The 
technique allows the researcher to obtain ‘experiential knowledge’ (Bernard 2002, 
322) and even observe whether people’s actions are in tune with their interview 
responses. For instance, in some interviews people said that they had no contact 
whatsoever with the police, the State or state agents; however, while conducting 
observations it was possible to notice that these people were often in contact with 
state agents and the police. Sometimes, this happened in institutional settings, 
including state-funded schools and health centres. On other occasions informal 
conversations unfolded where young people complained about encounters with the 
police, when they had received a baculejo (a local term used to describe an unpleasant 
or forceful stop-and-search, when the police often use brutality and violence, for 
example by applying pressure to the suspect’s interlaced fingers while his/her hands 
are above their head and punching the suspect’s ribs or kicking their legs to spread 
them and/or hitting the suspects on the genitals).  
As a means of complementing data gathered from secondary sources (e.g. 
reports and other literature) and from interviews and focus groups, participant 
observation can allow for the triangulation of research findings. Although the method 
has been traditionally used by anthropologists (Scott 1985), other scholars have found 
it useful to collect detailed and in-depth data and to attain a profounder understanding 
of the field and research topic (Iqtidar 2011). Some Brazilian scholars have conducted 
well-respected and productive research projects using only this method (Zaluar, 
2010).  
In the first case study, observations were conducted in events organised by an 
NGO in the case study community and while ‘hanging around’ with young people and 
residents in the neighbourhood. In one community for example, young people made 
no effort to hide their stashes of drugs for sale when I walked around with locally 
known research collaborators. The reasons why literally every participant had 
mentioned the drug trade as one of the main problems in the community became 
clear. The drug trade certainly was very noticeable and so was the fact that, for the 
most part, very young males were engaged in the trade at street level.  
It was also easy to observe that the police were hardly ever present in the 
communities. There were also opportunities to conduct observations during 
interviews and at a local school where I occasionally volunteered as a supply English 
teacher. Inappropriate living conditions in these communities were also easily 
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noticeable; so was the inadequate provision of public services. Insufficient rubbish 
collection and vast open sewage pipes were common problems. So was the lack of 
leisure spaces for the community and the state of the local school – lacking space, 
ventilation and human resources. The drop out rate would probably be way higher if 
there had not been programs such as Bolsa Família (a government conditional cash 
transfer based on criteria such as school attendance). These conditions made it easy to 
see why education did not seem an appealing route for young people wanting to 
achieve social mobility. There were many opportunities to have informal 
conversations with the school’s staff, the chef and the students. Many had stories that 
they wanted to tell about bereavement in their families caused by young people’s 
involvement in the drug trade or police violence. The data from all these encounters 
were rich in detail and allowed for an understanding of the social context of the 
communities and of research participants.  
4.5 Ethnographic methods and a feminist approach  
‘The importance of ethnographic fieldwork is unquestionable when one tries 
to understand social actors and explain the sudden and continuous growth of 
violent expressions in the city’ (Zaluar 2013, 3) 
 
Ethnographic methods provide rich data, detailed descriptions of participants’ 
narratives and of the researcher’s observations; they also provide the ground for the 
analysis and interpretation of these data. Their significance lays in their provision of 
opportunities for the researcher to engage with participants in an empathetic way, to 
‘look through their eyes’ so to speak (Hoggart, Lees, and Davies 2002). An 
ethnographer is never simply a researcher; rather, her or his personal life becomes 
implicated in the fieldwork (Whyte 1955). The exposure to research encounters and 
systematic reflection about these, guided by field notes, permits the ethnographer to 
confront new questions and develop those that seem relevant; consequently 
unexpected findings can emerge from the study. The researcher deploying these 
methods becomes a translator of lived experiences and narratives, with the task of 
producing a text (Feltran 2011). Learning and translating this information entails the 
process of using ethnography as a method. 
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Ethnographic methods are challenging because the time taken to collect data is 
extensive, involving prolonged periods in the field. In many ethnographies the 
narratives are written in a literary almost storytelling approach, an approach that can 
in some cases define the audience for the work (Creswell 1998, 61). For instance, 
while this form of writing can appeal to a broader public, it may not necessarily be 
applicable for researchers interested in quantitative (‘hard’) data or policy makers 
interested in summarised bullet points about a social issue. A further challenge is that 
in studies that use qualitative or ethnographic research methods the researcher needs 
to remain adaptable since she/he is involved in a learning process, which can lead to 
shifts in the research questions, as they develop in the course of the research (Blaikie 
2000) 
While deploying ethnographic methods, the researcher needs to remain 
sensitive to fieldwork issues such as gaining access to groups through gatekeepers and 
individuals who can provide or block entrance to the research field. The field 
researcher located key informants, individuals who provide useful insights into the 
group and could guide the researcher to information and further contacts. The 
researcher should also become concerned about reciprocity between the investigator 
and the subjects being studied in exchange for their information, and the impact of the 
researcher on the field (reactivity) and on the people being studied. Therefore, to 
allow for ethical standards, the field researcher should make his or her presence 
known to avoid deception about the purpose of the research. For Creswell (1998) this 
process results in a final product that is a holistic portrait of the social group and 
context, which incorporates both the views of the actors in the group (emic) and the 
researcher's interpretations of views about human social life (etic).   
The key research topics of this thesis – violence and public security – are not 
easily researched. Both topics are intertwined in complex relations including, for 
example, the State, its apparatus and civil society. Often people are unwilling to talk 
openly about these issues due to fear of retaliation by the police and local criminals. 
The topics are also embedded in intricate networks involving various powerful actors 
such as politicians, the military and businesses, not only poor people living in slums. 
Many of these actors are difficult to reach, especially the ones involved in illegal 
networks, given the secrecy and illegality of their activities. However, researching 
these groups directly, especially their connections to violent relations, crime and 
public security inadequacies can prove challenging due to issues of deception and the 
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unleashing of partial narratives (see Young’s 2011 discussion of the limitations of 
ethnographic research). The most powerful actors are well protected, they rarely 
appear on the news and for the most part they lie beneath the surface of common 
knowledge. As a result, researchers are left with few options when researching the 
topics violence and public security, such as investigating media accounts and public 
perceptions.  
This thesis engages with the views of those most marginalised populations, 
whose opinions and experiences have been largely neglected in the international 
literature, as well as investigating the dominant narratives of state actors. The initial 
idea was to meet some young people (aged 16 and over, for ethical reasons) and 
residents of low-income communities to discuss with them their everyday experiences 
and views about the research topics: public security and violence. For this purpose, a 
feminist approach was adopted insofar as the study engaged with the voices of people 
who are often ignored and silenced in society and in the mainstream literature. 
Feminist researchers have emphasised the importance of examining the experiences 
of the oppressed and marginalised (Alcoff 1991, Hemmings 2011, Ryan-Flood and 
Gill 2010, Stanley and Wise 1993). It was for these purposes that I spent 6 months 
conducting fieldwork in Brazil. This immersion, coupled with the fact that I had 
previously lived in the northeast of Brazil for 17 years, have family ties in the area 
and significant understanding of local cultural norms, allowed me to develop research 
contacts and access data that may otherwise not be available in the literature or if less 
proximity or other methods were used. In that sense, although the study is not a 
traditional ethnography, it deployed ethnographic methods and techniques.  
In this research, the perceptions and experiences of state actors (e.g. public 
security agents and the police), community leaders and those engaged with young 
people targeted by security policies were all included. While considering the 
difficulties in encountering ‘truthful’ accounts and interpretations, particularly when 
engaging with politicians, the study aimed to triangulate the findings by using a 
variety of sources and methods, engaging with as many people as possible in the 
community and by deploying critical theory to deconstruct emerging and often 
conflicting narratives. 
Ethnographic methods provide the foundations for both data gathering and 
data analysis. Nevertheless, where appropriate, a thematic analysis was employed for 
analysing the qualitative data gathered (Butler-Kisber 2010). This method allows for 
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an analysis of the data prior to the development of theories, unlike positivist methods 
in which the researcher may already have rigid definitions and conceptualisations 
prior to collecting or analysing their data. However, there is debate as to whether a 
researcher really can go into the field completely free of preconceptions about their 
subject of study (Silverman 2010). Despite this possible limitation, a thematic 
approach enables researchers to make links across individual experiences, events, and 
actions (Butler-Kisber 2010).  
4.6 The politics of representation  
Researching less powerful groups raises questions of representation (Alcoff 1991). As 
argued by Bourgois (1996, 11) ‘any detailed examination of social marginalisation 
encounters serious problems with the politics of representation’. Social scientists 
often worry that their research, the stories and the events they write about could be 
misinterpreted as negative stereotypes of disadvantaged groups. In fact, much of the 
literature on poverty in the United States has been critiqued for its middle-class 
moralising bias that devalue the narratives of the poor, constructing them as morally 
inferior, see for instance Young’s (2011) critique of the famous study Tally’s Corner 
(Liebow 1967).  
Nevertheless, this need not mean that social scientists should avoid writing 
about marginalised groups, or sanitise the social problems and suffering that exist (see 
Bourgois 2003, Goldstein 2003, Scheper-Hughes 1993). Furthermore, it would be 
impossible to study and analyse a history of events without its subjects (Spivak 1988). 
To ignore existing social problems and marginalise research done with vulnerable 
groups out of fear of giving the poor a bad ‘name’ or representation, would make us 
‘complicit with oppression’ (Bourgois 1996, 12). 
Spivak (1988) has challenged the retreat approach adopted by some 
researchers (e.g. Foucault, Deleuze), including feminist academics (Trebilcot 1988). 
The ‘retreat approach’ rejects the practice of ‘speaking for others’. Indeed, in some 
circumstances, speaking for others should be avoided, as it can disempower and even 
misrepresent or harm those who are spoken for (Alcoff 1991). Nevertheless, avoiding 
the practice all together assumes that it is possible to be disentangled from discursive 
practices in a neutral place in which words do not have material effects.  
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For Spivak (1988), as well as for Alcoff (1991), retreating is not a solution to 
the dilemmas of speaking for, with or to less privileged groups. If less privileged 
groups speak for themselves, their speech will not necessarily reflect their interests or 
even be ‘listened to’, corroborating in political ineffectiveness. Excluding and 
ignoring the oppressed person’s voice can simply ‘continue the imperialist project’ 
(Spivak 1988, 298). It leaves the possibility of dialogue unexplored. For those 
reasons, this study has advocated the feminist practice of speaking with and to rather 
than for the oppressed. 
While focusing on studying the experiences of the poor in relation to violence 
and public security, it is also important to note, that in most low-income communities 
and favelas very few residents engage in crime. The majority of residents are 
representatives of the working class of Brazil, providing numerous services to 
predominantly middle- and upper-class areas of the city. The favelas and periferias 
are not ghettos, therefore; they do not have the typical characteristics of traditional 
American ghettos as described by scholars such as Wacquant (2012, 2008). 
Ethnographic accounts best capture these differences, by focusing on the local level, 
rather than applying Eurocentric or dominant Anglo-Saxon theories without specific 
knowledge of the everyday experiences and context of the subjects of study. This 
allows for the development of important observations of micro dynamics in relation to 
the structural macro context to generate more encompassing theories applicable to the 
Brazilian setting. Furthermore, this approach fosters plural debates that include 
knowledge produced by researchers in the Global South. 
Ethnographic methods need not be used in their most traditional form, as 
developed by anthropologists. Many researchers from a variety of disciplines, 
including political science, geography and sociology, have deployed these methods to 
obtain rich, contextualised and in-depth data (Emerson, Fretz, and Shaw 1995, 
Garmany 2011a, Gupta 2006, Iqtidar 2011). Researchers that apply ethnographic 
methods are no longer simply trying to study kinship and ‘other’ societies. 
Ethnography is a phenomenological method, which can be employed for re-thinking 
dominant European and Anglo-Saxon categories, in order to understand a society in 
its context. It can be used to grasp what may appear ‘good’, ‘bad’, ‘useful’, and 
‘unusual’; and how people perceive public institutions or social phenomena.  
As argued by Emerson et al. (1995, xvi) ‘ethnography can contribute to a 
deeper understanding of the personal, work, an organizational processes likely to be 
Roxana Pessoa Cavalcanti 
 80 
encountered’. Rather than setting out with a hypothesis, when deploying ethnographic 
methods the writer aims to construct a narrative from field notes that will interest the 
outside audience, introducing the setting, examining patterns of behaviour, typical 
situations in that setting and evidence to reach an academic contributory idea. The 
vivid details in this type of writing enable writers to establish a degree of legitimacy, 
allowing the reader to understand the context in which something is made possible, 
and understanding social occurrences at ground level. However, it is essential to 
consider the potential limitations of the method. Spivak (1988), for instance, notes the 
importance of considering the unequal power relations between researcher and the 
‘researched’, particularly when knowledge is produced about the Global South’s 
marginalised groups from the perspective of European and North American scholars.  
As someone who was born, grew up and has family ties in Recife, I am 
particularly attuned to northeastern cultural norms, accents and material realities. This 
is an advantage in conducting the research. At the same time, having spent over a 
decade outside Brazil, and having become a social researcher, I developed an 
enhanced ability to notice and challenge taken for granted power relations and 
inequalities extant within the Brazilian context. Nevertheless, it is important to stay 
attentive to differences that can pose a challenge, including the researcher’s gender, 
ethnicity and socioeconomic status.  
For Zaluar (2013) for instance, gender and class origin became a key 
challenge when conducting research in Rio de Janeiro’s favelas in the 1980s and 
1990s. In over twenty years of research, she became acutely aware of the need to 
engage with research assistants from these communities. She was often accepted as an 
interlocutor but explained that she was ‘fooled most of the time’ (Zaluar 2013, 7). 
Participants persistently misled her because they did not feel obliged to tell the truth 
to a female outsider. When she realised this, she decided to introduce male research 
assistants.  She found that once she recruited a male research assistant from the 
community, accounts that were significantly different began to emerge. In one of her 
field studies she learned that one of her research participants was planning to rape her 
(Zaluar 2004a, b) but having employed research assistants from the community 
increased her safety by enabling her to access this information before it was too late 
and to be accompanied in her fieldtrips by a local resident who knew the area and its 
residents.  Ethnographic studies have thus benefited from the employment of research 
assistants. For these reasons – the search for rich accurate accounts and the reduction 
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of research risks – I chose to adopt Zaluar’s methods of research collaboration and I 
recruited two research collaborators. Additionally, I believed that there could be 
benefits to participating for the collaborators and for the wider community that we 
could reach, such as the opportunity to have a dialogue about local issues and the 
potential for sharing any concerns with a wider international audience. My personal 
experience of being a research collaborator in the UK, during my undergraduate 
studies, also contributed to this belief that participatory research offers potential for 
mutual benefits. While being a research collaborator I learned practical research 
skills, gained research experience and became more interested in finding ways in 
which the social sciences and communities outside academia can work towards 
similar goals of promoting social justice. My hope was that the collaborators in Recife 
would gain similar positive research experience. Collaborators also received an 
honorarium for their time.   
I recruited one local female and one local male collaborator from one of the 
communities – Tourinho – where the research was first carried out. This approach 
enabled safe access to a much larger number of participants within a short period of 
time. Because of their local ties of kinship and friendship, and because they were 
active members of the community through their volunteering work with a non-
governmental organisation providing sports and arts workshops to young people, 
residents felt more inclined to participate in the study and attend interviews and to 
help the collaborators with their work. In the second case study community, Vitoria, I 
was able to conduct the data collection at a local school, which reduced some of the 
risks associated with the research. It also meant that I could access a significant 
number of participants for the study. I was unable to find collaborators that were 
mature, old enough (e.g. 18 years old and over) and had the time and the necessary 
knowledge of the community to participate safely. My own time constraints and the 
lack of youth organisations or NGOs in Vitoria also hindered the recruitment of 
collaborators in this second case study community. For all these reasons above, I was 
unable to recruit collaborators in Vitoria. Nonetheless, I was still able to gain in-depth 
data through the interviews and observations that I carried out on my own. 
The collaborators in Tourinho were well connected and well liked in the 
community because of their voluntary work, as well as for their efforts to organise 
events and celebrations (e.g. children’s day festivities, São João parties, Christmas 
celebration) and to collect gift donations for young people in the community. By 
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being associated with the collaborators I was accepted and trusted more easily had I 
simply been a stranger.  
In some aspects collaborators were gatekeepers, who had lived in the 
community for most of their lives and were familiar with the surroundings and with 
residents. Their participation added value to the research, not only because I was safer 
in the community and able to visit areas that I would otherwise not have dared to visit, 
but also because in some cases people felt more comfortable talking to them. For 
instance, the interviews conducted by the male collaborator, especially with other 
young men in the community, elicited data that may not otherwise have become 
available to a female outsider. When walking in the community with the 
collaborators, young men felt no need to disguise their activities (e.g. while they were 
splitting the stashes of drugs) and some residents felt safe to approach the researchers 
to say hello and to find out more about who the lead researcher was. I believe that my 
own vulnerabilities, as an evidently pregnant woman, contributed to this curiosity and 
to being perceived as not threatening and in need of solidarity. This vulnerability, 
combined with the engagement of the collaborators, facilitated the research.  
Some researchers have had similar positive experiences of doing research in 
Brazilian low-income communities. Perlman (2010, xix), for instance, wrote ‘I have 
never felt as safe or as welcomed in any community before or since. My presence was 
met with warm acceptance. People took care of me as they did of each other […]. 
People loved being interviewed’. At the time of her original study, some aspects of 
being a low status young female student caused her not to be taken seriously. But at 
the same time, not being taken seriously enabled Perlman to access government 
documents and aerial photographs that she needed in the research. The process of 
doing research, therefore, requires the researcher to adapt to particular contexts.  
4.7 Case study research and neighbourhood cases 
The two cases studies of this research were selected and defined on the basis of their 
socio-economic and geographical features. The first case is the community of 
Tourinho and the second case is the neighbourhood of Vitoria, both in Recife. For 
ethical reasons, the names of all participants and the names of their communities have 
been changed to pseudonyms. Firstly, this section examines the importance and the 
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limitations of case study research. Secondly, it describes the two cases selected and 
explores their relevance to this project.  
 
‘A case study is an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary 
phenomenon in depth and within its real-life context, especially when the 
boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident’ (Yin, 
2009, 18) 
 
Yin (2009) argues that case studies are the preferred method when ‘how’ or ‘why’ 
questions are being asked; when the researcher has limited control over events, and 
when there is an emphasis on a contemporary phenomenon within a real-life setting. 
For Yin, the complexity of the phenomenon being studied and the depth of its real-life 
context indicate that there will be many more variables at play than the data may 
imply. To address this challenge, he suggests that many sources of evidence must be 
employed and the researcher must attempt to triangulate findings.  
Therefore, despite common misunderstandings that a case study is a ‘soft 
method’, it requires rigorous methodological routes. There is a common 
misconception that case studies are unsuitable for scientific generalisation. However, 
similarly to experimental research, case studies can also be ‘generalisable to 
theoretical propositions and not to populations and universes’ (Yin 2009, 15). Their 
goal is therefore analytic generalisation rather than statistical generalisation or 
enumeration.  
Quantitative methods deployed in experimental research and surveys are often 
considered more rigorous or ‘scientific’ and are frequently prioritised by funders; 
however, they often fail to engage with the phenomenon’s context and focus on a few 
variables instead (Yin 2009). Other methods, for instance, histories may be rich in 
context yet they focus mostly on non-contemporary events and are more suited for 
dealing with archival or secondary data when living respondents may no longer be 
available to participate in the study. Different methodologies can thus complement the 
limitations and strengths of one another. It is with this in mind that this study 
deployed multiple methods. One of the advantages of conducting case studies is the 
method’s ability to work with diverse forms of evidence, for instance documents, 
interviews and observations (Yin 2009). Furthermore, case study research can engage 
with single or multiple cases. 
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Case studies can be deployed for exploratory, descriptive or explanatory 
studies, the focus of this thesis is explanatory. The thesis examines how current public 
security policies aimed at reducing violence interact with the needs of young people 
in communities facing marginalisation in Recife and how they affect these 
communities. The development of the research in two case studies allowed the 
researcher to compare the findings from each community. It also enabled the 
researcher to examine whether the findings in one place are unique or whether they 
are also present in other parts of the city. For instance, are residents’ experiences of 
policing similar? Do security policies have diverse or similar impacts in each 
community? A comparative approach can inform these questions. The 
neighbourhoods for this study were selected, for the most part, on the basis of 
practical conditions, such as the availability of access through gatekeepers, but also 
because they were understudied and met particular socio-economic and geographical 
criteria predominant in much of Brazil’s population, such as: 
 
• The neighbourhoods are ‘informal settlements’, or in the Brazilian term 
‘abnormal agglomerates’, that is, they are perceived as favelas, and they are 
low-income communities in the peripheries of the city, where most residents 
do not have land title. 
 
• The areas are perceived as undesirable places to live because they face stigmas 
associated with crime and violence. 
Research about violence in Latin America shows that poor communities are 
disproportionately affected by urban and state violence and inappropriate public 
security provision. This makes it important to consider and conduct research in these 
communities. An important reason for selecting Tourinho and Vitoria is that both 
communities remain understudied. Students from Recife’s largest university (UFPE) 
tend to conduct research where the university has established ties (e.g. in a 
community known as ‘Coque’) or in another medium sized community (called 
‘Brasilia Teimosa’) located near the middle/upper-class neighbourhood of ‘Boa 
Viagem’ where many students live and where transport links facilitate access. The 
fact that Tourinho and Vitoria were under-studied made them more appealing sites for 
the research. This also meant that I had to spend a significant amount of time 
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developing networks, contacts, and trust in the communities. I also had to spend hours 
travelling in multiple forms of overcrowded public transport from one end of the city 
to another, often at dawn and late in the evening, or being stuck in traffic jams. The 
hardest part of doing this work was dealing with feelings of anger, sadness and 
frustration at my inability to change the problems and injustices that I could see and 
that participants discussed. The second hardest part was being pregnant while 
experiencing first-hand some of the difficulties in accessing public services (e.g. 
healthcare, public transport) that Brazilian people routinely experience.  
The first case study was conducted in Tourinho, a small community in 
Recife’s south zone peripheries. Some participants came from surrounding areas, 
because they were all engaged with the NGO that provided access to most participants 
and because of their physical proximity. The community surrounds one of the largest 
prisons in Latin America, making it an interesting site to examine the dynamics of 
public security, the interactions between crime, state institutions and poor 
communities. During interviews residents explained that the drug trade was often run 
from inside the prison. In the 1970s, the community was much smaller, at the time it 
was mostly formed by prisoner’s wives who wanted to live near their imprisoned 
partners. Some social housing, conjuntos habitacionais  (COHAB) in Portuguese, 
were also built in the area. The community faces the stigma attached to poor 
neighbourhoods, it is perceived as a dangerous ‘no-go’ area, beleaguered by the drug 
trade and it also faces inadequate provision of public services and policing. 
Approximately one hundred interviews and two focus groups have been carried out in 
this community. Numerous pages of field notes have also been written during this 
case study. I maintained contact with my informants from the start of the first 
fieldtrip.  
The second case study community, Vitoria, is a low-income neighbourhood in 
the north part of Recife near one of the city’s upper-class areas. Access to Vitoria was 
established through contacts at a local school. The community faces similar problems 
to Tourinho, insofar as it is a stigmatised area, where the drug trade and inappropriate 
public service provision and policing are key issues in resident’s views. However, 
there are some differences between the two sites. First, different battalions of the 
military police (PM) patrol each community. Second, there are important 
geographical disparities in the communities. Vitoria is located in a predominantly 
hilly area, which residents call ‘altos’ (a type of hill). This means that Vitoria has 
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more areas that can only be accessed on foot or by motorbikes, making it harder to 
police and, unlike Tourinho it does not have a prison nearby. Vitoria is also listed 
among the fifteen most violent neighbourhoods of Recife, because in 2013, those 15 
(out of the total 94) neighbourhoods were the territories where 51% of homicides in 
the city occurred, according to government reports (Oliveira 2015b). Vitoria is mostly 
affected by the tráfico formiga (‘ant trade’) – in other words small amounts of drugs 
are dealt by many different young men, which seems to have significant implications 
in terms of higher competition, often leading to more violent disputes at street level 
when compared, for example, with Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo, where a relatively 
small number of large, organised criminal groups dominate the market. Due to the 
presence of the prison, where organised criminals operate, drug trafficking in 
Tourinho, seems to face less problems of small-scale drug trafficking competition in 
comparison to Vitoria.  
4.8 Final methodological remarks 
This chapter discussed the research methods employed in this thesis. It argued that 
ethnographic research in the field of public security can enable the researcher to elicit 
in-depth data about people’s everyday lives, narratives and the effects of social and 
security policies in ways that could not otherwise be achieved with, for instance, 
quantitative research. Numerous pages of observations, unstructured interviews, semi-
structured interviews (N = 185) and focus groups (N = 4) were conducted during 6 
months of fieldwork with the assistance of 2 research collaborators. Some of the 
recurring themes in interviews were particularly prominent among younger age 
groups (16-29) and among the participants who considered themselves as indigenous, 
black, moreno or pardo (mixed ethnicity). For these reasons, the age and ethnicity of 
participants is presented, according to what participants themselves considered their 
ethnic origin to be. In some cases residents did not associate with an ethnicity and did 
not want their age revealed.  
As seen in this chapter, the communities selected were diverse yet share some 
commonalities. Both communities have a high density of households and inhabitants, 
and are known as hot spots for drug-related crime and violence. They share some of 
the problems found in favelas, including poor access to housing and public services, 
such as: rubbish collection, education, sanitation, health care and public security 
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provision. A more detailed discussion of the latter will be provided in the next 
chapter. The chapters that follow go beyond methodology, the sea of numbers, 
homicide statistics and contextual information in order to examine the living intricacy 
of people, places and dynamics that get lost in dominant narratives, in macro theories 
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CHAPTER 5 – Police reform  
 
This thesis examines the impacts and effects of new public security policies on people 
living in poor communities in the northeast of Brazil. Through an analysis of 
qualitative data from observations and interviews with state actors (government 
officials and high-ranking members of the police) this chapter examines the impact of 
a public security policy and program of police reform entitled Pacto pela Vida (Pact 
for Life, or PPV) from the perspective of this group of participants. The chapter 
outlines the security policy that this thesis focuses on and deconstructs the discourses 
of State officials and the police about the effects of this public security intervention. 
The chapter argues that the application of Global North solutions and criminological 
theories to the Global South is particularly problematic given Recife’s context, and is 
based on the fallacies of theories of deterrence and policing.  
At this point, it is important to reiterate this thesis’ conceptualisation of the 
State. The State here refers to a political system or association that can reveal the 
workings of power and governance (Gupta 2006). The State is not a fixed unitary 
entity, making it difficult to define, yet it is distinct from other institutional forms. 
Migdal (2001) provides a more precise definition: 
 
‘The State is a sprawling organization within society that coexists with many 
other formal and informal social organizations, from families to tribes to large 
industrial enterprises. What distinguishes the State, at least in the modern era, 
is that State officials seek predominance over those myriad other 
organizations’ (63) 
 
As Midgal conceptualises it, acquiring this predominance is the State’s major 
challenge19. But beyond definitions of the State, what is most important for this thesis, 
as Gupta and Sharma (2006) put it, is to focus on the practices of the State, the ways 
in which the State manifests in everyday life, which can enable an appreciation of its 
role in the ‘perpetuation of exploitation and inequality’ (19). With this in mind, an 
analysis of the existing top-down discourses of state actors about security enables a 
comparison, in subsequent chapters, with the narratives emerging from the bottom up, 
from marginalised people living in poor communities, especially young people20 
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whose voices are often under-represented in the literature on public security. By 
engaging with both sides of this debate, the thesis allows for the voices of the 
marginalised to emerge while also investigating the discourses of the powerful. 
Conflicting discourses and tensions in the field of security – and between the 
police and young people in poor communities – exist around the world and so are not 
unique to Brazil. However, the forms they take in the northeast of Brazil are often 
overlooked. The existing literature tends to extrapolate the findings emerging from 
the Rio-São Paulo axis to the remainder of the country, yet this fails to account for 
regional differences. In the Brazilian context, Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo are the 
exceptions rather than the norm (see Garmany 2011b for a wider discussion).  
Furthermore, as Macaulay (2007) asserts, the overall literature and research in 
this field is rather thin with regard to Latin America. This chapter therefore expands 
the existing literature by also exploring some of the challenges in this field, and some 
of the Brazilian regional differences relevant to the formulation and implementation 
of security interventions, with a specific focus on the context of Recife. In its own 
right, the case of Recife warrants further investigation. As shown in Chapter 2, Recife 
has one of the country’s highest concentrations of violence when measured by 
homicide rates (57.1/100,000 inhabitants in 2011, Waiselfisz 2014, 63). The city is 
one of the Northeast’s largest economic hubs and ranks among the ten largest 
Brazilian capitals, with a metropolitan population estimated at about 3,750,000 
inhabitants (IBGE 2010). Focusing on Recife expands understandings of violence, 
public security and youth safety in the Global South, beyond the contexts of Rio de 
Janeiro and São Paulo.  
Some of the chapter’s guiding questions are: what practical changes have 
occurred in the field of public security since the implementation of PPV? How do 
experts (policy-makers and practitioners) explain the decline in homicides in 
Pernambuco? What, in their opinion, are the current challenges in the field of public 
security? These questions are important and are worth analysing not only because 
they examine recent developments in an understudied geographical area but also 
because they refer to the relation between state and society, which exposes the 
effectiveness of civic rights – such as the right to safety, protection from arbitrary 
arrest and police brutality, access to a fair trial – as they have been enforced in 
northeast Brazil.  
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First, the chapter outlines provides an overview of this current programme of 
public security and police reform in Pernambuco. Second, it begins to examine the 
narratives of state agents involved with this programme, focusing on their alleged 
achievements and the challenges that they face. This leads to a discussion of the 
perverse effects that can be seen in instances where crime control policies from the 
Global North have been emulated in the Global South. It concludes with an analysis 
of the theoretical implications of these developments. 
5.1 Overview of public security reforms  
Most Latin American police forces are notoriously corrupt, inefficient and militarised 
(Chevigny 1995, Frühling 2009, Huggins, Haritos-Fatouros, and Zimbardo 2002, 
Macaulay 2007, Mesquita Neto 2011). As Macaulay (2007, 634) puts it, Latin 
American police forces are ‘plagued by a number of ills, including: corruption; 
militarised hierarchies, organisational culture and training; prejudice- rather than 
intelligence-led policing practices; lack of independent external oversight; and high 
levels of human rights abuses under democratic conditions’. These characteristics are 
not conducive to the re-democratisation of the region and provoke calls for reform. 
In the last two decades a number of police reform initiatives have been 
developed, and implemented in Latin American countries (Husain 2009, Frühling 
2009), often in response to these growing perceptions that the police and criminal 
justice systems are not adequately responsive to citizens, do not provide security and 
justice and are not accountable to the law or to the communities they serve (Mesquita 
Neto 2006, 153). Furthermore, increasingly high crime rates have led to demands for 
improved public security policies and policing (Tulchin and Ruthenburg 2006, Husain 
2009). It is in this context that PPV emerged.    
State actors who were interviewed explained that PPV had emerged in 
response to the extreme levels of violence and high homicide rates in Pernambuco, 
and the growing perception that the public security apparatus and the police urgently 
needed to address the situation. Although over one hundred project ideas were 
proposed in the initial PPV plan, as seen in Chapter 2, and structured around six lines 
of action 21 (PESP-PE 2007, Ratton, Galvão, and Fernandez 2014), only two lines of 
action were implemented. In an interview with one of the sociologists involved with 
the design of PPV in July 2013, I was told that although PPV was perceived as a 
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success for the reduction of homicides, the implemented parts of the programme had 
been focused on the governance of the police.   
It is unclear how the process of policy implementation took place and why 
only certain lines of action were implemented. Although these questions are not the 
focus of this thesis, attempts were made at having a discussion about this with State 
actors and sociologists initially involved with the programme. Neither could provide 
an answer or justification and some claimed that there were some social crime 
prevention programmes, such as the project ‘Atitude’, which provides arts training for 
ex-offenders trying to overcome addiction. Such programmes were very small in size 
and unable to cope with the demand. Thus, the question remains for further research, 
why have social crime prevention programmes received less funding or not been 
implemented? This has become a key critique of the State’s failure to implement all 
of the initially proposed projects. The sociologist Ana Portella, who was also involved 
in the design of PPV, argued that the recent setbacks, such as increases in homicide 
rates, are a result of the lack of implementation of all projects initially proposed 
(Maciel 2015). As Portella argued: 
 
‘Intelligence-led policing and new managerial reforms were successfully 
implemented. The civil and military police work was implemented but the 
integration between the police, government and society has been 
unsatisfactory. There is no sizeable programme of prevention, for example, 
and neither has the human rights agenda been implemented, remaining 
restricted to some of the police training’ (ibid, unpaged). 
 
 Some of the important and not implemented projects relate to: (1) educative measures 
at schools; (2) the failure to create a council of public security responsible for the 
democratic management of PPV; and (3) improvements to the quality of life in low-
income communities, such as improvements to the health service and measures to 
tackle racial violence (ibid). 
The implemented projects displayed similarities to the violence and crime-
reduction strategies developed and deployed in cities such as New York, Bogotá and 
Belo Horizonte, insofar as they focused on the application and management of 
information, crime statistics and police targets. This led Macedo to argue that the 
policy was a case of ‘institutional isomorphism’ (2012, 28), because it mimicked and 
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appropriated governance and social control measures developed elsewhere. Overall 
the policy focuses on the expansion of the use of institutions of social control such as 
the police and the prison, thus emphasising the panoptic model of governance long 
ago noted by Foucault (1979). 
Although many of the projects originally proposed were not implemented, 
investment in public security grew rapidly. Using data from the federal government 
system of integrated financial administration (SIAFI), Macedo (2012, 84) estimated 
that investment in public security in Pernambuco grew by 717.4% from 2006 to 2010. 
However, it is not possible to access detailed information about the distribution of this 
investment, a critique made by the academic Zaverucha (Macedo 2012). Interview 
data and initial evaluations of PPV (Macedo 2012; Wolff 2014) show that the 
intervention focused far more on repressive policing instead of on the social and 
economic projects originally proposed. 
 One of the most visible changes with the implementation of PPV is the 
establishment of a computerised system of monitoring and management of police 
work, comparable to the American model COMPSTAT, which seeks to make chiefs 
of police accountable for dealing with crimes committed in the areas for which they 
are responsible. Police work in Pernambuco was territorialised and divided into 26 
catchment areas, or Áreas de Segurança Integrada (AIS), geographical ‘areas of 
integrated security’. The PPV management committee meets weekly and monthly to 
compare, monitor and discuss data gathered in each of these 26 areas of security. 
Once these meetings are over, the information is not made available to the public 
(Macedo 2012, 101). A number of police operations 22  are monitored in these 
meetings, for example: 
 
1. Malhas da Lei: monitors the enforcement of arrest warrants in operations by 
civil and militarised police. 
 
2. Repressão ao Crack: monitors the amount of crack cocaine seized and the 
number of flagrant arrests.  
 
3. Autoria CVLI: monitors the degree of resolution of police investigations into 
intentional lethal crime. 
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4. CVLI Focos qualis: monitors the number of police investigations submitted to 
the justice system in cases of serious crimes where the offenders have been 
identified. 
 
5. Mandados: monitors the number of prison warrants resulting from the 
integrated work of chiefs of police and the public ministry.  
 
6. Repressão ao Crack 1: monitors the number of drug selling points identified 
by police operations.  
 
The implementation of PPV has also come with increasing use of Situational Crime 
Prevention methods (Clarke 1997, Clarke and Felson 2004), that is, not only more 
policing to reduce criminal opportunities, but also closed-circuit television (CCTV) 
cameras in some locations, electronic monitoring tags for offenders, geo-mapping of 
hot-spots and the placement of ambulances in hot-spots to attempt to save the lives of 
victims of violence. These developments are problematic on a number of levels that 
are discussed below. 
First, three main contested ideologies provide the basis for this model, all of 
which emerge from the mainstream criminological theories of the Global North 
discussed in Chapter 1. These include: (1) deterrence theory (Nagin 2012) through 
increased policing and incarceration; (2) situational crime prevention theory (Clarke 
1997, Clarke and Felson 2004) mentioned above; and (3) rational choice theory 
(Clarke and Felson 2004). The rationale for these theoretical frameworks is that crime 
is inevitably going to happen – unless the opportunities in the environment are 
reduced – because it perceives rational individuals as calculating the risks and 
opportunities of offending. By assuming the inevitability of crime, and adopting an 
approach that focuses on the management of crime, instead of focusing on addressing 
the causes of crime, the model neglects the significance of structural, racial, gendered 
and economic inequalities in motivations to commit interpersonal violent crime. It 
also marginalises the irrational and emotive aspects of crime, such as bravado, rivalry 
and jealousy.  
The second problem relates to the impacts of this managerial model of control. 
The model emphasises State definitions of crime, tending to focus on controlling 
certain crimes, such as drug related street offenders rather than for instance the 
violence caused by corporations in environmental disasters or the persecution of drug 
barons higher up in the hierarchy of the drug trade or even the violence committed by  
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state actors (e.g. the police). The outcome of this is the aggravation of social 
inequalities by targeting the easier to catch (read poorer) suspects. Remarkably, the 
impact of the focus on police work is to the detriment of any social measures of 
security intervention initially proposed by PPV (PESP-PE 2007, 116-140). For 
example, social work, training programmes and employment schemes for young 
people who are likely to become involved with the drug trade and violence.  
The policing and targeting of drug-related offenders (by arresting them and 
seizing their drugs) assumes that targeting drugs equals reducing violence and draws 
more young people into the youth and criminal justice system. Preventative social 
measures should take effect before young people become involved in the drug trade, 
and before they enter the costly, brutalising and inhumane Brazilian criminal justice 
system (Rosenblatt 2012). Therefore, the policy’s emphasis on monitoring, for 
example, the amount of narcotics apprehended replicates parts of the contested system 
of security governance of the war on drugs (Simon 2007). More inequalities were 
revealed in Chapter 7, in the narratives of poor community residents who felt 
criminalised and under-protected in their experiences of policing, and in the 
experiences of people who were victims of non-lethal yet serious violent crimes.  
The third problem is that some of PPV’s operations were circumstantial and 
discontinued, raising concerns about the temporality and unsustainability of safety 
interventions. Fourth, PPV’s structure of governance, for the most part, reveals that 
only data produced by the State or the police are used as indicators for monitoring 
outputs or ‘success’ and police performance, as illustrated above in the list of some of 
the police operations and programs that were put in practice. The absence of adequate 
means of external control is an important critique raised by members of civil society, 
as discussed in Chapter 8. This selective use of outputs for monitoring jettisons the 
importance of relational aspects of policing such as police accountability, citizens’ 
perspectives about police performance and data from victimisation surveys as 
opposed to police data. The consequences and challenges of this approach are 
discussed in the remainder of this chapter. 
5.2 The views of state actors: alleged achievements and challenges 
This section examines extracts from in-depth interviews conducted with ‘experts’, 
including high-ranking state officials involved with the development and 
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implementation of PPV. These include executives and high-ranking members of the 
police – both the plain clothed investigative civil police (Polícia Civil or PC) and the 
uniformed patrolling militarised police (Polícia Militar or PM). High-ranking 
officials were keen to praise the government’s security policy. This is not surprising, 
given that patronage, hierarchy and political connectedness play important roles in 
police and government officials’ promotions and career prospects in Brazil (cf. 
Denyer Willis 2015, 131-132; Pereira 2008, 199). Nonetheless, interviewees’ 
narratives enable an analysis of a hegemonic discourse about security interventions 
and at least illustrate some of the national and regional challenges in the field of 
public security.  
 According to most high-ranking interviewees the governor had been brave and 
ambitious to take on-board the challenge of discussing and addressing the public 
security problem in Pernambuco, as this was seen as an unsavoury, politically 
dangerous and difficult topic. Interestingly, it is precisely the image of doing 
something about law and order that has been attractive to different electorates around 
the world (Chevigny 2003, Frühling 2009, Malone 2012). In fact, as argued by 
Uildriks (2009) ‘all too often police reforms and initiatives to improve the quality of 
policing are the result of opportunistic and political considerations’ (16). However, 
according to all high-ranking interviewees, PPV is not a temporary or politically 
opportunistic project but the first tangible systematic and successful public security 
strategy aiming to reduce lethal violence in Pernambuco.  
During the ten-year period 2002-2012, lethal violence was on the rise in most 
states in the northeast region of Brazil – except in Pernambuco23, where homicide 
rates declined between 2008 and 2012 (Nóbrega 2012, 21, Waiselfisz 2014, 26, 
Ratton, Galvão, and Fernandez 2014, 11). The policy-makers and practitioners who 
were interviewed offered a series of explanations for this, all of which related to PPV. 
This is illustrated in the following interview extract with a senior member of the 
management of the public security secretariat: 
 
‘Having the political will is a start [in order to achieve reductions in 
homicide]. Also, another point is the model of management by results. Third, 
there is investment; we increased [the public security budget] from 20 million 
[Reais] per year to around 80 million [Reais] per year. It varies from year to 
year […] there are plenty of areas of investment that are not included in these 
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80 million, but they are also important, such as training and recruitment. But 
this 80 million is mostly structural investment, such as creating áreas 
integradas de segurança (integrated areas of security), investing in police 
stations, appropriate cars for the police, appropriate uniforms, guns, bullet-
proof vests, handcuffs. […] we have recruited 10,000 new professionals over 
the last 10 years. [….] There are cases when you invest in a certain 
municipality, in all those things, but without achieving a reduction in violence 
and criminality, so something is missing there. I think it is the model of 
management by results that we have applied with Pacto [PPV] that is 
important’ (23rd September 2013)  
 
While experts claimed that the ideas implemented by PPV were innovative, they share 
many similarities with models of police reform in countries such as the US. For 
example, PPV emulated performance management systems, such as COMPSTAT, 
and shared an emphasis on increasing incarceration, just as seen in America’s widely 
debated and contested Zero Tolerance Policing (Bratton 2005, Dixon 2005, Burke 
1998, Dennis 1997, Jones and Newburn 2007, Newburn and Jones 2007, Silverman 
and Della-Giustina 2001, Young 1998).  
In fact, measuring police performance is not new in Brazil either. For 
example, the Minas Gerais police went through a number of reforms in partnership 
with research and academic organisations during the 1990s and 2000s (Ward 2006, 
177-179). The idea of territorialising police work by creating new geographical 
distinctions, such as the AIS (Área integrada de segurança) mentioned in the extract 
above, is not new either. Moreover, áreas integradas de segurança were also created 
in 1999 in Rio de Janeiro in an attempt to better organise and improve public security 
provision (Husain 2009, 77). 
It is noticeable that in the opinion of all the government experts interviewed, 
the results allegedly achieved by PPV were an outcome of investment in more 
policing, including investing in resources; in the tools of policing, such as guns and 
safety equipment; and in investment in the management of police work, such as 
making the police responsible for certain areas and monitoring their targets through 
the State Planning and Management Secretariat (SEPLAG). This raises administrative 
approach raises a number of issues and it assumes that crime can only be prevented 
through the criminal justice system. Social measures, which can prevent crime, are 
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undermined (e.g. the creation of youth clubs, leisure activities, apprenticeships, 
quality employment, better education, educational campaigns, substance misuse 
treatment). Social measures, such as those mentioned, have potential to avoid the 
long-term impacts of the excessive use of the criminal justice system for criminalised 
individuals, for society and for the resources of the State.  
Despite PPV’s managerialism and focus on more policing, its implementers 
deployed a specific narrative about crime, one that assumed that the responsibility for 
crime lies beyond the work of the police; a narrative that emphasised shared 
responsibility among government agencies and society. Once again, this is not a new 
idea (see Garland 1996), not even in the Brazilian context. The federal government 
had since the year 2000 launched the National Public Security Plan (Plano Nacional 
de Segurança Publica) with comparable principles where responsibility for security is 
concerned (Mesquita Neto 2011, 391). Macaulay (2007, 645-646) supplements 
Garland’s (1996) thesis, positing that under high levels of crime, States delegate 
responsibility to other agencies and social actors, especially where radical criminal 
justice reforms are unlikely to bring about electoral benefits. An interview with a 
Delegada in the homicide department illustrates the embedment of this narrative of 
delegating responsibility for crime: 
 
‘Many people think safety is a question to be addressed by the police but 
there’s a lot more to it than that. There are issues around education, sanitation, 
and so on. Pacto came to unite all these elements with the objective of 
reducing criminality in the state of Pernambuco, especially focusing on lethal 
and intentional violent crime. You will hear a lot about this CVLI (Crimes 
Violentos Letais Intencionais or Intentional Lethal Violent Crimes). The fire-
fighters also became involved, there is more planning, and government bodies 
now have shared targets. So for example, lighting in one area may help reduce 
criminality so CELPE (an electricity company) may be involved, or closing a 
bar in another area might help. In summary, we are all [in it] together, with the 
same objective, which is to reduce lethal crime, which has been happening 
over the last few years. […] The state of Pernambuco has been divided into 26 
areas, some need more attention than others. For example, [points to a map] 
this area here, Santo Amaro, was very violent, but now we have about three 
homicides per month there.’ (Delegada, civil police, DHPP, 7th October 2013)   
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High crime rates have led officials to cast doubts on the ability of the traditional 
institutions to control crime. Thus, the responsibilisation narrative has emerged in 
tandem with the acceptance of the limits of the State in crime fighting. This requires 
multi-agency working, an issue that is further illustrated in an interview with a 
military police chief (major) in Pernambuco:  
 
‘We used to think of security as a problem for the police but now it is 
everyone's responsibility. All the different State secretarias (agencies) are 
responsible for security. For example, the secretariat of education is 
responsible too, they need to make sure the schools does not provide 
opportunities for drug use, they need to make sure the school has appropriate 
lighting, make sure they engage the students’ (School patrol, military police, 
16th October 2013) 
 
The process of expanding the narrative of ‘security’ and widening responsibility for 
crime-fighting has long been observed in Anglo-Saxon countries, for example in the 
UK and US (cf. Garland 1996, 2001). This narrative and agenda has been 
simultaneous with the steady escalation of the size and scope of State agencies of 
criminal justice and increases in the numbers of cases processed (ibid) in these 
countries, as well as with continuing international US police assistance, such as the 
provision of police training (DP 2015a, Leeds 2014).  
An example of the increase in the scope of the criminal justice system is seen 
in increasing homicide investigations and increasing numbers of people incarcerated. 
For instance, although homicide investigations may refer to cases committed in 
previous years, the number of cases investigated in 2007 was equivalent to only 5.4% 
of the 4,592 homicides committed that year24 in Pernambuco (Nóbrega 2012, 126). 
Between September 2008 and July 2009 there was an increase of 430% in the number 
of inquéritos (police investigations) submitted to the criminal justice system in 
Pernambuco (ibid, 156). Despite the tardiness of the Brazilian courts in processing 
these cases, 21% of them led to imprisonment (ibid). This is a sharp increase in cases 
brought to justice in comparison to years prior to 2007.  
While a growing body of literature has critiqued the consequences of the 
growth of the penal State (Garland 2001, Wacquant 2009, Cunneen et al. 2013), for 
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the experts interviewed, this new way of working is responsible for the alleged 
successes of PPV. According to many interviewees, a shift in the way the police 
would achieve promotions, was also an important managerial reform implemented 
through PPV. Brazilian public office and promotions are notoriously known to be 
achieved through personal contacts and via a hierarchical structure (cf. Soares 2000), 
but promotions in PPV would (allegedly) be achieved by results, as argued by the 
chief of Pernambuco’s civil police: 
 
‘We began to concentrate on gestão para resultados (management by results), 
and we began to have management indicators. In the past, to reach a higher 
rank in the police one would need around 18 years of experience. But in the 
new model what mattered were results, so this gave young officers an 
opportunity and they embraced the changes. […] This is a change in culture. 
Before 2007 you had no targets, you worked if you felt like it. […] In 2009, 
the bonus system was created, so officers had an incentive to hit targets, for 
seizing firearms and/or crack cocaine, for example. The culture of private 
businesses is now implemented inside a public institution – the police.’ (24th 
September 2013) 
 
The idea that there has been a change in police culture, in particular a change towards 
the ‘culture of private businesses’, as the chief of Pernambuco’s civil police claims 
above, is a crucial tenet of the contested managerial criminology that began to be 
implemented in the Global North at least some thirty years ago (Brownlee 1998, 
Feeley and Simon 1992, Garland 2001). Under the managerial approach, 
humanitarian ideals have been misplaced in the move towards business-like and 
efficiency-oriented policies in which quantitative outputs (e.g. the number of people 
processed through the criminal justice system) have priority over the ideals of 
rehabilitation and social crime prevention (e.g. investment in educational programmes 
and employment and training opportunities for offenders or groups at risk of 
offending). This approach presents dangers and inherent contradictions to the idea of 
‘efficiency’, because, it makes the criminal justice system larger and overburdened, 
therefore more expensive and harder to manage (Brownlee 1998). Humanitarian 
values are also harder to enforce as the following section on incarceration suggests, 
and as seen in Chapters 6, 7 and 8 – in the data emerging from lower-ranking police 
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offers and civil society – which explore some additional criticisms of the managerial 
approach. 
According to some high-ranking experts, another outcome of PPV was that the 
investigative police (civil police) began to investigate crimes prior to making arrests. 
This was an important shift, one that was seen as a new approach in the Brazilian 
context, which was named repressão qualificada, but the idea is simply ‘intelligence-
led’ policing. It entails gathering information before making arrests rather than 
making arrests and subsequently attempting to extract confessions from suspects 
(often through the use of methods of torture). This is expressed in an interview with 
the chief of the Pernambuco’s civil police: 
 
‘Before, the police would go into a favela and kick all the doors down, 
regardless of whether people were innocent or guilty. People in favelas are 
poor, that doesn’t mean that they’re all criminals. Now with this new concept, 
police intelligence began to have value. In the beginning of Eduardo’s 
government we had 6 people working in intelligence, now we have 200 
people. Now the police have a new reality.’ (24th September 2013) 
 
This alleged change implies that the police in Pernambuco are now more democratic 
in the sense that they no longer simply ‘kick all the doors down’ in poor communities 
to investigate crime. But rather, the police now investigate crimes prior to making 
arrests with its increased number of intelligence specialists. This is an important point 
but it significantly contradicts arguments by lower-ranking members of the police and 
the accounts of community residents that emphasise continuous arbitrary policing and 
abuse of force. So while politically-connected and high-ranking state actors made 
claims about the innovations, modernisation and democratisation of the police, 
Chapter 6 draws on data from lower-ranking officials who contested these claims and 
presented further critiques of the public security apparatus. Moreover, the experiences 
and narratives of community residents and activists in Chapter 7 challenge any claim 
that the police have become more democratic, insofar as policing continues to be 
unequally applied, targeting suspects on the basis of their social status rather than any 
actual information that has been gathered. 
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5.3 The limits of current modes of control and of the discourse of success 
Although the dominant discourse emerging from government officials and high-
ranking members of the public security apparatus is that PPV had reduced homicides 
in Pernambuco, and is therefore the sole cause for claims of success, more needs to be 
said about the effects of this program of state building and about the potential for 
confounding causal variables. In a workshop, Tulio Kahn, a respected Brazilian 
academic, connected to the state government of São Paulo, argued that the reduction 
in homicides in Pernambuco, as well as in Minas Gerais, Rio de Janeiro and São 
Paulo, was linked to a number of factors, including demographic changes. According 
to Kahn (2011): 
 
‘The economy's upturn after the 2003 crisis, the progressive reduction of 
social inequality, the issue of the Disarmament Statute in 2003, improved 
police efficiency in some states, combined with the decrease in the proportion 
of young population, among other factors, seem to be stabilising and even 
reducing violent crime in some states. The drop in homicides can be observed 
particularly in the big cities of São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Minas Gerais and 
Pernambuco states, to mention only the most important. All these states had in 
common a large population but a low rate of population growth between 2000 
and 2010. The police of these states have undergone extensive management 
reforms in recent years and have specific policies for the control of the 
homicides.’  
 
Although Kahn, in this analysis, has ignored the role of organised crime in some 
places, such as São Paulo, in monopolising and exerting control over who dies and 
how many murders occur (see Denyer Willis 2015 for a broader discussion of this), he 
did raise important points such as economic growth and demographic changes – 
including a decrease in the proportion of the population made up of young males, the 
grouping most prone to be involved in violent crimes either as perpetrators or victims. 
In fact, although PPV claimed accountability for reductions in homicides, recent data 
show increasing rates of homicide since Brazil’s recent economic downturn (Oliveira 
2015a, DP 2015b). This raises questions about PPV’s claims and the efficacy of its 
methods.   
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Moreover, beyond confounding and contributing factors to the reduction in 
homicides, it is also important to note the effects, sometimes perverse, of methods of 
state building and crime control such as PPV, which raise doubts and questions on the 
dominant success discourse of PPV. The displacement of crime to other areas is one 
such issue. When asked about this potential effect, high-ranking interviewees 
acknowledged the possibility of displacement, including an increase in homicides in 
one of Recife’s neighbouring cities (Olinda), but they reasoned that there is simply a 
need to avoid letting ‘the areas that are doing well stagnate’ (interview with senior 
member of the public security secretariat). They did not posit any apparent concern 
for preventing the causes of crime and, in their narrative, the displacement of crime 
could be addressed by improving and strengthening the repressive arm of the State – 
policing. This approach fails to answer how reforms – based on an unsustainable 
approach of increasing the demands on the criminal justice system and the overload 
on prisons – such as PPV can be maintained to avoid compromising state resources 
and ultimately state capacity.  
Another form of displacement relates to the type of crime committed. While 
cases of lethal violent crime decreased, some experts argued that property crime 
increased, alongside increasing economic development and increasing wealth in the 
city, as illustrated below: 
 
‘In 2006, the state of Pernambuco had over 4,000 cases of murder. Now, you 
can walk around Boa Viagem Avenue [an upper-class avenue on Recife’s 
seafront] and you’re certainly not going to be murdered. But don’t take your 
handbag with you because you’re likely to be mugged [laughter]. […] People 
from poor communities, like Ibura, come here [the upper-class 
neighbourhood] to steal’ (Delegado, civil police, 26th September 2013) 
 
Although the overall homicide rate declined in Recife – in 2002 it was 90.5/100,000 
and by 2012 it had dropped to 52/100,000, indicating a decline of 42.5% over this ten-
year period (Waiselfisz 2014, 39), there remain many challenges in the field of 
security. The rate of 52/100,000, far from a ‘success’, is well above the national and 
international average, and it is also above the rate of murders considered to be an 
‘epidemic’ (10/100,000). 
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Another challenge relates to regional differences. According to interviewees, 
the problem of lethal violence in Pernambuco is different in comparison to larger 
Brazilian cities like Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo. While deaths in Pernambuco were 
also often related to the drug trade in some way, the trade in Pernambuco is less 
organised and smaller than in the southeast (Wolff 2014). By being less organised, 
there is more competition and less monopoly over the underground economy, which 
generates more violence as interpersonal and business conflicts multiply at street 
level. This potentially explains Recife’s higher rate of homicide in comparison with 
other Brazilian capitals (see the homicide data in Chapter 2 and Waiselfisz 2015; 
2014; 2013 for interstate comparative data). The case of Recife contributes to an 
understanding of regional social and policy challenges but it also creates potential for 
a gloomy view of human interaction, bordering on a Hobbesian ‘war of all against all’ 
(Hobbes 1651/2009).  
Another challenge is that these interpersonal conflicts now affect more women 
and younger children than in previous years, through their involvement in the drug 
trade, an issue posed by a delegada from the homicide division of the civil police 
(DHPP): 
 
‘In the past, many women died because of domestic violence, today their 
deaths are often connected to the drug trade […] Often women in the 
communities look for the protection that they can get from drug lords. There is 
a high status associated with being the woman of a criminal. But this woman 
will spend 24 hours marked to be killed by a rival gang so many of them die in 
this way. And in other ways too; when there is a dispute or disagreement, 
people nearby die too. All the structure of the drug trade that you have in 
different places like Rio, you can find here too but in a smaller scale – there is 
the person who will deliver the drugs, the one who will split them, the taxi 
driver who will be involved, the soldados (people in charge of ‘security’ and 
confrontations), the aviãozinhos (literally, little airplane, but meaning a child 
who delivers drugs and messages from the sales point – called boca – to the 
customer). Here aviãozinhos are younger: 6 or 7 year olds’ (7th October 2013)   
 
The perceived increase in the involvement of young people in criminal activities, 
including the drug trade, has intensified debates about reducing the age of criminal 
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responsibility in Brazil (Douglas 2015, Haubert and Cancian 2015). In July 2015, 
parliamentarians in the Camara de Deputados (Brazilian House of Representatives) 
voted against reducing the age of criminal responsibility from 18 to 16 years old for 
heinous crimes, which included drug trafficking. However, after an amendment to the 
proposal that removed drug trafficking, torture, aggravated robbery and terrorism 
from the original proposal, the proposal by the Brazilian centre and right wing parties 
has moved on to a second round of voting prior to be sent to the senate. Age and 
gender, for that matter, have come to the fore in the penal age. The population of 
incarcerated women has been on the rise. The vast majority of these women are 
incarcerated due to direct, and indirect involvement, or simply proximity to the drug 
trade. For instance, they are the mothers, wives, girlfriends and female relatives of 
men involved in the drug trade, who are often the ones present at home when the 
police arrive to search for drugs (Denyer Willis 2015). The delegada quoted above 
emphasised such important regional differences in the country, which generate 
obstacles to policing. Pernambuco’s context posed the challenge of ‘micro-
trafficking’ instead of ‘macro-trafficking’, as argued by a major of the military police:  
 
‘Micro-trafficking is the tráfico formiga (translates as ant trade). An ant 
carries one little grain of rice at a time. Just like that, the young people in the 
community make a sale and then go get a couple more rocks of crack cocaine 
from their hiding spot at a time. If they get caught, they say it is for personal 
use. Throughout the night he may use a couple of rocks and sell 7 or 8, 
running back and forth’ (1st August 2013) 
 
Because of these regional differences, and lower criminal organisation in 
Pernambuco, the police face fewer barriers in entering communities affected by the 
drug trade25, in comparison to cities like Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo. These 
communities in Pernambuco also tend to be smaller and accessible by vehicle, 
facilitating the police’s presence. In comparison to Rio, Pernambuco’s communities 
are affected by the drug trade but are not under drug trafficker control. However, the 
young age of perpetrators and the fact that they trade in small quantities at a time 
mean that policing and prosecuting them becomes more difficult. And, as stated 
above, this increases the numbers of street level disputes, due to the multiplication of 
individual competitors in the trade of small amounts of narcotics. 
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Some experts denied the presence of gangs or organised criminal groups in 
Pernambuco, arguing that the problem of organised extermination groups and gangs 
had been addressed by PPV, while others claimed that only small criminal groups 
remained: 
 
‘There are small groups. Police action has tackled the large groups. Six years 
ago they were far more organised but the way they have found to exist is by 
going small. Most have been imprisoned but occasionally one [or another] has 
been released. In the past, they weren’t just [involved] in [drug] trafficking but 
also in the business of execution/killing). This still exists but in a much 
smaller scale in comparison to 5-6 years ago.’ (Executive Secretary of 
Management of Public Security, 23rd September 2013) 
 
‘There were some [organised crime] groups, like Thundercats, Hylanders, but 
they didn't focus just on the drug trade, they did killings too and other criminal 
activities. They have mostly been dismantled since Pacto started.’ (Civil 
police, delegado G.M., Boa Viagem, 26th September 2013)  
 
Thundercats and Hylanders are two of Pernambuco’s armed organised criminal 
groups. They have been associated with multiple offences, such as fraud, drug 
trafficking, extortion, armed robbery and summary executions (G1-PE 2013), often 
linked to the acerto de contas, that is, an informal type of ‘justice’ or violent 
punishment to settle debts or punish those who have debts in the underground 
economy. The acerto can also refer to bribe arranged with the police in exchange for 
freedom (for more details on the dynamics of the acerto see Mingardi 2000). 
According to the delegado above, these groups have been dismantled by PPV. 
Chapter 7 and 8 contradict this claim with data from the case study communities, 
where residents’ experiences contradict the narratives of state officials. 
Given the regional differences explained above, different policing approaches 
have been deployed. In contrast to the UPPs (Pacifying Police Units) in Rio, the state 
apparatus in Pernambuco did not need to reclaim spaces from the control of drug 
lords. One similarity between the UPPs and PPV is the expansion of policing in poor 
communities, as illustrated by the comments of a civil police delegada: 
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‘The problems here are different. The drug trade in Rio is far more organised 
than anywhere else in the country. They are also better armed, with guerrilla 
firearms. The only similarity [in our approach to public security policy] is that 
here we have the patrulha do bairro (neighbourhood patrol), which brings the 
police inside the [poor] communities like the UPPs do in Rio, except that here 
they come in police cars.’ (Centro, Recife, 24th September 2013) 
 
While in Rio de Janeiro there has been an emphasis on attempting to enforce 
community policing and the UPP police patrol on foot, the type of policing provided 
in Pernambuco is still more distant. Officers tend to remain in police cars rather than 
trying to make connections and establish relationships of trust with the communities 
that they police. Data emerging from interviews with state actors and with community 
residents reveal that PPV has placed insufficient (if any) emphasis on community 
policing. The community-policing model, Policia Amiga (friendly police) in 
Pernambuco, was attempted in only twelve communities in all of the state, and ended 
up associated with increased police abuse and corruption (Wolff 2014, 176). In the 
most notoriously violent or feared communities, patrolling on foot increased officers’ 
concerns about possible ambushes (ibid). Yet the alternative – motorised patrols – 
reinforces the distance between civil society and the State, since officers are unable to 
interact and establish relationships with community residents. The insufficient 
number of officers available to work serves only to exacerbate this issue.  
Another important regional difference is that while police forces in Rio and 
São Paulo continue to be responsible for a number of executions and homicides 
resulting from police action, many expert interviewees praised PPV for achieving one 
of the lowest rates of police killings in the country. During 2007-2012 the 
Pernambucan police killed an average of 31 people per year (Bueno, Cerqueira, and 
Lima 2013, 124), an average of 0.35 killings per 100,000 inhabitants. However, these 
figures are actually higher than in the years prior to PPV. In 2004 the Pernambucan 
police killed 17 civilians, in 2005 they killed 24, and in 2006 the figure was 13 (ibid). 
Official data on police killings in Pernambuco was not available prior to 2004.   
It is important to note that Bueno et al’s (2013) data only included cases of 
police killings of civilians while in confrontation (mortes em confronto) and during 
working hours (thus not including off-duty police killings or other police homicides 
and injury followed by death – because of the unavailability of these data in many 
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Brazilian states). Bueno et al (2013, 122-123) raised questions about the reliability of 
this type of data in Brazil, arguing that more effort and investment is needed to 
produce data that are trustworthy. Nevertheless, in comparison to states such as São 
Paulo (SP) and Rio de Janeiro (RJ), Pernambucan police action seems less lethal, at 
least while on duty and according to official statistics. According to Bueno et al 
(2013) during the same time period (2007-2012), the SP police killed an average of 
479 civilians per year (an average rate of 1.16 per 100,000 inhabitants), while the RJ 
police killed an average of 885 per year (5.55 per 100,000 inhabitants)26.  
One of the effects of Pernambuco’s comparatively less lethal policing is that 
the Pernambucan police have avoided becoming an enemy to low-income 
communities (Wolff 2014, 100). Wolff’s argument is that the somewhat less lethal 
application of police force in Recife has allowed them to avoid alienating people in 
low-income communities to the same extent as in Rio de Janeiro. He argues that 
‘because of this, favela residents have not sought alliance with drug traffickers, who 
for their part remained relatively isolated from local political life’ (66). It is important 
to note that even in Rio de Janeiro where drug traffickers are able to enforce authority 
and influence local politics in many communities, most residents have not sought 
alliance with traffickers because of police violence. Instead, in many cases, residents 
fear Rio’s heavily armed and organised drug traffickers, and have been coerced into 
this alliance by trafficker’s violence or threats (Penglase 2005, 2008).  
Some public security officials who were interviewed claimed that PPV 
achieved the ‘success’27 of having fewer police killings in comparison to Rio de 
Janeiro and São Paulo by, on one hand, including police killings in official homicide 
data. Whereas in most of Brazil police killings were problematically called autos de 
resistência, which could be interpreted as ‘acts in self-defence’, they were not 
included in intentional homicide rates. And, on the other hand, there was a system of 
payment by results, that is, bonuses are given to police forces if their area presents 
low and declining numbers of homicides according to established targets. So, 
according to high-ranking interviewees, every PM officer and chief of battalion 
(Major) will receive a bonus for each six-month period in which the area they are 
responsible for hits targets relating to, for instance, the reduction in the number of 
homicides by 12% (a figure based on international violence-reduction strategies) and 
the number of firearms seized. Civil police received their bonuses according to the 
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number of inquéritos (police investigations) of homicide cases that they had resolved 
and sent to the Ministério Publico (Public Prosecutor).  
Low-ranking interviewees from the military police claimed that they never 
received their bonus, even if they had achieved their targets. They also claimed that 
despite declining rates of homicide it was very difficult to hit the 12% reduction mark. 
Furthermore, many scholars are suspicious of the accuracy of Brazilian data on police 
killings, since the ‘civil police control the state’s forensic “morgues” (Instituto de 
Medicina Legal, or IML), making it possible for civil police officers to hide 
information that could transform a police shooting into a homicide’ (Huggins 2010, 
77).  
Zaverucha (2004, 107) criticises the conflict of interests that can emerge from 
the work of investigative police with that of what should be the ‘scientific police’ 
responsible for forensics. For instance, he received complaints that laudos periciais 
(forensic reports) had been altered to hide evidence of torture suffered within police 
stations. Data about violence thus become compromised at least partly due to the civil 
police control over forensic information. According to Zaverucha (2004, 113), the 
IML remains under the subordination of the SDS (Secretariat of Social Defence), 
which is a police authority, despite the separation of the IML from the direction of the 
civil police. The full autonomy – functional, administrative and financial – of the IML 
has not been established.   
Huggins (2010) hypothesises that the police may be responsible for up to 70% 
of all civilian murders in Brazil as the violence committed by off-duty officers (often 
working for the private security sector or as vigilantes) is often underestimated. 
Nevertheless, despite Huggins’ extensive and influential research about Brazilian 
policing, she presents no evidence for this 70% figure. It is difficult to measure 
clandestine acts of violence by police that have not been brought to justice. According 
to the report by the special rapporteur of the United Nations, Phillip Alston (2008, 25) 
‘the public prosecution service in Pernambuco estimated that approximately 70% of 
the homicides in Pernambuco are committed by death squads’, and these are 
predominantly formed by ex-police, prison agents, active and off-duty police.  
Some recent examples of military police involvement in grupos de extermínio 
(death squads) as well as in drug and firearm trafficking in Pernambuco include the 
case of Operação Guararapes II in Recife’s metropolitan region (G1-PE 2012) and 
the case of three military police officers in another death squad, one of whom killed at 
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least thirty people, in the hinterland of the state of Pernambuco (G1-PE 2015). The 
cases of police abuse of force are not limited to those connected to death squads, but 
they also relate to on-duty officers who have not been caught. When police 
transgressions and brutality are revealed, they do much to maintain the constant 
erosion of public trust in the State and its institutions. The case of a group of military 
policemen who forced seventeen teenagers to jump off a bridge (Ponte Joaquim 
Cardoso) into the polluted Capibaribe River in Recife during the 2006 carnival 
highlights the point. The teenagers were allegedly mistaken for a group that 
committed arrastões (mass robberies which typically take place in crowded public 
places and involve weapons). Nearly a decade after the incidents, none of the police 
officers have been incarcerated, although they are now facing trial for the death of six 
of the victims and the attempted murder of the other surviving eleven youths who 
were forced to jump into the river (DP 2015c).  
In order to be successful, police reform needs to include a number of measures 
beyond changes in police promotion – for example changes in training, and internal 
and external systems to control poor conduct and procedures (Frühling, 2009). That is 
not to say that reforming the way the police are rewarded is not a significant step 
forward. Traditionally, promotions in Latin America have been profoundly influenced 
by informal and personal connections (Soares 2000, Ungar 2009, Uildriks 2009, 11). 
This had the adverse effect of fostering opportunistic professional motivations and 
obstructing attempts to improve the quality of policing. As Uildricks (2009) puts it, 
this notorious traditional informal method of promotion mars Latin American 
criminal justice systems by an opportunistic mentality that is linked to the ‘absence of 
a connection between individual police performance and rewards’ (p. 12). But, as this 
section reveals, more needs to be done to reform Latin American police. 
This section has begun to examine aspects of public security and policing that 
have not been dealt with by new security interventions. It explored the limits of 
current models of control and challenges to its claims of success. State actors claimed 
to have reduced the number of homicides in Pernambuco through the implementation 
of PPV yet they ignored other potential causal factors to this phenomenon. For 
instance, the changes suggested by Kahn (2011), including the country’s period of 
economic growth, the reduction of socio inequality, the disarmament statute, and the 
decrease in the proportion of the young population. PPV’s model – of targeting crime 
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hot spots through policing – risks displacing crime to other areas, an issue that 
interviewees were unable to address.   
The increased focus on deploying the criminal justice system mars state 
capacity and does not deal with longstanding problems in the police, such as 
involvement in police violence and death squads. Methods such as community 
policing, that emphasise the development of relationships with recipient communities, 
have not been successfully implemented in Pernambuco despite the regional 
differences highlighted. Those included the lower level of criminal organisation in 
comparison to Brazil’s large southeaster cities, which facilitates the presence of the 
police in affected communities. One other potential challenge for Pernambuco is that 
the number and proportion of cases of homicide are higher than in the southeast, at 
least in part due to increased competition in the drug trade at street level. By 
emphasising a criminal justice approach in this context, PPV will face difficulties of 
sustainability and saturation. Moreover, the homicide data that PPV bases its claims 
on can be manipulated since the civil police are in charge of the morgues (IML). 
Irrespective of this risk, this section revealed that recent government statistics show 
increasing numbers of homicide during 2015. Further critiques will be presented in 
following sections and chapters.  
5.4 Hyper-incarceration  
The Brazilian prison system has been described as chaotic, repressive and even a 
‘warehouse wasteland’ (Denyer Willis 2015, 56). One of the main challenges to PPV, 
acknowledged by expert-interviewees, was prison overcrowding. Nevertheless, police 
interviewees saw rising rates of incarceration as a desirable effect of their work, given 
that PPV had focused on policing and imprisoning offenders, growing incarceration 
meant that they were doing ‘a better job’ at tackling crime. At the time that the 
interviews were conducted in 2013, officials and senior managers at the secretariat for 
public security in Pernambuco claimed to have no strategy or perceived solution to 
the issue of overcrowding. Some discussions were taking place with regards to the 
construction of new prisons, yet no concrete strategy or plan to deal with this issue 
had been developed. The initial plan of public security, out of which PPV emerged, 
had mentioned the problem of growing incarceration rates. However, none of its 
projects proposed a solution to this, even though the plan proposed that the criminal 
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justice system became more effective at ‘reducing impunity’ (PESP-PE 2007, 63). 
Even the proposed projects that related to the prisons only vaguely refer to improving 
efficiency and prison management without explaining how these outcomes would be 
achieved (ibid, p. 95-96).  
Personal email correspondence dated 24th August 2016, with the Integrated 
Centre of Communication of the Secretariat of Social Defence in Pernambuco reveals 
that a number of new prisons are emerging in the state to deal with increasing 
numbers of prisoners. Those are: the maximum security Presídio de Tacaimbói, 
opened on 8th April 2016 with 676 spaces; the Presídio de Santa Cruz do Capibaribe, 
opened on 10th July 2015 with capacity for 186 inmates; and the Complexo de 
Araçoiaba, which is under construction, with capacity for 2,754 inmates distributed 
over 7 units. There is also a new institution for young offenders (Centro de 
Atendimento Socioeducativo) under construction in the city of Arcoverde. 
As mentioned in Chapter 2, the initial proposals for community conflict 
resolution programmes (ibid, 124) do not seem to have been implemented or at least 
prioritised. Email correspondences with workers involved in the administration of the 
public security system indicate that the means of conflict resolution may never have 
been implemented. The views of these workers indicate that there is much resistance 
and disappointment with the effects of PPV on the prisons, as illustrated by the 
narrative of a senior lawyer who has worked for nearly two decades in Pernambuco’s 
penitentiaries: 
 
‘I am unaware of any planning on the part of the judiciary in the development 
of PPV. I am also unaware of any conflict resolution interventions or 
mediation. What we have today are audiências de custódia (court hearings 
prior to custodial sentences), which were a recommendation of the CNJ 
(National Justice Council). This establishes that the person arrested for a 
flagrant offence is presented to a judge before a decision is made about 
whether they will be sent to prison or respond to their trial in liberty. I 
highlight that this initiative only takes place in the city of Recife due to the 
shortage of material resources (judges, staff etc.). The decision to provide 
gratification for officers who hit targets is absurd. Prison overcrowding is 
unbearable, the state (Pernambuco) has now reached 31,000 incarcerated 
people, but our capacity is for 11,000. This has led to many recent prison 
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rebellions. Another issue is the insufficient number of penitentiary agents. We 
should have at least 6,200 agents but instead we have 2,000. In response to the 
deficit of 4,000 agents, some prisoners are given the role of an agent, given a 
key and the command of a pavilion. That way, any plans to improve the penal 
system are delayed’ (correspondence 20th August 2016).  
 
There is much to unpack in this extract, not least the absence of conflict resolution, 
overcrowded understaffed prisons, prisoner rebellions and the issue of prison 
governance, which is further illustrated in Chapter 7, through the narrative of an ex-
prisoner who was given the ‘key-holder’ role, taking charge of the governance of a 
prison pavilion. A significant element of the extract above is the critique of the impact 
of PPV’s methods on prisons and inmates. According to the Centre of 
Communication of the Secretariat of Social Defence in Pernambuco (email 
correspondence 24/08/2016), the court hearings prior to imprisonment implemented 
since 2015 are leading to increasing liberation of prisoners.  
There is much heterogeneity in the data that emerged from the public security 
system itself. For police interviewees and those involved in the management of the 
public security system, hyper-incarceration was seen as a sign that the police and the 
criminal justice system had become more efficient by processing more cases. 
Nonetheless, the prison population in Pernambuco was increasing before the start of 
PPV in 2007, which indicates that although PPV may have contributed to the 
continuing growth of the prison population, it cannot be the sole cause of this 
phenomenon. For instance, in 1999 there were 7,533 inmates in Pernambuco, and by 
2006 this figure had doubled to 15,778 (PESP-PE 2007; Nóbrega 2012, 64).  
The prison population in Pernambuco, as well as in the rest of Brazil, has 
continuously increased since the 1990s (Carvalho 2013; see also table 6 below). Data 
from the penitentiary census, DEPEN (MJ 2015) show that in 1994 Brazilian prisons 
housed 129,169 inmates, approximately 88 prisoners for every 100,000 of the 
country’s inhabitants. But by 2011 the prison population had increased to 514,582, 
approximately 270 inmates per 100,000 inhabitants (Carvalho 2013, 2). In 
comparison to the national average, which is already high by international standards28, 
the state of Pernambuco has an even higher rate of inmates per overall population: 
294/100,000 in 2011 and 327/100,000 in 2012 (see table 6, figure 4; see also figure 5 
to compare the incarceration rates of all Brazilian states). It is clear that the rate of 
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incarceration has accelerated during the PPV years (since 2007). In 2006, there were 
185.57 inmates per 100,000 inhabitants and by 2012 this rate had risen to 
327.07/100,000. This phenomenon is not unique to Pernambuco or even Brazil. 
Increasing rates of incarceration have been observed throughout the globe in the last 
10-20 years. The Anglo-Saxon literature best captures this development in countries 
such as the US, the UK since the Thatcher era, Australia, New Zealand, and Canada 
since 2000 (Feeley and Simon 1992, Cunneen et al. 2013, Garland 2001, Wacquant 
2009). 
 













2005 17,423 9,437 8,198 220.03 
2006 15,778 5,954 8,256 185.57 
2007 18,836 10,508 8,298 221.53 
2008 19,808 11,243 9,562 226.79 
2009 21,041 12,349 9,675 238.82 
2010 23,925 13,737 10,135 271.56 
2011 25,850 15,177 10,567 293.88 
2012 28,769 18,003 11,478 327.07 
Source: Ministério da Justiça (2015)  
 
Figure 4: Prison population in Pernambuco (2005-2012)  
 
















Figure 5: Rate of incarceration per state June 2013 (inmates per 100,000 inhab.)  
 
Source: Depen-MJ in Azevedo and Cifali (2015, 115) 
 
This growth in imprisonment is not proportional to growing criminal activity. In some 
places crime was dropping while incarceration rates were increasing at 
disproportionate levels, while in other cases both reported crime and incarceration 
rates were expanding (Wilkinson and Pickett 2010, Nagin 1998). One of the factors 
that many researchers have associated with the increasing use of imprisonment is the 
growing social (rather than criminal) insecurity arising from the implementation of 
free markets and neoliberal policies. For example, the casualisation of wage labour 
and the commotion of ethnic hierarchies (Wacquant 2012). The rationale behind the 
neoliberal conceptual framework is that free markets have increased social inequality, 
while decreasing welfare provision, and that these developments have revived a 
number of insecurities, not least fear of crime, which contributes to demands for 
authoritarian crime control of ‘others’, the ‘have nots’, the poor, those perceived as 
dangerous and subjected to ethnic and racial discrimination (Cunneen et al. 2013, 
Feeley and Simon 1992, Garland 2001, Wacquant 2008). These authors argue that 
current social insecurities are therefore coupled with widespread ideologies of 
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individualism and with the increasing commodification of public goods to contribute 
to a perceived need to police and warehouse the ‘other’, the stigmatised populations 
seen as criminal and undeserving.  
Under this framework, the rehabilitative approach to justice was abandoned 
and replaced with a focus on the individualisation of responsibility and accountability, 
and an emphasis on rational choice – all of which dilute the necessity for social and 
structural responses to crime (e.g. improving education and welfare support, 
addressing unemployment). According to these authors, the neoliberal philosophy has 
revived neoclassical concepts such as deterrence and retribution, which have come to 
be central aspects of current criminal justice.  
However, this analysis does not necessarily apply to Brazil, a country that has 
not followed the traditional neoliberal political economy and instead has expanded 
overall spending on welfare and education in the 2000s (Barros et al. 2010, Comin, 
Barbosa, and Carvalhaes 2012, Neri 2009), as argued in the introduction (Chapter 1). 
Furthermore, few would dispute that Brazilian society has been unequal, punitive and 
racially discriminative towards the poor for centuries before neoliberalism came 
about. Instead, the expansion of mass incarceration in Brazil may be best explained as 
an outcome of modifications in sentencing law and practice, the enactment of 
‘tougher’ penalties and increasing punitive practices in sentencing. These changes 
have been driven by popular politics and by mass media influence in triggering 
punitive reactions to extensively reported events such as high-profile cases (Hall 
2014, Cunneen et al. 2013, Carvalho 2013), for instance the case of Isabela Nardoni 
and the case of Eloá29. As argued by Hall (2014), this penal culture is ‘the extent to 
which social, historical and political ideology coincide in the minds of popular media, 
government policy and activism’ (58-59). Penal ideology or penal culture, as defined 
below, has played a key role in increasing sentences in the Brazilian case. 
Azevedo and Cifali (2015) argue that to understand the paradox of a leftist 
country such as Brazil, which had been committed to redistributive policies and the 
reduction of social inequality but which has shown increasingly conservative 
tendencies when it comes to public security policies, namely the expansion of the 
prison system, it is important to observe the role of politics at each federative state 
level. For instance, while the Worker’s Party governed the country (Lula’s and 
Dilma’s governments), states such as São Paulo were governed by the PSDB party, 
which has discursively and in practice enforced a certain style of punitive law-and-
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order politics, promoting heavy incarceration, in particular for drug-related offences. 
These are important localised developments with an impact at the national level, since 
the state of São Paulo’s prison population (207,447 inmates in 2013) is 
disproportionate in accounting for 36% of the country’s inmates although the state is 
home to only 22% of the national population (Ibid). Furthermore, Azevedo and Cifali 
also suggest that in recent years many punitive laws have been proposed and rapidly 
created in contexts of high public demand. Although the number of cases against 
white-collar criminals has also increased, the demographics of the majority of the 
Brazilian prison population remain concentrated in low-income and poorly educated 
individuals who have committed theft or drug-related offences (Azevedo and Cifali 
2015, 119; Carvalho 2013). The criminalisation of activities associated with the poor, 
or with particular ethnic groups, leads to the overrepresentation of these populations 
in prison.  
If the police and the criminal justice system start to process more cases, 
clearly more people will be imprisoned. If the police target specific crimes in 
particular areas, either due to discrimination (by the police, society or policy-makers) 
or due to actual increased occurrences of these crimes in certain areas, more of these 
targeted populations will end up receiving some form of punishment. In this way, the 
emphasis on tackling drug related offences impacts the growth of the prison 
population. This is one of Carvalho’s (2013) main arguments.  
Both Macaulay (2012) and Carvalho (2013) explain that Brazilian legislators 
in the 1990s contributed to the expansion of the prison population with the creation of 
new crimes (extension of criminalisation), and the limitation of rights in the execution 
of sentences, which reduced the number of inmates who could leave the prison 
system. A noteworthy example of this development was the creation of act 8.072/90, 
which ‘increased punishment, withdrew progressive sentencing, increased the term 
for parole and obstructed the commutation and pardon for crimes known as heinous 
crimes’ (Carvalho 2013, 1), including drug trafficking. In 2007, drug trafficking 
accounted for 15% of the Brazilian male prison population and by 2011 it represented 
24.43% of male inmates and 49.65% of female inmates (ibid, 3). Nonetheless, 
interviewees raised an important point about the impact of the crisis of the Brazilian 
penal system (while also placing the onus of the problem of increasing mass 
incarceration and prison overcrowding simply on the slowness of the Brazilian 
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criminal justice and court system). According to a delegado of civil police, in the 
neighbourhood of Boa Viagem, Recife:  
 
‘One of the challenges is that the justice system is very slow. If you go to a 
prison, you will find that 70% of prisoners are temporary prisoners [prisoners 
awaiting trial]. They are still awaiting trial. Most should not even be there. 
This also causes overcrowding in the prisons.’ (26th September 2013) 
 
Police interviewees argued that many of the people currently incarcerated are not 
meant to be in prison; they are prisoners awaiting trial for much longer than they are 
supposed to be in custody. In some cases prisoners await trial for years. The justice 
system is incapable of dealing with the amount of cases to be processed. According to 
some interviewees, it is possible to find prisoners in this situation for 5 years, and 
even 10 years. A number of studies conducted in different parts of Brazil corroborate 
concerns with this excessive amount of time for cases to be processed in the Brazilian 
criminal justice system (Adorno and Pasinato 2007, Ratton, Torres, and Bastos 2011, 
Ribeiro, Machado, and Silva 2012, Pinheiro 1999).  
The Brazilian penal code stipulates that the legal duration for processing cases 
of homicide (homicidio culposo) should be approximately 260 days (if the accused is 
in custody) and up to 310 days (if the accused is not already in prison) between the 
crime being reported and the first appearance in court (Macedo 2012, 33). However, 
as shown in Ribeiro’s (2012) review of studies in this field, the average processing 
time for cases of homicide varies from 707 days to 2,230 days (over 6 years).   
This situation raises a number of concerns about the disrespect for prisoners 
and suspects’ human rights, and raises questions about the perverse impacts and the 
sustainability of methods of public security that overtly rely on policing and 
incarceration, exacerbating Brazil’s multiple existing injustices and inequalities. The 
emergence, growth and effects of organised crime inside prisons has already been 
identified and studied in the southeast of Brazil (Adorno and Pasinato 2007, Gay 
2015, Feltran 2011, Dias 2011, Denyer Willis 2015, Misse 2011b, Nóbrega 2012). 
Pernambuco’s existing situation indicates that the state is likely to follow similar 
patterns, developing societal relations determined and influenced by criminal factions 
such as the Comando Vermelho from Rio de Janeiro and the PCC (Primeiro Comando 
da Capital) from São Paulo. Indeed some researchers already predict that the type of 
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prison gang dynamics found in Rio de Janeiro may emerge soon in Pernambuco 
(Wolff 2014, 96). While these questions are not central to this thesis, they relate to the 
potential for the erosion of state capacity emerging from the State’s own security 
initiatives (e.g. PPV) and from the continuing repressiveness and precariousness of 
the Brazilian criminal justice system. Additional research would be necessary to 
examine these pressing questions and shifting new dynamics.  
The activities and power of gangs and organised criminal groups like the PCC 
are made possible through the prison system, insofar as the prison provides a space 
from which to organise, to foster anger against injustice, and a justification for joining 
a criminal organisation that can provide a network of support, governance, rules and 
survival in the prison (Darke 2013, Denyer Willis 2015, Dias 2011, Feltran 2011). A 
recent geography PhD study by Arruda (2014) conducted in Pernambuco’s prisons 
revealed that groups such as the PCC already have influence over smaller gangs of 
inmates. Arruda (2014, 186) argued that the prison houses the main leaders of 
organised crime and functions as the headquarters for drug trafficking. The 
management of the prison and its inmates is shared between representatives of the 
State (poder público) and the bosses of criminal organisations.  
Many interviewees saw incarceration as the only available method to deal with 
drug-related violent crime. They claimed that the problem of violent crime was often 
associated with drug addicts but that there were insufficient rehabilitation programs. 
Furthermore, in their view, many convicts were not interested in being rehabilitated 
and the extant rehabilitation programs had not seemed successful in restoring 
offenders. This loss of hope in rehabilitation was a contributing factor to the 
increasing use of incarceration, as seen in the narrative of a senior member of 
Pernambuco’s secretariat of public security: 
 
‘This is one of the problems that we face.  The prison population has increased 
a lot. […] Many crimes are no longer happening because people who are more 
likely to offend are now in the programme. They offend, the police arrest. We 
don’t have the means to remove people from incarceration and stop them from 
offending, or rehabilitate them. There are [drug rehabilitation] programmes 
but their efficacy is questionable, sometimes people don’t even want to join 
the programmes […] We don’t have a solution yet, a way to get people off 
crack.’ (23rd September 2013) 
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The apparent solution to crime had rather Americanised connotations. Despite the 
claims that PPV was exclusively tailored to Pernambuco’s context, some experts 
admitted to having travelled to the US and observed the models of policing that 
(supposedly) worked – including zero tolerance policing – as shown in an interview 
with the chief of the Pernambucan civil police: 
 
‘Over the years since Pacto [pela vida] started, the prison population has more 
than doubled from around 15,000 to 30,000 inmates now. On average, we 
used to imprison 50 people per month. Now the figure is around 500. Among 
the successful (my emphasis) criminological policies in the world, I had the 
opportunity to visit New York in 1998 and get to know their Zero Tolerance 
(my emphasis) policing, where they had very high incarceration rate. Here it 
has not been different. We created Operation Malhas da Lei, which consists of 
the capture of inmates. Today we have this operation in each area, there are 26 
malhas, I knew it would go well, in six months we went from 50 to 400 
captures per month. The secretariat decided this was the secret [to success]. 
The secret to success is incarceration. This is our aim (my emphasis). I don’t 
know any other policy in the world that could revert a situation of violence 
without incarceration.’ (24th September 2013) 
 
So, in the narrative of the chief of the Pernambucan civil police at the time of the 
research, incarceration is the ‘aim’ of PPV and is perceived as ‘the secret to success’. 
The question of how success is defined, of course, is important here. The punitive 
rhetoric on crime, which argues that prison works and that this form of punishment 
deters crime, is in conflict with the objectives of effectiveness of managerialism and 
threatens to erode these ideals, since it widens the size of the criminal justice system, 
increasing the burdens on it and makes it harder to manage. 
As Macaulay (2007) puts it, politicians (and the police, it could be added) in 
Latin America are ‘deluded in supposing that incarceration is an adequate 
containment and incapacitation strategy’ (638). The very fact that prison gangs have 
coordinated mass organised criminal acts outside prisons, using their mobile phones 
and networks, illustrates Macaulay’s point. This was made evident and fresh in the 
public mind when the PCC (Primeiro Comando da Capital) gang brought chaos to 
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São Paulo by coordinating riots and hostage-taking in 2006 and during the attacks in 
2012, which resulted in the deaths of 24 military police, 8 civil police, 7 penitentiary 
agents, 3 municipal guards and 493 civilians (Cubas 2013, 24). These incidents were 
not unique. The Comando Vermelho (CV) in Rio de Janeiro has also caused major 
disruption to the city by organising mass criminal acts from within the prison 
(Penglase 2005). While Criminal groups in Pernambuco do not seem as organised and 
powerful, there is ethnographic evidence that suggests that organised prison groups in 
Pernambuco are also in control of operations outside the prison. This will be 
illustrated in Chapter 7, in the narratives of interviewees from one of the case study 
communities, Tourinho.   
 This section has exposed growing support for incarceration among state 
actors. This support was grounded in the loss of hope for rehabilitation of criminals, 
in the idea that the aim of the public security apparatus is to reduce impunity by 
increasing the amount of offenders that are caught and punished. The data from the 
ministry of justice show disproportionately high rates of imprisonment, and raise 
questions about the perverse impacts of the increasing use of this approach. Some of 
these issues relate to the inability of the Brazilian criminal justice system to manage 
the increasing numbers of prisoners, many of whom have overstayed their time 
awaiting trial, and to the abuse of human rights through the warehousing of inmates in 
overcrowded conditions. Beyond these problems, the section argues that prison has 
been an unproven method of incapacitation in the Brazilian context. The method has 
instead contributed to increasing criminal organisation. The following section 
expands on the inherent problems of the ideologies that justify increasing 
penalisation.  
5.5 Zero tolerance 
Many Latin American public officials and political leaders, under pressure to show 
that something is being done about crime and violence, are tempted to try to adopt 
quick fixes from the US experience, which is ‘seen to represent something like best 
practices’ (Bailey and Dammert 2006, 2). According to Bailey and Dammert (2006), 
these ideas are not well understood and may produce unwanted outcomes. They also 
fail to acknowledge cultural and regional differences. Zero tolerance policing, 
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sometimes referred to as ‘broken windows’, is one such example, taken from New 
York and imported to countries such as Brazil and Mexico.  
Homicide rates in New York dropped from 25.6 per 100,000 inhabitants in 
1990 to 8.4 per 100,000 in 1999 and continued dropping thereafter (Young 2011, 
120). When Mayor Giuliani and his police commissioner Bratton introduced zero 
tolerance policing, an aggressive and targeted policing method, supported by a system 
of computer mapping of high crime areas, known as COMPSTAT, crime was already 
declining (Young 2011, 122). But they claimed that their intervention had led to 
falling crime and both Giuliani and Bratton received international recognition based 
on these claims. At the core of their narrative is the idea that the criminal justice 
system and the police can deter crime. The myth of the New York miracle, as Young 
(2011) contends, was constructed by the narratives of state actors and social agencies 
aiming to capitalise on a phenomenon that was disconnected from their interventions.  
Believers in Deterrence Theory argue that the criminal justice system has a 
role in dissuading people from committing crime (Nagin 2012, Onwudiwe, Odo, and 
Onyeozili 2005) and this in turn justifies calls for tougher criminal justice 
interventions, such as the extensive use of imprisonment and policing (Beato 1999, 
Onwudiwe, Odo, and Onyeozili 2005). But international studies have critiqued and 
refuted deterrence theory. According to Beato (1999), there is no evidence that 
increased policing reduces crime. In the US, while both the prison population and the 
length of sentences tripled between 1975 and 1989, this did not give rise to a 
proportional or substantial decrease in violent crime (Reiss and Roth 1993).  
As Dixon (2005) argued, when New York’s crime rates were falling, crime 
rates were in fact declining all over the US.  There is evidence that both high 
incarceration rates and New York’s zero tolerance policing cannot account for 
declining crime rates in the US in the 1990s and 2000s since a number of other social 
factors were at play. Levitt (2004), for instance, presents evidence that the decline in 
crack cocaine and the legalisation of abortion were important factors in the great 
American crime drop. Furthermore, as Young (2011) argues this was not an 
exclusively American phenomenon, crime rates where declining in most of the 
developed world. 
Zimring (2007) argues that no single variable, on its own, could account for 
this phenomenon. He compares the US with Canada, which also saw declining crime 
rates (albeit without changes in imprisonment) and argued that the great crime drop 
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was part of an expected cyclical downturn influenced by a number of social factors, 
including a decline in the most crime-prone age group: 15-29 year-olds. In his 
analysis Zimring also included changes in the model of policing as one of the factors 
responsible for the crime drop, including the introduction of COMPSTAT and 
changes in police management in New York. But he does not include increased 
incarceration as part of the equation. Zimring fails to take into account any cultural 
changes in American society and the impact of the decline in crack markets. The 
ethnographer Ric Curtis (1998) introduced the ‘little brother syndrome’ thesis to 
explain the cultural shifts that impacted the American crime rate. In a nutshell, Curtis 
argued that children, who had seen the devastating effects of gang violence, were less 
inclined to take part in this violence when they grew up. His argument is that this 
generational factor impacted crime rates.  
With regard to increasing incarceration, some countries such as the 
Netherlands and Germany have reduced their prison population and have also seen 
declining crime rates (Young 2011, Economist 2013). In Brazil, while the prison 
population has been increasing, overall crime rates, especially homicide rates, have 
not declined (Dias 2012, Salla 2012, Waiselfisz 2014). These examples contradict the 
mainstream criminological theories of zero tolerance policing and deterrence. 
Moreover, even if hyper-incarceration did reduce crime, questions must be asked 
about what kind of society is being developed if only repression is deployed to 
address social ills. Incarceration is a very costly method of crime control and does not 
lead to criminal rehabilitation (Brownlee 1998). If anything, it is likely to have a 
criminogenic effect and encourage recidivism (Simon 1997/2013, Young 2011), since 
once an individual has been through the criminal justice system and is labelled a 
criminal, chances of future employment and housing are significantly reduced 
(Maruna 2001), and opportunities arise within prison to become involved in gangs or 
criminal organisations (Arruda 2015, Dias 2011, Misse 2011). As Simon (1997/2013) 
puts it ‘incarceration measurably increases the chance that someone will commit 
another crime and likewise makes it harder for the subject to be absorbed into an 
alternative economy of power (like work, but also including family and community 
building activities)’ (p. 541).  
An over-reliance on punishment as deterrent also reinforces social divisions, 
insofar as it promotes the ideology of ‘them and us’, a criminology of the ‘other’ 
(Brownlee 1998, Garland 2001), in which offenders and suspects, especially those 
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from socially and economically marginalised backgrounds, are constructed as 
outcasts, excluded undesirables, whom the rest of us must fear and against whom we 
require protection. This ideology and discourse of deterrence generates a vicious 
circle by intensifying the demand for punishment and social control (Brownlee 1998, 
326).   
The new model of policing that was developed in Pernambuco, according to 
all high-ranking interviewees, entailed a modernisation and break away from the old 
model of policing that had emphasised the characteristics commended by the older 
(military) police service, such as a strict hierarchy and authority to repress suspects 
regardless of whether evidence had been gathered (a system that resembled the 
incarceration of war prisoners). The new police, according to government experts, 
focuses on intelligence-led policing, is better resourced (for example, they have 
greater access to firearms – regardless of whether that is in reality desirable), and have 
access to information technology.  
5.6 Prioritising managerial reforms over the training and structure of the police 
PPV is infused with problematic methods and effects. While it improved the capacity 
of the public security system to apprehend more suspects, not a single interviewee 
said that police training or other crime prevention methods had been emphasised. 
When specifically asked about training, high-ranking officials made vague claims that 
there was continuous training provision. Contradictorily, when interviewing lower 
ranking officers (e.g. soldados in the military police), officers complained about the 
scarcity of training. Likewise, residents in low-income communities believed police 
brutality and widespread discrimination occurred because the police were not 
appropriately trained. In the words of one young man from the Tourinho case study, 
police officers ‘come bulinado (bullied/harassed) from the academy. In the training of 
ROCAM [a specialised military police battalion] they get beaten, pepper in their eyes, 
they get shot with plastic bullets, they have to spend 2-3 days without eating… this 
creates a monster for the streets’30.  
The inadequate training hypothesis seems plausible, but it could also be 
suggested that beyond inadequate training there are extreme and ingrained social 
divisions in Brazil that are used as bases on which to attempt to justify disdain, 
brutality and discrimination. Moreover, factors such as inefficient oversight of police 
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work, inefficient methods of accountability, and the lack of trust in the formal justice 
system’s ability to deal with those perceived as criminal all compound the willingness 
to deploy ‘rough justice’ on the streets and act as a ‘monster’ (as described by many 
of the community residents who participated in this research). These issues are 
examined and made prominent in the narratives of members of civil society examined 
in Chapter 7. 
Police training and challenging the militarised structure were not mentioned in 
interviews as key elements of PPV31. The overall emphasis was on PPV as a 
managerial reform for the public security system. PPV’s initial plan proposed 
‘integrated working’, that is, the idea that the institutions of criminal justice and the 
different police forces, including civil and military police, work cooperatively to 
complete the cycle of policing. Indeed, this was mentioned in interviews when senior 
officials argued that PPV has brought these agencies to work together, for instance by 
having weekly meetings for monitoring targets. These meetings are attended by 
representatives of all military police battalions and civil police stations as well as 
members of other agencies and projects such as: the prison; the drug rehabilitation 
programme Atitude; government statisticians analysing police and crime data; and the 
managers and members of the public security secretariat (SEPLAG). The key 
message and belief from the proposers and supporters of PPV was that managerial 
reforms could reduce homicide.  
Indeed, some of Brazil’s key proponents of managerial reforms have made 
these arguments known in an edited book by Veloso and Ferreira (2008b). These 
authors propose that ‘increasing police efficacy’ (p. 49), ‘speeding the process of 
detention’ (p. 55) and ‘repressive and punitive interventions’ are ‘the leading 
determinants of the reduction of violence’ (page 56-57) in what they considered 
successful crime reduction initiatives in Brazil and abroad, including the cases of the 
cities of Boston, New York, Bogotá, Belo Horizonte and São Paulo. Much of this 
argument is based on the delusion that William Bratton, managerial police reforms 
and COMPSTAT achieved the ‘New York miracle’ of reduced homicides. 
 Veloso and Ferreira have also misunderstood the strategies of the Boston Gun 
Project (known as Operation Ceasefire) by suggesting that a central aspect of 
Ceasefire was the elevation of rates of imprisonment (p. 51). The Ceasefire evaluation 
report, which they quote, clearly states that at the heart of the Ceasefire approach was 
the ‘pulling levers’ framework (Braga et al. 2000, 5). Key to this framework was not 
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increasing rates of incarceration, but rather disseminating a crime prevention 
message. In other words, one of the central strategies was to ‘advertise’ a speedy 
response by law enforcement agencies specifically for cases of violence (not drug 
offences).  
Another important aspect of Ceasefire was the ‘personalised nature’ of the 
application of its framework (p. 20), which included meetings and forums with gang 
members and a working group formed of street workers, probation officers, churches 
and community groups (p. 5). Unlike Veloso and Ferreira, who support the Broken 
Windows Theory proposing targeting low-level crime (see p. 48), the Ceasefire 
approach focused on serious violent crime and on targeting illicit firearm-traffickers. 
As the Ceasefire evaluation reports, key to the success of the approach were the 
efforts of the working group and the circulation of the crime prevention message. 
These Global North cases of alleged successful violence reduction have been 
misunderstood and uncritically embraced by Brazilian proponents of managerialism 
in crime control.  
5.7 Theoretical implications and conclusions 
This chapter has argued that ideologies informed by mainstream criminological 
theories emerging in the Global North have penetrated the discourse and practice of 
police reform in Brazil with perverse consequences for the Brazilian context.  It 
challenged the underlying notions of Situational Crime Prevention (SCP) and 
deterrence through more policing and incarceration that dominate the methods of 
security provision in the PPV framework. These theories are part of a particular field 
of inquiry: mainstream criminological knowledge. Mainstream, managerial or 
standard criminology refers to conservative, dominant and traditional schools of 
thought within the discipline, such as classical, neoclassical and positivist 
criminology32. Focusing on Brazil, this thesis challenges the practicality of these 
theories and their ideologies. 
SCP and deterrence theory have many limitations, not least that they rely on 
punishment (through incarceration or the risk of punishment through increased 
policing and increased barriers to offending) as a deterrent. Punishment is far from 
guaranteed since an offender may not be caught, or they may come to an informal 
settlement or agreement – an acerto – with corrupt police officers to avoid 
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imprisonment. Neither do these theories take into account individual differences, such 
as ‘attention to future consequences’ (Nagin 2012, 68), which is to say that not all 
individuals, especially young offenders, think of future consequences when they are 
about to offend, so the risk of future punishment, for example, would not necessarily 
have a deterrent effect on their actions. It is not argued here that there should be no 
punishment, but that it has not been proven that incarceration is an effective method 
of crime control. Deterrence is a difficult theory to test, given that only those who 
have not been deterred come into contact with criminal justice institutions. There is 
also no evidence that deterrence methods actually reduce reoffending (ibid).  
In fact, scholars associated with the critical school of criminology have 
proposed that removing large numbers of people from certain communities through 
incarceration – a process which has a notoriously disproportionate impact on the 
poorest and most ethnically diverse areas – tends to reduce their resources and social 
capital, therefore making these areas more, not less, prone to crime (Simon 2007). 
Alongside other scholars, this chapter has also challenged the idea or claim that 
growing incarceration reduces crime (Dixon 2005, Levitt 2004, Young 2011, Zimring 
2007). Growing incarceration and the application of SCP against discriminated 
populations contribute to the extreme inequalities extant in Brazilian society and in 
the Brazilian criminal justice system, whereby poor blacks end up over-represented, 
targeted and criminalised.  
This thesis expands the work of critical criminologists (Taylor, Walton, and 
Young 2013), who stand in opposition to mainstream criminology, to an under-
studied Brazilian metropolis, Recife. It considers the perverse effects of managerial 
theories developed in the Global North, which travel to the Global South.  
Accordingly, this chapter discussed some of the regional differences that warrant the 
study of Recife, including the city’s high crime rates, similarities and dissimilarities in 
methods of policing (e.g. Recife deploys less lethal force, and a motorised approach), 
differences in the drug trade and organised crime (which are smaller in scale and 
organisation yet more deadly) in comparison to the more studied southeast of Brazil. 
The chapter drew on the discourses of the powerful to examine how this context and 
the effects of the informant ideologies of security programs, as manifested in projects 
such as PPV, are perceived from the top-down. It drew attention to the increasingly 
high rate of incarceration in overcrowded prisons, and the growth of the deployment 
of repressive measures of crime control (e.g. policing) to the detriment of social 
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measures, providing a critique of the ideologies that make these interventions 
intelligible in the hegemonic discourses of state actors.  
Promoting democratically accountable policing does not seem to be the aim of 
the security project. This would require a change in the focus of governance, from the 
managerialism that emphasises the numerical count of arrests made and drugs 
apprehended to a more discursive model of policing, which would require extensive 
police training and independent oversight of the police. These points have not 
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CHAPTER 6 – Institutional self-critique  
 
This chapter draws on the challenges to the dominant discourse of ‘success’ presented 
earlier by high-ranking state actors, and examines critical and counter-hegemonic 
narratives on the part of other state actors, namely low-ranking police officers. The 
chapter scrutinises inherent and enduring problems in the security apparatus, which 
are noticeable in the narratives of state actors, including classism, racism and 
brutalising training. It argues that these problems, and the unequal social relations in 
which they are embedded, hinder the application of democratic principles in security 
interventions and erode the legitimacy of the State and its interventions. In doing so, 
the chapter complements an incipient criminological body of literature on policing in 
the Global South (Bayley 2001, Bayley 2006, Carrington, Hogg, and Sozzo 2016, 
Chevigny 1995, Denyer Willis 2015, Huggins 1998, Tavares dos Santos 2009).  
This thesis is concerned with the effects of new public security initiatives on 
young marginalised people living in Recife’s low-income communities. In Chapter 5, 
high-ranking government officials and high-ranking police made the case that the new 
security agenda in Pernambuco had been innovative and successful in reducing crime, 
particularly homicide, and that this had benefited all citizens. However, Chapter 5 
also began to reveal some of the perverse effects of the new security agenda and 
provided a critique of the theoretical frameworks and ideologies that this agenda is 
based on. While the reform of state institutions, in particular the security apparatus, is 
desirable in order to foster the protection of the population, these institutions exist 
within a particular set of unequal social and power relations that repeatedly hinder or 
undermine reforms.  
This chapter examines the practical problems of implementing security 
interventions without promoting respectful, non-sporadic policing and without 
working to develop trust in police-community relations. It discusses hidden and 
obscured self-critiques of hegemonic discourses from the perspective of state actors 
who are not politically well-connected, namely lower-ranking police officers. These 
issues are important because when particular methods of security are enforced, such 
as those that have embedded some of the ideals of zero-tolerance policing, they can 
have spatial and social class implications (Davis 2013). Attempts to cleanse the streets 
of groups and communities who are perceived as disorderly, socially undesirable (e.g. 
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the poor and marginalised) can be attractive to businesses and profit-seeking real 
estate developers (influential sectors in Pernambuco), though, ultimately the chapter 
supports the thesis that this approach segregates social space and the polity along 
class and ethnic lines33.  
This chapter starts by exploring key emerging themes and critiques of the new 
security agenda by drawing on interviews with members of the police. First, it looks 
at narratives that reveal the connection made by security providers between crime, 
poverty and substance misuse – a narrative that is part of a broader and enduring 
criminalisation of the poor. Second, it examines some challenges emerging from 
inadequate community-police relations, including lack of trust in the police and the 
resulting impediments to investigations, as seen in community’s ‘law of silence’. 
Third, the chapter exposes corruption, class and ethnic discrimination in the narratives 
of members of the security apparatus. Finally, the chapter explores some of the 
dilemmas arising from increased policing in the Brazilian context and from the 
challenges faced by low-ranking officers, who complain about the inadequacy of their 
training and about the brutalising processes that they have encountered in the force. It 
is argued that new security interventions in Pernambuco and police reform have not in 
fact done what would be necessary to promote policing that is respectful of citizens’ 
rights, intelligence-led, and based on consensus. 
6.1 Blaming the poor: crack, social class and violence 
The narratives examined in this section reveal the development of a counter-narrative 
to the punitive rhetoric about crime and criminals. In these narratives, criminals are 
not portrayed as outsiders who need to be incarcerated and eliminated from the public 
sphere. They are constructed as socially excluded and impoverished people with drug 
addictions, who ultimately epitomise public health problems in the country. This 
construction is paradoxical, as it ‘others’ criminals along class lines since the police 
present classist understandings of the causes of crime. In this narrative, crime and 
poverty are inherently conflated. While the police claim to be just doing their job, 
which is, in their view, to arrest criminals, they do not believe this is the long-term 
solution to violence and crime in the city. Police interviewees argued that although in 
their view PPV’s emphasis on policing could reduce homicide rates, it was necessary 
to do more to prevent the causes of crime. However, this would not be achieved 
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simply through policing.  Interviewees called for a less symptomatic approach, one 
that includes crime prevention through sports and education, as suggested by a senior 
member of the Pernambucan civil police: 
 
‘Look, young people don’t like the police. The police are there to restrict 
them and enforce the law. The country doesn’t seem to have realised that 
young people need areas of leisure; that they need to be at school, that they 
need family and social support. If the young are not supported by society, by 
the church, by the family, they will choose the easy route [crime]. 
Unfortunately, without those things, they will probably end up [involved] with 
the police. We see the success of Pacto [Pela Vida] in reducing mortality, 
there are 1,000 less deaths each year. If Pacto [Pela Vida] wasn’t here, there 
would have been 6,000 more deaths in this process [2007-2013]. I think we 
need a policy towards the young people before they become involved with the 
police. In terms of investigation, we are one of the best in the country but we 
need to see young people as a fundamental piece of the puzzle – they need 
education, football, but what do they have today? Even a football match 
becomes a war’ (24th September 2013). 
 
Members of the police force are acutely aware of the deleterious effects of adversarial 
encounters on police-community relations. As he puts it, ‘young people don’t like the 
police. The police are there to restrict them and enforce the law’. The possibility of 
improving these encounters and relationships through accountability, or striking up 
respectful dialogues, and generating or sustaining opportunities for positive 
relationships and communication is side-lined by a Hobbesian account of a ‘war of all 
against all’, of conflict: ‘Even a football match becomes a war’. Where law 
enforcement is seen as the inevitable way to uphold the social contract, despite its 
alleged secondary role in crime control – as the interviewee puts it crime would be 
best or primarily prevented by social interventions (education, leisure, the family and 
so forth). The public and the young are constructed as dangers and threats in the 
enduring ‘war’ metaphor (Corva 2008, Sousa Silva 2016, Steinert 2003). This denies 
the relevance of the possibility of democratic communication in the policing of 
marginalised social groups. As Steinert (2003) argues, the war metaphor fits into 
dominant ‘cultural values’, insofar as there is an admiration for ‘masculinity that will 
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exact proper retribution for the harm done’ (274). It follows that the ‘warrior’ role or 
ethos (Zaluar 2013) is perceived as necessary in this masculine narrative that 
constructs certain members of the public as criminal enemies. 
For the chief of the investigative police interviewed above, young people turn 
to criminal lifestyles because they live in socially deprived conditions – without social 
support, including support from the ‘family’ and ‘church’, without ‘leisure’, and even 
peaceful ‘football’ matches. Young people are constructed as perpetrators, but never 
as victims of crime or as citizens in need of protection or public security services. The 
police interviewee feels the need to justify the managerialist ideology – PPV’s 
methods and coercive authority – by claiming that it decreases homicide rates. 
However, he does not deny the importance of addressing deeper structural issues, 
which are seen as an obstacle to enhancing the type and quality of possible police-
youth encounters. 
In an interview with a young female chief officer in the civil police 
(delegada), she argued that the problem of homicide in Pernambuco is mostly 
associated with poverty and drug addiction. State actors interviewed repeatedly made 
similar claims. However, data from the Department of Homicide and Protection to the 
Person in Pernambuco (DHPP-PE) show that almost 32% of cases of reported 
homicide are drug-related (Nóbrega 2012, 129), leaving the majority of cases brought 
to the police classified as un-related to drugs. Moreover, given that the police in 
Brazil resolve so few cases of homicide each year (Costa 2015), it is difficult to make 
an accurate association between cause and effect. 
While comparing PPV to other interventions (e.g. UPPs in Rio de Janeiro), the 
same delegada maintained that while PPV focused on tackling impunity and resolving 
cases of homicide, it did not succeed in providing any other type of intervention – 
such as adequate drug rehabilitation or social assistance in the poor communities 
targeted by the program. Furthermore, she also emphasises the regional differences 
between Recife and Rio, where the drug trade is better armed and more organised in 
comparison with Pernambuco. 
 
‘The problem here is mainly related to the situation in poor communities. If 
you ask me today how many people I have arrested in middle class areas, I 
will tell you almost none. The crimes that we focus on today, like homicide, 
robbery followed by murder, mostly originate in poor communities in the 
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periphery. The protagonists are from the periphery. Sometimes, they live in a 
house with no lighting, no food. If it weren’t for these conditions, people 
wouldn’t have the reduced moral values to point a gun at someone else to steal 
handbags. These people are excluded from society. This generates a revolt 
against our society. They will try to include themselves in their own way. We 
have a beautiful seafront, posh neighbourhoods. Then you go into the 
periphery they haven’t even got pavements or paved roads. […] The kids I see 
looking for food in the saucepans in their houses, and crying because there is 
no food – unfortunately they’ll be my ‘clients’ [arrested criminals] in the 
future. Pacto [pela vida] is achieving results but not in relation to the causes of 
crime – in some cases it is not even poverty, it is miséria (extreme poverty)! 
[…] Often these crimes are related to the use of crack cocaine. We need 
preventative policies at the federal, state and local government level to deal 
with this. We also don’t have enough rehabilitation centres in Pernambuco. 
They are all over-crowded. Ninety per cent of the homicides are linked to drug 
trafficking, either as dealers or as users, sometimes it is caused by a dispute, 
drug debt. Once we reduce the population of drug addicts we will also reduce 
homicides, because we will reduce the problem of drug debt and the demand 
for crack. I don’t know if you have ever met a crack addict… they have lost 
their lives and the ability to make decisions. If you ask them any questions, all 
they will tell you is ‘I want another rock [of crack cocaine]’. Crack is a 
disease. This is a public health problem. If we treat it as a problem for the 
police, we will simply overflow prisons. This is not what we intend. But Pacto 
[pela vida] is doing what it can within the limits of the police.’ (Delegada, 
civil police, Centro, Recife, 24th September 2013) 
 
Here we see the association of the problem of violent mortality as one caused by drug 
addiction. Addicts accrue debts and pay with their lives. If only there were fewer 
addicts, there would be less drug debt and less demand for crack cocaine. In this way, 
broader, structural and institutional issues connected to drug trafficking – which is 
organised from outside poor communities, facilitated through financial institutions 
and political actors (Nóbrega 2012, 60), and enriches people higher up the scale – 
become marginal, and the only culprit to be targeted is the drug addict living in 
poverty.  
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In a context where firearms are readily available, where there is a population 
in either poorly paid work or unemployed, and where young people have access only 
to poor quality education and inappropriate policing, the problem of crime is 
individualised to an extent and the scapegoats are a few drug addicts. A wide 
international literature discusses the problem of individualising crime and placing 
blame on certain social groups, particularly young black men (Caldeira 2000, 
Fernandes 2013, 2014, Hall 1978, Misse 1995, 2011a, Sousa Silva 2016, Wacquant 
2008, Young 1999, 2011). So the point here is not to dismiss the destructive impact 
that the spread of crack cocaine can have in a community, or to explore the process of 
individualisation of crime, since this has already been written about. Instead, the 
objective is to examine the problematic contradictions within the narratives that focus 
on structural problems and yet simultaneously individualise these problems by 
placing the onus for crime on individual addicts. These explanations rely on opposing 
sets of values. Ultimately, the emphasis on locating the causes of crime at the level of 
individual failure (addiction) makes intelligible the punitive discourse that is deployed 
to justify repressive policing and incarceration and relegates compassion, restorative 
justice and rehabilitation to the periphery.  
The delegada rightly points out the significance of the crack-cocaine epidemic 
in current levels of homicide in Brazil, as well as some of the continuing structural 
problems in Brazilian society – such as poverty, social inequality and inadequate 
infrastructure in poor communities – ‘they haven’t got pavements or even paved 
roads’. She defends the role of PPV as it is ‘doing what it can, within its limits’. But 
there is no consideration of the type of policing that is on offer to those communities, 
or of the fact that somewhere further up the ladder decisions were made to invest in 
repressive policing (‘arresting criminals’) as the main method of crime control instead 
of investing, for instance, in drug rehabilitation or in other social crime-prevention 
methods (e.g. demilitarised community policing, youth clubs, apprenticeships and 
employment opportunities).  
Nóbrega’s (2012, 93-94) study argues that when it comes to crimes such as 
homicide there is an inverse relationship between poverty and crime. While poverty 
declined and investment in welfare increased in northeast Brazil, the number of 
homicides continued to grow in the 2000s. His thesis is contradicted by the case of 
Pernambuco, where the rates of homicide were in decline from 2007-2012 in tandem 
with reductions in poverty and increasing investments in welfare, as shown in earlier 
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chapters. Nonetheless, Nóbrega does consider one important factor in linking an 
increasing number of homicides with a growing population of young people (aged 15-
29) in northeast Brazil. His data suggest that increasing homicide rates in the region 
are also connected to various other factors including the crack trade, firearm 
availability, alcohol consumption, the inefficacy of the institutions of public security 
(ibid, 37), and the migration of organised crime from the southeast of Brazil to the 
northeast, with many of the drug shipments seized by the police in Pernambuco found 
to have come from São Paulo (ibid, 58).  
The northeast region of Brazil has had a thriving marijuana business, and 
indeed has ideal climatic conditions for growing marijuana plants. In 2009, however, 
the federal police destroyed 1.6 million crops (549 tons) of marijuana in the region, 
and this dismantling of the business is said to have inadvertently stimulated the trade 
in crack (ibid, 61), a drug that is more easily transported and harder to detect. The 
growth of the crack business has been accompanied by a growing number of murders 
linked directly to the activities of death squads, although the impact of death squads 
on homicide rates is difficult to analyse (especially in quantitative terms) since data 
are often based only on killings that have been reported and investigated, leaving out 
those death squads that have not been dismantled or prosecuted (Nóbrega 2012, 126-
138).  
According to Wolff (2014) the spread of crack cocaine in Recife brought 
instability to low-income communities with increases in violence associated with 
crack addiction. Wolff explains that in Rio de Janeiro traffickers have been abler to 
become organised and coercively establish their authority, informal law and social 
control over communities because they have access to more wealth, in comparison 
with Recife. Rio has a higher demand for cocaine from upper- and middle-class 
clients, and because of the geography of low-income communities in the city (which 
are often located in hilly areas with narrow alleyways) police and motorised access is 
more difficult and drug hiding-places more numerous. The case in Recife is dissimilar 
to Rio in many ways. Most of Recife’s low-income communities are smaller, located 
on flat land and accessible by car, which facilitates motorised police action.  
Furthermore, while marijuana was the predominant drug in the Northeast’s 
drug market, the profits it provided were significantly smaller than those associated 
with the crack/cocaine trade. As Wolff (2014) argues, all these factors have made 
drug traffickers less powerful and less influential in Recife than in Rio de Janeiro, 
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including in their degree of control over the local trade, thus enabling more 
competition and small-scale (albeit lethal) disputes. The cocaine trade was never 
really established in Recife to the same extent as in Rio partly due to lower demand 
and because Recife’s gangs are less wealthy and less organised (Koster 2009, Wolff 
2014). As argued by Garmany (2011b), the greater concentration of wealth in Brazil’s 
south and southeast regions ensured that these regions had higher demand and a more 
thriving market for illicit drugs in comparison with the northeast region. Additionally, 
by being better connected in terms of transport, communication and technology, the 
drug market developed earlier in the southeast of the country.    
According to Wolff (2014) by 1998 crack cocaine had started to spread in 
Recife, with the consequence that the city began to experience much higher rates of 
homicides than Rio de Janeiro. A cheaper and highly addictive drug, crack became 
widespread in poor communities. These particular findings from Wolff’s research – 
which connect increasing homicide rates with a single factor: the spread of the crack 
market – are based on interviews with members of the police and therefore provide 
only a partial account of the dynamics of a high-homicide society. His research had to 
rely on first-hand data because there is very little written about drug gangs in low-
income communities in Recife. Nevertheless, this raises the risk of his research 
findings becoming skewed.  
While crack can be destructive and lead to lethal disputes, it is difficult, 
perhaps impossible, to establish a single cause or leading cause of violence in Recife. 
Neither is this the aim of this thesis. Nonetheless, it is important to note that while 
there are regional differences in terms of wealth and geography, between Rio and 
Recife, a number of other factors need to be taken into account in any analysis of 
violence and the dynamics of public security interventions – not least the impact of 
the type of policing provided (or not provided), the fluctuation in public policy 
provision, the spread and impact of small arms, and cultural aspects such as 
machismo and bravado which influence a cycle of personal revenge. The impacts of 
rixas (rivalry and interpersonal conflict) need to be taken into account (Rodgers 
2009).  
As revealed in the ethnographic study of institutionalised young people who 
committed infractions by Drybread (2014) in the northeast of Brazil, socio-legal 
constructions of young people, and emotive and local cultural norms and values, play 
important roles in violent interactions. Drybread’s study revealed that for her 
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participants – institutionalised male young offenders – masculinity was constructed 
not in relation to femininity but in relation to age. These young men committed 
murder to prove themselves as sujeito-homen (man-subjects) instead of children. 
News reports can also provide illustrative examples of the cultural and emotive 
rationale that often affects violent relations such as in the case of Isabel de Souza, a 
three-year-old who was shot in the head during her baptism by a jealous relative who 
had a rixa with the child’s father. Isabel died in hospital (JC 2015). Likewise, death 
squad killings of petty criminals must also be taken into account (Alston 2008, 
Huggins 2010, Ratton 2012).  
Regional differences in violence are important because the type of public 
security policy that needs to be provided must address those differences (Freitas 
2013). Data from the Department of Homicide and Protection to the Person in 
Pernambuco (DHPP-PE) show that almost 32% of cases of homicide are related to 
drug trafficking, 28.2% are associated with vengeance, 20.5% are linked to 
interpersonal relations, 7.9% are considered crimes of passion, 7.16% are connected 
to death squads and 4.14% with fights (Nóbrega 2012, 127-129). These data refer to 
registered homicides. There is scope for inadequate categorisation or overlap, for 
example, if a person killed by a death squad hired by drug traffickers (e.g. due to a 
drug-related debt) or if the same criminal group operates as a death squad and drug 
trafficking organisation, how should the crime be categorised? Quantitative 
classifications can be somewhat blurred. How, for instance, is a fight not classified as 
an interpersonal relation? One important point is that whether or not crack cocaine is 
the leading cause of lethal death in Recife, security interventions (such as PPV) do not 
seem equipped to deal with the root causes of crack addiction, neither are they able to 
deal with crime problems symptomatically, as shown in this thesis. The expansion of 
repressive policing and incarceration as methods of crime control – part of the war on 
drugs in which it becomes the norm to blame the poor, the marginalised and drug-
addicted for violent relations – obstructs understandings of the causes of crime and 
hinders the implementation of democratic values in public security interventions. 
6.2 Silencing the poor?  
So far this chapter had shown that certain narratives about drugs and criminals have 
been deployed to account for structural violence and crime problems. An 
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interchangeable issue is dialogue between the police and the recipients of policing, 
because accountable problem-solving policing requires the public’s cooperation, and 
information emanating from citizens (Jackson et al. 2013, Lea and Young 1993, 
Shiner 2016). So one of the main challenges for the current type of policing in the 
view of police interviewees, in the context in which only the poor are being targeted, 
is the ‘lei do silêncio’ (law of silence, that is, an unwritten rule in poor communities 
that residents will not talk to or inform the police, in other words, ‘no grassing’). But 
if the police are mostly in their cars or inside police stations, instead of establishing 
connections in the community, it is not surprising that people will not inform or trust 
the police. Police corruption and inefficiency, are also factors leading to mistrust, so 
is residents’ fear of revenge: 
 
‘One of the main challenges we face is the predominance of fear. I will give 
you a very clear example. There is a community, in area 5, ‘Alto Jose 
Bonifácio’, where an 11-year-old boy was playing on the steps leading up the 
hill. A guy on a motorbike is going up the steps [riding the motorbike actually 
on the steps] and shoots the boy. His mum and neighbours see it all, and the 
mum runs to him. The man in the motorbike threatens her: ‘You’ll let him 
bleed to death there, you won’t save him. And tell your other son to stop 
messing around in the area’. This mother would not talk. She would not say 
anything about who did this. In a place like this, you’d never get any 
witnesses. If it wasn’t for the investigations, phone taps and intelligence-led 
policing, we’d immobilised. The way we investigate has improved.’ 
(Delegada, Civil Police, Imbiribeira DHPP, 7th October 2013) 
 
How do the police obtain information if people refuse to talk to them? According to 
police interviewees, occasionally an informer will come forward, but the delegada 
claimed that there is a need for covert police operations, such as telephone tapping, as 
people in poor communities are too scared to inform the police. This is a significant 
issue for the Pernambucan police and for many other police forces in Latin America. 
Moreover, as well as fear, as Denyer Willis (2015, 71) points out, lack of trust in the 
Brazilian justice system discourages witnesses from stepping forward, making it 
difficult to resolve cases, particularly homicide, leaving investigations either 
obstructed or reliant on indisputable evidence such as security camera footage, where 
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this is available. Other resources include anonymous tips and fingerprints, although 
these are hardly reliable or available, especially hard scientific evidence (such as 
fingerprints and DNA samples), given that the police generally hear about cases long 
after the crime has occurred, are slow to respond to calls, and usually do not even 
bother to isolate the crime scene with cordons (cf. Garmany 2013, Denyer Willis 
2015).  
In authoritarian regimes the police enforce security and conduct investigations 
by instilling fear, through brute and unrestricted force, often using torture, but these 
methods are unwarranted in democratic regimes, although they continue to be used34 
(Huggins 2010, Zaverucha 2004). As would be expected, none of the police 
interviewees acknowledged the continuing use of any methods of torture. However, 
recent media reports – for instance concerning the kidnapping and torture of a law 
student by civil police; instruments of torture found in a Pernambucan prison; and 
cases of torture in juvenile detention centres (Cavalcanti 2011, JC 2013, Machado 
2011) – and first-hand accounts from interviews conducted in low-income 
communities suggest otherwise, as will be illustrated in Chapter 7. In a democratic 
society the police can only attempt to provide security and carry out investigations 
through means that are respectful of citizens’ human rights, in cooperation with the 
public and with their consent (Jackson et al. 2013, Shiner 2016, Uildriks 2009, 16). So 
the lack of dialogue between the police and the public, and the factors and relations 
that silence the poor – fear of retaliation, sporadic police presence, motorised distant 
policing, mistrust – are some of the problems that obstruct cooperative police-citizen 
relations and the implementation of democratic public safety interventions. 
6.3 Ethnic, gender and class discrimination 
This section reveals that programmes of security and police reform such as PPV have, 
instead of addressing long-standing problems of segregation and discriminatory 
policing, aggravated these issues, further restricting access to public space and social 
relations along class, gender and ethnic lines. In the first part of this chapter 
interviewees blamed the poor for violence by talking about criminals as impoverished 
drug addicts and people who refuse to cooperate and communicate with the police due 
to fear. In this section, a moralising narrative about the poor is observed in 
interviewees’ opinions about crime. In all cases, poverty and crime are discursively 
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linked, in the latter in a more discriminatory narrative that directly criminalises poor, 
mulato and black people. The evidence emerging from interviews with members of 
the police and with residents in low-income communities indicates that both social 
class and ‘race’ were mobilising factors in police-community interactions. This is not 
a surprising finding – it is well backed up by the Brazilian and the international 
literature (Barros 2008, Bowling and Phillips 2007, Goodman and Ruggiero 2008, 
Hall 1978, Wacquant 2008, Zaluar 2004a) – but nevertheless it is a rather enduring 
and bleak one. What is distinctive in the evidence here presented is the extent of 
discrimination, disdain and ethnic and social class divisions in the ways in which 
community-police relations took form in Pernambuco, despite efforts to reform the 
police.  
The police are the most visible state institution, the ‘State on the streets’ 
(Hinton 2006). Yet, the very nature of police work can enforce social distinctions and 
social divisions by enforcing the law against certain citizens in order to protect others. 
This generates an unequal distribution of public safety. While some citizens receive 
police protection, others are the targets of police repression. This imbalanced 
provision of security and the way it affects diverse social groups is what González 
(2014, 24) calls ‘micro-citizenships’, which is to say constrained or fragmented 
citizenships. The concept refers not only to the imbalance in the receipt of security 
provision, but also to its consequences, such as the likelihood that some citizens will 
refrain from public space and community participation due to fear of crime and 
inadequate protection, and also the likelihood that some groups will resort to extra-
legal measures or ‘take the law in their own hands’.  
At the very least, the unequal distribution of policing and disproportionate 
policing tactics – such as police racial profiling, verbal and physical confrontation 
with residents of poor communities – generate resentment and hostility towards the 
methods of the police. The next chapter shows in more detail that this was a key 
concern for residents, who demanded to be treated with respect and dignity, but 
instead felt vulnerable to discriminatory and disproportionate policing practices.  
Although in theory the police have the job of protecting any citizen in need 
and enforcing the law against perpetrators, in reality by targeting specific groups – for 
instance due to societal or institutional misconceptions and prejudice against 
particular groups or because a particular type of crime, prominent among certain 
social groups (e.g. drug-related offences instead of tax evasion or police violence) is 
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targeted – the State and its repressive arm, the police, generate the fragmentation of 
citizenships (González 2014, Neocleous 2000). However, this fragmentation is not 
simply caused by enforcing the law to protect some groups of citizens against other 
citizen groups, but also by societal prejudice and decisions about enforcing certain 
laws and prioritising certain crimes (that is, when the State decides to enforce the law 
or when it enacts surveillance). 
Class discrimination is embedded into everyday interactions, in everyday talk, 
in the way spaces in the city are organised. It is widespread in Brazilian society in a 
way that is taken for granted by Brazilians. However, for an outsider, the way it 
occurs seems less subtle. In an interview with a high-ranking officer from the military 
police (major) we talked about the type of violence and drug trafficking that occurs in 
the communities that he polices. He complains that the trendy new musical style in 
the community only attracts poor people to the area, and is nostalgic about the days 
when the clubs in the community played samba and attracted an upper-class clientele. 
He directly associates violence with poverty. Even the personal taste of the poor (e.g. 
brega music) is allegedly a cause for violence:  
 
‘We have this disorderly occupation [housing] in the morros [hillside 
communities], abandoned by the State. […] There is a lack of structure, lack 
of investment, lack of culture. They have a life that is different to the rest of 
the city. It is a different reality. If you walk past, [you will see that] these are 
party people. Sunday to Sunday there is always beer on the bar tables, the 
music is created in the community, those bregas [type of music]. It is mostly 
young people who are out and about. The other thing is that now it is natural 
here for women to be the mother and the father in the household. They get 
pregnant and they themselves raise the kids. So what happens is, in these 
parties, there are a lot of drugs, some people are addicted, others use them 
regularly. In the past, the clubs in these communities played samba, now it is 
just brega. I have already talked to them to put the samba back on but they 
choose brega. It is a culture shock really. In the past, we had Martinho da 
Villa, Zeca Pagodinho [famous samba artists], the people that would come to 
these parties were upper class, you could tell, because they were coming from 
Boa Viagem [upper-class neighbourhood], and you could tell by their nice 
cars. With these people, there is no type of violence, no fights, no theft. But 
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some people are seduced into the hill by young women that have active sexual 
lives, and then there are the traffickers, this is when violence occurs.’ (Major, 
military police, 1st August 2013) 
 
The major’s view places the blame for violence on poor young women and families 
perceived as dysfunctional. As he puts it, first, these women get pregnant (almost 
mysteriously, as the role of men in reproducing is neglected here), then they raise the 
children themselves – implicitly, these are the children who then become offenders. 
Then, these women, in his narrative, seduce people into the community, where once 
again, mysteriously violence occurs when presumably ‘seduced’ people encounter 
drug traffickers. Young women are thus constructed as a ‘moral danger’ and young 
men as ‘criminals’ (Loader 1996, 48). The interstices of the asymmetrical power 
relations with regard to gender, class and age are mixed and meshed in a narrative that 
simply criminalises people in the peripheries of the city.  But the nature of the major’s 
rhetoric does little to explain crime and much to place culpability on the victims of 
multiple forms of structural violence. 
 Even the musical taste of these populations, or any expression of their culture, 
is blamed and associated with violence. As social scientists have argued (Bourdieu 
1984, Skeggs 1997, 2004) judging the tastes of the working class and the poor is a 
method of enforcing social distances and segregation by the dominant social classes. 
For Bourdieu, the mechanism through which the dominant classes naturalise their 
representations and ideas is defined as ‘symbolic violence’ and is developed by 
institutions and agents of authority. However, the association of crime with poverty, 
and the repression and criminalisation of activities associated with the poor, is not 
new in Brazil, as illustrated by the work of Holloway (1989) on the criminalisation of 
capoeira and the work of Chazkel (2011) on the jogo do bicho (a form of informal 
gambling known as ‘the animal game’). The behaviour and activities of lower classes 
in Brazil have historically been perceived by elites as distasteful and threatening, 
often leading to brutal reactions, surveillance and control by police (Holloway 1993). 
Just as Denyer Willis (2015) notes, ‘poor black and brown men have been – and are – 
the subjects of the social processes that criminalise bodies and spaces, alternatively 
called structural, everyday, institutionalized, or symbolic violence’ (9). 
Some officials admitted the problems of class and ethnic discrimination in the 
police at an institutional level, as well the problem of police corruption, and argued 
Roxana Pessoa Cavalcanti 
 142 
that more police are now dismissed due to this. While other officers denied 
discrimination or dismissed its extent, every official interviewed associated crime 
with poverty, and often with one’s ethnicity, as shown in the extract below, where a 
homicide detective, a delegada at the Department of Homicide and Protection of 
Persons civil police station, argues that poor black people are the main ‘recruits’ for 
criminal lifestyles.  
 
‘Nobody likes the police. If I said that there is no corruption in the police and 
no discrimination in relation to race and class, I would be lying. But now we 
have a lot more officers being dismissed. There is prejudice everywhere. But 
here today the ‘marginal’ [criminal] doesn’t have a stereotype anymore, a 
stereotype of colour. […] But If I said that this is not a problem anymore I 
would be lying; it is the poor and black people that are still victims of this 
recruitment [into crime], unfortunately they are still the main actors in the 
practice of crime. If the police were just walking about the streets wearing 
uniforms, preventative police, people would like that. But if you go to make 
arrests, invade a community at night, knock down some doors to make an 
arrest, nobody likes that. There is no harmony in this relationship – of course 
not! But there is no guerrilla [referring to the inexistence of independent 
armed groups taking part in fighting against the police]. There are exchanges 
of bullets between criminals and police but more in cases of retaliation, not 
simply because the police went into the community, this is rare’ (Delegada, 
civil police, DHPP, 7th October 2013)  
 
Once again, crimes of the powerful, white-collar crimes and crimes committed by the 
police themselves are not considered. According to the delegada, ‘poor and black 
people’ are ‘still the main actors in the practice of crime’. This association of crime 
with poverty is well documented in Brazil, as discussed in Chapter 2. There is a body 
of literature focusing on critiquing this social representation (see also Nóbrega 2012, 
Beato and Reis 2000). The delegada notes the type of policing that is delivered to 
those perceived as criminal, that is repressive policing. As she puts it, making ‘arrests, 
invading a community at night, and knocking down doors’, all of which causes 
friction and disdain for the police.  
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In a study of racial profiling in the Pernambucan police, Barros (2008) 
conducted a survey with 923 participants (454 in training and 469 already working for 
the military police), 24 interviews and looked at 1,538 Boletins de Ocorrência 
(registered police crime records), he found that most officers (65%), most trainee 
officers (76.9%) and students in the school for non-commissioned officers (74%) 
believed that black or mixed race people are targeted during stop-and-searches. In line 
with the delegada’s views above, this approach (targeting on ethnic and class 
grounds) generates widespread distrust and dislike for the police. The distrust, disdain 
and dislike often emerge because of the police’s involvement with corruption and 
discriminatory practices. But rather than being unique to the police, such problems are 
endemic at most levels of the Brazilian state (Hinton 2006, 11) and, it could be 
argued, at most levels of Brazilian society. Police reforms and the implementation of 
PPV have not dealt with these issues. Although according to interviewees a number of 
dismissals due to corruption have occurred, the training of police and current internal 
oversight systems have not focused on addressing the lack of police accountability, 
institutional racism, classism and corruption in the force. 
6.4 Rolling out policing 
The expansion of policing has the potential to drain state capacity and resources. An 
issue that was emphasised in many experts’ narratives was the need to recruit more 
and new staff since PPV had achieved results by focusing on cases of homicide; 
additionally, by dealing with cases of murder within 24 hours of their occurrence. For 
experts, the regular monitoring of police targets and the bonus system for 
achievement were also central to PPV’s achievements, but the achievement of targets 
depended on the police being well staffed: 
 
‘We don’t have enough officers. I have 740 officers in my battalion. Just one 
of the neighbourhoods we police has 11,000 inhabitants. We should have at 
least one officer for every 100 inhabitants to be able to act. In total my 
battalion polices an area of nearly 200,000 people. Also bear in mind that 
officers also take holidays, get ill and pregnant, so effectively, we have even 
fewer.’  (Major, military police, 1st August 2013) 
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Complaints about the insufficient number of police officers were also common in 
interviews with the civil police. Yet, policing has increased, and armed militarised 
police are even present inside public schools. This topic has raised much debate in 
Pernambuco, as well as internationally (Kupchik 2016). Research studies in the US 
have found that bringing police inside schools tends to increase the chances that 
young people will be arrested for minor behaviours and leads to poorer care for young 
people (ibid, unpaged). In other words, more policing means more criminalisation. 
Moreover, police officers end up being asked to provide wider services, such as 
dealing with family crises and the effects of childhood trauma, without being 
adequately trained for this (ibid). One interviewed major chose a medical metaphor to 
explain his view of the need for armed policing in schools: 
 
‘Look, the gun is the tool of work for the police, just as the scalpel is a tool for 
the surgeon. But today the biggest ‘gun’ that we have is the spoken word and 
dialogue.’ (Major, school patrol, military police, 16th October 2013) 
 
According to the major, the school patrol had been established prior to PPV and was 
seen as an essential aspect of policing. Schools, in particular state funded schools, had 
become besieged with firearms and with the spread of the drug trade – students were 
both dealing and using drugs at school – often this led to violent, and sometimes 
lethal, conflict at schools, generating a perceived need for policing. Yet, for the 
major, the school patrol did not just provide repressive law enforcement, it also 
became involved with educational work, including preventative talks to discourage 
young people from using and dealing drugs and encouraging them to participate in 
artistic and sport activities instead. These non-adversarial dialogues were seen as 
necessary to create opportunities to befriend young people and build positive 
relationships between the police and the young. 
 
‘[The school patrol] started a few years before Pacto [pela vida], around the 
year 2000, during the government of Jarbas. We provide motivational talks at 
schools, sometimes music, many of our officers are musicians or sports 
people. We try to dissuade young people, as parents ourselves, from becoming 
involved in a life in drugs’ (Major, school patrol, military police, 16th October 
2013) 
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Despite the ‘armed police at school’ polemic, young people in the schools that I 
visited during the fieldwork, enjoyed the art and sport activities provided by the 
school patrol. In one particular school, young people had developed strong 
relationships with two well-liked officers who visited the school unarmed to provide 
talks and anti-drug motivational courses, but this was a small initiative with only two 
officers involved.  
6.5 Soldiers  
This section explores the strongest self-critique of the public security system, which 
emerged from interviews with soldados (‘soldiers’, the lowest and initial rank in the 
militarised police force; those who patrol the streets). Their critique was centred on 
the inadequacies of the methods and ethos of policing in use, on the fallacies of 
brutalising training and working conditions, which they viewed as a form of 
socialisation of police to be violent. Among the interviewees, while the high-ranking 
officials involved with PPV for the most part praised the government and PPV itself, 
officials further down the hierarchy tended to be more critical of the programme.  
Interviews conducted with low-ranking military police officers were arranged through 
a contact established a few years ago in one of the case-study communities. This set 
of interview data was very different from the data gathered from interviews arranged 
through a snowballing method with higher-ranking officers. The interviews were 
more critical of the government’s approach to crime control. At times, the officers 
asked to stop voice-recording them, especially when they wanted to talk about issues 
that could lead to their detention for disciplinary action, since the militarised police 
continue to abide by a military code of conduct. This was most evident when they 
discussed data mishandling, violence and corruption in the police:  
 
Roxana – ‘How has Pacto pela Vida changed the work you do?’ 
 
Officer Júlia – ‘We have targets, like reducing homicides, but the ethos is still 
the same. Our boss wants us to be out on the streets dando tapas (slapping 
people), they don’t understand that a lot of the work we could do is 
preventative, we could instead be talking to young people and doing some 
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educational work about drugs and guns. Our boss is not interested in that. How 
can we reduce homicide with oppressive work? We are hardly trained to use a 
gun… I think I got a chance to try using one once in my training.’ 
 
Interviewees claimed to have had hardly any firearms training and yet were given a 
gun to carry. Júlia’s partner also said ‘I think I got to shoot a gun once during training, 
some people didn’t even get one chance as there wasn’t enough ammunition’ 
(military police soldado Júlio, July 2013). While researchers have debated the 
variation in the training and use of armaments across nations, for instance, in the US 
officers are taught to shoot at the centre of mass and in Sweden police are taught to 
shoot at a suspect’s legs (Maguire 2010, 200), the idea that a military police officer in 
Brazil can receive a gun to work with after having had hardly any training handling 
firearms raises concerns about the potential for more widespread and serious misuse 
of armaments and force. Furthermore, there is a danger that State use of violence can 
fulfil the ‘brutalisation hypothesis’, which is the idea that state violence can 
encourage or be used to justify more violence by the general population (Maguire 
2010, Shepherd 2005).  
 
Roxana – ‘Really? So what was the rest of the training like?’ 
 
Officer Júlia – ‘We have had hardly any training. I think we had about 4 
months when we started a few years back. Most of the people who started with 
me have dropped out. One attempted suicide. We didn’t get our pay for a 
while; some people couldn’t afford the bus or food during training. It was 
quite a brutalising experience. You are treated with very little respect, you are 
shouted at, and your skills are not really put into use. I have a degree but have 
never used these skills at work.’  
 
While officers like Julia criticised police training – both its quality and availability – 
higher-ranking officials had claimed that the police were no longer trained to be brutal 
and violent, and that they were now in the service of communities rather than the 
State. There is a stark contrast between the claims made by the less powerful low-
ranking and the more powerful and politically connected high-ranking officers. 
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‘In the past we focused on serving [interests of] the State. So if we caught 
someone on the streets we would give them a beating. I am saying this 
because it is the reality. The police would kill. ‘Ah [if we come across] bandits 
we kill them’, and that [approach] was seen as OK. People themselves would 
celebrate if a bandit was killed. But there has been an evolution in society. 
Things have changed with Pacto. Before, alcoholism was very common in the 
force, even in high-ranks. But, in 2004, we had this national training, which 
included a human-rights module. In 2007, Pacto started and it aims at 
preserving life, not killing. Today you have a different type of police. The 
police battalion that hits targets [of reducing homicide] will get a prize, a 
bonus at the end of the semester, say R$3,000 (approximately £700 at the time 
of the interview) for an official, R$1,500 for a soldado (initial rank in the 
military police). Pacto has been saving lives. […] If you ask me, how many 
people have been killed by the police in my battalion since the start of Pacto, I 
can tell you, less than 10 people. That is a large difference in comparison to 
the 1990s.’ (Major, military police, 1st August 2013) 
 
As seen in the two extracts above, while many high-ranking officials had argued that 
the police had become more humane under PPV and that the ethos of the police was 
no longer to kill, eliminate or beat criminals, lower-ranking officers casted doubt on 
the impact of brutalising police training. The initial plan of public security in 
Pernambuco had proposed a number of reforms. This included police training, such as 
training in harm reduction for 2% of officers in the military police (PM) and civil 
police (PC) (PESP-PE 2007, 114) and the training of 16% of officers within 4 years, 
in courses about: human rights, firearms, public law, violence against women, ethnic 
and racial relations, prevention and mediation of conflict (ibid, 112-113). The data 
emerging from interviews with officers suggests that either training proposals were 
not implemented, or they failed to reach a significant or sufficient part of the police 
force. Given that officers are equipped with firearms and continuously deal with 
issues that affect human rights, these training courses and refresher courses should 
reach all relevant members of the police.  
A recent study conducted by a member of the military police in Brazil 
corroborates the deleterious impact of these contradictions, revealing increasingly 
emerging critiques within the police and the denial of their importance by older 
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generations within the police (França and Gomes 2015). As França and Gomes argue, 
the warrior ethos within the PM training continues to take precedence over the 
development of skills in negotiation and respect for human rights. The experiences of 
suffering and physical punishment in police training instigate the military pedagogy 
and mentality that lauds values associated with masculinity and the use of force, thus 
contributing to the enactment of police violence on the streets (ibid). 
When residents in low-income communities did have contact with the police, 
it was the military ethos of the patrolling police that prevailed – the police were 
violent and abusive towards residents – practices that resonate with the hazing in 
police training (Huggins, Haritos-Fatouros, and Zimbardo 2002, 148) that is still 
predominant as argued by the PM soldados interviewed. Huggins’s et al show that 
hazing in police training was significant to the creation of acceptability of violence 
(Huggins, Haritos-Fatouros, and Zimbardo 2002). According to Huggins, physically 
and psychologically punishing exercises, detention for failure to obey to arbitrary 
authoritarian commands, abusive name-calling and status degradation were all part of 
the dehumanising militarised police training in Brazil during the military dictatorship 
years (1964-1985). According to my research participants in low-ranks of the PM, 
beyond the re-democratisation of Brazil, these same aspects of police training remain 
present in the militarised police. 
Officers argued that the training they were subjected to was brutalising and 
did not prepare them to deal with civil society. They argued that among the initial 
recruits who started with them, most had decided to leave the police before their 
training had ended, seeing that this type of work ‘was not for them’. One trainee had 
committed suicide, most suffered from anxiety and stress related to the training, work 
and to bullying from superiors. Six trainees died during interviewee’s training course 
in car accidents and run over in front of their battalion. According to interviewees, 
this happened because they were under pressure to return to training on time but were 
not given enough time to return to the battalion after being out on the streets.  
Interviewees also reported that there were months of delay between starting 
their training and getting their first salary; many had to survive in a situation of severe 
poverty, with no money for transport, accommodation or food. One trainee had come 
from the interior of the state and having no payment, no family or friendship networks 
to support him in the city, he would walk miles after training until the nearest hospital 
where he would check himself in, this was both his accommodation and a place to 
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receive some form of nutrition – he received soro (intravenous hospital serum), as he 
could not afford to buy any food. What these examples show is that the institution of a 
culture of brutalisation in the police as an institution is not generated on the streets, 
but rather it is present and ingrained from within, noticed in the very beginning of 
officers’ recruitment and training. The provision of basic police rights is significant to 
any police force or state that wants to reform because ‘ultimately human rights values 
can only be expected to be internalised by police if, they are treated likewise’ 
(Uildricks 2009, 14). 
Another problem with their training, according to participants, was that it was 
inconsistent and not available for all officers. For example, some officers had not 
received any training for 4 years, since they started working for the police. However, 
some of their colleagues had been selected and sent to further training courses. This 
privilege, they explained, was not universal as there were not enough officers to patrol 
each area, so further training would take them away from urgent patrolling duties. 
They explained that there had been some changes in the curriculum of the last set of 
recruited police officers, including the addition of a module on community policing. 
The officers interviewed had not received this training. They did not believe that their 
training could prepare them for policing civilian communities.  
This is an important difference in comparison to Huggins’s et al (2002) 
research. While in Violence Workers many officers had accepted the status quo, and 
became executioners, torturers or atrocity facilitators, my low-ranking participants 
critiqued the police force’s training and practices and viewed those as archaic and in 
need of reform. This does not deny the role of hazing in police training in shaping the 
outcomes of the type of policing that is enacted on the streets. Many residents, as seen 
in the next chapter, complained about police violence and brutality. Certainly 
militarised dehumanising and brutal training plays an important part in shaping the 
identities and practices of many officers in the force. However, while Huggins et al 
aimed to interview police that were involved in atrocities, it must be noted that our 
samples are clearly different. My police sample was established on the basis of 
access, experience of having worked during the PPV years and willingness to be 
interviewed. Nonetheless, what both my data and Huggins’ et al data show is that the 
training of Brazilian police remains inadequate and brutalising. 
The critique made by low-ranking officers went beyond the inadequacies of 
training and extant police culture. They also questioned the accuracy and reliability of 
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police and homicide statistics and raised questions about the unequal distribution of 
policing across neighbourhoods. Those issues are illustrated in the extract below: 
 
‘During carnival I worked in the office computing the homicide stats. Our 
boss wants to hit the targets so that he gets a bonus. We were told not to 
compute some of the deaths. There was not much we could do, otherwise we 
would be at risk of disciplinary action. We can even be imprisoned. I don’t 
really believe that Pacto [pela Vida] has made much difference. I live in a 
low-income community myself, we have hardly any policing. I see a police 
car pass by but I don’t see them do anything. The police don’t know how to 
abordar (approach/stop and search) a citizen. The police are sent to particular 
areas where they are on ‘show’ or when it is near an election. […] Pacto pela 
Vida made some changes. They divided the city in different areas [áreas 
integradas de segurança, or AIS], some motivational plans were created to 
motivate officers. And more officers were contracted. We definitely have a lot 
more police officers than we did before Pacto.’ (Officer Júlia – PM) 
 
Officer Júlia, just like other residents in the community, expressed a lack of 
satisfaction with the type of policing that is available in low-income communities. 
Many of Brazil’s low-ranking officers, like Júlia and her colleague, live in the very 
low-income communities that are the subjects of police criminalisation, where much 
of the population is targeted as ‘suspect’. The officers’ complaints were very similar 
to those of the residents. They see a police car occasionally going past but they do not 
see any intelligence-led policing taking place or any actual policing on the streets. 
Just as the majority of interviews with officers and officials emphasised, Pacto pela 
Vida focused on repressive policing action and very little on preventative work.  
During an interview with two low-ranking police officers who both live in 
low-income communities, they asserted that despite the fact they are police officers 
living in the community, there is not enough policing actually taking place in their 
communities. They argued that the police are in fact rarely present, and even when 
they are present there is much corruption in the high-ranks of the police, so that if 
they arrest a drug trafficker, he will have important political allies or friends in the 
police and the case will be dropped. This is much like the argument made by Arias 
(2006; 2010), that the continuation of trafficker power and violence in poor 
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communities can be associated with extended networks between criminals, 
politicians, state actors and community actors.  
The officers interviewed argued that they knew better than to interfere in their 
own community, where they felt vulnerable and where their families are exposed to 
arbitrariness and risk experiencing cruelty and vengeance from local criminals. Both 
officers claimed that most of the increase in police presence seen during the 
implementation of PPV focuses on protecting high-income neighbourhoods, 
especially during election periods. Throughout the last election period, the mayor 
extended the number of police cars and officers and asked them to go on ‘display’ to 
upper-class neighbourhoods. In the officers’ words: Foi um puro circo (literally, ‘It 
was a pure circus [show]’). 
6.7 Conclusion 
This chapter’s findings warrant at least two important contributions to the debate on 
public security and the criminological literature. First, they expose some of the 
ingrained and continuing forms of social and power inequalities extant in the security 
apparatus, as well as its institutional failure to address deep-seated and longstanding 
issues of corruption and discrimination, which primarily affect people living in low-
income communities. Second, they enable an examination of a counter-narrative 
about security policies emerging from state actors themselves. This counter-narrative 
illustrates concerns about the inadequacy of increased and repressive policing in 
resolving crime in Brazil, as well as concerns about the structure of the police and the 
type of police training that is available. As suggested in the introduction of this 
chapter, these findings complement a growing body of literature about policing in the 
Global South. 
The enduring issues of classism, sexism and racism in the police, explored in 
this chapter, impede the possibility of consensual intelligence-led policing. These 
affected the possibility of improving the quality of police-community interactions, 
and contributed to a lack of trust in the police, which ultimately reinforces the ‘law of 
silence’ (the informal rule of not informing on somebody, not ‘snitching’) in poor 
communities. The chapter showed that problems in the training and brutalisation of 
officers before they start working also reduce the prospects for positive community-
police relations. In other words, it was argued that continuing and unaddressed issues 
Roxana Pessoa Cavalcanti 
 152 
of classism, racism and training in the public security apparatus mar the application of 
safety policies and interventions, insofar as these policies cannot promote the safety 
of the most marginalised and vulnerable if these populations are continuously 
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CHAPTER 7 – Public perceptions of crime, safety and policing: The 
case study communities 
 
What intended and unintended effects (if any) have new public security interventions 
such as Pact for Life (PPV) had on the communities most affected by high rates of 
homicide? The preceding chapters outlined and discussed the emergence and impacts 
of this new public security intervention from the perspective of state actors. This 
chapter complements these data by affording a focus on the experiences of public 
safety of members of civil society and young people living at the margins. This 
chapter asks: How do the subjects of this new security programme perceive it? What 
impacts has PPV had on their experiences of security and on the type of security that 
is on offer in their communities? This chapter critically examines the impact of 
managerialist criminological ideologies on the quality of policing, police 
accountability and on the relationship between marginalised community residents, 
young people and the police in Brazil.  
Studies focusing on the Anglo-Saxon experience have argued that young 
people’s frequent use of public space has made them more available as a population 
to be policed, and that safety interventions and methods of policing have increasingly 
criminalised, excessively policed (often on the basis of their socio-economic status) 
and yet also under-protected those young people (Loader 1996, McAra and McVie 
2005, Squires and Goldsmith 2010). But to date, few academic studies have focused 
on young people’s experience of policing in the context of the new public security 
initiatives and state building exercises, especially in the northeast of Brazil. The 
experiences of young people in northeast Brazil share some similarities and 
distinctions in comparison with the southeast of the country and elsewhere in the 
world. However, there is currently no published work that provides insight into how 
young people in low-income communities respond to new policing interventions such 
as PPV. This chapter asks what shifts, continuities, and silences can be observed in 
the field of public safety from the perspective of youth in Recife’s periferias.  
The chapter provides a glimpse of the world and perceptions of Brazilian non-
elites that are poorly understood and rarely examined. The data were gathered in two 
low-income communities in Recife’s metropolitan region. First, this chapter explores 
the demographics and socio-economic context of these two case study communities. 
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Second, it focuses on an examination of the data emerging from the first case-study 
community: Tourinho. The findings reveal that young people perceive the police as 
brutal and distant. Third, the chapter examines data from the second case study 
community, Vitoria. It shows some similarities in the perceived problems of the 
public security system in comparison with Tourinho.  
After months of fieldwork in periferias in the northeast of Brazil, negative 
experiences of policing and of life at the edge of the city in communities where drug 
trafficking and extermination groups torment the life of residents became noticeable 
and recurring themes. These data are complemented with residents’ experiences of 
criminalisation, seen in their narratives about the imposition of disrespectful policing 
on poor residents perceived as deserving (trabalhadores or workers) and the treatment 
of these residents as bandidos (criminals). The chapter argues that the continuing 
conflation of poverty and criminality, and the racialisation of punitive crime control, 
continues despite recent police reforms and the implementation of new security 
programmes. As such, it provides a counter-narrative from below and a critique of the 
hegemonic technocratic discourse of ‘success’ in public security intervention that 
were deployed by state actors in Chapter 5. Managerial reforms have exacerbated 
some of the ills of the Brazilian criminal justice system. For example, police in Brazil 
adopt illegal practices to reach quantitative targets, the model of policing has 
remained practically unchanged and protection rackets and organised criminals 
continue to operate from within prisons. 
7.1 Demographics 
Recife, the capital city of the state of Pernambuco, is located in the northeast of 
Brazil, a region that was a hub for the sugar cane industry in the 16th century 
(Scheper-Hughes 1993). Although sugar cane remains the most important crop in the 
region, its economic importance has declined. There are large industrial plants in the 
city’s suburbs, but most of the economy relies on the service sector, it being estimated 
that 60% of the population works in the private service sector (Koster 2009). In 
contrast to other large Brazilian metropolises, where poor communities are generally 
concentrated in peripheral areas, Recife has a large number of slums scattered across 
the city, but its periferias do also tend to have higher concentrations of poverty.  
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 The first case study community, Tourinho, as defined by participants in the 
area, comprises two adjacent neighbourhoods located in the peripheries of the 
metropolitan region of Recife, with a total of 41,097 inhabitants. The boundaries of 
the community are hard to define, even for residents themselves. A smaller part of the 
community (under 3,000 residents) is part of the city of Recife while the largest part 
belongs to the metropolitan region of Recife, more specifically it is located within a 
neighbouring municipality: Jaboatão dos Guararapes. Demographic data about the 
neighbourhood’s population in Recife are easily accessible; however, detailed data 
about neighbourhoods in Jaboatão are not available. For this reason, most of the data 
here presented are limited to the smaller better-off section of the community.  
 
 
Figure 6: Tourinho*, Pernambuco, October 2013 
 
 In the 19th century, the territory belonged to an engenho (sugar mill) and early in the 
20th century the population began to settle in the area. Today the community is 
constituted of a combination of small gated terraced houses, some two- and three-
storey buildings, some irregular settlements and some small local businesses. Most 
residents have metal bars around their houses’ windows and doors, gates and 
sometimes guard dogs. The average monthly household income is R$1,296 (the 
equivalent of £298 in 2013) and the average household consists of 3 people. This 
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income is probably an overestimate since data on the poorer side of the community, 
belonging to the municipality of Jaboatão dos Guararapes, are not available.  
The only data available about the part of the community located within the 
Jaboatão dos Guararapes municipality show that there are over 3,000 households 
considered by the State as ‘abnormal agglomerates’ in the community, or in other 
words, ‘abnormal housing’, slums or irregular settlements (IBGE 2010). Over 10,000 
people live in these impoverished households, on average 3.4 people per household. 
The population is 54.5% female and 45.5% male. According to the local city council 
(Recife 2013), the population is ethnically 54% pardo (mixed background), 35.5% 
white, 9% black, 0.95% amarela (yellow) and 0.54% indigenous; 37% of the 
community is aged under 25 (see Table 7). The second case study community, 
Vitoria, is situated in the north part of Recife, adjacent to a middle-class 
neighbourhood and it is constituted of several smaller low-income communities. 
According to the local city council (Recife 2013), its population is 33% white, 55% 
parda (mixed background), 10.23% black, 1% amarela (yellow) and 0.22% 
indigenous. Nearly 40% of the population is aged under 25 (see Table 8). 
 
Table 7: Demographics of Tourinho  
Population by age % Inhabitants 
0 – 4 years 5.95 
5 – 14 years 15.37 
15 – 17 years 5.25 
18 – 24 years 11.45 
25 – 59 years 50.33 
60 years plus 11.65 
Source: Prefeitura da cidade do Recife (2013). 
 
Table 8: Demographics of Vitoria  
Population by age % inhabitants 
0 – 4 years 6.63 
5 – 14 years 15.66 
15 – 17 years 5.33 
18 – 24 years 12.34 
25 – 59 years 49.32 
60 years plus 10.72 
 
Source: Prefeitura da cidade do Recife (2013). 
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Data from the local city council (Recife 2013) show that Vitoria occupies an area of 
160 hectares and has a total of 31,025 inhabitants (193.38 inhabitants per hectare), 
46.74% are male and 53.26% female. There are 9,113 households in the area and an 
average of 3.4 people per household. The average monthly household income is R$ 
1,166 (the equivalent of £268 at the time of writing). 
The local government published a series of reports about the human 
development index (HDI) of Recife’s neighbourhoods, with the support of a United 
Nations project (PNUD, Programa das Nações Unidas para o Desenvolvimento) in the 
2000s. The data refer to the years 1991 and 2000. Although this is over a decade ago, 
it does give some indication of socioeconomic conditions in both studied 
communities. The HDI was created to provide a point of comparison in terms of 
development between countries and it includes data about income, life expectancy 
and education. The HDI in the upper-class neighbourhood of Boa Viagem in Recife 
was 0.964 in the year 2000, this was equivalent to Norway’s HDI. Meanwhile the 
HDI in Tourinho was 0.751 and in Vitoria, it was 0.731 in 2000, respectively 
equivalent to the HDI of Kazakhstan and Ecuador (Bitoun 2005). These figures, 
although quite dated, and somewhat imprecise, exemplify the extent of social 
inequalities within the city.  
While since the 2000s there have been some economic improvements in 
Brazil, as shown in Chapters 1 and 2, such as mild reductions in income inequality 
and increasing social investments in welfare and education, Brazil continues to be a 
highly unequal country in which the population’s ability to consume, often through 
credit, has increased. So one can easily find well-dressed people in low-income 
communities using mobile phones and cars. But access to education (especially higher 
education), adequate public transportation, healthcare, housing and public safety, 
among other public goods, continues to be precarious and unequally distributed 
throughout Brazilian cities.  
7.2 Tourinho: distant and brutal policing 
‘The ROCAM35 (militarised police patrol on motorbikes) gave him a baculejo 
(a forceful or violent stop and search). They looked at his carteira de 
identidade (ID card), took 40 reais (equivalent to approximately £13 at the 
time) from his wallet and called him a shameless cripple. He wasn’t disabled 
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or anything, he might have smoked [marijuana] and he had a broken leg’ 
(Luther, community resident and activist, September 2013)  
 
Young people’s experiences of stop and search were traumatic. Their friends’ 
experiences were also traumatic and resonated known problems of coercive and 
militarised policing (Huggins 1998). Although the program PPV had increased 
sporadic policing to some extent, by increasing motorised police patrols and police 
crackdown operations, it had not so far improved the quality of policing, neither the 
quality of the interactions and dialogue between the police and community residents 
or the level of police accountability. Policing did not resemble what is known 
internationally as community policing. The baculejo illustrates the continuity of the 
inadequate, violent and adversarial policing. This term was first referred to in the 
methodology chapter. It is used locally to describe a violent or coercive ‘stop and 
search’ where the police may, for instance, apply pressure to the suspect’s interlaced 
fingers while his/her hands are on his/her head, punch the suspect or kick his/her legs 
to spread them open.  
This approach provoked much disdain for the police in the community. In a 
focus group in Tourinho, young people argued that although cases of homicide might 
have decreased, other forms of violence continue in the community. They argued that 
this violence was different from what they saw on TV in Rio de Janeiro, where they 
often heard reports of police entering communities shooting. They argued that in 
Pernambuco, instead, the police entered the community dando lapada (giving out 
beatings). Some young people referred to the police as the capitão do mato, a 
historical character from the time of slavery, who was responsible for capturing 
fugitive slaves and punishing those who caused disorder or who disobeyed their 
masters. The analogy said much about the type of policing available for poor black 
and mulato communities.  
The analogy of the capitão do mato dando lapada has parallels to the general 
state approach to these communities, insofar as the access to general public services 
beyond policing, is also inadequate and socially unjust. The living conditions of those 
communities in the periferias, favelas and informal settlements in 21st century Brazil 
are illustrated in the following field note observation from an afternoon in July 2013: 
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‘At nearly 2pm I got off a bus, which barely squeezed through the narrow 
paved roads and alleys leading to the community. As I walked into the 
unpaved roads of the community I noticed cheerful people sitting outdoors on 
plastic chairs chatting. There were occasional bits of pavement to walk on, 
some open sewage running down the street and uncollected bits of rubbish 
scattered around, stenches of odour in the air. The weather was still and the 
heat reflected off the brick and concrete walls around. Some of the decaying 
small brick houses that formed the community and the apartment blocks had 
been built in the 1970s near the prison. But despite the appearance of 
deterioration, rents were surprisingly high, the funding I had naively set aside 
for accommodation would hardly cover the monthly cost (R$350, 
approximately £116 at the time) of renting a single room in a home in 
Tourinho’  
 
Outward appearances said little about the people who live in Tourinho. Many of the 
people encountered during the fieldwork were active members of social movements, 
active in local politics, innovative people capable of reinventing themselves and being 
creative and organised. In a meeting with Lourdes in the small building where she ran 
an NGO in Tourinho that provides leisure and cultural activities, sports and arts 
training to young people in the peripheries of the city, she explained that there is a 
high demand for housing in the area as many of the prisoners’ family members want 
to live near the prison, as well as traffickers who kept business ties with inmates, 
pushing the price of rents upwards. Lourdes was quick to deflect attention away from 
negative connotations about the community and was keen to present positive and 
innovative images of its people. She explained her work in the community: 
 
‘The group [NGO] started in the porch of my house. Some of the guys used to 
tag walls with spray paint during the night… we didn’t have the financial 
means but we decided to get together and put what little we had together to 
form a group that would do something for the community… using drawing, 
tagging, graffiti. We have been together 10 years […] and have won prizes 
due to our community work taking kids off the street.’ 
 
Roxana Pessoa Cavalcanti 
 160 
Lourdes became one of the co-researchers in this project and enabled access to a 
larger sample of residents and young participants; she also became a key informant. 
In a focus group towards the end of the fieldtrip, Lourdes was less reluctant to talk 
about security or topics that risked associating marginalised people in the peripheries 
with crime. She explained that distant policing was one contributing factor to 
inadequate security provision since the police were unable to develop relationships in 
the community that would facilitate their work. In her words ‘If Pacto pela Vida is 
something that should get to us, they should have contact with the community and 
know what happens here. But they don’t know the reality of the community. É eles lá 
e nós aqui (they are over there and we are here)’36. A young female elaborated that 
the problem was not solely that the police had little contact with residents, but also 
that the contact they had, tended to be brutal and lacked dialogue: 
 
‘They [the police] don’t arrive chatting; it is all done on the base of violence. I 
watched them stop a group of four guys the other day and ask for their ID 
cards. The boys didn’t have their IDs. The police ordered them to put their 
hands on their heads. One guy was a bit slow so the officer gave him a 
bufetada [a slap] that sent him into a wall and then to the ground. It is better to 
trust a thief than the police. One side is insecurity, the other is fear’ (Estrela, 
17 years old, white, Tourinho, 29th October 2013) 
 
Having to face threatening behaviour by the police was the norm for the young people 
in this study. Numerous accounts of police misconduct emerged in our conversations, 
from minor to severe verbal and physical abuse. Just as Brinks (2008) argued, the 
communities that were least patrolled were the recipients of the most acute forms of 
police brutality. Marquinhos, a young mulato male, was picked up and taken to the 
police station with three friends, and described this negative encounter: 
 
‘The officer sat next to his partner, with his gun pointed at us. We asked him, 
‘Could you not point your pistol at us? None of us is a bandit’ he replied ‘You 
want me to point it at my partner, do you?’, so I said [sarcastically] ‘But in our 
direction it’s ok, is it?’ He got up, went towards a guy who he’d arrested, and 
stepped on his hands like this [demonstrates]. Then he started asking the boy 
where the boca (drug-selling point) was. After 30 minutes of massagem 
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(literally ‘massage’, but meaning beating/torture), the boy was pianinho-
pianinho (docile/withdrawn).’ 
 
Such methods of policing and governing the young and the marginalised are 
reminiscent of Foucault’s (1979) work on criminal justice institutions insofar as they 
attempt to discipline the body of the excluded. The exception is that, in Tourinho, 
governing the marginalised continues to entail physical brutality against the bodies of 
young poor and black males, and continued to be visible in public spaces well beyond 
medieval times. Therefore, the European Foucauldian framework does not enable an 
understanding of the continuing issues of visible physical violence against the 
marginalised in ex-colonies, such as Brazil37. These issues can only be understood in 
the historical and socio-economic context of Brazil (discussed in Chapter 2) taking 
into consideration the narratives that make continuing forms of violence and 
problematic methods of police reform intelligible (as discussed in Chapter 5). 
Existing policing practices caused fear and anger in the community. But fear 
emerged from other sources too, beyond local criminals and the police, the local 
prison and its guards were another part of the State that caused distress and carried 
negative connotations for residents.  As I walked around Tourinho with Lourdes, 
around one of the largest prisons in Latin America, I was told that there were regular 
shootouts by the prison wall. ‘Guards shoot at people trying to throw parcels over the 
wall’, she said, ‘only last week I was on my phone walking down this street when I 
heard the shots and run [to avoid a stray bullet]. The community lives with these 
dangers on a daily basis’.  
Proximity to the prison meant that many participants were in tune with the 
dynamics of prison-community relations and aware of the ways in which the prison 
meshes with the periferias. The intensification of policing that came with PPV, the 
increasing targeting of drug offenders and incarceration of members of extermination 
groups had caused important changes in the landscape where organised criminal 
groups operate. Although a recent study by Wolff (2014) claims that criminal 
behaviour in Recife’s low-income communities remains ‘unconstrained by the 
organisational and socialization dynamics of prison gangs’ (p. 97), according to 
residents of low-income communities38 surrounding the prison, criminals in Recife’s 
prisons do indeed have an impact in the community even from within the prison’s 
walls.  
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According to residents, Recife’s prison inmates have control over drug 
shipments. They also coerce residents to hiding inmates in their homes when there is a 
prison escape and coerce young people in the community to throw parcels containing 
weapons and drugs over the prison wall. A study conducted by a Brazilian scholar, 
Arruda (2014), contradicts Wolff’s point too. Arruda’s study, which was conducted 
with ex- and current inmates inside Pernambucan prisons, showed that well-connected 
prisoners have control over and involvement with criminal organisations operating 
inside and outside the prison. This is supported by data emerging through 
conversations with residents in Tourinho. 
For local residents, PPV’s methods had done little to reduce fear and 
insecurity. The increasing use of inadequate and chaotic prisons and local young 
offenders’ institutions aggravated residents’ anxieties. These institutions were the 
sources of multiple examples of corruption, firearm and drug trafficking affecting the 
community and other state institutions, such as the school. Lourdes had arranged an 
interview with a local teacher Samuel (25 years old, white, Tourinho) who discussed 
these anxieties in the following extracts of our conversation: 
 
Roxana – ‘What are the main problems faced by young people in your 
neighbourhood?’ 
 
Samuel – ‘I think the lack of space, lack of activities, drugs, violence and fear. 
This is the society of fear. Some of my students are armed in the classroom 
selling drugs. I leave my home and I don’t know whether I will come back 
again. About ten years ago my neighbours could sit outdoors till late playing 
dominos. Now by 8pm everyone is indoors. I was in a music gig [in the 
community] the other day but it had to be interrupted because two people were 
murdered. I see children working as aviãozinhos [delivering drugs or 
messages for drug dealers]. I live near the FUNASE (a young people’s 
detention centre) and just this week 100 young offenders escaped. All that? 
How? Did anybody see it happen? How do they get hold of guns? Through the 
police themselves. It costs R$40 reais (about £13 at the time) for a little gun, 
R$300 (about £100 pounds at the time) for a [model] 38.’  
 
Roxana – ‘Really? So how difficult is it to get hold of a firearm?’ 
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Samuel– ‘It’s very easy to buy guns. The police themselves sell guns to 
bandits. Unfortunately, we have to live as if we were in prison. In my house I 
use 8 locks, but it has to be like that, there are armed men constantly walking 
by. There’s no security for us. But [pauses sarcastically, and sighs] they have 
built the arena (the football stadium for the 2014 World Cup).’ 
 
Residents saw that the State had funds to make certain investments, such as spending 
on the preparations for large sporting events, but public money was hardly ever 
invested in the communities most at need. These communities bore the brunt of the 
availability of firearms, police corruption and violence and drug trafficking, all of 
which became familiar themes in interviews with community residents. Residents 
provided ample evidence of the systematic violation of their civil rights – not least the 
right to safety. In this context, for many young men, access to firearms and 
involvement in the drug trade39 offered an artificial form of safety, a level of income 
that occasionally available, often temporary, minimum wage jobs could not afford 
them (see also Goldstein 2003). Top-down public security policies had not affected 
people on the ground level, since policing had hardly changed in their view. 
 
Roxana – ‘How about the police? Are they around when this is happening?’ 
 
Samuel – ‘Most of the time the police car is carrying a novinha (attractive 
young 16-17 year-old female). Most of us have no contact with the police. 
They are just there in their cars… We never talk. People with money wet 
[bribe] the hands of the police and get their attention. The police work for the 
government but really they act like a private service. Those who can’t wet 
their hands don’t receive any attention. The police don’t know how to 
approach us, they have poor training and go straight to the tapa 
(slap/violence).’ 
 
These are familiar complaints throughout Brazil: police violence; the lack of dialogue 
in police-community interactions; and ineffective, distant policing40 – ‘the police are 
just there in their cars… we never talk’. When residents did encounter the police they 
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were stereotyped, considered to be criminals on the basis of their appearance and 
where they live, and were subjected to repression: 
 
‘There are many menores (young people under 18) being killed in brutal ways 
here. The impact of crime is large. The community has not mobilised about 
this. The police are violent and don’t work properly and they judge by 
appearance’ (Najha, male, 18 years old, mixed ethnic background)  
 
‘The government have invested a lot in repression, little in education and little 
social assistance, they have reduced the number of homicides, [but] increased 
the prison population’ (Baque forte, male, 33 years old, black) 
 
Another key informant and co-researcher, Luther, commended this critique. Luther, 
an activist and arts teacher from the community, teaches graffiti to schoolchildren, on 
a temporary ‘verbal’ contract with the local municipality. He doesn’t have carteira 
assinada (signed employment contract and official employment documentation). He 
says that the municipality doesn’t want any commitment with employees like him. 
And he will get a little extra cash being on a verbal contract since his taxes are not 
being paid. He is also involved with the same NGO where Lourdes works. The 
following is an extract of a conversation we had while he showed me around the 
neighbourhood, explaining that repressive policing and the prison could not resolve 
drug related offences in the community: 
 
Luther – ‘We live right where the drug trafficking occurs. It is up to you if you 
want to go up or not. That is where they stay waiting for people coming to 
buy.’ 
 
Roxana – ‘Are the customers coming from outside the community or from 
within the community?’ 
 
Luther – ‘Most are from the community. For the young people it’s like a job. 
Sometimes they get into trouble with the police but a couple of weeks later 
someone else will take on that job.  So it’s this circle of things, the drugs are 
always around. […] That big derelict house was a FEBEM (young offender’s 
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institution). Then it was mostly used as a base for drug sales and it has also 
been used for prostitution.  A girl was killed selling drugs here, during the 
night. Don’t worry, we are OK [safe] here in the daytime. We think a group of 
guys came to take her stash and killed her. But art has power to change things, 
we did some work here to reclaim the building, we got a donation and used the 
money to buy tins of spray paint to do our [graffiti] work here. These two girls 
over there, they are selling drugs, they hide it in the bushes until they get a 
customer with cash. Some people have been caught here by undercover police. 
People who sell need guns to defend themselves, if someone comes to take 
their stash. […] That quadra (cement football pitch) over there is also another 
‘point’ for drugs. That area over there is a favela invasion. Over that hill is 
where the drugs are being sold now. We can go up if you want, it is safe to go 
up with me now. They know me around here’ 
 
[We go up a steep alleyway] 
 
Luther – ‘Dá-le Edson [greets a friend walking pass]. This is the reality here, 
those small kids are selling drugs, some as young as 9 or 11 years old’ 
 
Roxana – ‘Are there many people out at night here?’ 
 
Luther – ‘Most people selling drugs are out at night, that is when the money is 
there to be made, the rest of the residents are usually indoors, unless they 
study or work at night. So some of those guys sitting on that wall over there 
are lookouts, if the police come over they’ll use their mobile phones to let the 
patrão know that sujou (they inform the boss). Some of these young men have 
orders to retaliate and shoot at police, they have position of respect with the 
boss so they are given a gun to carry around their waist. Others will run into 
the mata [woods] where in the dark it’ll be very hard to see them. You don’t 
need to go far to see children involved in the drug trade.  
[…] 
Many politicians come around promising bricks and cement. Asking for a 
vote. But don’t actually do anything for the community. The houses here are 
mostly rented; they are expensive 300-350 reais a month (£100-116 at the 
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time). People who work here try to save to build a house and rent it. […] 
Some of these guys are working in the trade to send money to other guys who 
got caught and are in prison. There is this aspect of power in the drug trade. 
The trade is so ‘banal’, people from the community walk pass and don’t even 
look. On this street here, the guys throw bags of drugs over the walls of the 
prison wall, sometimes it has been arranged even with the security man in the 
prison or arranged by mobile phone with the guys inside’ 
 
Luther’s account reveals many similarities to the experiences of cities like Rio de 
Janeiro, insofar as very young children become involved in the drug trade, sometimes 
as lookouts and eventually as armed guards for the trade. His narrative retells well-
known problems of clientelism and state neglect for living conditions in the 
neighbourhood. When residents were asked what could be done to resolve the issue of 
insecurity and drug related violence, most participants pointed to the government and 
the State as responsible for these tasks. They explained that they had already done 
their share of the work by paying taxes, so they expected better policing and more 
state investment in spaces for leisure in the community, activities and better training 
opportunities for the young, as well as more investment in the creation of good quality 
well paid jobs and less corruption in the police and the State more generally. 
Community residents explained that these were some of the reasons why they had 
joined the 2013 street protests.  
During the fieldwork, one hundred and sixteen respondents in the two case 
study communities were asked to rate the work of the police in their communities. 
While only seven respondents (6%) perceived police work as satisfactory, 32 
participants (32%) said that policing was average or regular in their community (33% 
chose not to respond and 28% said that the quality of policing was poor or terrible). 
Despite the ills of the police, residents demanded more policing. 
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Luther angrily summarised the community’s security demands and the racial and 
social inequalities experienced in the community (and possibly in most of the 
country), especially relating to policing and criminal justice:  
 
‘There is some policing here because the prison is inside the community. It is 
bad with the police and worse without them. What the community needs is 
more professionals, educators, psychologists, social workers and so on. But 
because of the police’s culture, they suspect anyone that walks by with a 
plastic bag in their hand; they stop and search because in poor communities 
the police see everyone as a bandit. I’ve seen this with my own eyes. It is 
normal here. If you live near the boca de fumo (drug sales point) they are 
immediately rude to you. For them, any citizen out on the streets at 11pm is 
involved [in the drug trade]. If a rich kid gets caught, they are labelled 
chemically dependent [on illicit drugs] and taken to rehab, if a poor guy is 
caught, he’s thrown in the prison. What is the use of the Brazilian prison? It 
just jails the mind 24 hours a day. You never hear of a young person who left 
a Brazilian prison and started university. The carceral system doesn’t 
regenerate anyone’.  
 
Luther’s views about the prison were not unique in the communities studied. Other 
residents supported the critical view that the prison has few functions other than to 
exclude certain groups in society since, as Luther put it, the prison does not stop crime 
or rehabilitate offenders: it ‘doesn’t regenerate anyone’. Luther and three other 
community activists had spent time in youth penal institutions (e.g. FUNASE) 
providing arts workshops to young offenders, and reported the horrors of the 
conditions in which young people were incarcerated in these institutions. These 
included common cases of torture, risk of losing one’s life with frequent killings and 
rebellions, overcrowding and insufficient socio-educative programmes. Although this 
thesis is not about the youth justice system, these are important problems that warrant 
further research because the cumulative effects of changes in public security policies 
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have profound implications for multiple criminal justice institutions, for human rights 
and societies more broadly. These issues deserve more attention and discussioni.  
7.3 Vitoria: workers vs. criminals  
Access to the Vitoria was facilitated through a contact in a local school. Most of the 
participants at the school were students aged between 16 and 18. However, some were 
mature students who also lived in the community or had returned to education to 
attend evening classes. Some of the staff that lived in the community were also 
interviewed, like Zefinha, the school chef, a resident since the 1970s. Zefinha 
explained that when she first moved to Vitoria, there were few houses; there were 
many trees and green spaces. But as more and more houses were self-built by 
residents and their growing families, there is now barely any unoccupied space in the 
area and hardly any leisure spaces for young people. Almost every space is needed for 
housing and every space is used. She explained that there was plenty of work around 
in the past, but in the last decade, the community saw the establishment of the drug 
trade, in particular the crack cocaine business and drug dealers became the main 
employer in the community. According to residents, like Zefinha, in the drug trade 
young people can earn better wages, but this business has brought a rise in drug 
related disputes and homicides. Many students, she explained, are drug users and drug 
dealers. However, this was not immediately noticeable. The following field note 
highlights the most evident issues in Vitoria: the inadequate provision of state 
services, poverty and brutal policing: 
 
‘It was eleven thirty in the morning. Approximately 30 children were lying on 
the concrete floor, in a space of about 12m2; then they were move around, 
working out. There is plenty of loud talking and screaming on the background. 
An adult monitors what they do. This is their physical exercise class. The 
school’s amenities are very small and there are no green spaces or recreational 
areas, other than this concrete floor where the young people are exercising. 
The security guard opens the door and lets me in. The admin staff are running 
                                                
i To read more about the youth justice system in Pernambuco consult Amorim, Melo, 
and César (2016), Nolasco (2010) and Schuler (2015).  
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around trying to attend to all the requests and answer all the questions posed 
by young people who are coming into the small air-conditioned office area. 
The atmosphere is tense and the staff seem stressed. The students, who are 
coming in, want to know whether they will have any classes or any teaching. 
Some of the teachers have not turned up for work. One of them called to say 
she had childcare issues that day. Another teacher had been sporadically 
coming to work due to health problems. There was no one to substitute them. 
The admin staff are trying to operate a miracle with the timetable. They 
explain this is a daily occurrence because, the state government hires most 
teachers on temporary contracts, and according to the admin staff, temporary 
workers often have little regard for the school or the children. I sit down to 
wait for my interviewee, Gustavo. I am nearly five months pregnant and my 
bump is already visible, giving rise to a lot of interest and questions from the 
young people. They ask about the gender of the baby, if my son will have an 
English name, and where he will be born. I try to steer the conversation to 
learn more about the young people. Gustavo is late. More young people come 
into the office, they ask for new rucksacks. The school’s deputy director tells 
me that the children sell the rucksacks that they are given at school for R$10 
(roughly £3 at the time). The young people claim that the last rucksack they 
were given was damaged, or ended up stolen or lost. A small child walks in 
the office with no uniform. He looks about ten years old. He is delivering food 
for the staff from a local business. He receives some change for his work. 
Since Gustavo has not arrived and I cannot get hold of him on the phone, I 
agree to provide cover for the absent teachers and deliver an English class. 
The students are thrilled, they ask if I can stay and teach them every day. 
Gustavo arrives after my class.  He is tall, moreno (mixed ethnicity) and quiet. 
He is sixteen years old and has recently committed some offences in the 
community. The staff at the school were keen to warn me about this. His latest 
known infraction was the theft of a motorbike in front of the school. He gives 
me short answers to most of my initial questions but when we start talking 
about police-community relations he decides to tell me about one of his 
encounters with the police in the neighbourhood. “I was out at midnight with 
four friends, we were coming back from a football match in the stadium, we 
watched Sport against Náutico. The police stopped us and asked what we were 
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doing out at that time. We said we’re coming back from the football. Then 
they started beating us to the ground, kicking and punching us. A neighbour 
woke up and called two of his brothers who work for the civil police to stop 
them. We went to the police station the next day but nothing was done about 
it.” Despite reporting the crime, and despite nothing being done about it by the 
police, Gustavo says he would like more policing in the neighbourhood to feel 
safer. He explains that not all the police are violent and corrupt.’ (Field note, 
2nd October 2013) 
 
The differential treatment that the police provide to different sectors of society, which 
often depends on one’s social class, but also ethnicity, age and gender, generates 
hostility in community-police relations. This was the case in both case-study 
communities. Paradoxically, despite being exposed to inappropriate safety provision 
and differential policing, people in low-income communities demand more policing. 
This section explores this problem drawing on data from the second case study 
community: Vitoria. The section also discusses the effects of the construction of 
residents as workers or bandidos (common criminals, rather than bandits). Note that 
in Brazil there is no connotation in everyday use of the term bandido to Hobsbawm’s 
(2000) social bandits or Robin Hood.  
The local escola estadual (state-funded school) where most of the research 
was conducted in Vitoria, like the remainder of the neighbourhood, occupies a 
particular space in the city, an area seen as undesirable and peripheral (periferia), a 
working-class neighbourhood, spatially segregated from the predominantly white 
middle and upper class parts of Recife and yet interconnected to the city through the 
workers, voters and people that live in Vitoria. The neighbourhood is densely 
populated with small self-built brick houses, with some narrow pavement on some 
streets, most of which have open sewers, no green spaces such as parks or gardens, 
and hardly any public spaces where residents could gather, except for the quadrinha 
(a cement football field) where young men gather to smoke licit and illicit substances 
and where some drug dealers conduct their business.  
The interviews were conducted at the school, sometimes at the small dusty 
library (which was often closed) when we could find a space to sit that did not have 
mice excrement. Sometimes the school’s deputy headmaster offered her small office 
when she was occupied with other activities around the school, otherwise, interviews 
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could also be conducted in empty classrooms, during the frequent gaps in the 
curriculum caused by absent teachers.  The background epitomised the conditions of 
living in the neighbourhood and the precariousness of the education system in the 
area. Young people frequently wanted to be interviewed to occupy their time during 
the daily aulas vagas (a free hour with no lesson due to the routine absence of school 
teachers). Many interviews brought out very similar themes to those raised in 
Tourinho, such as concerns about inappropriate distant policing, police corruption, 
drug trafficking and routine homicides. Participants repeatedly complained that there 
was no dialogue between residents and the police and that officers were only ever in 
the neighbourhood after a crime or traffic accident happened.  
 
 
Figure 7: Main street in Vitoria*, July 2013.  
 
One of the disparities between the communities was that in Vitoria, young 
people seemed even more under-protected, isolated and entrapped at home due to fear 
of violence. Just as Caldeira (2000) demonstrated in City of Walls, in relation to upper 
and middle-class people, people in the low-income communities studied also put up 
metal bars on the doors and windows of their homes to feel safer, they had high levels 
of suspicion and their habits were changing to avoid interactions in public. In his 
ethnographic study in a different Recife community, in the early 2000s, Koster (2009, 
283-284) referred to an informal curfew placed on residents by drug traffickers, 
particularly at night. Residents would be told to stay indoors, for instance when 
traffickers were executing other gang members at night. Bystanders would also be 
killed to avoid incriminating evidence. Vitoria and Tourinho's residents also made 
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references to similar situations, and adapted to these occurrences of violence by 
staying indoors in the evenings, sometimes as early as 8pm.  
In this context, inappropriate security provision can deteriorate public life in 
many ways, including by leading fearful citizens to withdraw from public spaces 
(Pearlman 2010, Saunders-Hastings 2013, Frühling 2009, González 2014), or from 
participating in political and community life (e.g. participation in public debates, or 
through associations, protests and community organisations). The police, as the most 
visible institution of the State in charge of citizens’ protection, also fulfil many 
political functions. All policing is in this sense political but not necessarily egalitarian 
or conducive to democratic participation. The police can be used as a political tool to 
protect some citizens from other citizens. They can also enable politicians to achieve 
political ends, either by gathering votes through their associations or through the 
services that they provide to certain citizens, or even simply by being visible in some 
areas and appearing to be protecting some citizens. As such the corporation is a 
politicised institution with potential to either improve or deteriorate public life and the 
conditions in which democratic ideals can be fostered.  
For residents, fear of crime, and lack of protection from it, had profound 
consequences. Their other major fear was that of being mistaken for a criminal or 
bandido by police while spending time in public spaces and interacting with potential 
criminals. In a deeply unequal society such as Brazil, to be constructed as a bandido 
or criminal has profound consequences for the chances of life or death of poor black 
and mulato people. Whether imagined or real, the bandido category can also impact 
their chances of employment, of being free to use public spaces, or simply of having 
freedom from time in prison. At first, this fear of being thought to be a criminal might 
seem unwarranted, but a closer look into local relations provides the rationale for the 
worker versus bandido division.  
One afternoon, in a conversation with a friendly and elderly resident who 
owns the local bakery, Dona Lalá, she was interested in what I was doing in the 
community. I explained that I was studying and writing about the impacts and 
consequences of the State’s actions and in how the Brazilian criminal justice system 
affects the lives of ordinary people from Recife. She advised me to speak to Seu 
Antonio; she said ‘a great injustice had happened to him’, which would show me how 
the Brazilian State treats the poor. She arranged a meeting for me to meet Seu 
Antonio at her house one afternoon when he 
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Dona Lalá went off to the housework at the back of the house, I talked to Seu Antonio 
on the porch behind the metal fence where we could catch a breeze and some shade 
from that scorching afternoon.  
Seu Antonio was a short, frail-looking man, slim and dark-skinned, his face 
and hands had many wrinkles. I imagined he was in his early 60s but in fact he was 
only 48. His appearance resulted from years of hard labour and suffering. Despite the 
relative power asymmetry between researcher and informant (Spivak 1988), Seu 
Antonio was very receptive and keen to tell me his story, which emphasised his 
identity as a worker rather than a bandido. Seu Antonio explained that he was arrested 
in Alto do Pinhal – an even less affluent part of the neighbourhood – where he had 
met Dona Lalá and her family before they moved. During his youth, he had been a 
close friend of one of Dona Lalá’s ten children. Prior to our meeting he was unfairly 
sentenced and incarcerated for 3 years and had been to 5 different prisons. The 
following excerpt re-tells Seu Antonio’s story: 
 
Roxana: ‘Can you tell me more about how the arrest happened?’ 
 
Seu Antonio: ‘At that time, I was in the habit of drinking [alcohol] with a 
friend in Alto do Pinhal. He invited me for a beer at his house.  I was sitting in 
the living room and he went to the kitchen to get something. I didn’t know, but 
he was rolling marijuana. I never smoked that stuff. I didn’t know he smoked. 
He was selling it too.’ [He pauses, waiting for a reaction or for more 
questions] 
 
Roxana: ‘So what happened after your friend was in the kitchen?’ 
 
Seu Antonio: ‘Some police entered the house, with guns and arrested 
everyone. Me too. I couldn’t understand what was going on. They took me, 
didn’t want to know that I had nothing to do with the drugs. In court, the 
safado (shameless, dishonest person) [his friend] incriminated me. He said I 
was involved too. I had no money to pay the lawyer, who wanted R$2,000 
(£700 at the time) to free me but I couldn’t pay. In prison, people with money 
don’t stay more than 2-3 days. The son of a shop owner I met inside left in 2 
days because his father paid.’ 
Roxana Pessoa Cavalcanti 
 174 
 
This type of heavy-handed raid or occasional policing is common in Brazil’s most 
marginalised communities and slums (Arias 2006). Seu Antonio finds it necessary to 
assert his innocence by explaining he ‘had nothing to do with the drugs’ and ‘never 
smoked’, emphasising that he stayed in prison only because ‘he could not pay’ the 
lawyer, while ‘the son of a shop owner’ paid and became free. For Seu Antonio this 
was not an option. Having migrated from the countryside’s dry lands with his mother 
and siblings to Recife at age 7, his family had never had enough cash; he left school at 
age 10 to work and support the household. Seu Antonio’s case is one of many stories 
in which the poor (and often black or mulato) are criminalised and receive differential 
treatment from all the institutions of the criminal justice system because of their 
socio-economic circumstances. 
But the lines that divide those perceived as deserving from those seen as 
undeserving are not simply drawn between the criminal justice system and citizens, 
they are also drawn among people of similar background. Social inequality in Brazil 
systemically affects all social relations and institutions. For instance, when asked 
what prison was like, Seu Antonio said he was respected by inmates and was never 
beaten because his recorded offence was not seen as serious enough. He said that for 
the most part, prisoners only persecuted people who committed sexual offences, or 
those who had hit their mothers. For these inmates, seen as undeserving, the only 
perceived solution was death by beating. Here lies another telling episode of the 
blurred boundaries of injustice. Seu Antonio had seen some of these offenders get 
murdered in jail. To obtain protection, many inmates join gangs in prison, an issue 
already documented by ethnographers (Penglase 2008). But because Seu Antonio 
‘minded his own business’, and was not seen as undeserving, he was offered a role of 
respect, that of the chaveiro (translates as keyholder).  
The chaveiro is responsible for maintaining order inside the prison. Other 
prisoners elect him and the informal rule is that the group will do as he says. The 
chaveiro makes the decisions and can also offer protection to prisoners under threat 
by inmates. Scholars have begun to discuss this form of self-governance in Brazilian 
prisons (Darke 2013, Arruda 2014), a consequence of increasing incarceration, 
precarious physical conditions and overcrowding. In this context, the chaveiro 
becomes necessary, to provide order and informal justice. Chaveiros in Pernambucan 
prisons are also responsible for managing prison wings as if they were a market 
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(Arruda 2014). This includes the management of all sales that occur informally 
among prisoners and between prisoners and outsiders, including food and clothing 
sales, as well as drug sales.  
Zaverucha (2004, 42-43) argues that prison authorities are complacent41 with 
this practice, since they are aware of it and either authorise, fail to eliminate it and 
even incentivise the election of a chaveiro. The chaveiro has a similar role to the 
preso de ordem (ordering inmate). Until the early 2000s, prisoners used to be kept 
captive in overcrowded cells in police stations in Pernambuco. The preso de ordem 
would accomplish the tasks that police officers did not want to get involved with in 
these cells, partly because police wanted to avoid the foul odour from these 
overcrowded cells but also because they wanted to avoid contamination with common 
diseases and ailments caused by unhygienic conditions in cells (Zaverucha 2004). The 
preso de ordem would, for example, provide water in buckets for prisoners to drink, 
resolve conflicts between prisoners, collect laundry and so on, in exchange for an 
early release. 
Seu Antonio's story is telling of the practice of informal governance in prisons 
through the role of chaveiros. He explained that those who stole from inmates would 
receive a severe beating with a piece of wire, wood or the shaft of a wooden broom. 
He argued that thieves should not be mixed with matadores (murderers), because 
thieves would get together to kill matadores. This seemed contradictory, the line 
drawn between being a thief and a murderer being rather blurred if thieves also kill. 
Seu Antonio explained that matadores were hired on the outside to kill thieves in cold 
blood, but in prison thieves made up the vast majority of inmates, so together they 
could get revenge42. While in prison, Seu Antonio had no idea when he was going to 
be released. But one day, after three years of incarceration, a prison warder asked him 
if he wanted some work in the prison. It was some labouring work in exchange for a 
couple of days on the outside. Allowing prisoners a ‘day-off’ on the outside has been 
sanctioned by law in Brazil (McCann 2008, 64). The possibility of going out made 
him accept the work.  
It was then, in 2011 that he went to Dona Lalá’s house, looking to talk to her 
son Seu Zé to tell his story and ask for work. The type of work he did was often 
temporary, informal and low-paid, what is known colloquially in Brazil as bico; the 
nearest equivalent Anglo-Saxon academic term is sub-employment. He explained that 
his bicos were in the local construction industry. He has known Dona Lalá since he 
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was 15 years old; he worked with two of her sons and has been a family friend since. 
So a few days after he told Seu Zé about the injustice that happened, a lawyer went to 
the prison and he was released. Seu Antonio was keen to show me some paperwork 
that he carried around with him, with numbers that I could use to look up his files and 
see official reports about his innocence. Only by making alliances with a family that 
had a somewhat higher-class status and available cash, Seu Antonio was able to 
access the formal justice system.  
This excerpt illustrates why people in low-income communities fear 
associating with criminals or being mistaken as a bandido. It also shows how, for the 
majority of Brazilian citizens, the post-democratic Brazilian state continues to govern 
in undemocratic and unjust ways. Seu Antonio had a number of his human rights 
violated, including the right to life, liberty and security (Article 3 Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights [UDHR] and article 6 of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights [ICCPR]), the right not to be subjected to torture or to cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (Article 5 UDHR and article 7 
ICCPR), the right to equality before the law and equal protection by the law (Article 7 
UDHR and Article 26 of the ICCPR), and the right not to be subject to arbitrary 
arrest, detention or exile (Article 9 UDHR and Article 9 ICCPR).  
It is commonly heard in Brazil that there is no justice for the poor, and indeed, 
this is well founded in the everyday experiences of the poor. It emerges from a society 
where social inequality is intertwined with institutions that need reform, such as the 
prison and the police, and can only be understood in the context of existing power 
relations. Brazilians have constitutional rights to justice but in practice access to 
justice is deeply unequal (Holston and Caldeira 1998, Zaluar 2010). Seu Antonio’s 
case is one example of the multiple forms of abuse, violence and violations that have 
become routine and occur in a large scale in Latin American countries. These 
violations are not necessarily a deliberate part of state policy, which was the case 
during previous Latin American military dictatorships, as explained by Engstrom and 
Hurrell (2010): 
 
‘Consolidating democracies have not sought to strengthen the regional human 
rights regime as much as this theoretical approach might lead us to suppose. 
Instead they have laid much greater emphasis on the construction of a regional 
system of protecting and promoting democracy – one which is far more directly 
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under the control of states, which is politically and legally less constraining, and 
which is less susceptible to progressive development both from within the 
‘system’ and by civil society groups.’ (15) 
 
While the few opportunities for civil society’s engagement in Brazil’s democracy 
limit the progress of the human rights regime, so do other aspects of Brazilian 
federalism. That is, international institutions, such as IAHRS (Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights) have reduced abilities to make Brazilian federal 
authorities accountable for human rights violations, given that Brazil’s infamous military 
police are controlled at sub-national level (Engstrom 2012), dispersing and diluting 
accountability.  
Moreover, Seu Antonio's case exemplifies one of the perverse outcomes of 
increased policing without the democratisation of police values. Poor black males are 
arrested, simply for being in the wrong place at the wrong time, without having 
necessarily committed an offence. A number of violations of his rights, as argued 
above, followed his arbitrary arrest. He became simply another number to be 
measured by police performance statistics, mistakenly assumed to be a ‘success’ 
arrest of a member of an armed and drug-related criminal group. This type of police 
arbitrariness generates resentment towards the State and its institutions in poor 
communities. It also reinforces the authority of organised criminals that claim to 
provide security in these communities. It posits parallels with the first case study, 
Tourinho, as shown in Luther’s experience: 
 
‘They [the extermination group that provides private security] asked me to 
paint the words Aqui só entra quem for convidado (Only those who’ve been 
invited enter here), and paint a picture of a police car turned upside down next 
to the words, on a wall at the entrance to the community.’ (29th October 2013) 
 
Fear of crime not only led to the isolation of residents and their retreat from public 
space, as argued earlier, but it also led to resentment towards the State. While many 
criminologists have argued that fear of crime is often unrelated to the actual 
experience of crime, this was not the case in the communities studied. Most 
participants had either been victims of armed robbery, threats and violence, or they 
had friends and family who had been victimised in these ways.  Crime, fear and 
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inadequate policing eroded public life. Adequate or at least basic security provision is 
a key necessity for societies to participate in community life and develop beneficial 
networks and organisations.  
Apart from one local grassroots NGO, residents were unaware of the existence 
of other organisations through which continuous dialogue or non-adversarial contact 
with the police or the public security apparatus was possible, where demands could be 
made, and where the system could be responsive to residents – such as CONSEGs 
(Conselhos de Segurança Pública), a public security council that had existed in the 
state of Pernambuco prior to PPV. Residents explained that sometimes, during 
election years, participatory organisations and NGOs would appear to act as 
beneficiaries in the community, then they would introduce a political candidate that 
they supported for vote bargaining. Once elections were over these institutions would 
vanish, especially if the candidate had not been elected, and old patterns of 
inequalities once again prevailed.  
7.4 Gender inequalities 
The intersections of gender, age and class inequalities in Brazilian society make 
visible key limitations of policing and public security interventions such as PPV. 
Gender studies have pointed to the importance of acknowledging and understanding 
the effects of the performance of gender roles (Butler 1988, Drybread 2014), the ways 
in which patriarchal relations or the dominance of masculine values over feminine 
values perpetuate genders inequalities, and the manifestations and effects of certain 
forms of masculinities centred on the ethos of violence and bravado (Bourgois 2003, 
Connell 2005, Zaluar 2010). Feminist studies have also argued for the importance of 
understanding the silences (Ryan-Flood and Gill 2010) that expose patriarchal 
relations and gender inequalities. What is not said can say much about how gender 
inequalities manifest. For instance, while policing and PPV have allegedly aimed to 
reduce homicides – a type of violence that victimises men far more than women – the 
programme and its interventions have been silent about the ways in which non-lethal 
violence against women might be addressed. Sexual and non-lethal violence – the 
types of violence most often committed against women and girls – have been 
neglected.  
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Brazil is a patriarchal society with growing cases of femicide and widespread 
violence against women. Here I adopt Chesney-Lind’s definition of patriarchy as a 
‘gender system in which men dominate women and what is considered masculine is 
more highly valued than what is considered feminine’ (Chesney-Lind 2006, 9). 
Symbols, values, representations and the performance of femininity, and even the 
lives of feminine bodies, are less valued. Patriarchal and sexist ideologies demarcate 
gendered power relations and portray women’s bodies as the property or object of 
desire and dominance by men. Patriarchal dominance can take many forms; of 
particular concern to criminology are violence against women, rape, inadequate 
access to justice, the neglect of women’s needs in policies of crime control and the 
ways in which crime control affects gendered bodies differently. 
Few would deny the existence of multiple forms of gender violence and the 
repression of women in multiple spheres of social life in Brazil, such as the family, 
work, religion, in communities, politics and in the criminal justice system (Gregori 
2010, Hautzinger 2007). However, the role and place of women in patriarchal 
societies is often under-theorised or left unaddressed. As Wilding (2010) suggests, in 
Latin America, women are consistently missing from mainstream debates about 
violence, whether as victims or perpetrators of violence. In this study, three out of 
every ten participants, male and female, expressed concerns about rape or violence 
against women. This is probably an under-estimate considering the stigma and shame 
associated with these topics and the reluctance to associate oneself with the role of 
victim of sexual or gender-related crime. Nonetheless, these concerns were based on 
common knowledge about unreported sexual and violent crimes against women, 
especially in Vitoria. These themes are demonstrated in an interview with Alice (16-
year-old, mixed-ethnicity): 
  
Roxana – ‘What can you tell me about your community?’ 
 
Alice – ‘I don’t spend much time out on the streets so I don’t know much about 
the neighbourhood. I know that we have problems with sanitation on the stairs 
[the community is on a hill and there are very long stairs, instead of roads, along 
the hill]. There are also mudslides in the community during the rainy season so 
people can lose their homes. There is plenty of drug trafficking and drug use, 
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especially crack cocaine […] now and then you hear of a young person who was 
killed.’ 
 
Roxana – ‘Really? Can you tell me more?’ 
 
Alice – ‘Well, like a friend of my cousin’s, he was killed because of drug debt. 
That is quite common. There are also cases of men killing their women. 
Recently a guy shot, killed and cut up the body of his woman, because of 
jealousy. She was very pretty and polite, she was 21 years old.’ 
 
Roxana – ‘What about the police, do you see them around?’ 
 
Alice – ‘Yes I see a police car around, I noticed they started going around about 
one year ago.’ 
 
Roxana – ‘Are people happy about this?’ 
 
Alice – ‘Yes, but we need more policing.’43 
 
The first analysis of quantitative data from the Brazilian national health system 
database (Sinan, Sistema de Informações de Agravo de Notificação do Ministério da 
Saúde) by Cerqueira and Coelho (2014, 6), estimates that there are 527,000 cases of 
attempted or actual rape in Brazil every year and, of those cases, only 10% are 
reported to the police. The study reveals that 89 per cent of victims of rape in Sinan’s 
data are female and 70 per cent are children and adolescents (ibid, 26). Many young 
women, like Alice, were concerned about being raped and avoided public spaces 
because of this rational fear based on known cases of rape and violence against 
women in the community. Neither the police nor drug traffickers were available to 
offer support, justice or protection (as it is the case in some communities in the 
southeast, where drug traffickers take on this role, see Arias 2006). It is interesting to 
note that while PPV focuses on curbing the level of homicide, a crime that has 
greatest impact on young men in poor communities, the policy fails to address serious 
crimes against women.  
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This is not to say that women are not affected when men in the community, 
their sons, partners and male friends are killed or when they are the recipients of 
police solutions to crime (imprisoned). Clearly, there are multiple forms of impact 
these occurrences have on communities and women, such as loss of income, 
bereavement and family breakdown. By being silent and neglecting or marginalising 
the importance of the variety of crimes in the city, PPV provides a very partial form 
of public safety provision. The policy is, in this sense, made by men and for men. Its 
implementation, as shown in Chapter 5, emphasised punitive and repressive practices 
advocated by mainstream criminological theories that draw on narrow understandings 
of crime and criminal justice.  
As argued by Young (2011, 189) ‘the lens of orthodox criminology not only 
distorts, it leaves out’. In this instance, by being androcentric, focusing on repressing 
crimes that mostly affect men, such as homicide, criminal justice interventions based 
on orthodox criminological theories have left out gender issues. The data that are 
measured, monitored and emphasised in police targets – such as the amount of drugs 
apprehended and the number of cases of homicide – have nothing to say about rape or 
victims of serious non-lethal violence. The public security apparatus has disregarded 
the provision of women’s safety in at least two ways. Those are: (1) by failing to 
include women in any significant or genuinely proportionate and representative form 
in the running of the system; and (2) by failing to consider and monitor violent crimes 
that affect women in the performance outputs that are measured.  
The government of Pernambuco created a secretariat for women, but it is still 
unclear what impacts this has had at street level or for people’s daily lives. This new 
and small secretariat for women promotes a number of programmes focusing on 
gendered violence, including campaigns against violence against women and the 
training of public sector professionals who deal with victims of domestic violence 
(Portella and Nascimento 2014, 53). It also runs 4 shelters for victims and their 
children (ibid). None of these projects produce performance indicators and neither are 
their outputs monitored by PPV, a critique already made by sociologists involved with 
the initial design (albeit not the implementation) of the PPV (ibid). Moreover, data 
from an interview with members of the Secretariat for Women reveal that these are 
small-scale projects that are unable to deal with the scale of gendered violence in the 
area. 
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Certainly some improvements or moves in the right direction have started at 
national level, prior to PPV, such as the creation of women-only police station 
(delegacias da mulher). However, with the creation of PPV, Pernambuco has seen 
increasing rates of incarceration of women rather than increasing security for women. 
In an interview with a senior member of staff of Recife’s Secretariat for Women (28th 
January 2016), I was told that with increased policing and growing incarceration of 
men involved in the drug trade, more women in low-income communities have been 
pushed into the drug trade, sometimes due to lack of alternative economic means or 
coerced by their imprisoned partners, leading to sky-rocketing rates of incarceration 
of women too. 
Alice’s narrative above has parallels with the case of two sisters from her 
community, Vera and Simone. Vera had been in an abusive relationship for nearly 
twenty-five years with Fernando, and her extended family had had enough of seeing 
her hiding her bruises. Vera was withdrawn, ashamed and depressed. She relied on 
her abuser as a source of income. According to Simone, Fernando was an ‘alcoholic 
and schizophrenic’ and in one of his crises he had threatened to kill the entire family. 
His daughters were so scared of him that one fled to Rio de Janeiro in search of a 
better life and the other started sleeping with a knife concealed under her pillow. 
Simone explained how her family had decided that it was time to do something about 
Fernando. He was a threat for the entire family and they knew that the formal justice 
system could not deal with him efficiently enough to ensure the safety of Vera and her 
daughters. At the time of the fieldwork, the family, which included Vera and 
Simone’s siblings, was debating whether to hire a matador (a killer), to exterminate 
Fernando. In their view this was the only solution to Vera’s and the family’s suffering 
at the hands of Fernando. I have kept in touch with this family and know that 
Fernando is still alive and Vera continues to live with him. The family’s decision was 
swayed by one of the evangelical siblings who argued against killing. Both of their 
daughters have now moved to Rio de Janeiro but many members of the family still 
think that they need to take justice in their own hands. This gap in public safety 
service provision to women and surviving victims of violence, beyond fostering 
inequalities, has potential to erode the capacity of PPV by generating more work 
related to homicides inflicted by militias, matadores, illegal security groups and death 
squads that are keen to fill the security gap, or to ‘employ violence (e.g., vigilantism) 
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as a means of creating their own extra-legal forms of security’ (Arias and Goldstein 
2010, 4). 
The inadequate and unequal provision of access to justice in programmes such 
as PPV compound and contribute to the status quo by neglecting and being silent 
about gender violence. PPV focuses on trying to reduce homicides and not on trying 
to reduce (non-lethal) violence more broadly speaking. Although at the national level 
Brazil has implemented some innovative gender-focused initiatives, local public 
security policies such as PPV have generally failed to focus on women’s needs and to 
address the social and power inequalities that engender gender violence. On the 
national scale, Brazil started to criminalise domestic and family violence in 2006 with 
the creation of the Maria da Penha law. The country’s women-only police stations 
were first established in 1985, and access to them has been expanded with the opening 
of 475 units (Hautzinger 2007, UN Women 2011). Evaluations from the United 
Nations suggest that women-only police stations have increased access to services 
such as counselling, legal and social support (UN Women 2011, 1). However, 
women-only police stations are not open overnight or at weekends when cases of rape 
and violence are more likely to occur (Mendonça 2015) and large numbers of 
complaints brought to women’s police stations never enter the legal system (Gregori 
2010). Neither are the police or mediators available in low-income communities, or in 
good terms to enable dialogue with residents or prevent these crimes from happening. 
In the case of local policies, the public need to trust the police to report these crimes, 
and the police needs to be responsive and present so that community-police relations 
can be developed and trust can be built.  Furthermore, public security policies need to 
be expanded to include social and economic assistance to victims of gender violence. 
The criminalising approach cannot address the economic and gender inequalities 
(Hautzinger 2002, Hautzinger 2007) that force abused women to stay in these 
relationships. 
7.5 Age 
The neglect of gender issues is one weakness of PPV; another issue is the lack of 
attention to the age of victims and perpetrators of crime. Enforcing policing and 
incarceration does not appear an adequate policy to resolve the roots of youth crime 
and youth victimisation. Despite not having reached the level of organisation present 
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in Rio de Janeiro, the drug trade has become so widespread in Recife that it was 
mentioned in every interview. Many young people interviewed had friends or family 
who had become involved with the trade, often at a very young age: 
 
George (18 years old, male) – ‘I was born here and have lived here all my live 
with my six brothers, I am the youngest, I lost my father when I was 6. I live 
with my mother. […] The main problem here is drugs. Lots of my old school 
friends are in this life in drugs.’ 
 
Roxana – ‘Are they using drugs or selling them?’ 
 
George – ‘Both. They are selling and smoking crack and marijuana.’ 
 
Roxana – ‘When did they get involved with this “life in drugs”?’ 
 
George –  ‘When they were 11 or 12 years old. Many are dead already.’  
 
Roxana – ‘Really?’  
 
George – ‘Yes, because of drug debt. They end up in fights. Young people 
killing young people. Sometimes it’s rivalry, or because one took the selling 
spot of the other. Or they have a misunderstanding over how they split the 
product between them […] sometimes I hear them arguing about it.’ 
 
Roxana – ‘So, do they have a boss?’ 
 
George – ‘Yes, they do.’ 
 
Roxana – ‘And is the boss also a young person? Do people in the community 
know who their boss is?’ 
 
George – ‘He’s an adult. Yes, people know him, but no one talks about this. 
The police came and did a clean-up last month. Sometimes the police take 
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their guns and drugs. There were others [other bosses] who were arrested but 
this guy came to take their place.’ 
 
George seemed aware of police action in the community; however, repressive action 
did not suffice to resolve the cycle of violence in the drug trade. Neither did it stop 
ever-younger children from engaging in the drug trade. The perception that the police 
are unable to succeed in the war on crime and drugs because people aged under 18 
cannot be prosecuted and penalised in the same way as adults is one of the rationales 
for demands to reduce the age of criminal responsibility in Brazil. So far the move 
towards reducing the age of criminal responsibility has been one of the main 
successes of conservative (and sometimes evangelical Christian/protestant) groups 
such as the so-called Bancada Bala, Boi e Biblia (also known as the bancada BBB, or 
‘Bullets, Beef and Bible’ caucus) and the Bancada da Bala (the bullet lobby) formed 
largely by politicians that are linked to the armaments industry and ex- or current 
members of the police that have turned to politics to propose increasingly punitive 
agendas (Douglas 2015). However, repressing this kind of crime (drug related) 
through policing does not stop it from happening, as the data here and international 
studies reveal (Shiner 2016). There were new candidates and recruits willing to re-
establish business as usual once arrests had been made. Moreover, there is 
incontestable evidence that incarcerating younger people neither reduces crime nor 
rehabilitates young offenders, but that it does lead to negative life-outcomes (Gomes 
2015, MacDonald 2006, 2010, Squires and Stephen 2005).  
George’s experience suggests that the police presence on its own (given that 
some police live in the community) might deter some crimes, but cannot address the 
various forms of violence and drug related crime in the community:  
 
George – ‘There isn’t much theft here. There are many policemen living in my 
alto [hill], maybe that’s why. The problem is mostly drugs and [violent] fights 
between couples. It’s not safe here. After 8pm you can’t really sit outdoors. 
Like, there was a guy sitting near my neighbours’ that got hit by a stray 
bullet.’ 
 
Roxana – ‘So has the government done anything to change this situation?’ 
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George – ‘I think so, there are more police cars. I think there are fewer 
homicides. But I don’t think there’s enough policing here. And their work 
needs to improve. There’s no dialogue between the police and the residents. I 
don’t think people fear them, but they don’t trust the police. […] They take 
bribes and even drugs, without arresting, it is not that common here but it 
happens.’ 
 
Nearly all participants mentioned police corruption in the neighbourhood, including 
accepting payments instead of arresting suspects. The drug trade, in particular the 
growing trade in crack cocaine, has increased illicit cash exchanges and provides 
more opportunities for corrupt police to extort drug dealers and traffickers (Wolff, 
2014, 126). As George suggests, despite police corruption, increased policing was a 
key demand in the communities. But so was improvement to the model of policing, 
such as improving the approach and increasing ‘dialogue between the police and 
residents’. 
7.6 Public reflections on policing: discrimination, mistrust and criminalisation 
In Tourinho and in Vitoria the drug trade provided an alternative source of income 
and lifestyle to some young men with few qualifications and few well-paid 
employment prospects, just as in Bourgois’ (2003) study of crack dealers in East 
Harlem44. But residents and young people themselves were aware that what they 
called a vida no mundo das drogas (life in the world of drugs) would lead to either 
early death or trouble with the law.  Most residents were concerned with the easy 
access to firearms and the lack of meaningful activities for young people, which in 
their view led many the young towards the drug trade and a vicious circle of 
unregulated violence. But unlike the drug trade in southeast Brazil (e.g. Rio de 
Janeiro), residents claimed that traffickers did not interfere with the day-to-day 
activities of public service providers such as the opening and closing of schools and 
local businesses. In contradiction, most claimed that the drug trade and firearms were 
sometimes present within schools, thus interfering with some aspects of services in 
the local community. Although most participants had noticed an increase in policing, 
they argued that this was not enough to ensure safety and address drug related 
violence in the neighbourhood. As explained by one young female student: 
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‘My best friend had to move to the interior of the state because her cousin, and 
neighbour, killed two chefes de boca (bosses of a drug selling point). The 
entire family was under threat so she had to leave’ (Karine, 16 years old, 
female) 
 
As in Tourinho, in Vitoria most participants wanted more policing, despite 
complaining about multiple police ills and brutality. It was possible to code the 
interview data from 116 participants into four categories about their perception of the 
police presence in their neighbourhoods. Only nine participants (8%) responded that 
they thought the police were sufficiently present in their community. Sixty-five 
respondents (56%) said that the amount of policing in their neighbourhood was 
inadequate. Thirty participants (26%) did not want to comment on this topic and 
seven (6%) said that the police was sometimes sufficiently present in the area. What 
was even more disturbing is that seventy-two participants (62%) responded that they 
feared and mistrusted the police, while only fifteen (13%) responded that they did not 
fear or mistrust the police and twenty-nine respondents (25%) refused to comment. 
People felt distant to the police, there being no dialogue or positive interaction 
with them. Residents would occasionally call the police and report a crime 
anonymously over the phone. However, most people were unlikely to provide 
information to the police during investigations, partly this was because the police 
were hardly present in the community, while the people that they may be 'snitching' or 
informing on, were there most of the time. The lei do silêncio (literally 'law of 
silence', discussed in Chapter 5) remains strong.  
People feared revenge but in some cases they simply did not trust the police, 
given that when residents and young people did talk face-to-face to the police, their 
encounters were rather unpleasant. Police officers interviewed claimed to be 
attempting to do their work and follow orders, but in some cases, this work entailed 
arbitrary stop and searches to meet targets, for example some officers were told to 
simply stop and search thirty people riding motorbikes. The arbitrariness of those 
stop-and-searches deteriorated community-police relations and in some cases led to 
conflict between officers and residents. Most young males interviewed explained that 
if they were outdoors after 9pm they were immediately seen as criminals. Some of 
these young men claimed that the police would ‘plant’ drugs in their pockets to arrest 
Roxana Pessoa Cavalcanti 
 188 
them. Some had also seen friends being arrested in this way. Young males also 
reported that the police extort cash from residents under threat of arrest. Many had 
been victims of police violence, as illustrated by Gustavo’s experience above. The 
dominant discourse about violence reduction and managerial police reform – which 
focuses on targets such as drugs and firearms apprehensions, numbers of arrests, and 
number of people processed through the criminal justice system – obscures the 
multitude of ways in which arriving at these targets or acclaimed results affect and 
generate costs to the marginalised. The data presented here provide a challenge to the 
narratives of ‘success’ of state interventions.  
Experiences of police brutality were common, in much the same way that 
Garmany (2014, 1242) suggests, on the basis of his research in a favela community in 
a different northeaster Brazilian state, that ‘hostility and disrespect toward the poor 
have become institutionalised procedure’. Bernardo, 16, from an indigenous 
background, had been a victim of arbitrary brutal tactics during a stop and search 
carried out by a special militarised police force called GATI (Grupo de Apoio Tatico 
Itinerante – Policia Militar de Pernambuco, GATI-PMPE). Bernardo explained that 
during recurrent stop-and-search operations, police officers had punched and kicked 
him (and other young people in the community), and ordered him to interlace his 
fingers while physically compressing them, causing intense pain.  
Specialist militarised shock troops, such as GATI, or ROTA in São Paulo, or 
BOPE in Rio de Janeiro, formed by heavily armed military police were created to 
combat threats of a 'terrorist' nature, armed banked robberies and serious armed 
conflict. ROTA for example, was created during the last military dictatorship in 
Brazil (1964-1985), specialising in armed conflict and political repression. Yet, when 
armed conflict was no longer a motive for this type of policing, these troops turned to 
the combat of ordinary crime without abdicating the methods developed during 
periods of military arbitrariness (Pinheiro 1982, 60). The current research shows that 
GATI, just like ROTA, continues to arbitrarily deploy militarised repression methods 
on ordinary civilians perceived as suspects. 
Physical punishment and extra-legal methods of social control were 
commonly imposed on the bodies – particularly the young, indigenous or afro-
Brazilian bodies – of people who live and utilise public space in particular territories, 
in the criminalised slums and territorially peripheral communities, the spaces 
perceived as dangerous, criminal, undeserving, and undesirable to inhabit. Both 
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violence and the repression emerging through the public security apparatus are 
unevenly distributed in the city. Residents of the periferias are the population most 
exposed to violence emerging from the drug trade and from the most repressive 
methods of policing, as demonstrated in several studies (Cano 1997, Feltran 2008, 
2011, Fernandes 2013, Garmany 2011a, Zaluar 2004a). In both case study 
communities, non-lethal police violence, such as the baculejo (forceful stop and 
search, often involving a physical beating) had been common. But there were also 
cases of police killings. One young man had seen his brother being shot by the police 
in 2013, he explained: 
 
‘My brother was coming back from a gig at night when one of his mates stole 
his silver chain, so he decided to call the police. When the police came, 
instead of treating him as a victim, they accused him of theft and of carrying a 
firearm. He didn’t have a firearm. They shot him but he survived […] My 
other brother was involved in drug trafficking and he was shot and killed by 
the police in 2012. My mother was devastated. The officer who shot him was 
disciplined and lost his uniform [lost his job]’ (João, 17, Vitoria, mulato) 
  
Despite being the most victimised group in the community, young indigenous and 
black people were also the most criminalised group by the police. Young black males 
were the focus of police surveillance, just like in other parts of Brazil (cf. Adorno 
1995) and beyond borders (Cavadino, Dignan, and Mair 2013, 291, Wacquant 2008). 
Inevitably, the more a group is targeted by penal and repressive institutions, the more 
likely it is that they will become over represented in crime statistics (as offenders) and 
in penal institutions, such as the prison. Institutional racism generates a vicious circle 
of criminalisation – the more black people are over-represented in the penal system as 
offenders, the more they are the subjects of surveillance and the targets of police 
work.  
7.7 Conclusion 
Drawing on data from two case-study communities in the peripheries of Recife, this 
chapter has presented a critique of the public security apparatus, based on the voices 
of people in marginalised communities. The chapter presented demographic 
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information that contextualised these communities in the epicentre of multiple social 
inequalities. Focusing on data emerging from observations in the communities and 
interviews with residents, mostly (albeit not all) young (aged 16-29), the chapter 
examines the current state of policing in the peripheries of Recife, the gaps in public 
security provision, and the consequences thereof. For the most part the chapter reveals 
continuity in neglectful, criminalising and violent methods of policing. When asked 
what changes they had noticed in terms of government action to improve security, 
most participants said they hadn’t noticed anything, some had seen the appearance of 
a police patrol car but had not actually seen the police in action on the streets, their 
relationship felt distant from the police. When they did interact with the police, those 
encounters were adversarial and reflected enduring problems of disrespect for the 
human rights of poor, indigenous and afro-descendent citizens. 
 One of the gaps in public security provision is the neglect of women in policy 
making and in the application of policies. PPV focused on targeting homicides, a 
crime that affects more men than women. It did not address the multiple forms of 
violence, including non-lethal violence, that exist in the city.  So female victims of 
abuse and rape were left neglected and unprotected, leading some residents to seek or 
contemplate seeking alternative forms of security provision from matadores (hired 
killers) and extermination groups. Furthermore, since female victims of serious non-
lethal violence were uncounted and unrepresented in the dominant framework that 
focuses on monitoring quantitative targets, there was no observable adaptation of the 
public security apparatus to deal with their victimisation. 
While claims of reduced numbers of homicides were good for political 
campaigns, the current model of policing did little to resolve insecurity in 
marginalised communities, which saw ever-younger children join the drug trade and 
ordinary residents criminalised by racist, sexist and classist policing and public 
security interventions. As such, the chapter provided a critique of the dominant 
technocratic discourse of ‘successful’ state interventions (e.g. PPV) presented in the 
media, in the narratives of state actors (especially high-raking government actors), 
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CHAPTER 8 – Democratising public security interventions 
 
This thesis focuses on examining the effects of public security interventions on people 
in low-income communities, especially the young. The previous chapters explored, 
from an institutional perspective, a particular intervention (PPV), its challenges and 
alleged successes (Chapter 5); from the perspective of the police and low-ranking 
officers, issues of discrimination and a self-critique of public security interventions 
(Chapter 6); the perspective and experience of policing of young people and residents 
of low-income communities (Chapter 7). So far, this investigation has brought to light 
conflicting constructions of public safety programs, and revealed significant 
challenges in the implementation of safety measures.  
 This chapter examines some further challenges to the democratisation of 
Brazilian policing, drawing on reflections, observations and interviews emerging from 
the two case study communities and from politically active members of civil society, 
including activists and members of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) 
concerned with the issues of public safety and justice. The chapter argues that the 
application of new public security interventions has been considered a success based 
on the measurement of certain quantitative outputs – such as the reduction of 
homicide rates, the increasing numbers of people processed through the criminal 
justice system, increasing apprehension of drugs and firearms – while neglecting the 
limits of this type of measurement and disregarding the importance of qualitative 
aspects of public safety interventions. Drawing on the Brazilian case, and expanding 
on longstanding quantitative/qualitative debates in the social sciences (Silverman 
2010, Westmarland 2001, Young 2011), this chapter examines some of the 
epistemological problems in the prioritisation of quantitative measures over 
qualitative ones. Overlooked qualitative aspects include: citizens’ perspectives, police 
accountability and external independent policing oversight, the hidden45 and under-
studied impacts of public safety interventions, such as the continuation of organised 
criminals and death squads operating from within overcrowded prisons. 
 Recent studies focusing on Brazil have begun to theorise issues around the 
monopoly of violence in Brazil (Denyer Willis 2015, Arias and Goldstein 2010). The 
data presented in this chapter and in the literature review (Chapters 2 and 3) suggest 
the need for social theory that does not emanate from a hegemonic Euro-American 
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(Global North) unidirectional point of view, and for theory that does not exclude large 
sections of humanity (in the Global South). Part of this debate is based on the need for 
a post-colonial perspective, an approach that does not simply align itself in relation to 
theories from the Global North. For instance, state theories about the monopoly of 
violence, often originating from the European context (Tilly 1992), are frequently 
deployed in debates relating to the Brazilian case. Although there is credit in 
considering who, whether and how violent relations take place, the monopoly of 
violence may not be the best framework to understand the State or violence in Brazil, 
since arguably neither the State nor organised criminal groups (at least outside São 
Paulo) have ever had a monopoly of violence. 
In the following order, the chapter debates: (i) the limits of the ways in which 
progress or success in public security interventions are measured, (ii) the effects of 
undemocratic, distant and brutal policing, such as the coexistence of the police with 
violent organised crime and death squads, (iii) the inadequacy of means of civil 
participation in the establishment and monitoring of public security interventions, and 
(iv) the debate about the extent of the state presence in low-income communities or 
State-civil society engagement. Finally, the chapter reflects on the debate around 
measures that may promote democratic – which is to say transparent, accountable and 
respectful – policing. These include the demilitarisation of the police and the public 
security apparatus, structural changes to this system, and the creation of permanent 
means of dialogue between civil society and the police. 
8.1 The manipulation of quantitative data 
Chapter 7 started to develop a critique of the uses and misuses of quantitative data in 
the measuring and overseeing of public safety interventions, insofar as the data that 
are measured neglects significant and serious violence that does not necessarily lead 
to death, for instance, rape and violence against women, even when these crimes are 
reported. In an interview with a senior member of the statistics team (Gerência de 
Análise Criminal e Estatística or GACE) of the secretariat for public defence of 
Pernambuco, I was told that although the State does have data on these crimes, the 
data are not used to monitor performance, unlike the data on homicides and drug 
apprehensions. Moreover, although the state of Pernambuco has recorded these 
crimes when they have been reported, the data are classified, apparently so as to avoid 
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causing panic and increasing fear associated with certain areas. This section examines 
other limits and problems pertaining to quantitative measures, especially in terms of 
accuracy. Following sections examine the need for qualitative measures.  
Both community activists and residents in both case study communities were 
suspicious of the accuracy of government statistics. They argued that in most low-
income communities, residents had not noticed a drop in violent crime. In fact, levels 
of lethal violence fluctuate and it may be difficult for residents in poor communities 
to notice declining crime rates at street-level. In this aspect, statistical figures are 
more easily observed. However, even where statistics can be observed, there are 
multiple confounding issues at stake and numerous classifications that can impact 
statistical data. As elaborated by Denyer Willis (2015, 38), a potentially violent death 
can be classified in various different ways: ‘found bones (ossadas), found bodies 
(corpo achado), suicide46 (suicídios), suspicious death (morte supeita), death to be 
clarified (morte a esclarecer), robbery followed by death (roubo seguido de morte, or 
latrocínio), manslaughter (homicídio culposo), resisting arrest followed by death 
(resistência seguida de morte), multiple homicide (chacina), and intentional homicide 
(homicídio doloso)’. Eight of these categories are possible in Pernambuco, with the 
exception of the notoriously contested ‘resisting arrest followed by death’, which was 
used throughout Brazil to justify police killings, but has been abolished as a category 
for labelling violent deaths in Pernambuco with the creation of PPV.  
 In my third and final trip to Recife during my research, I obtained permission 
to attend another PPV meeting on 27th January 2016, where I could observe first hand 
the complexity of counting the dead. A delegado approached the head of statistics 
sitting next to me to informally request the change of classification for a case. Bones 
had been found in his jurisdiction and classified as a homicide, affecting his targets. 
The delegado argued that often these deaths occurred in neighbouring states but these 
dead bodies were buried in his jurisdiction; and that the death may have been 
manslaughter (homicidio culposo) instead of homicide (homicidio doloso), in which 
case, the delegado reminded the statistician that the death would not affect his stats. 
Denyer Willis (2015) argues that there is no question that statistics released by the 
public security apparatus are ‘adjusted, manipulated, subcategorized, or poorly 
represented to convey rosier images of public security’ (51). 
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Figure 8: PPV's meeting room at SEPLAG  
Recife, PE, 27th January 2016 (prior to the arrival of attendees).  
  
 Another recent example in Pernambuco raises concerns about the 
manipulation of statistical data. The Associação dos Delegados de Pernambuco 
(ADEPPE or association of chiefs of civil police of Pernambuco), dissatisfied with 
working conditions and low pay, started a campaign in August 2015 to pressure 
government officials to negotiate these issues. As part of the campaign the ADEPPE 
has published crime rates that are significantly higher than those released by 
Pernambuco’s secretariat of social defence (SDS). For instance, according to the SDS, 
there were 3,785 cases of car theft in Pernambuco from 1st January to 31st July 2015, 
while according to ADEPPE there were 7,955 (Oliveira 2015c). According to the 
SDS there were 380 robberies on public transport from 1st January to 31st July 2015, 
but according to ADEPPE there were 971 (ibid). 
The potential for manipulation of data is a key concern in the Brazilian 
context, since the police control the morgues (IML) and there are no effective 
independent institutions of oversight, as the latter section of this chapter reveals. 
Moreover, much of the work that the police do is not easily quantifiable in the same 
way that arrests, gun apprehensions and numbers of deaths are. What residents are 
clearly able to judge are the quality of policing and their relationship with the police. 
Accordingly, in residents’ views, the police’s relative absence (sporadic presence), 
brutality, indifference, corruption and prejudice have not changed with PPV – these 
characteristics of policing were not easily addressed by PPV’s system of monitoring 
quantifiable performance targets.   
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8.2 Death squads 
The type of policing available made many residents feel unsafe and sometimes led 
them to rely on the work of illegal private security groups and death squads. But 
many residents were simply victims of extortion from these groups, who charged 
them fees for security. In these circumstances community residents felt that the police 
were, in effect, protecting the rich and criminalising the poor. In the words of Luther, 
a key informant in Tourinho introduced in Chapter 7, who has lived all his life in the 
community: 
 
‘We don’t feel safe. We ask ourselves: who’s worse, the bandits or the police? 
Because the police are meant to protect us but they sometimes kill. We live in 
a violent society that values having, not being. The police force was created to 
protect the rich, not the poor’ (Black, teacher, artist, activist, October 2013).  
 
Several other residents made similar comments. As illustrated in Chapter 7, residents 
of low-income communities felt under-protected by the police, but they were also 
acutely aware of routine killings by drug traffickers, death squads and individuals 
connected to the drug trade. These killings were often linked to drug debt. Revenge, 
whether fuelled by inter-personal conflicts or by disputes relating to the drug trade, 
was used in place of a dysfunctional and slow criminal justice system, or where 
formal avenues of justice could not be utilised (e.g. to settle disputes in the 
underground economy). Since citizens are unable to access justice through state 
institutions they are increasingly likely to seek extra-legal forms of security (Arias 
and Goldstein 2010, Davis 2010). Revenge, private violence and extra-legal security 
were made possible through what Arias and Goldstein (2010) have conceptualised as 
‘violent pluralism’, through a variety of violent actors, citizens, police, ex-police and 
death squads.  
 The context of high insecurity made private security options appealing to 
residents, so that the efforts to improve personal safety go beyond the middle and 
upper class gated community. Low-income community residents also tried to increase 
their safety using gates, locks and avoiding being outdoors in the evenings, due to fear 
of crime and violence. Many participants felt trapped and imprisoned in their own 
homes.  Many paid small fees, such as R$3 per week, for illicit private security in the 
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community, which was sometimes delivered by ex-police officers, deploying violence 
as a means of conflict resolution.  
The infrequent presence of the on-duty police also compelled residents to 
piece together alternative security solutions. As argued by Denyer Willis (2015, 7), 
after the fall of centralised authoritarian regimes, ‘new and decentralized security 
entities have become powerful producers and regulators of violence, particularly in 
parts of cities with weak state-society relations’. These decentralised ‘security 
entities’ are present outside São Paulo where Denyer Willis (2015) conducted his 
study. For instance, Luther, as well as other residents, commented that some of the 
organised matadores (hired killers) that manage and systematise illicit security 
companies in the community, and extort residents for the service provided, have been 
imprisoned. However, according to residents, these illegal groups continue to manage 
their business and earn an income from within the prison, they continue to operate in 
the community from within the prison: 
 
‘Most people here pay R$3 per week for security. On Saturdays a man comes 
to collect the money from each household. If you are not in, he will come 
again on Sunday. The leader of the gang, Marcos Cabeça Afundada (‘Sunken-
Head Marcos’) is in prison but his guys still work for him. Many matadors, 
who used to look after a street each, are in prison but the money continues 
going to them. From inside prison they can order a killing [of a local thief]. I 
can’t tell you exactly what happens if a resident refuses to pay [the fees]. 
Sometimes their house will get burgled. But the matador assures you that if 
anything is taken from you, he will reimburse you for what was taken. It’s bad 
with him, and worse without him.’ (Luther, 29th October 2013) 
 
Participants in Tourinho explained that these illicit security and extermination groups 
formed by ex-policemen operated by extorting money from residents in return for 
their services while also working as an insurance company, promising to reimburse 
residents for potential losses. As long as the fees of R$3 per week (R$13 per month) 
were paid (the equivalent of around £2.50 per month or 4 hours of labour paid at the 
minimum wage in Brazil). However, residents were coerced into paying these fees 
since they were aware that they would be victimised if they did not, potentially by the 
same group that provides this form of security. The extermination groups were 
Roxana Pessoa Cavalcanti 
 197 
responsible for informal justice in the community, by killing any petty criminals, 
people who owed money, or even drug dealers and users. However, according to 
numerous residents of Tourinho, since the leader Marcos had been imprisoned, the 
number of drug dealers in the community had increased: 
 
‘Some people miss the time when Marcos was out because the community did 
not have problems with drugs. The drugs problem started here in the last 7 or 
10 years. But you know he was not arrested because of the community. No 
one here would have spoken about him (reported him to the police). But his 
friends are also ex-police officers and they are all being investigated for being 
part of an extermination group. When he was investigated they found 60 
fighting cocks in his house and an imported pistol, apparently worth R$20,000 
(£6,670 at the time), which could shoot even under water. He got done for 
that. Now everything here is acabado (run down), there is crack cocaine 
everywhere. The public market is full of zombie addicts – kids, women and 
men. When Marcos was out, the problem in the community was just 
homicides between rival security groups. People died because of the 
competition between extermination groups. One group would start terrorising 
the community to damage the reputation of the other group, because they 
wanted to take over the security business, it caused all sorts of fights.’ 
 
The parasitic nature of the security business escalated levels of violence in the 
community. Dellasoppa (2010) argued that militias and informal security groups, 
usually backed by policeman living in poor communities, have presented themselves 
as the security solution for these areas while simultaneously ‘breaking down’ the 
State’s monopoly on legitimate force. But discussing the issue as a ‘breakdown’ of 
the monopoly of violence suggests that such a monopoly has in fact existed at some 
point in the history of Brazil – which does not seem to be supported by the literature 
discussed in this thesis. What is observable is that these groups have multiplied the 
sources of violence in communities in the peripheries of the city. 
Moreover, even where the State has attempted to monopolise violence through 
state building programs and interventions such as PPV, these attempts have proven 
inadequate. That is because, even though the police carried out a number of 
operations to arrest members of death squads in Pernambuco (Alston 2010) and the 
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main leaders of these groups had been imprisoned, they were still able to maintain 
their power and coercion in the community, operating from within the chaos of the 
Brazilian prisons, through their networks and mobile phones.  
The information about death squads, emerging from community residents 
interviewed, is plausible, given that Brazilian prisons are known to be overcrowded, 
informally organised (as discussed in Chapter 7) and the headquarters for many 
criminal organisations, where all sorts of contraband and mobile phones circulate 
(Arruda 2014, Dias 2011). In this context, Luther explained that nobody in the 
community would want to be seen talking to the police:  
 
‘If you are seen talking to the police and then they seize some stuff [e.g. 
firearms] from one of the [extermination] groups, later your house could be 
burgled because they think you grassed them up [informed on them]. It is not 
worth the risk. Some people might do it but only anonymously’.  
 
Criminal groups in the community needed and wanted to avoid any contact with the 
police or with police informants, as this could increase the costs of their operations. 
For this reason, they were concerned with the identity of their clientele. A young man 
had recently received a beating in the community because he was not known in the 
community and tried to buy drugs there. The dealers thought he was a police 
informant and attempted to kill him but he got away. According to residents, he ran 
out of the community, todo rasgado (totally torn-up) from his beating. This type of 
violent display of resistance to the police comes about not only from the need to avoid 
police for the conduct of illicit activities, but also from the resentment and hostility is 
provoked by inadequate, sporadic, arbitrary and discriminatory policing tactics. 
Residents wanted to be treated with dignity and respect but in the absence of this, a 
minority had decided to retaliate, generating great impact in the circle of hostility in 
police-community relations. Transparent, non-sporadic, demilitarised (in practice, 
dress-code and equipment) and accountable policing could go some way to increasing 
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8.3 Civil society and police oversight 
This section discusses data gathered through interviews with community activists and 
members of non-governmental organisations (NGOs), here labelled as ‘civil society 
experts’. They are considered experts because as a group they have insight into both 
the perceptions of state officials and the perceptions of people in recipient 
communities, given that their work bridges these two worlds. This group presented 
some of the core critiques of PPV, which related to its focus on repression as opposed 
to social prevention of crime; as well as to the amount of money invested in these 
aspects of crime control; and the concerns about the impacts of escalating 
incarceration and overcrowding in prisons. In the previous chapter, many participants 
argued that the only government action that they had noticed was more repression 
towards poor and black people. This experience resonated with the claims made by 
civil society activists: 
 
 ‘Based on our organisation’s experience, government statistics do not 
represent what low-income communities say about police brutality and crime. 
The government of Pernambuco claims that homicide and violent crime have 
decreased but poor communities continue to complain about these issues and 
have not felt any difference.’ (NGO activist.) 
 
According to activists, PPV was simply reinforcing the traditional conservative 
approach to public security policies, which emphasised repressive policing. They 
were dissatisfied with the level of oversight over the police, with the lack of police 
accountability and demanded independent monitoring of PPV as a program through 
councils, a request which was not met, it seems due to lack of political will.  
Between May 2007 and September 2010, a group of Pernambucan journalists 
financed by the Associação do Ministério Público de Pernambuco (Association of the 
Public Prosecutor Ministry of Pernambuco, AMPPE) organised a blog – PE Body 
Count – that consulted public security institutions about the numbers of cases of 
homicide on a daily basis. While the blog existed, information about nearly 14,000 
homicides – including time, name of victim, location, and other details – were made 
publicly available. A digital counter of homicides was placed in the centre of Recife 
and on the web for one year. The blog and the counter worked to pressure the 
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government for reforms and as a method of independent monitoring of the conditions 
of public insecurity. According to interviews conducted by Macedo (2012) with 
members of the team who ran the blog, cases of violence were often underreported in 
official statistics and sometimes registered as deaths from falls, electric shocks or 
traffic accidents, instead of as homicides. But when the blog’s funding was no longer 
available and with the employment of some leaders of social movements in 
government jobs, independent methods of monitoring the public security apparatus 
were no longer available (ibid).  
Latin America is known to have insufficient mechanisms for police or state 
agencies to consult and engage with citizens about what they want from police, except 
for rare public consultations (Ward 2006, 199). As argued by Ward (2006), when 
police reforms are attempted without the participation of civil society (NGOs, 
community groups, individual citizens, research organisations), they can generate 
suspicion about the extent of commitment and transformation, especially in places 
where citizens have high levels of distrust for the police. Madalena, a sociologist who 
had been involved with the public security department, summarises the main critiques 
made by civil society activists and debates them with members of the public: 
 
Madalena (23rd July 2013) – ‘Pacto pela Vida is very expensive. But in 2006 
we were in a state of civil war [metaphorically speaking], more than 4,000 
people were killed in Pernambuco and Recife. Pacto emerged out of a forum 
that was organised for experts to discuss this problem. There were people who 
worked with healthcare, organisations like Gajop (NGO) were invited but they 
refused to participate in this way, they thought the event should be open to 
more people and organisations. There was a meeting at university and various 
project proposals emerged. The university proposed six ações (projects) with 
popular participation. But the way this was left, Pacto [pela Vida] was not a 
public security policy, just a plan. The aim was to reduce homicide rates by 
12% each year. It was not something to be accomplished solely by the police, 
but also by social workers, psychologists, and so on. Why 12%? The 
statisticians of the SDS (Secretaria de Defesa Social, or secretariat of social 
defence), said that this target was based on studies from Colombia and from 
the USA. This idea was also based on arguments by Brazilian scholars like 
Sapori and Luiz Eduardo Soares that the problem of security could be 
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addressed if the lack of articulation between justice institutions such as the 
police, prison, public prosecutor, courts was resolved. Pacto [pela Vida] led to 
improved targets but the public prosecutor (Ministério Público) says that 90% 
of inquéritos (police investigations) received are poor and lack information. 
Another issue is that it is common for the police to be involved in death 
squads, such as os justiceiros. So one of the objectives was to tackle death 
squads. […] There has been some reduction in homicides but an increase in 
violent property crime. Crime is migrating. Some targeted areas, like Santo 
Amaro, have improved but criminality has increased in other areas. 
Unfortunately the only method of crime prevention implemented has been 
repressive: increasing policing, there has not been any increase in social 
interventions’. 
 
Female resident – ‘We need vocational courses and apprenticeships to occupy 
the young people here. They used to queue for any opportunity of training. We 
asked for two training schools and instead we received an academia da cidade 
(a program for physical activity/exercise)’ 
[…] 
Madalena – ‘Pacto is only 10% about prevention and 90% about repressive 
policing. The patrulha do bairro (neighbourhood patrol) is nothing like 
community policing. The police shouldn’t just be inside their cars. They need 
to be inside the neighbourhood making connections, getting to know people 
and what happens in the area, being responsible for the neighbourhood. There 
is insufficient training for the police. The police have maintained the military 
code of conduct. They should be trained to avoid using their guns and only 
selectively use force where necessary. There has been some reduction in 
homicide statistics since it has been prioritised and even the fire service is 
involved in trying to save victims of violence before they pass away. So if 
someone has been run over and at the same time there is a call about someone 
who has been a victim of attempted homicide, the second will be prioritised 
because the person who was run over may die but this won’t affect the 
homicide rates. We need an independent conselho (council) to monitor this 
public security policy and to press for improvements but there is resistance 
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and a lack support and interest from the government to have this established.’ 
(Madalena – Sociologist – July 2013) 
 
Community activists made a number of criticisms in relation to PPV: the policy is 
expensive, focused on repressive crime control, and lacks organised official external 
supervision. One of the main critiques was that to some extent the policy had reduced 
homicides by improving the provision of emergency health care and rescuing people 
who had already been victims of violence. Consequently, while this would have an 
impact in violent crime statistical trends, it does not necessarily mean that violence 
decreased. As Madalena exemplifies above, the fire service is now more active in 
rescuing and prioritising victims of homicide and people who have been shot, but this 
does not stop them from being shot or victimised in the first place. Another PPV 
strategy that contributes to this fallacy is stationing ambulances in and around areas 
considered hot spots for violence during high-crime periods (e.g. weekends). As 
Wolff (2014, 176) puts it, this practice has ‘substantially increased the survival rate of 
gunshot victims without necessarily affecting the overall number of violent incidents’ 
or, for that matter, without affecting the fear of crime and scepticism by residents in 
the poorest and most affected communities.  
Civil society activists argued that PPV’s focus on increased policing side-lines 
the need for a broader and systemic approach to public security, one that includes 
more methods of social crime prevention. Residents, as seen above and in the 
following section were sceptics of PPV’s claimed results and methods. Instead, they 
demanded more programs devoted to crime prevention (such as vocational 
training/education, recreation, family welfare, employment, routine patrol on foot). 
Furthermore, to be effective a broader policy approach requires a combination of 
crime preventative measures with: (a) adequate crime repression and investigation; 
(b) appropriate prosecution; (c) well-staffed and humane prison system; (d) ex-
offender rehabilitation (employment training and job opportunities, counselling, drug 
treatment). As argued by Bailey and Dammert (2006, 19), simply relying on increased 
police presence and more crime repression can produce more convictions (including 
of non-guilty persons), stretch the criminal justice system (which then becomes more 
vulnerable to inefficiency and injustice), and overcrowd the prison system (where 
advanced criminal skills can be developed).  
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The emphasis on repressive policing alongside the breakdown of 
communication between government and civil society were key complaints in 
interviews with activists. According to Pereira (2005, 200), while democracy in Brazil 
has been beset by continuing violence and repression by state security forces, there 
has been a failure to form genuinely democratic and sustainable institutions that 
connect the public to political representatives. In the sphere of public security and 
policing, this disconnection poses important questions about the instability of state 
building efforts.  
The political unwillingness to systematically and recurrently engage with the 
public in the long term, and the failure to support an external oversight council for 
PPV, were important shortcomings of the programme – and were only admitted by 
civil society activists such as Madalena, who was no longer employed at the time the 
fieldwork was conducted. In contradiction to her critical view, the higher the ranking 
of the public officials working in public safety, the more they praised PPV and the 
governor, and the more they ignored the need for continuing communication and 
engagement with civil society. If the purpose of the police is solely coercive, without 
negotiation or consultation, they are effectively an authoritarian and undemocratic 
institution. A lack in oversight limits the ways in which the police can be subjected to 
democratic standards of accountability. 
The Pernambucan constitution (Art. 101) created the Conselho de Defesa 
Social (Council of social defence) to coordinate public security interventions (Alepe 
2015), but the government has not put this into practice (Zaverucha 2000). When 
government officials and high-ranking practitioners were asked during the fieldwork 
about PPV’s disengagement with civil society and about an independent monitoring 
council, they claimed that PPV had emerged from civil society and explained that 
there was originally a forum for debate and public consultation prior to the 
establishment of PPV.  
However, this engagement with civil society occurred on a one off basis and 
thus was not lasting. As Engstrom and Hurrell (2010) put it, ‘the democracy regime 
[in Latin America] operates with relatively little civil society participation […] As 
such, the notion of solidarism that underpins the democracy regime is still 
fundamentally State-centred’ (3). Furthermore, institutions such as the National 
Public Security Council (Conselho Nacional de Segurança Pública, CONASP) have a 
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limited consultative role instead of a deliberative role and its members are appointed 
by government officials rather than elected (Leeds 2013), limiting their impartiality. 
The government officials interviewed argued that there were already other 
institutions in place to monitor the police, such as the corregedorias de polícia (the 
police internal affairs and complaints office). However, it is common knowledge that 
those institutions are not independent from the police, neither are they run by civil 
society, so they are unable to provide effective and independent police oversight. 
Police themselves staff the corregedorias. State officials argued that PPV had weekly 
meetings to monitor the police. However, this was an internal, and therefore not 
independent, method of control and oversight.  
Chevigny argues for a combination of internal and external oversight of the 
police, suggesting that ‘real accountability will have to combine internal and external 
controls’ (1995, 267). He explains that when monitoring comes exclusively from 
outside, it leads to resistance and a lack of cooperation on the part of the police, 
therefore making it very difficult for outsiders to investigate. As a result, 
recommendations made by outsiders are easily ignored. If monitoring comes 
exclusively from internal structures, meanwhile, it becomes ineffective and existing 
habits are liable simply to become normalised. 
In Pernambuco, mechanisms of external oversight directed exclusively at 
monitoring Pacto pela Vida have not been developed. PPV suffers from low levels of 
information transparency, and engagement with civil society only occurred, 
sporadically and infrequently at the beginning of the governor’s mandate (Ribeiro 
2014, 5 and 20). There were no systematic mechanisms – such as an external council, 
an external committee, or even regular community meetings with state actors – to 
ensure that the state was responsive to citizens’ demands and to complaints about 
PPV, policing and safety. The council of public safety or CONSEGs (Conselhos de 
Segurança Pública) that had existed in some locales in the previous government of 
Jarbas Vasconcellos were not present in the territories of the case studies. In sum, in 
Recife (and in many other parts of Brazil), there exist few formal opportunities for 
public deliberation about policing and public safety interventions.  
There are some institutions that can enforce external control over police 
activities, but they do not have this oversight as their main task. As Cubas (2013) 
notes, some examples are Comissões de Assembleias Legislativas (Committees of 
Legislative Councils), Comissões das Ordens de Advogados (committees of barristers 
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associations), Ministérios Públicos Estaduais (state public ministries), committees by 
religious groups, National and regional human rights councils, international 
organisations, civil society organisations and the press. Few mechanisms of external 
oversight have focused on the control of police abuse of force and police violations of 
citizens’ human rights. Some exceptions are the police ombudsmen (ouvidoria), an 
institution directed by a representative from civil society and with the autonomy to 
denounce cases brought to its attention, and therefore with some power to monitor 
police abuses.   
The state public ministry and some international organisations can also 
monitor the police. However, few people in low-income communities are aware of 
these institutional resources and their roles. Most residents (albeit not all) interviewed 
were very distrustful of the state and its institutions and are unlikely to report crimes, 
especially crimes committed by the police. Even the police themselves are unlikely to 
report their colleagues in cases of abuse of force and inappropriate treatment of 
citizens, leaving those problems to be dealt with by internal oversight institutions, as 
illustrated in a study about the Brazilian police ombudsmen (Cubas 2013). 
Furthermore, the extent to which complaints against the police lead to any outcome, 
or punishment, beyond the initial denúncia (complaint communication) is unclear. 
Brazilians commonly say that such complaints acabam em pizza, (‘end in pizza’), 
meaning that nothing is done about them.  
PPV’s internal oversight meetings are not open to the public, but during the 
fieldwork I did attend one such meeting, on 4th July 2013, through an invitation by a 
gatekeeper. Unlike in the findings of Suska (2014, 7), it was not possible to see ‘high 
ranking officers explaining themselves to a number of civilians’. Instead, they 
explained themselves in front of colleagues and government officials. At the meeting, 
which consisted for the most part of a male-dominated round table of government 
officials, chiefs of civil police and heads of militarised police battalions, the police 
were indeed judged on their targets, which were displayed through a flashy 
PowerPoint presentation compiled by government statisticians. The targets were for 
the most part measured in relation to the number of corpses resulting from violent 
crime and lacked the inclusion of broader methods to measure police work, such as 
victimisation surveys or public opinion polls about police work. This absence of 
victimisation surveys constitutes a major impediment to criminological and social 
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research in Latin America, as well as to the formulation of coherent and meaningful 
policy agendas (Macaulay 2007).  
Furthermore, there was no independent organisation or member of civil 
society present at PPV’s weekly meetings to discuss or monitor the policy. New 
equipment, flashy PowerPoint presentations, meetings at the SEPLAG with men in 
suits and police, PPV adverts on television and headlines in local newspapers, all 
portrayed a very different picture of the public security apparatus in comparison to the 
reality experienced at the ground level in poor communities. 
In summary, while state officials in Chapter 5 claimed that PPV was a policy 
focused on targets and results, that it worked to reduce violence because of the 
increase in policing and in investment in the police’s resources – such as police cars, 
guns, bullet-proof vests and recruitment of more police officers – these were precisely 
the factors that residents of low-income communities criticised. Residents noticed the 
new police cars; but they did not see any change in police work, nor did they ever see 
any police officers apart from when they had been called to deal with a specific 
situation. They claimed not to have any contact with the police, other than the 
occasional stop and search if they were out at night, or if they were black, and these 
adversarial encounters regularly featured examples of brutal police conduct.  
8.4 Lack of, excess or inappropriate state involvement? Building state presence 
through public security interventions 
When asked about the presence of the State in their neighbourhood, many residents in 
the two communities studied said that they had not noticed any presence at all, other 
than during elections when politicians visited the community making promises and 
asking for votes in exchange for goods, for instance electronic devices such as tablets. 
Residents commonly mentioned the existence of this type of clientelism in their 
communities. Just as Leeds (1996) argued in relation to Rio de Janeiro, electoral 
democracy has returned but the deeper re-democratisation of Brazil has been a slow 
and fragile process with neoclientelistic overtones, without guarantees of adherence to 
rule-of-law principles, and without guarantees of practical democracy for the poor.  
However, some residents did show awareness that the State was present in 
their communities in a multitude of ways – for instance through institutions such as 
schools and, in Tourinho, in the form of a prison, a hospital, a cemetery and a police 
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station. As argued by young people, the State was present throughout their everyday 
life, albeit not necessarily in the ways that they desired: ‘of course the state is present 
here. The schools, the police station, the hospital, all this is the State’ (Marcos, 18 
year old, mulato, Tourinho). Residents perceived all of these institutions as necessary 
but undesirable, given their adverse connotations – the loss of liberty, illness, and 
bereavement, abuse of force and disrespect by the police. Thus the issue of ‘state 
absence’ is better rephrased as the ‘type of state presence’ that residents in these 
communities experienced.  
Pacto pela Vida is effectively an exercise in increasing state presence and 
state-building in these communities, in the sense that the presence of the police – ‘the 
State on the streets’, as Hinton (2006) puts it – has increased in comparison to 
previous years, even though it remains insufficient and inadequate. PPV, just like the 
UPPS (Unidade de Policia Pacificadora, or Pacification police units) in Rio de 
Janeiro, is an exercise of state-building insofar as the State is rhetorically, figuratively 
and physically increasing presence in the field of public security, regardless of the 
motivations or intentions of this development (such as to cater ‘security’ for large 
sporting events, to look to be doing something about crime, and to support a political 
campaign).  
This type of state-building has not yet dissipated old habits of clientelism, old 
forms of state engagement and methods of political bargaining in poor communities. 
It illustrates that the State is not absent, but rather inadequately engaged with these 
spaces and their residents47. However, in contradiction to the findings of Arias (2006) 
in Rio de Janeiro, Recife’s clientelist politicians did not appear to make connections 
with drug traffickers in poor communities to bargain for votes. This may be 
understandable as traffickers are less organised and less powerful in Recife in 
comparison with Rio de Janeiro. Thus politicians did not use traffickers’ influence 
over community organisations to pursue their political ends, such as campaigning and 
vote buying. In Recife, politicians could directly interact with these communities and 
their organisations, without the mediation of organised criminal groups48.  
The problem often cited in poor communities was the selective type of state 
presence that is available to them. Most often, residents explained that during election 
year they would interact a lot more with state officials and politicians, especially 
those asking for votes and arranging vote buying. But they felt that the quality of the 
provision of basic services, such as health care was inappropriate, they often 
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experienced water shortages, poor schooling (e.g. aulas vagas, cancelled lessons, due 
to teacher absences), precarious lighting, open sewers running down through the 
community; as well as a violent state presence experienced through brutal encounters 
with the police. Many residents, despite wanting more and better quality policing, 
thought that the best way to resolve the problem of safety was to invest in better 
quality education for the young, opportunities and spaces for leisure and culture; and 
well paid 49 job opportunities. These social measures, in their view, had been side-
lined by security measures focusing on more policing and more surveillance (e.g. the 
installation of closed-circuit television cameras).  
According to policy-makers and government officials who were interviewed, 
some of the changes and advances brought by PPV were: (1) the institutional reform 
of the police; (2) the managerial reform of criminal justice institutions – including the 
civil and militarised police forces, the Ministério Público (Public ministry) and the 
judiciary – all of which were encouraged to improve their shared communication and 
efficiency through a system of monitored targets. Police work was allegedly 
integrated since the civil and militarised police needed to work together, and were 
monitored through a model of central government management via the Secretaria de 
Defesa Social (Secretariat of social defence); (3) police work was territorialised and 
the state of Pernambuco was split into 26 areas (AIS, or areas of ‘integrated security’) 
to facilitate the management of police work in each territory on the long run; (4) 
finally, a system of financial gratification was created for members of the police in 
each area that hit its targets related to the overall aim of reducing lethal violent crime 
(Ratton, Galvão, and Fernandez 2014, 14). PPV implemented measures to increase 
the professionalisation of police work, which entailed the bureaucratic restructuring of 
the police as an institution with new criterions for promotion and merit.  
All of these changes differ widely from the perceived modifications from the 
point of view of residents in low-income communities, as shown in chapters 7 and 8. 
Many residents in poor communities had not noticed the effects of PPV. While most 
participants from low-income communities claimed to have heard of PPV, most had 
no idea what the government or the police were doing differently. However, young 
people were able to convey their disaffection with the police and their feeling of 
disconnection and distance from public institutions and public policies, as illustrated 
by these two excerpts from conversations in each of the case-study communities:  
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‘The secretariat of public defence only represses and controls the population. 
Pacto pela Vida is a mechanism of control, full of racism, homophobia and 
awful stop and searches. Repression is the tactics of the police and it is 
directed at the poor and black people from the periphery’ (Maria, 26 years old, 
black, Tourinho)  
… 
Roxana – ‘What impact has Pacto pela Vida had in your neighbourhood?’ 
 
Oliveira (18 years old, Vitoria, mixed background) – ‘Almost none, before we 
had no policing, now there are two officers.’ 
 
In fact, residents’ perception that little had changed in practical terms at street level 
may be supported by recent increases in homicide rates. Media reports have revealed 
that since March 2014 the number of homicides in Pernambuco has been increasing 
again (Oliveira 2015a) and government data confirm this trend (see table 10 below).  
 
Table 10: Number and rate (per 100,000) of Intentional Lethal Violent Crimes (CVLI) in 
Pernambuco (PE), Recife's metropolitan region (RMR) and Recife (2007-2014)  





2007 4592 1046 2617 53.97 68.02 71.2 
2008 4523 981 2445 52.59 63.08 65.6 
2009 4018 818 2111 46.19 52.04 55.93 
2010 3495 677 1772 39.78 42.58 46.29 
2011 3507 692 1783 39.47 44.71 47.86 
2012 3320 597 1655 36.96 38.27 43.97 
2013 3101 452 1405 34.14 28.76 36.95 
2014 3436 514 1520 37.41 32.45 39.56 
Source: INFOPOL (SDS 2015) 
 
This raises questions about the sustainability of PPV’s crime control methods. An 
interview with Delegado Ramon (PC) published on the Diário de Pernambuco (20th 
June 2014) indicates that police in the state are dissatisfied with their working 
conditions, overworked (some police work up to 64 hours per week), under pressure 
to meet targets and yet they get paid the second worst salary among all Brazilian state 
police forces. Del. Ramon claims that these were some of the concerns that led the 
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police to strike and this consequently impacted the recent negative results of PPV 
(Oliveira 2014). 
The concern with sustainability had been raised by civil society and activists 
interviewed and also in a recent evaluation of PPV (Ratton et al. 2014, 2). As argued 
by Uildriks (2009, 2) ‘what perhaps most characterizes initiatives in Latin America to 
modernize and democratize policing and criminal justice systems is the difficulty of 
achieving lasting police and criminal justice reforms, security and an integration of 
democratic principles and the rule of law on an institutional level.’ It is therefore 
difficult to identify developments in the field of public security that will be lasting 
and successful in the long-term, and in which success can be measured from multiple 
perspectives, and by quantitative and qualitative aspects. These differences in 
methods of measuring and the dissonance between what communities and activists 
viewed as important measures of an efficient public safety system and what the State 
itself claimed as a successful and efficient system, ultimately suggest the need to 
debate democratic demilitarised public safety intervention in the remainder of this 
chapter. 
8.5 Democratic public security? 
Community activists and those who had become involved with social movements felt 
disheartened about PPV. They explained that there was no room to debate the 
intervention and no real public participation in the day-to-day running of the 
programme. PPV had come from above and was being implemented from above, 
regardless of what people thought at ground level:  
 
‘I took part in the initial process of the program but there was no space to 
debate youth and human rights, there was only repression and spread sheets 
with numbers and statistics. There was no room for social movements. The 
result is simply more police cars, with their attention turned to commercial 
locations and evangelical churches’ (Baque Forte, 33 years old, black, 
community activist, Tourinho) 
 
Some young people, particularly those most politicised and involved in the student 
mobilisations and protests of 2013, argued that Pacto pela Vida was a tool of 
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oppression by the State, used against the poor and non-white population. The vast 
majority of participants said that their monthly income was insufficient for their basic 
needs and indicated that they felt targeted by the police because of their ethnicity 
and/or social class.  
 
‘In practice Pacto is a program of repression towards the poor. The police are 
poorly trained, they instil fear in residents of peripheral neighbourhoods’ 
(Malungo, 22 years old, non-white, Tourinho) 
 
It was common knowledge that police practice and the way they approach suspects 
continues to be different according to social class. The problem of officers ‘knocking 
down the doors of shacks’ in favelas, invading them without a warrant, was especially 
noticeable during the night, when fewer witnesses are present. The practice of 
operating at night was instituted at least as far back as during the military regime 
(1964-1985), according to Huggins (1998, 136), as it enables the police to hide their 
activities while also inculcating fear in the targeted population. Disrespect, 
discrimination and police violence towards low-income residents remain common. 
Goldstein’s (2003, 177) research in the 1990s in Rio de Janeiro shows that ‘the forms 
and levels of daily violence and suffering in the city are experienced differently 
according to class, race, gender, and location’. Just as Anthony Pereira (2000) argued, 
in this context, democracy is rendered inoperative. Where the practices of formal 
institutions, like the police, are enacted through such an extremely unequal social 
order, and the rule of law is differentially experienced according to social status, 
access to citizenship rights and democracy are at best limited and inadequate. The 
differential treatment and disparities in the way security and repression are distributed 
are perennial examples of social inequalities in Brazil. 
Holston and Caldeira (1998, 263) argued that one of the paradoxes in 
Brazilian democracy is that while political institutions have been democratised, 
citizenship is compromised as citizens suffer continuous violations of their civil 
rights, and violence and impunity are standard. On the one hand, the State is 
responsible for violent and corrupt policing, while on the other hand, police violence 
is tolerated due to popular ‘support for illegal and/or authoritarian measures of 
control’ (Holston and Caldeira 1998, 265). It could be argued that this paradoxical 
aspect of a ‘disjunctive democracy’ (Holston and Caldeira 1998, 264) – tolerance of 
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violent policing – is not applicable in this study, according to data emerging from the 
residents of Tourinho and Vitoria. Residents wanted less repressive and 
discriminatory policing; paradoxically, they wanted more police patrolling the streets 
on foot (not staying in their cars). One young male summarised it well: 
 
‘We need the demilitarisation of the police. The way it is now, they don’t 
make us feel safer, they don’t protect the community, their impact is negative. 
They don’t respect residents – and if you’re poor, you’re treated like a bandit’ 
(Jose Claudio, 17 years old, black, Tourinho)  
 
Contradicting Holston and Caldeira’s (1998) argument, the residents of Tourinho and 
Vitoria did not favour military and violent police practices. As argued by Goldstein 
(2003, 199), questions about democracy and citizenship must be connected to the 
experiences of the poor. The lived experiences of the poor are under-described, under-
analysed and simplified as homogenous responses to politics and policies that go 
against their interests. However, insofar as the debate on militarised policing goes, in 
the two Pernambucan case studies, residents’ responses to issues of policing and 
security did not seem to conflict with their interests. Community residents repetitively 
talked about their wish for the demilitarisation of the police. Many viewed the police 
force as a repressive agency of the State, particularly towards the poor. They wanted 
and needed policing, but they demanded a model of policing that respected them and 
viewed them as citizens instead of enemies and suspects. Bailey and Dammert (2006) 
echo these points and elaborate an explanation of why military involvement in 
domestic policing is a problem. 
The Brazilian military police, although now under civilian control, is divided 
into military ranks, is institutionally beset by a rigid military hierarchy and ideology 
(see Cubas 2013), as well as military culture and training, and continues to be 
subjected to a military penal code. Moreover, the Brazilian military continue to be 
influential in the country’s public security provision apparatus, with many generals 
occupying positions of leadership in the secretariats of public security of various 
states and the army being increasingly present in public life and called in to control 
public order (Fernandes 2013, Harig 2014, Mesquita Neto 2011, 258, Soares 2000, 
Zaverucha 2000). One recent example of this occurred during the police strikes in 
May 2014 in Pernambuco, when the army was called in to control rioting and looting 
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in the larger cities of the metropolitan region. The photos below (figure 10 and 11) 
circulated on social media at the time, their source is unknown but informants in 
Recife have confirmed their accuracy. 
 
 
Figure 9: The army patrolling an upper-class neighbourhood, Boa Viagem, Recife, May 2014. 
 
Figure 10: The army pointing rifles at ordinary citizens while patrolling a low-income community 
in Recife, May 2014.  
The reliance of the Brazilian federal and state governments on the armed forces to 
contain short-term crises in the public security apparatus, for instance police strikes, 
postpones and hinders reform proposals and the demilitarisation of the public security 
system (see also Mesquita Neto 2011). In this context of militarised public safety, 
fighting those perceived as internal enemies and threats take precedence over 
consensual policing, equality before the law and the protection of citizens’ safety and 
human rights. The military ethos and mission is distinct from that of the police. As 
argued by Chevigny (1995, 255): 
 
Roxana Pessoa Cavalcanti 
 214 
‘Military forces are organised primarily to use violence against a well-defined 
enemy, and although they can patrol, they are ill-suited to turn to the police 
jobs of service, peaceable order keeping, or even arresting suspects for crime. 
A soldier is trained to solve many problems by shooting someone, and the 
police if they think of themselves as an army, are likely to do the same’ 
 
Soldiers obey orders from above instead of responding to citizens’ demands and their 
use of force is less restrained. Yet, although the army’s presence in public security is 
of concern and worth mentioning, there are similar issues with the type of policing 
that exists in Brazil. The patrolling police polícia militar (PM) is no longer under the 
control of the army but it does maintain militarised training, culture and hierarchy, as 
well as the semiology of its ranks, such as the soldado (or soldier, which is the lowest 
rank of the military police). The PM soldiers tend to obey orders from above, rather 
than respond to citizens’ demands, in the same ways as an army soldier would. 
 Police forces have historically and frequently been an obstacle to democracy, 
via strikes and politicisation (Pereira 2008), and through being deployed to support 
undemocratic governments, for instance, in Brazil (Huggins 1998) and in India 
(Bayley 1983). In this context, the contested concept of ‘democratic policing’50 stands 
in stark contrast to the policing observed in the course of this research. Democratic 
policing tends to be defined in the literature by a range of criteria or a set of principles 
(Bayley 2001, Jones, Newburn, and Smith 1996, Loader and Walker 2007, Manning 
2010, Pino and Wiatrowski 2006). This thesis has adopted Bayley’s definition, which 
refers to democratic policing as a model of crime control in which the police are 
governed by the rule of law instead of being driven by arbitrary political regimes. The 
definition implies that the police are accountable to the law as opposed to government 
(Bayley 2006).  
A democratic police would focus on protecting human rights so that 
democratic politics could be conducted in a fair manner, this means that the citizenry 
need to be free from the threat of arbitrary arrest and detention, and to be able to 
enjoy freedom of association and movement. Democratic policing requires protecting 
the public from cruel and excessive use of force; it requires respect for due process 
and equality of treatment. An essential feature of the concept is therefore police 
accountability (Loader 1996). Democratic policing demands negotiating expertise to 
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manage disputes and assist the public, officers need to know their community and 
apply moderation in their use of authority (Bailey and Dammert 2006, 15-18).  
Moreover, in this framework, democracy has relevance to policing because the 
values associated with democratic citizenship – equality, justice, representation and 
participation – should come to the fore, and preclude managerial concerns with 
efficiency and effectiveness (Loader 1996). This is particularly important for those 
marginalised populations that have little or no influence over the few existing formal 
and informal channels to affect police work. As Loader (1996) put it, policing 
requires democratic legitimation at least for three reasons. First, because as an 
exercise of power, policing can have a significantly detrimental influence over 
citizens’ quality of life and liberties; second, policing signifies an allocation of a 
public good, the provision of public safety, having effects of the ordering of social 
relations and playing a key role in the mediation of conflict. Finally, democratic 
legitimacy is important because ‘a legitimate institution holds out greater hope of 
achieving its purposes’ (Loader 1996, 38). 
Nonetheless, the concept of ‘democratic policing’ does have its limitations, 
since the nature of police work can enforce social inequalities by using coercion 
against certain citizens in other to protect other citizens. This quintessential aspect of 
policing can function as an obstacle to even the most developed and reformed, 
allegedly democratic police forces (Harkin 2015). Moreover, policing cannot be 
disconnected from wider societal asymmetries of power and inequality. This is not to 
say that police misconduct and abuse, such as the targeting and discriminatory 
treatment of poor black youth, cannot be changed until broader inequalities in 
Brazilian society and the cultural inheritance of slavery are addressed. But rather that, 
the inherent classism, sexism and racism in policing and public security interventions, 
as seen in the findings of this thesis, are made intelligible in this wider context. 
Democratic policing is rather different from the type of policing experienced 
in low-income communities in Recife. As shown in previous chapters, residents 
argued that the police discriminated on the grounds of ethnicity and skin colour; that 
black people were stopped and searched more often and they were also often the 
victims of verbal abuse, such as being called bandido and ‘marginal’ by the police 
and the victims of physical abuse and excessive use of force by both the military and 
civil police. Police brutality, disrespect and violence are common in their daily lives. 
Under such conditions ‘democratic politics loses its legitimacy and efficacy’ (Holston 
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and Caldeira 1998, 263). Residents felt criminalised, not only by individual officers 
but also by the policies and state programmes, including Pacto pela Vida. In their 
view, PPV was not a ‘success’; it targeted them as suspects rather than as citizens in 
need of access to public security. The managerial reforms implemented by PPV, 
focusing on increasing effectiveness and efficiency, did not attempt to make policing 
more democratic or legitimate.  
Appearance, clothing and indicators of social class were said to influence 
police practice rather than actual intelligence-led information. For example, poor 
residents expressed concern over the duality in what they claimed was the police 
view: residents were either seen as ‘workers’ in uniforms or ‘criminals’ if they 
happened to be wearing clothes that, in the minds of the police, they probably could 
not have been able to afford to buy legally.  
 
‘They know that I am not involved [in the drug trade] but they stop and search 
me nearly every day and treat me badly. [...] People say, if you are black you 
are a drug trafficker, if you are white you are drug user. The families who live 
near this situation always suffer, often the police come into our homes and 
turn them upside down [...] Yes, there is police corruption here, I have seen 
young people loose their money in a simple stop and search’ (Fiori, male, 21 
years old, Tourinho, Black) 
 
Most residents complained that the police were untrustworthy, corrupt, and inefficient 
and that officers discriminated against them on the grounds of ethnicity and social 
class. As argued by Holloway (1993, 7) ‘Despite major changes since slavery was 
declared illegal in 1888, Brazil still lives with the legacy of the social relations, 
institutions, and attitudes built up over the previous 350 years when it was a society of 
slaves and masters’. The country maintains ‘strong roots in the culture of slavery, 
oppression and social exploitation’ (Fernandes 2013, 211). 
Many residents stated that they feared the police, because of the memory of 
past police violence and abuse – whether experienced personally, seen in the media, 
or heard of in the community. Nevertheless, rather paradoxically, most participants 
argued that they would like more policing.  In their view, it is the model of policing 
that needs to be addressed. Another divergence with Rio de Janeiro, for example in 
contrast to Goldstein’s (2003) findings, is that in Tourinho and Vitoria residents’ 
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greater sympathy was towards the police and not towards local criminals. Recent 
ethnographic work by Palloma de Menezes (2014) in Rio de Janeiro shows that 
residents in low-income communities are often unwilling to show sympathy for, or 
talk about, either the police or drug traffickers. Adopting either narrative is risky for 
residents that live among both the police and organised armed groups.  
In the beginning of my fieldwork, I also found it difficult to have 
conversations about these topics with residents, who often deflected my questions. 
However, once I had spent more time in the field, taking part in community activities 
(e.g. volunteering) and celebrations (e.g. children’s day) and becoming a virtual friend 
to many residents on social media (e.g. Facebook), it became clear to residents that I 
was not an informant to either the police or local criminals but rather a pregnant 
researcher who was going back to the UK. Only then did our conversations begin to 
flow. We developed some level of trust in our relationships and residents began to 
talk about these topics. The fact that residents were not completely unsympathetic to 
the police should not be surprising. I do not wish to convey an image of homogeneity. 
There was conflict, controversy and diversity in views about the police and about 
local criminals. Nonetheless, residents did demand more policing, they also demanded 
better policing, and not the type of policing they received. This should not be 
surprising. Despite being critical of policing practices, communities around the world 
tend to demand more policing (Herbert 2006), especially more foot patrols, which are 
perceived as non-threatening (Waddington 2006, 3) and associated with more 
visibility, accessibility and responsiveness (Wakefield 2006, 7).   
For the most part, interviewees who were at the top of the government and 
police hierarchies saw few defects in PPV. Nevertheless, some of these interviewees 
did mention the problem of corruption in the police force and generally in public 
institutions in Brazil, and some even suspected that the ‘success’ figures presented by 
PPV were often exaggerated. During interviews with low-ranking militarised police 
officers and even with a delegado (chief of civil police), these suspicions were 
expressed, as shown in Chapter 6. Often this happened after the interview was 
‘officially’ finished, once the voice recorder was turned off, the interviewee would 
narrate accounts of corruption. One delegado alleged that the success of 
Pernambuco’s public security program PPV was a political project. He had worked 
for the police handling data for PPV and claimed that when the policy failed to reach 
its 12% target in homicide reduction in a year, it still made newspaper headlines 
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celebrating the ‘success’ of reducing it by just under 6%. The year after, the reduction 
was similar but the headlines celebrated a 12% decrease – he said ‘how they got to 
that [false] figure I don’t know’.  
One of the main challenges for PPV, in the experts’ views, related to the 
difficulty of putting a sufficient number of police officers on the streets. Many of 
those recruited through concursos (public contests) they argued, were not truly 
interested in police work and would leave as soon as a better opportunity came up. 
But residents as demonstrated above also demanded more officers and more policing. 
Another challenge, cited by state actors, was increasing the number of prison spaces. 
The majority of participants, from civil society and from the State, observed a need to 
increase the scope of social crime prevention interventions, including programs for 
the rehabilitation of drug addicts.  
One of the most pressing challenges to be addressed by PPV, for low-ranking 
officers and low-income community residents, is the type of police training that is 
implemented. Cases of class and ethnic discrimination by state actors, namely the 
police, were common and associated with poor training. Sometimes this 
discrimination materialised in relation to where the alleged ‘suspect’ lived, the poorer 
the community the more suspiciously residents were treated. Dress code also raised 
suspicion by the police. For example, young black men wearing branded surfer shorts 
were seen as criminals. Supposedly they could not afford this type of clothing unless 
they were drug traffickers. Furthermore, in the eyes of the police, if poor residents 
were workers, the police expected them to be employed in manual working class jobs, 
which, in their view, require uniforms. 
 In summary, the development of a public security intervention has been an 
advance in the sense that ‘security’ and policing had so far been commodities only 
affordable or delivered to the upper and middle-classes. These sectors of the 
population already resorted to paying for private security (e.g security guards, gated 
communities, private leisure centres etc.). While residents in poor communities were 
and still are exposed to extortion groups claiming to provide security, as illustrated in 
Chapter 7. It is nonetheless an advancement that some effort, regardless of its motif, 
has been made to develop a public security intervention, this thesis has revealed 
numerous pitfalls in the theoretical rationale, design and implementation of this 
program.  
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Clearly, declining homicide rates benefit the population as a whole, poor or 
otherwise. However, it is unclear whether it was solely the implementation of PPV 
that led to this temporary decline in murder rates. And the adequacy – both in terms of 
kind, quality, quantity and distribution – of public security provision remains 
questionable. PPV is founded on what Young (2011, 191) would call a ‘cosmetic 
criminology’, insofar as it treats crime as a mere blemish, addressing it through 
superficial administrative measures while ignoring processes of stigmatisation, 
prejudice, and power inequalities inherent in the policy, in the security apparatus and 
in the criminal justice system. One key reform that localised and managerial 
interventions such as PPV were not able to achieve is the democratisation of the 
police, which – as suggested above – is a key demand on the part of residents of low-
income communities. Essential to this is the demilitarisation of the police and public 
security apparatus as the section below suggests.   
 
 
8.6 Demilitarisation: can it be achieved? 
Approximately three decades after the end of Brazil’s military dictatorship, the 
demilitarisation of the police has not yet materialised. In a recent interview, the 
academic and former public security secretary for the state of Rio de Janeiro and later 
for the federal government under Lula, Luiz Eduardo Soares argued that the leftist 
federal governments of Lula and Dilma have refused to engage with the topic of 
security because dealing with crime and policing is seen as a right-wing agenda 
(Aranda 2015). He argued that the political left believes that violence is only a 
consequence of structural issues such as education and poverty, and therefore public 
security policies are neglected and considered the responsibility for each state as 
opposed to the federal government. In this context, a federal issue such as 
demilitarising the police remains stalled.  However, the violent police response to the 
2013 protests against rising bus fares and the famous case of the disappearance of the 
builder Amarildo after being captured by the military police in Rio de Janeiro also in 
2013 revived the debate about demilitarisation (Bonis 2013, Kawaguti 2013, Araújo 
2014, Welle 2014). One year later, the Truth Commission that investigated crimes 
committed by the last military dictatorship (1964-1985) stated its support for the 
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demilitarisation of the police, among other recommendations (FolhadeS.Paulo 2014). 
The UN’s Human Rights council had already recommended demilitarisation in May 
2012 to reduce the amount of extra-judicial killings by the police in Brazil (Bonis 
2013) and a study by the Fórum Brasileiro de Segurança Pública (N = 21,101) found 
majority support for demilitarisation among members of the Brazilian military police 
(Welle 2014).  
But the revived demilitarisation debate is complex and contested for a number 
of reasons (see Mesquita Neto 2011, 241-268 for a discussion of previous attempts to 
demilitarise public security in Brazil). By law, the Brazilian 1988 constitution 
established the existence of a military police, required to be an auxiliary force to the 
army if the country is for instance at war. This has implications to the structure of the 
police and their training, which is essentially military and centred around the combat 
of enemies, rather than focused on service to civilians. So first, demilitarisation would 
require at a minimum, an amendment to the constitution, which is a lengthy process, 
requiring political will and majority approval on a series of voting sessions at the 
legislative. Second, the distinctive possible ways to demilitarise and re-establish the 
police are contested (Kawaguti 2013). There are questions around, for instance, 
whether the military police would be integrated to the civil police, or whether a whole 
new force would be created; which branch of the State would be in charge policing, 
the municipalities or each federative state; and questions around the salary, pensions 
and job benefits of existing members of the police after the military police are 
inoperative. Third, although as illustrated above many Brazilian scholars51 support the 
demilitarisation and agree that it could lead to positive outcomes, they argue that 
demilitarisation on its own is unlikely to end police violence altogether. This 
argument is reinforced by common knowledge that the civil police are also 
notoriously violent, and corrupt, although being most infamous for torturing suspects 
rather than for killing them at the rate that the military police do52 (see for instance 
Sapori’s critique of demilitarisation on FolhadeS.Paulo 2014).  It could be argued that 
although demilitarisation would not enable the end of police violence completely, it is 
at least possible to suggest that it has potential to reduce it, and to promote better 
policing through the unification of the police. This does not mean that Brazil needs 
one single police force, or a centralised police. Rather, the country could benefit from 
having police forces responsible for completing the full cycle of policing and that are 
trained through coordinated groups of institutions founded on democratic principles 
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rather than militarised and separate institutions (as it is the case currently for the 
military and civil police). 
 At least four proposals53 have been presented by politicians to demilitarise the 
police, all of which recommend the unification of the main police forces – the civil 
and the military police – so that one force will be responsible for the full cycle of 
policing (Kawaguti 2013, Welle 2014). This measure would eliminate the current 
division of functions, between the investigative police (PC) and the patrolling police 
(PM) and reduce the existent competition, conflict and lack of collaboration between 
the different police. In an interview with the Brasil Post, the specialist in public 
security Ignacio Cano, makes an important point, that although demilitarising the 
police would be beneficial, demilitarising the entire public security apparatus and its 
policies is essential to reduce police violence (Araújo 2014). This could entail for 
instance less involvement of military personnel in policy making and implementation; 
the end of the army’s involvement in public security matters; the end of the military 
training, hierarchy and military justice system that can either acquit violent officers or 
punish minor misdemeanours with incarceration.  
Overall, the findings of this thesis strongly suggest that there is public support 
for demilitarisation in the communities studied and that demilitarisation would be a 
step towards more democratic policing and public safety. Yet, as argued by the 
previous coordinator of the Secretariat of Security, Justice and Human Rights of the 
estate of Rio de Janeiro Jacqueline Muniz (2006), democratising police practices and 
improving police-citizen interactions does not need to wait until the constitution is 
amended. Willing public leaders, estate governors, secretaries of public security and 
chiefs of police could, in the meantime, take measures to democratise policing – such 
as stressing the importance of transparency in policing to limit opportunities for 
police deviance, explaining how police procedures must take place and enforcing 
systems of rewards and punishments for, respectively, democratic and deviant 
policing practices. Once demilitarisation is achieved, more profound and lasting 
transformations can be achieved, including changes to the structure of the police, their 
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8.7 Conclusion 
This chapter argued that existing methods of safety intervention in Pernambuco have 
been deemed a success based on a narrow set of quantitative measurement indicators, 
to the neglect of qualitative indicators. The chapter examined some of the problems of 
quantitative measurement, such as the potentially confounding manipulation of data. 
It also reinforced the argument made in previous chapters that there is a clear 
dissonance between the experiences and demands of civil society and the claims made 
by the State.  
Community residents generally took the view that although there had been 
noticeable increases in the amount of policing, the model of policing remained the 
same – militarised, violent, disrespectful of citizens’ human rights, sporadic and 
distant (motorised instead of foot patrols, thereby reducing the chances of some form 
of dialogue emerging between the police and the community). Paradoxically, and in 
spite of these ills, residents demanded more policing, just as they also demanded 
better policing. Residents were fully aware of the needs for organised security 
provision. Inadequate policing had led to the formation of alternative security groups, 
informal extermination groups and death squads formed (although not exclusively) by 
off-duty or ex-police officers who extorted money from residents in return for 
protection, even when members of these groups had already been incarcerated.  There 
was awareness that simply incarcerating members of organised criminal groups was 
insufficient to control them. This is because organised criminals could continue to run 
their business from inside the overcrowded and chaotic prisons, through their 
networks with corrupt prison staff, police, visitors and even via mobile phones. 
Moreover, new groups of organised criminals emerged when previous ones had been 
dismantled. Criminals also diversified into various activities beyond extortion and 
informal security provision and the community had seen sprawling crack-cocaine 
drug and firearm trafficking and armed robberies. Although there is no single panacea 
for these problems, the chapter debated some measures that may have potential to 
curb and moderate these problems, including the democratisation and demilitarisation 
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CHAPTER 9 – Conclusions 
 
‘Transitions to democracy very rarely wipe out – in one dramatic reform – the 
accretion of years and sometimes decades of authoritarian practices and 
mentalities in militaries and judiciaries’ (Pereira 2005, 200) 
 
While the above quote from Pereira refers to militaries and judiciaries, this thesis 
contends that its core point, regarding the legacy of undemocratic rule, also applies to 
other state institutions, not least the police and the public security apparatus. Brazil is 
a young democracy, but democratic transition and the reinstatement of elections do 
not necessarily imply the democratisation of state institutions or the reduction of 
violence, as this study and others have shown (Arias 2010). Nonetheless, the 
continuity of an authoritarian legacy does not mean that there has been no change.  
What are the impacts of reforms and new public security policies on those 
most in need of protection? How do residents of Brazil’s low-income communities 
perceive the security agencies and the new approaches to security? How do they relate 
to the police in contemporary Brazil? What differences are there between the security 
needs of the understudied northeast of Brazil and the southeast? What difference does 
this make for the types of policies and practices necessary to exert a monopoly of 
violence, or at least to control violence? This thesis has contributed to the debate 
around these questions.  
The central argument of this thesis is that managerial police reforms and new 
security programmes, namely PPV in Pernambuco, have not been the panacea to 
criminological problems. These reforms have not addressed long-standing issues of 
discriminatory policing. They have also failed to tackle brutalising, militarised police 
training and practices. The overall model and style of policing, in spite of the 
implementation of new security interventions, remained somewhat unchanged (‘old 
wine in new bottles’). New security interventions had no effect in making the police 
adopt democratic principles such as equality before the law and accountability, 
especially when the police interacted with marginalised people in low-income 
communities. Neither were these new programmes able to inhibit diverse forms of 
violence and the continuing operation of organised criminals in these communities. 
Instead, the increasing use of policing and incarceration as methods of crime control 
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exacerbated existing inequalities, with the most vulnerable populations worst affected. 
This argument contributes new insights to the criminological and public security 
literature in Brazil, which had, first, both largely marginalised the stories and lived 
experiences of the poorest communities in the northeast of Brazil and second, failed 
to challenge the narrative of ‘success’ about new methods of crime control deployed 
in this region of the world.  
While this thesis has challenged managerial police reforms in Brazil, 
considering some of their effects, this does not mean that the author entirely disagrees 
with some of these reforms or with some of the proposals made by authors that 
support managerial reforms, such as L. E. Soares (2008) and Ratton et al (2014). For 
example, the proposals to control firearms and monitor police apprehensions of 
firearms have the potential to reduce violence. The same effect could not be expected 
through monitoring drug apprehensions. What this thesis has argued is that it is 
important to consider the wider cumulative effects of managerialism, which have 
profound implications for police-community relations, criminal justice institutions 
(e.g. the prison) and the exacerbation of social inequalities.  
This thesis has addressed some important debates around the methods and 
principles of policing that were not affected by managerial reforms focusing on 
monitoring certain targets. To conclude, the remainder of this thesis discusses the 
need to address inequalities in knowledge production, the provision of security as a 
public good and summarises the main findings examined in preceding chapters. It also 
highlights the key contributions made, makes policy recommendations and presents a 
critical reflection of the study, suggesting areas for future research. 
9.1 Inequalities in knowledge production 
While the criminological literature has largely been produced in the Global North and 
in Anglo-Saxon countries, the Brazilian literature on public security has for the most 
part focused on the southeast of the country. Both, therefore, have tended to neglect 
the northeast of Brazil, and cannot fully account for all regions of a continent-sized 
country such as Brazil. Significant regional differences render dominant theories and 
public policies inadequate to some contexts. For instance, the ways of explaining and 
addressing regional problems need to account for diversity – for example the fact that 
criminals are exceptionally well organised in the southeast of Brazil yet the rate of 
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violence as measured by homicide rates is much higher in the northeast, an issue 
illustrated in earlier chapters. Public security or safety provision, crime and violence 
rank as some of the most important and contested topics for most Brazilian people. 
And yet, as illustrated in chapters 2 and 3, much of this literature in Brazil focuses on 
the experiences of the southeast region, where drug traffickers in poor communities 
have been so powerfully organised that they have been described as ‘parallel states’ 
(Leeds 1996). In these cases traffickers have assumed control over entire 
communities, enforcing the law with their own hands, controlling who is allowed in 
and out of communities, and making it difficult for the police to interact with local 
people. In some cases traffickers also assume the role of welfare provider, dispensing 
loans, jobs and medication, yet at the same time they coerce residents into turning a 
blind eye to trafficking or hiding drugs and firearms in their own homes. This 
literature has, for the most part, neglected regional differences. The case studies in 
Recife provide evidence that criminal groups there have not been organised or 
powerful enough to be considered ‘parallel states’ within poor communities. And yet 
both the southeast and the northeast regions face similar problems when it comes to 
the need to be able to walk the streets safely, or to co-produce policing through 
consensual practices rather than having it imposed on citizens without respect for 
their human rights and needs. Policing, in all of Brazil, needs to be distributed 
throughout cities with the same democratic principles (transparency, accountability, 
equality before the law), regardless of the social inequalities and differences deep-
seated in citizen’s circumstances. 
The State is not as absent as one might initially think in these communities, 
whether in the southeast or the northeast of Brazil. In Pernambuco, for instance, the 
development of the public safety programme Pacto pela Vida (PPV) since 2007 is one 
example of state building and illustrates the interactions of the State with people in 
poor communities. While some studies have argued that the implementation of the 
PPV programme has been a success (Ratton et al. 2014), these existing enquiries have 
not elicited the voices of marginalised groups subjected to these interventions. No 
study had yet been conducted in Recife’s low-income communities to examine the 
perspectives of their people, and understand how these new security interventions 
impact residents, in particular young people, in these communities. The cases of 
Tourinho and Vitoria have much to reveal about the impact of the new security 
agenda. This investigation is particularly important given that PPV has gained enough 
Roxana Pessoa Cavalcanti 
 226 
positive publicity to receive international awards and to potentially influence national 
policy, as stated in interviews with government agents54; and, corroborating Macedo’s 
(2012) findings, Brazil’s national secretariat for public security (SENASP) has 
proposed to implement PPV at the national level. It is therefore essential to 
understand what implications this could have for Brazil and the Global South. 
This thesis has engaged with the views of residents of low-income 
communities and with the discourses of state agents and members of civil society, in 
order to challenge the dominant technocratic and managerialist discourse regarding 
PPV. Here, the adopted definition of technocracy refers to an organisational structure 
or system of governance where decisions are made on the basis of a particular type of 
mainstream technological knowledge. In PPV’s case this technological knowledge is 
based on statistical information, especially homicide rates, the number of firearms and 
drugs seized and the number of people processed through the criminal justice system. 
This form of knowledge is founded on the deployment of a success narrative focusing 
on crime management, the identification, analysis and management of crime data. The 
managerial and dominant discourse refers to PPV as a successful policy (Ratton, 
Galvão, and Fernandez 2014) but when we ask how this success is measured, and by 
whom, an alternative analysis arises.   
9.2 Public security in debate 
The states of Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo, Minas Gerais and Pernambuco have, since 
the 2000s, seen overall declining homicide rates (with some upward fluctuations). The 
literature theorising this phenomenon is becoming polarised. On one side are the 
scholars who argue that a number of factors related to government interventions are 
responsible for this decline. Among these, we have former advisor and head analyst of 
the São Paulo State Secretariat for Public Security, Tulio Kahn, who argued that 
improved policing was a key factor in declining homicides (Goertzel and Kahn 2009, 
Kahn 2011); Beatriz Magaloni (2015), supporting the UPPs in Rio; and, former 
advisor in the field of Public Security to the deceased ex-governor of Pernambuco 
Eduardo Campos, Ratton (2012) in Pernambuco.  
On the other side, are a minority of researchers conducting qualitative and 
ethnographic research, who argue that evidence from the ground up can enrich this 
debate, provide alternative explanations and raise important questions about public 
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safety and public security provision. Among these, are Feltran (2008; 2011), Dias 
(2013), Wolff (2014) and Denyer Willis (2015).  Feltran, Dias and Denyer Willis all 
argue that policing and hyper-incarceration in the state of São Paulo have not caused 
the decline in homicides, but rather that they have enabled or facilitated the monopoly 
of violence by one criminal group, the PCC (Primeiro Comando da Capital). In their 
view, the State’s public security provision has had perverse impacts and has not 
contributed to reducing crime in the ways it claims.  
Depending on where the questions to evaluate public security provision, and 
interventions such as PPV, are asked and on who is asked those questions, an entirely 
different discourse emerges. Evidence from poor communities in Chapter 7 provides a 
critique of the dominant discourse of successful intervention and successful policing. 
The statistical reduction of homicides in Pernambuco, whether accurate or not, did not 
speak to people in these communities.  
For these communities, the mainstream criminological literature (as labelled 
by Taylor, Walton, and Young 2013), the theories on crime prevention, policing and 
reform (Bratton 2005, Clarke 1997, Clarke and Felson 2004) emerging from the 
Global North and deployed in the development of security policies in the Global 
South do not address the developments at the micro level in the peripheries of Recife. 
Theories such as ‘Broken Windows’ (Bratton 2005, Wilson and Kelling 2013) and 
situational crime prevention55 (Hirschi and Gottfredson 1988, Clarke 1997, De Souza 
and Miller 2012) have been used to promote managerial criminology around the 
globe, from COMPSTAT in New York to PPV in Recife, regardless of their 
applicability or of their perverse outcomes. Moreover, Brazil’s proponents of 
managerialism have, in some cases, misread and misunderstood homicide reduction 
programmes from the Global North, such as Operation Ceasefire, as illustrated in 
Chapter 5. These authors had incorrectly interpreted the central element of Ceasefire 
as the increase in rates of incarceration (Veloso and Ferreira 2008b), and some seem 
to have truly believed that COMPSTAT and crime management technologies could 
make the Brazilian police more accountable and reduce crime (Soares 2008, 12-15), 
showing little awareness of the established critiques of managerialism, COMPSTAT 
and the New York miracle, discussed in Chapter 5. The fact that academics from the 
Brazilian left – who are proponents of police demilitarisation and supporters of the 
human rights agendas, such as Luiz Eduardo Soares – support contested managerial 
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crime control measures that risk exacerbating social inequalities suggests another 
paradox that warrants further research.  
The dominant managerial success discourse is disconnected from the voices of 
people in low-income communities. The overall feedback from people in the case-
study communities revealed dissatisfaction with the State and with the type of 
security and policing that is provided. While technocrats may argue that the only type 
of data that can truly convey results are statistics about actual crime rates, this 
dismisses the importance of the relational aspects of the police with citizens. 
Statistical reductions in homicide may look good on paper but they do not mean that 
the police are less violent and brutal in these communities. Residents had numerous 
complaints about cases of disrespect and abuse of their human rights on the part of the 
police. Furthermore, the analysis of homicide data does not take into account the 
cases of non-lethal violence, when the victim survives, such as rape and gender 
violence or police abuse of force; neither does it account for potential manipulation in 
the classification of deaths or in the manoeuvring of evidence collected at the 
morgues (IML), which are controlled by the police. 
9.3 Summary of findings 
This study started by outlining the development of a body of literature on youth crime 
and marginality around the globe. It attempted to both draw attention to and address 
the need for research that engages with the perceptions of young people and research 
that deploys ethnographic methods in the field of public security in the northeast of 
Brazil. As discussed in the introduction, the thesis contributes to the emerging body of 
literature that is developing southern theories, and a southern criminological 
approach, through an engagement with knowledge produced by academics in Brazil 
and an engagement with the perceptions of under-represented groups in civil society, 
namely young people and residents from low-income neighbourhoods. As such, this 
thesis ultimately develops a critique of mainstream criminological theories developed 
in the Global North and emulated or inadequately applied in the Global South. 
Chapter 2 provided some of the demographic and socio-economic backdrop to 
the research, including themes such as poverty, inequality and housing. It discussed 
the critique of popular notions that link marginality and poverty as causal factors to 
crime in Brazil. This utilitarian belief – that narrowly defines crime exclusively as the 
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predicament of material or social circumstances – denies the significance of 
subjectivity, agency and the evolvement of multiple forms of meaning making to 
transgression. Moreover, it criminalises and labels heterogeneous communities, 
territories and their residents. Chapter 2 also examined the genesis and theoretical 
rationale of Pernambuco’s new public security intervention: PPV.   
Chapter 3 started by focusing on the existing gaps in the literature, arguing 
that more research that takes into account Brazil’s regional differences and unequal 
knowledge production is necessary. It discussed issues relating to gender, young 
people, emerging debates in the international literature about Brazilian criminal 
justice institutions and the inadequate presence of the State in poor communities. It 
examined the development of the public security field of inquiry in the Brazilian 
literature and its most salient theories and debates about violence. It showed that the 
literature in this field has predominantly emerged in the Rio de Janeiro-São Paulo 
academic hub, despite the exceptionalities of these cities (Macaulay 2007, Garmany 
2011b). The vast majority of studies largely neglected the northeast of Brazil, despite 
clear evidence that violence and security are prominent themes in all of Brazil and 
that hard data, such as figures on homicide rates are particularly high in the north and 
northeast of Brazil. Furthermore, most of the literature in this field does not focus on 
the views and experiences of young people in poor communities. Chapter 3 also 
clarifies the use of key terms in the thesis, such as democratic policing, and reflects on 
policing theory and on some of the ambiguities of policing, democracy and security.   
 Chapter 4 discussed the research methods employed in this thesis. It argued 
that ethnographic research in the field of public security can enable the researcher to 
elicit in-depth data about people’s everyday lives, narratives and the impacts of social 
and security policies in ways that could not otherwise be achieved with, for instance, 
the quantitative methods56 favoured by technocrats. An emphasis on narratives can 
counter the limitations of methods that simply emphasise demographic variables out 
of context (Young 2011). There is a dearth of this type of research in the field of 
public security, and in particular in the northeast of Brazil, with few exceptions, a fact 
deriving partly from concerns about researchers’ safety and from the lack of prestige 
that this field of inquiry has among academics and government officials in Brazil. For 
the former, security is seen as a conservative topic, and for the latter it is an 
unsavoury subject. Its importance is therefore neglected. Chapter 4 also discussed 
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some of the challenges of deploying ethnographic and qualitative methods, including 
debates around the representation of the marginalised in academic work. 
 Chapter 5 outlined the main themes emerging from interviews with public 
officials, high-ranking members of the civil and military police in Pernambuco, and 
civil society representatives. These data are presented first, not because there is any 
superiority over the data emerging from poor communities, but because this approach 
helps to contrast the stark differences between the dominant discourse of success 
about government interventions and the narratives of people who are subjected to 
these interventions and state practices. The chapter provided: an overview of the high-
profile program of public security Pacto pela Vida (PPV) in Pernambuco; participants 
arguments that the police managerial reform had reduced homicides and of how it had 
done so, while also linking the methods arguably used with internationally contested 
policing strategies, such as (narrowly defined 57 ) Zero Tolerance policing and 
COMPSTAT; a debate about challenges to the current model of public security in 
Pernambuco, as seen from the perspective of these expert interviewees, these include 
prison overcrowding and the unsustainability of the program. Finally, the chapter 
provided a critique of the transplantation of Americanised crime control methods and 
criminology, developed in an atypical context – that of advanced industrial countries 
in the Global North – to societies such as Brazil. 
Continuing with the emerging critique of the new security agenda, Chapter 6 
outlined some of the contradictions emerging in high-ranking officials’ and police 
narratives, such as examples of class, gender and ethnic discrimination and 
acknowledgements of police corruption. It suggested that managerial police reforms 
have not targeted or addressed the endurance of these problems, which hinder the 
development of policing that is respectful of citizens’ human rights. The chapter also 
shows some of participants’ views about the increasing use of policing as an alleged 
solution to structural and social problems in poor communities. The narratives that 
emerged from interviews with low-ranking members of the police, who live in low-
income communities, were rather critical and sceptical of PPV’s methods – including 
the continuation of brutal street policing orders from superiors, and even the extent to 
which the hard data presented by the government was reliable. 
 Chapter 7 focused on the perceptions of residents and young people in the two 
case study communities. It starts with more specific demographic information to 
contextualise the two communities, defined by their socio-economic context and 
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territorial boundaries on the peripheries of the city. The chapter examines the most 
remarkable emerging themes from these places, which are not usually visited, but 
rather are more frequently avoided because they frighten and vex the middle and 
upper class public. For residents in both communities, the type of policing that they 
received was distant, sporadic and counterproductive. Residents feared local 
organised criminal groups in charge of informal security, extermination groups but 
also feared speaking with the police, who were hardly present at all in their 
neighbourhoods, except during the occasional motorised patrol. Moreover, when 
residents did have contact with the police, they were also subjected to brutal policing 
methods and were treated as criminals instead of being protected. This generated 
hostility and resentment but did not reduce demands for more and better policing.  
The chapter also illustrated some of the main gaps in security provision in the 
PPV program, such as its lack of focus on gender issues and its silences on the issues 
of non-lethal violence against women. Drugs, violence and a lack of decent job 
opportunities were mentioned as key problems in the community in almost every 
interview. Residents also complained about other problems such as rubbish collection 
and general infrastructure (public transport networks, local health care, water 
shortage), yet concerns about safety always ranked first for residents.  Some of the 
reasons for their concerns were personal experiences of victimisation, including being 
victims of theft and armed robbery or seeing friends and family victimised. In fact, 
most residents were concerned about armed robbery on the streets, a crime, which 
does not necessarily affect PPV’s homicide statistics, since many victims survive. 
Many participants in the two communities had experienced numerous cases of 
bereavement among family and peer groups, because of crime and violence in their 
neighbourhoods. This increased their fear, their feelings of being under-protected and 
their withdrawal from public spaces. It also contributed to the power and influence of 
extortion groups selling security in the neighbourhoods.  
Chapter 8 focused on debating some of the key broader theoretical debates 
connected to the research. It discussed some of the epistemological problems of 
focusing exclusively on quantitative outputs to measure success in crime control, not 
least because all data, even quantitative data, can be manipulated. Moreover, the 
chapter shows that despite increasing managerialism in crime control, increased 
policing and incarceration, organised criminals still exert influence outside prisons, 
from within them by operating over, under and through the walls. The chapter 
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reviewed PPV as a state-building exercise and the type of state presence that it 
provides, contrasting the discourse of success with the counter-narratives of people in 
the case study communities. It engaged with the views of civil society representatives 
from non-governmental organisations and social movements, who were both more 
critical of PPV’s methods, especially its dominant focus on repressive policing, and 
more in-tune with the views of people in low-income communities. Chapter 8 also 
examined the proposal of democratic policing, acknowledging some of the difficulties 
of achieving demilitarisation in Brazil.  
9.4 Key contributions: youth and safety in Recife 
From the findings of this dissertation, lessons can be learned and applied beyond 
Brazil, since other countries face similar issues – including countries attempting to 
make their institutions more democratic, or transitioning from authoritarian rule (e.g. 
Iraq, other Latin American countries), or suffering high crime and inequality rates, 
growing vigilantism and similar security issues (see Arias and Goldstein 2010, 6-10 
for a discussion of this). Mainstream proposed solutions, or those that become 
implemented such as managerial reforms, can be understood as part of broader shifts 
in social control with comparable developments found in many other countries 
(Brownlee 1998, Loader 1996, Maguire 2000, 316). The effects of these 
developments and the risks they pose vary according to the socio-economic context 
and history of each locale. They impact on populations differently through: the 
exacerbation of social inequalities; the deterioration of police-community relations; 
the development of problematic prison complexes; the further organisation of 
criminal groups; and the additional erosion of public spaces, safety and human rights, 
all of which become permissible in the agenda of particular forms of crime control. 
This thesis has made, at the very least, a twofold contribution to the academic 
literature on youth, crime and security. First, few qualitative studies deploying 
ethnographic methods have looked at how young people respond to violence and 
security issues in Brazil. With the exception of some of the research conducted in São 
Paulo (MNMMR, IBASE, and USP-NEV 1991) and Rio de Janeiro (Goldstein 2003, 
Zaluar 2004a), few studies have focused on the effects of institutions and methods of 
crime control through the lens and experiences of young people or marginalised 
people in the northeast of Brazil, with some exceptions (see for example Drybread 
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2014, Moore 2015). Studies focusing on the profiling of victims of homicide in Recife 
(Arnold, Falbo, and Figueiroa 2002) do not provide in-depth qualitative data about 
young people’s lives and perceptions, neither do they allow for any agency from the 
part of the researched. For the most part, the literature in this field, in Recife, has 
emerged from public health quantitative studies concerned with identifying and 
connecting causal variables to dead bodies (Falbo, Buzzetti, and Cattaneo 2001). 
Although some analytical academic work has briefly mentioned the Recifense case 
(Huggins and Mesquita 2000, Mesquita 1993), this work has not allowed for the 
voices of the marginalised to emerge. This leads to an insufficient consideration of 
agency and of the humanistic and spontaneous aspects of social phenomena and social 
action. The first overarching contribution of this thesis was to address this gap in the 
literature. Nonetheless, it must be acknowledged that there is a growing body of 
research about the effects, dynamics and intersections between prisons and 
communities outside prison in Brazil (Moore 2015, Silvestre 2008a, b, 2016) and 
relating to youth justice institutions in the northeast of Brazil (Amorim, Melo, and 
César 2016, Drybread 2014, Nolasco 2010, Schuler 2015).  
 The second main contribution was to address the gap in relation to the 
emergence of new security agendas. In particular this focused on the impacts of the 
policing programme Pacto Pela Vida (2007-date) in Pernambuco. As shown in 
Chapter 5, few studies have focused on PPV, and the ones that have tended to emulate 
or even generate the State’s dominant technocratic discourse of success (Ratton, 
Galvão, and Fernandez 2014), or to look at PPV’s system of governance (Macedo 
2012), without engaging with the recipient populations, which is to say the people 
most affected by security programmes. By engaging with the everyday lives of the 
marginalised, this thesis enabled a comparison between the discourses of the 
governing and the governed. It allowed for responses to emerge from below and 
exposed the realities of the field of security and policing in some of Brazil’s most 
neglected populations. 
 Public security policies and policing in Pernambuco, and it could be said in 
most of Brazil, penalise people on the basis of their appearance, social background 
and perceived deservedness. Citizens who do not appear to be trabalhadores 
(workers)  – by not using a uniform, or by being unemployed, or by not having the 
reputation of a worker – and those poor indigenous and afro-descendant citizens who 
use public space are criminalised or considered bandidos (criminal), even when they 
Roxana Pessoa Cavalcanti 
 234 
have not committed a crime.  Those who have a criminal record are forever 
considered undeserving bandidos and expendables. They are exposed to unlimited 
violations that are not constructed as crimes. They are treated, disciplined and handled 
as disposable bodies, the bodies that can be tortured, punished, incarcerated and 
disrespected during forceful militarised police stop-and-searches. Improved police 
training and increased opportunities to generate dialogue between these populations 
and the police are essential to amend thin and impoverished youth-police relations 
and community-police relations. Although residents complained that the police were 
distant and often disrespectful, they perceived a need for policing and public rather 
than private forms of security. Regular community public security forums that are 
inclusive of all residents, rather than available to small vocal minorities, open to 
dialogue and feedback between the police and the community; and an external and 
independent civil society council to monitor public security policies could go some 
way in addressing the problems and consequences of distant policing and arbitrary 
security policies.  
 Although research on policing in Latin American has been growing since the 
1990s, few studies have examined the impacts of public security interventions and 
police reform in Latin American cities from the perspective of recipient communities. 
Studies also face difficulties in measuring the success of reforms and identifying 
factors that are useful for comparison before and after reform (Ward 2006). This 
thesis provided an inquiry into the impacts of a particular public security intervention 
– PPV – in Recife, from the perspective of state actors (police and government 
officials), civil society (activists, NGOs) and residents of low-income communities. It 
revealed that there are a number of conflicting narratives between groups of research 
participants, and that their perceptions about the outcomes of PPV are rather 
conflicting. On one hand, there has been a step forward in the state of Pernambuco 
with the development, at state level, of the idea that ‘security’ cannot be simply a 
commodity for the rich (e.g. private security) and that it needs to be universally 
provided (public security) in order for all citizens, regardless of their social class, to 
be safer. On the other, public security policies have evolved but remain 
discriminatory and perceived as repressive. Access to public services, including 
security (but also beyond, e.g. education) is still inadequate, hindering wider progress 
to reduce crime and make citizens’ safe. The level of violence against youth, class and 
Roxana Pessoa Cavalcanti 
 235 
ethnic discrimination and inequalities remain high in Brazilian society and within 
state institutions such as the police.  
The data presented above reveal that by focusing on homicide reduction and 
increasing levels of incarceration, PPV has side-lined other important crimes in poor 
communities, including rape, non-lethal violence, violence against women, extortion 
and crimes committed by state actors, such as police abuses of force and abuses of 
human rights in prisons and young offender institutions. Women have been 
overlooked by the policy and so have the needs of young people. PPV defined and 
over-enforced the idea of security as the reduction of homicides; this has taken 
precedence over the overall protection of human rights. Respect and fairness towards 
people in low-income communities should, but has not, go hand-in-hand with 
legitimate policing or democratic police reform. Most residents in the low-income 
communities studied did not notice the effects of public security interventions at 
ground level.  In sum, the protection of the rule of law has not been the emphasis of 
programs such as PPV. Changing the focus and methods of security programs is 
fundamental to promoting more democratic, just and accountable policing. This needs 
to start from the training of the police and has to include educative campaigns to 
increase public support for the rule of law. 
Data from the case study communities revealed that simply incarcerating 
members of organised criminal groups did not, according to residents, dismantle 
extermination groups in charge of the sale of security in these communities. From 
inside the prison, members of these groups continued to manage and profit from a 
parasitic business, which, in the context of only sporadic policing, extorts money from 
residents in forcibly selling an alternative form of security. Despite attempts at state-
building such as PPV, the monopoly of violence in these communities continues to be 
fragmented and the marginalised continue to be treated as expendable nonentities 
victimised both by violent police and by illegal security groups which are themselves 
often made up of ex-police officers.  
Key local demands were social and preventative interventions such as 
investment in (1) vocational training for the young, (2) better-quality education, (3) 
access to leisure spaces and cultural activities, (4) improved work opportunities, (5) 
the demilitarisation and enhanced training for the police to develop dialogue and 
respect for human rights in their interactions with the public. Residents viewed these 
as essential to reducing violence. Instead, Pacto pela Vida focuses on more policing 
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(albeit unsatisfactorily), on imprisoning offenders and on measuring and monitoring 
targets.  
Ultimately, this approach is leading to the escalation of the prison population 
in an unsustainable manner. At the time of the research, there was no sustainable 
strategy for addressing the overcrowding in prisons, the prison-breaks, the 
rehabilitating offenders, or for dealing with the burden on the criminal justice system 
and courts. Nevertheless, there has been an overall statistical reduction in the number 
of homicides in the state of Pernambuco and in Recife (with recent fluctuations 
upwards58). It is difficult, and perhaps impossible, to assess whether this is a direct 
impact of Pacto pela Vida or whether there may be other influencing factors. Kahn 
(2011), for instance, also included in his analysis of declining homicides in the main 
cities of São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Minas Gerais and Pernambuco, the decrease in the 
proportion of young people in the population, the influence of an improved economy 
since 2003 and the degree of success of measures of gun control. It is possible that 
PPV has been at least one of the causal factors.  
But, most importantly, this thesis has provided a challenge to the hegemonic 
discourse about violence reduction and managerial police reform that masks the 
counter-productivity and the cost of these interventions to the marginalised. The 
empirical and lived experience in the periferias is largely disconnected and divergent 
from the dominant discourse of success depicted by government officials, high-
ranking politically connected police and even mainstream academics connected to the 
government through policy making.  
The data emerging from the voices of people in marginalised communities 
provide a counter-narrative to the hegemonic top-down discourse about security and 
PPV’s successes. Participants from the two low-income communities studied were 
deeply dissatisfied with the level of (or lack of) protection on offer from state agents 
such as the police. Not only were they acutely aware of instances of police 
misconduct, such as planting drugs to make arrests and demanding money in order to 
free individuals in their custody, many participants had been the subjects of brutal 
police practices, particularly during stop-and-searches. These included physical and 
verbal abuse. While residents demanded more policing, among other demands – such 
as better vocational training opportunities, more job opportunities and leisure spaces 
in the community – they did not believe that the current militarised model of policing 
could resolve crime issues in the community, neither could it foster positive 
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community-police relations. Policing did not, in its current model, offer residents 
protection – and not least among the reasons for this was the fact that residents in 
poor communities were themselves seen as ‘the problem’.    
9.5 Policy recommendations 
I hope to conclude by seconding some of Elliot Currie’s (1991/2013) social crime 
prevention strategies and complementing them with some further practical strategies 
for the Brazilian context. Currie proposed a number of macro and micro social crime 
prevention strategies. In summary, this thesis endorses the following of those: 
 
1. A supportive and active labour market policy ‘which seeks to provide 
all citizens with both the competence and skills to participate in the necessary 
work of the larger society and concrete opportunities to put those skills to work. 
This necessarily involves a substantial role for the public sector – a deliberate 
and unapologetic use of public resources not merely to train the labour force for 
hoped-for jobs in the private sector, but also to create dignified public and non-
profit jobs in areas of pressing social need’ (Currie 1991/2013, 393). This model 
is intended to emulate full-employment policies of Scandinavian countries and 
to encourage community-oriented jobs in critically needed areas such as the 
social and physical infrastructure of these communities. 
 
2. A strategy to generate intensive reductions in social and economic 
inequalities by ‘upgrading earnings and public benefits and services for low-
income people both in and out of the paid labour force’ (Currie 1991/2013, 
394). While programmes such as Bolsa Familia have begun to reduce Brazil’s 
inequalities, inequality remains high and these reductions have only been slight. 
So more needs to be done. A living wage coupled with full-employment would 
go some way to reducing those inequalities so keenly felt and expressed by 
most of Brazil’s population. These changes would also reduce the appeal of the 
drug trade as a form of income. As Currie (1991/2013) adds ‘this strategy 
should explicitly include an effort to reduce the gaps in the earnings of men and 
women’ (395), since women’s ability to economically support themselves is 
limited by low-wages and parsimonious benefits, they become more susceptible 
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to staying in violent relationships with abusive partners. Increasing women’s 
resources would also benefit many poor young people in households supported 
by women. 
 
3. ‘Comprehensive child and family support programmes’ (Currie 
1991/2013, 396) to address child abuse and neglected childhoods before young 
people become involved in drug abuse or in criminal groups or gangs that offer 
alternative forms of income, peer support and a sense of belonging. 
 
4. Inclusive youth intervention strategies, including expanding 
opportunities for ‘serious and intensive training programmes […], which 
provide usable formal skills’ (ibid, 398) and widening access to spaces in high 
quality higher-education institutions and increasing access to funding for the 
living costs of students from disadvantaged backgrounds. 
 
5. Expanding and remodelling methods of treatment to substance abuse 
instead of simply incarcerating drug addicts who offend. Addiction treatment 
needs to be user-friendly, easily available, and provide alternative opportunities 
to achieve gratification, status and esteem. These include stable employment 
opportunities and help to maintain relationships and family ties away from drug 
cultures.  
 
A number of public security and criminal justice policy recommendations are 
necessary to complement Currie’s ideas and adapt them to the Brazilian context. 
These include enduring measures to control firearm availability, including increasing 
regulation and control over manufacture, transfers and sales, as well as educational 
measures to lessen the tendency to resort to violent and armed conflict resolution. The 
implementation of formal means of conflict resolution, mediation and restorative 
justice could go some way to reducing the excessive use of prisons, which are already 
overcrowded and chaotic. Other necessary changes include: non-militarised improved 
police training with an emphasis on democratic values (including respect for equality 
before the law, safety from arbitrary arrest and persecution, and access to safety); 
measurement and performance monitoring of police accountability and legitimacy 
through citizen surveys; encouragement of discursive policing (Loader 1996) through 
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independent councils to monitor police work, those must also be publicised so that 
residents in poor communities are aware of these avenues; and regular police-
community forums open and accessible to all residents (this needs to include adequate 
timing, such as hours that do not collide with school hours to include the young, 
diverse opportunities/timings for non-adversarial police-community interactions to 
occur and a friendly inclusive atmosphere for all); improved police response to the 
victimisation of marginalised communities, in particular to the young and women.  
The creation of a fully independent oversight institution59 – which is well 
funded, able to investigate police misconduct, and staffed by members of civil society 
(rather than by current or previous members of the police, due to potential conflicts of 
interest) who have gone through a formal and transparent selection process (not 
appointees) so as to maintain effective independence – could go some way to 
promoting police accountability and reducing police abuse of force.  
The Brazilian criminal justice system also requires reforms to reduce the 
problems that compound the issue of prison overcrowding. These include an 
amendment to the law, to remove drug trafficking from the list of heinous crimes and 
reduce the number of petty drug-related offenders who end up incarcerated. The latter 
could be subjected to other penalties, including community work. There should be 
rehabilitative measures in prison, including adequate training and post-release 
employment opportunities. Prison infrastructure also needs extensive improvement to 
adequately address the human needs in line with human rights and reduce the anger 
and hostility that encourages the formation of organised criminal groups.  
None of these recommendations are easily achievable; they require 
organisation and political will, so public support for them would go some way in 
motivating politicians and the State to endorse them. It is hoped that this thesis and 
the dissemination of its findings will go some way in encouraging support for these 
recommendations and their practical application. 
9.6 Critical reflections on this study and further research 
While the research for this thesis has been able to contribute to a growing body of 
literature on youth, policing, public security and violence, and to make policy 
recommendations, a number of questions remain unanswered. Also, like any other 
study, this one faced certain limitations. Doing fieldwork overseas means that there is 
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a limit on the amount of time that is spent abroad, since a PhD student in the UK 
tends to be funded on the assumption that their thesis will be completed within three 
years. I was able to travel three times to Brazil during the course of my research and 
spend a total of six months in the field. However, when using ethnographic methods, 
more time in the field could have occasioned even more findings – or perhaps it 
would have yielded too much data to be analysed within the scope of a British PhD. 
Another limitation of this study is that although data were obtained from a variety of 
participants, insofar as the views of community residents are concerned the study only 
focused on two communities. Given that this is a qualitative study, this is justified by 
the focus on obtaining in-depth and rich data rather than on the extrapolation of 
quantitative findings from wider datasets. However, future studies could focus on the 
experiences of policing and the effects of public security interventions in other 
communities and cities, which may have different needs and diverse geographies, to 
conduct comparative analyses. 
 To answer the overarching research question of how public security 
interventions impact on young people living in low-income communities, it would 
have been helpful to consider, for instance, changes in data about victimisation in 
their respective neighbourhoods rather than the diluted data on homicides in the city 
overall.  That is because there are certainly disparities in the distribution of crime and 
policing across the city. Although these criminological data by GPS location do exist, 
they are currently based on reported crime (rather than a more expansive victimisation 
survey) and classified by the government of Pernambuco, so are therefore not 
available to researchers. After a formal request and a discussion with staff at official 
government bodies (e.g. GACE) in charge of statistics, I was told that the reason the 
data are classified is to avoid panic and to reduce fear associated with crime in certain 
areas. 
Further research is needed to address unanswered questions relating to how 
public security interventions may tackle the displacement of crime to other areas; and 
to how the police could be made accountable for their actions, particularly in low-
income communities and in their contact with poor young black males, given that 
existing institutions of external control have proven to be inefficient and insufficient 
to promote accountability or address police deviance.  
One of the achievements of PPV, though again at an unsatisfactory level, is 
the start of an effort towards monitoring the work of the police. As shown in 
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interviews, currently this focuses on targets such as seizing firearms and presenting 
lower homicide figures in certain areas. Research into other methods of measurement 
and evaluation would enable a wider and more holistic analysis and examination of 
police work. These could include, for instance, further research into public 
perceptions and victimisation surveys.  
Although this thesis has proposed a number of policy recommendations, as 
seen above – including the demilitarisation of the public security apparatus and the 
creation of a unified police force managed at each federative state level and supported 
by local municipalities – more research is needed to outline the processes needed in 
order to achieve police transparency and accountability. This is particularly the case 
because some of these recommendations had already been proposed in Brazil’s 
project for a Unified System of Public Security (Sistema Único de Segurança 
Pública), but not put into practice (Mesquita Neto 2011, 394-398).  Future research 
should consider the extent to which proposed reforms and projects were implemented, 
which policy recommendations became implemented in the field of public security 
and the reasons why some projects were not implemented. For example, it is unclear 
whether the initial proposals for projects in conflict mediation (PESP-PE 2007, 124) 
were ever implemented. Conflict mediation, as seen in the Boston Ceasefire project 
(Braga et al. 2000), is a central part of reducing violence. Other studies could also 
consider the existence and roles of alternative forms of conflict resolution in 
marginalised communities beyond the criminal justice system.   
More critical criminological research is needed in this field. For example, 
independent qualitative and quantitative victimisation studies could provide a more 
complete analysis to assess the needs and demands of Brazil’s population. These 
studies could address key gaps in the data produced by the police, given that crime is 
under-reported and poorly recorded, and government statistics often corrupted. 
Furthermore, they could expand what is known about violence beyond the data about 
homicides available through the public health system (SUS), for example to include 
data on violent crimes that do not necessarily lead to death or contact with the health 
system, such as rape, gender violence, armed robberies and police abuses. 
Furthermore, longitudinal studies could monitor the shifts in and development of 
security policies, the impact of these policies on poor communities and their effects 
on a variety of institutions, including the judiciary and youth institutions, so as to 
assess continuing changes in this field and promote best practices. More research is 
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also needed into the effects of increasing incarceration and into approaches to reduce 
re-offending and promoting effective rehabilitation of offenders. It is hoped that the 
questions and indications of gaps in the literature presented here will stimulate debate 
and foster other rigorous inquiries that can propose and facilitate processes of 
























This work was supported by the Economic and Social Research Council [grant 
number ES/J500057/1] and the Arts and Humanities Research Council [grant number 
AH/L000717/1]. 
  




Adorno, Sergio. 1995. "Discriminação racial e justica criminal em São Paulo."  Novos 
Estudos Cebrap 43:45-63. 
Adorno, Sérgio. 1992. "Democracia e pena de morte: as antinomias de um debate."  
Travessia, Revista do Migrante 5 (13):18-26. 
Adorno, Sérgio , and Fernando Salla. 2007. "Criminalidade organizada nas prisões e 
os ataques do PCC."  Estudos Avançados 21 (61):7-29. 
Adorno, Sérgio, and Eliana Bordini. 1989. "Reincidência e reincidentes penitenciários 
em São Paulo, 1974-1985."  Revista Brasileira de Ciências Sociais 9 (3):70-
94. 
Adorno, Sérgio, and Wânia Pasinato. 2007. "A justiça no tempo, o tempo da justiça."  
Tempo Social 19 (2):131-155. 
Alcoff, Linda. 1991. "‘The problem of speaking for others’."  Cultural Critique 20:5-
32. 
Alepe. 2015. "Constituição do Estado de Pernambuco." Accessed 9th April 2015. 
http://www.alepe.pe.gov.br/downloads/legislativo/ConstituicaoEstadual.pdf. 
Alston, Phillip. 2008. Mission to Brazil. In Report of the Special Rapporteur on 
extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions Mr. Philip Alston Online: 
United Nations. 
Alston, Phillip. 2010. Follow-up to country recommendations – Brazil. In Report of 
the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, 
Philip Alston. Online: United Nations. 
Amaral, Roberto. 2016. "O que estará em jogo no julgamento do Senado." Carta 
Capital, 22nd July 2016. 
Amorim, Augusto, Ronidalva de Andrade Melo, and Isaura de Albuquerque César. 
2016. "As unidades socioeducativas na Região Metropolitana do Recife 
(2011-2012): considerações sobre problemas estruturais, funcionamento e 
proposta pedagógica."  ARACÊ – Direitos Humanos em Revista 3 (4):177-195. 
Andrade, Mônica Viegas, and Betânia Totino Peixoto. 2007. Avaliação econômica de 
programas de prevenção e controle da criminalidade no Brasil. Belo 
Horizonte: UFMG/Cedeplar. 
Andreas, Peter, and Angelica Duran Martinez. 2012. "The Politics of Drugs and Illict 
Trade in the Americas." In Routledge Handbook of Latin American Politics, 
edited by Peter R Kingstone and Deborah J Yashar, 380-392. New York and 
Abingdon: Routledge. 
Aranda, Germán. 2015. "Entrevista: Luiz Eduardo Soares, antropólogo y experto en 
Seguridad Pública." El Mundo, 5th August 2015. Accessed 6th August 2015. 
http://www.elmundo.es/internacional/2015/08/05/55c102ec22601db8018b458
c.html. 
Araújo, Thiago. 2014. "Desmilitarização da PM é só parte da mudança necessária na 
segurança no Brasil, dizem especialistas." Brasil Post, 13th May 2014. 
Accessed 16th February 2016. 
http://www.brasilpost.com.br/2014/05/13/desmilitarizacao-
seguranca_n_5229091.html. 
Arias, Enrique Desmond. 2006. Drugs & democracy in Rio de Janeiro : trafficking, 
social networks, & public security. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina 
Press. 
Roxana Pessoa Cavalcanti 
 244 
Arias, Enrique Desmond. 2010. "Conclusion: Understanding Violent Pluralism." In 
Violent democracies in Latin America, edited by Enrique Desmond Arias and 
Daniel M. Goldstein, 242-264. Durham NC and London: Duke University 
Press. 
Arias, Enrique Desmond, and Daniel M. Goldstein. 2010. "Violent Pluralism: 
Understanding the New Democracies of Latin America." In Violent 
democracies in Latin America, edited by Enrique Desmond Arias and Daniel 
M. Goldstein, 1-34. Durham NC and London: Duke University Press. 
Arnold, Marianne Weber, Gilliatt Hanois Neto Falbo, and José Natal Figueiroa. 2002. 
"Years of Potential Life Lost by Children and Adolescent Victims of 
Homicide, Recife, 1997."  Journal of Tropical Pediatrics 48 (2):67-71. 
Arruda, Raimundo Ferreira de. 2014. "Geografia do Cárcere: Territorialidades na vida 
cotidiana carcerária no sistema prisional de Pernambuco." Ph.D., Department 
of Geography, Faculdade de Filosofia, Letras e Ciências Humanas, 
Universidade de São Paulo, USP. 
Azevedo, Rodrigo Ghiringhelli, and Ana Cláudia Cifali. 2015. "Política criminal e 
encarceramento no Brasil nos governos Lula e Dilma: Elementos para um 
balanço de uma experiência de governo pós-neoliberal."  Civitas 15 (1):105-
127. 
Bailey, John, and Lucia Dammert. 2006. "Public security and police reform in the 
Americas." In Public security and police reform in the Americas, edited by 
John Bailey and Lucia Dammert. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press. 
Ball, Stephen J. 1981. Beachside Comprehensive. Cambridge: Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Barros, Geová da Silva. 2008. "Filtragem racial: a cor na seleção do suspeito."  
Revista Brasileira de Segurança Pública 2 (3):134-155. 
Barros, Ricardo , Mirela de  Carvalho, Samuel  Franco, and Rosana Mendonça. 2010. 
"Markets, the State, and the Dynamics of Inequality in Brazil. ." In Declining 
Inequality in Latin America: A Decade of Progress? , edited by Luis López-
Calva and Nora Lustig, 134-174. New York and Washington DC: UNDP and 
Brookings University Press. 
Bayley, David H. 2001. "Democratizing the Police Abroad: What to Do and How to 
Do It." In Issues in International Crime. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department 
of Justice Office of Justice Programs. 
Bayley, David H. 1983. "The Police and Political Order in India."  Asian Survey 23 
(4):484-496. doi: 10.2307/2644234. 
Bayley, David H. 2006. Changing the guard: developing democratic police abroad, 
Studies in crime and public policy. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Beato, Claudio C, and Ilka Afonso Reis. 2000. "Desigualdade, desenvolvimento 
socioeconomico e crime." In Desigualdade e Pobreza no Brasil, edited by 
Ricardo Henriques, 385-403. Rio de Janeiro: IPEA. 
Beato, Cláudio C. Filho. 1999. "Políticas Públicas de Segurança e a Questão Policial: 
Eficiência, equidade e accountability." In Reforma do Estado e Mudança 
Institucional no Brasil, edited by Marcus André Melo, 335-365. Recife: 
Fundação Joaquim nabuco e Editora Massangano. 
Beato, Claudio, and Frederico Couto Marinho. 2007. "Padrões regionais de homicídio 
noBrasil." In Homicídios no Brasil., edited by Cruz and Batitucci. Rio 
deJaneiro: FGV. 
Roxana Pessoa Cavalcanti 
 245 
Beato Filho, Cláudio Chaves. 2013. Estudio de caso: Programa Fica Vivo en Brasil. 
CAPSI Iniciativa Centroamericana del Sector Privado: INCAE Business 
School. 
Bernard, Harvey Russell. 2002. Research methods in anthropology: qualitative and 
quantitative methods. 3rd ed. Walnut Creek, CA ; Oxford: AltaMira Press. 
Bitoun, Jan. 2005. O que revelam os índices de desenvolvimento humano. edited by 
Prefeitura do Recife. 
Blaikie, Norman. 2000. Designing Social Research: The Logic of Anticipation 
Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Blaustein, Jarrett. 2016. "Exporting criminological innovation abroad: Discursive 
representation, ‘evidence-based crime prevention’ and the post-neoliberal 
development agenda in Latin America."  Theoretical Criminology 20 (2):165-
184. doi: 10.1177/1362480615604892. 
Bonis, Gabriel. 2013. "É possível desmilitarizar a polícia brasileira?" Carta Capital, 
21st August 2013. 
Bourdieu, Pierre. 1984. Distinction: a social critique of the judgement of taste. 
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 
Bourgois, Philippe I. 1996. In Search of Respect: Selling Crack in El Barrio. New 
York: Cambridge University Press. 
Bourgois, Philippe I. 2003. In search of respect : selling crack in El Barrio. 2nd ed, 
Structural analysis in the social sciences. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Bowling, Ben, Shruti Iyer, Robert Reiner, and James Sheptycki. 2016. "Policing: Past, 
present and future." In What is to Be Done about Crime and Punishment? 
Towards a 'Public Criminology', edited by Roger Matthews, 123-158. 
London: Palgrave. 
Bowling, Ben, and Coretta Phillips. 2007. "Disproportionate and discriminatory: 
reviewing the evidence on police stop and search."  The Modern Law Review 
70 (6):936-961. 
Braga, Anthony A., David M. Kennedy, Anne M. Piehl, and Elin J. Waring. 2000. 
The Boston Gun Project: Impact Evaluation Findings. Harvard University: 
U.S. National Institute of Justice. 
Braithwaite, John. 1989. Crime, shame, and reintegration. Cambridge 
Cambridgeshire ; New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Braithwaite, John. 2002. Restorative justice & responsive regulation, Studies in crime 
and public policy. Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press. 
Braithwaite, John. 2004. "Restorative Justice: Theories and Worries." 123rd 
International Senior Seminar, United Nations Asia and Far East Institute For 
the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, Tokyo. 
Bratton, William. 2005. "Crime is down in New York City: blame the police." In 
Policing: Key readings, edited by T Newburn. Cullompton: Willan. 
Brenner, Neil, Bob Jessop, Martin Jones, and Gordon MacLeod. 2003. "Introduction." 
In State/space: a reader, edited by Neil Brenner, Bob Jessop, Martin Jones 
and Gordon MacLeod, ix, 355 p. Malden; Oxford: Blackwell Publishing. 
Briceño-León, Roberto, and Veronica Zubillaga. 2002. "Violence and Globalization 
in Latin America."  Current Sociology 50 (1):19-37. 
Brinks, Daniel M. 2008. The judicial response to police killings in Latin America. 
Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Roxana Pessoa Cavalcanti 
 246 
Brownlee, Ian. 1998. "New Labour: New Penology? Punitive Rhetoric and the Limits 
of Managerialism in Criminal Justice Policy."  Journal of Law and Society 25 
(3):313-335. 
Bryman, Alan. 2001. Social Research Methods. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Bueno, Samira, Daniel Cerqueira, and Renato Sergio de Lima. 2013. Sob fogo 
cruzado II: letalidade da acao policial. In Anuario Brasileiro de Seguranca 
Publica. 
Bueno, Samira, and Renato Sérgio de Lima. 2012. A opaca estética da indiferença. In 
5º Relatório Nacional sobre os Direitos Humanos no Brasil 2001-2010. São 
Paulo: Núcleo de Estudos da Violência NEV - USP. 
Burke, Roger Hopkins. 1998. "The socio political context of zero tolerance policing 
strategies."  Policing 21 (4):666-82. 
Butler, Judith. 1988. "Performative Acts and Gender Constitution: An Essay in 
Phenomenology and Feminist Theory."  Theatre Journal 40 (4):519-531. doi: 
10.2307/3207893. 
Butler-Kisber, Lynn. 2010. Qualitative Inquiry: Thematic, Narrative and Arts-based 
Approaches. London: Sage. 
Caldas, Paulo, and Marcelo Luna. 2000. O Rap do Pequeno Principe contra as Almas 
Sebosas. Brasil. 
Caldeira, Teresa Pires do Rio. 2000. City of walls : crime, segregation, and 
citizenship in São Paulo. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Cano, Ignacio. 1997. Letalidade da ação policial no Rio de Janeiro. Rio de Janeiro: 
ISER. 
Cardia, Nancy. 2012. Os direitos humanos segundo a pesquisa ‘Atitudes, normas 
culturais e valores em relação a violação de direitos humanos e violência'. In 
5º Relatório Nacional sobre os Direitos Humanos no Brasil. São Paulo: 
Núcleo de Estudos da Violência NEV - USP. 
Carrington, Kerry, Russell Hogg, and Máximo Sozzo. 2016. "Southern Criminology."  
British Journal of Criminology 56 (1):1-20. 
Carvalho, Salo. 2013. "Theories of Punishment in the Age of Mass Incarceration: A 
Closer Look at the Empirical Problem Silenced by Justificationism (The 
Brazilian Case)*."  Open Journal of Social Sciences 1 (4):1-12. 
Cavadino, Michael, James Dignan, and George Mair. 2013. The penal system : an 
introduction. 5th ed. London: SAGE. 
Cavalcanti, Jorge. 2011. "CNJ denuncia tortura de menores infratores: Relatório 
enviado ao governo do Estado revela que em quatro unidades da Funase 
jovens em conflito com a lei sofrem maus-tratos de policiais e agentes." 
Jornal do Comercio, 30th May 2011. Accessed 10th April 2015. 
http://jconline.ne10.uol.com.br/canal/cidades/policia/noticia/2011/05/30/cnj-
denuncia-tortura-de-menores-infratores-5956.php. 
Cavalcanti, Roxana Pessoa. 2016. "Armed Violence and the Politics of Gun Control 
in Brazil: An Analysis of the 2005 Referendum."  Bulletin of Latin American 
Research Online (March):1-16. doi: 10.1111/blar.12476. 
Cerqueira, Daniel, and Danilo de Santa Cruz Coelho. 2014. Estupro no Brasil: uma 
radiografia segundo os dados da Saúde (versão preliminar). Online: IPEA. 
Cerqueira, Daniel, Waldir Lobao, and Alexandre Carvalho. 2007. "O jogo dos sete 
mitose a miséria da segurança pública no Brasil." In Homicídios no Brasil, 
edited by Cruz and Batitucci. Rio de Janeiro: FGV. 
Chazkel, Amy. 2011. Laws of chance : Brazil's clandestine lottery and the making of 
urban public life, Radical perspectives. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. 
Roxana Pessoa Cavalcanti 
 247 
Chesney-Lind, Meda. 2006. "Patriarchy, Crime, and Justice: Feminist Criminology in 
an Era of Backlash."  Feminist Criminology 1 (1):6-26. doi: 
10.1177/1557085105282893. 
Chevigny, Paul. 1995. Edge of the knife : police violence in the Americas. New York: 
New Press. 
Chevigny, Paul. 2003. "The populism of fear: Politics of crime in the Americas."  
Punishment & Society 5 (1):77-96. doi: 10.1177/1462474503005001293. 
Christie, Nils. 1993. Crime control as industry : towards gulags, western style? 
London: Routledge. 
Clarke, R. V. G., and Marcus Felson. 2004. Routine activity and rational choice, 
Advances in criminological theory. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction 
Publishers. 
Clarke, Ronald V. G. 1997. Situational crime prevention : successful case studies. 
2nd ed. New York: Harrow and Heston Publishers. 
Coelho, Edmundo Campos. 1978. "A criminalização da marginalidade e a 
marginalização da criminalidade."  Revista de administração Pública 12 (2). 
Cohen, Phil. 1979/1997. "Policing the Working-class City." In Rethinking the Youth 
Question: Education, Labour and Cultural Studies, 110-138. London: 
Macmillan Education UK. 
Cohen, Stanley. 1972. Folk devils and moral panics : the creation of the Mods and 
Rockers. London: MacGibbon & Kee. 
Comin, Alvaro A. , Rogerio J.  Barbosa, and Flavio O.  Carvalhaes. 2012. 
"Manufacturing Jobs: Economic Cycles, job creation and structural change." 
ESRC Pathfinder Programme on Collaborative Analysis of Microdata 
Resources, Warwick Institute for Employment Research IER. 
Connell, R. W. 2005. Masculinities. 2nd ed. Berkeley, Calif.: University of California 
Press. 
Connell, Raewyn. 2007. Southern theory: the global dynamics of knowledge in social 
science. Cambridge: Polity. 
Corva, Dominic. 2008. "Neoliberal globalization and the war on drugs: 
Transnationalizing illiberal governance in the Americas."  Political 
Geography 27 (2):176-193. 
Costa, Arthur Trindade Maranhão. 2015. "A (in)efetividade da justiça criminal 
brasileira: Uma análise do fluxo de justiça dos homicídios no Distrito 
Federal."  Civitas: Revista de Ciências Sociais 15:11-26. 
Creswell, John W. 1998. Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design: Choosing Among 
Five Traditions. London: Sage. 
Cubas, Viviane. 2002. "A expansão das Empresas de Segurança Privada em São 
Paulo." Masters in Sociology, University of São Paulo. 
Cubas, Viviane de Oliveira. 2013. "A Ouvidoria e o controle da atividade policial na 
percepção dos policiais militares." PhD in Sociology, Faculdade de Filosofia, 
Letras e Ciências Humanas, Universidade de São Paulo, USP. 
Cunneen, Chris, James Cook, Eileen Baldry, David Brown, Melanie Schwartz, Alex 
Steel, and Mark Brown. 2013. Penal culture and hyperincarceration: the 
revival of the prison. Surrey and Burlington: Ashgate. 
Currie, Elliott. 1991/2013. "Social crime prevention strategies in a market society." In 
Criminological Perspectives: Essential Readings, edited by Eugene 
McLaughlin and John Muncie. Los Angeles; London; New Delhi; Singapore; 
Washington DC: Sage. 
Currie, Elliott. 1998. Crime and punishment in America. New York: Owl Books. 
Roxana Pessoa Cavalcanti 
 248 
Curtis, Richard. 1998. "The Improbable Transformation of Inner-City 
Neighborhoods: Crime, Violence, Drugs, and Youth in the 1990s."  The 
Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology (1973-) 88 (4):1233-1276. doi: 
10.2307/1144256. 
Darke, Sacha. 2013. "Inmate governance in Brazilian prisons."  Howard Journal of 
Criminal Justice 52 (3):272-284. 
Darke, Sacha. 2014. "Comunidades Prisionais Autoadministradas: o Fenômeno 
APAC [Self-governing prison communities: the APAC phenomenon]."  
Revista Brasileira de Ciências Criminais 107:257-276. 
DATASUS. 2015. Indicadores da Mortalidade. 
Davies, Mike. 2006. Planet of Slums: Urban Involution and the Informal Working 
Class. London and New York: Verso. 
Davis, Diane E. 2010. "The Political and Economic Origins of Violence and 
Insecurity in Contemporary Latin America: Past Trajectories and Future 
Prospects." In Violent Democracies in Latin America, edited by Enrique 
Desmond Arias and Daniel M. Goldstein, 35-62. Durham and London: Duke 
University Press. 
Davis, Diane E. 2013. "Zero-Tolerance Policing, Stealth Real Estate Development, 
and the Transformation of Public Space: Evidence from Mexico City."  Latin 
American Perspectives 40 (2):53-76. doi: 10.1177/0094582x12467761. 
De Souza, Elenice, and Joel Miller. 2012. "Homicide in the Brazilian Favela: Does 
Opportunity Make the Killer?"  British Journal of Criminology 52 (4):786-
807. doi: 10.1093/bjc/azs011. 
Dellasoppa, Emilio. 2010. "Urbanization, the State, and the Privatization of Policing." 
In Police practices in global perspective, edited by John Eterno and Dilip K 
Das. Plymouth: Rowman & Littlefield. 
Dennis, Norman. 1997. "Editor's Introduction." In Zero Tolerance: Policing a free 
society, edited by Norman Dennis. London: IEA. 
Denscombe, Martyn. 2007. The good research guide for small-scale social research 
projects. England: Open University Press. 
Denyer Willis, Graham. 2015. The Killing Consensus: Police, Organized Crime, and 
the Regulation of Life and Death in Urban Brazil. California: University of 
California Press. 
Dias, Camila Caldeira Nunes. 2011. "Da pulverização ao monopólio da violência: 
expansão e consolidação do Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC) no sistema 
carcerário paulista." PhD, Faculdade de Filosofia, Letras e Ciências Humanas, 
Universidade de São Paulo, USP. 
Dias, Camila Nunes. 2012. Esecialistas debatem sobre crime organizado. Globo, 
“Entre Aspas". 
DiIulio, John J., Jr. 1996. "Help Wanted: Economists, Crime and Public Policy."  The 
Journal of Economic Perspectives 10 (1):3-24. doi: 10.2307/2138281. 
Dixon, David. 2005. "Beyond zero tolerance." In Policing: Key readings, edited by 
Tim Newburn. Cullompton: Willan. 
Douglas, Bruce. 2015. "Brazil's 'bullets, beef and bible' caucus wants to imprison 16-
year-olds." The Guardian, 17th April 2015. Accessed 23rd July 2015. 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/apr/17/brazil-rightwing-caucus-
lower-age-criminal-responsibility?CMP=share_btn_tw. 
DP, Diário de Pernambuco. 2015a. "FBI ministra curso para servidores da SDS." 
02nd March 2015. Accessed 13th July 2015. 
http://www.diariodepernambuco.com.br/app/noticia/vida-




DP, Diário de Pernambuco. 2015b. "Homicídios do estado já superam total do ano 
passado." Last Modified 02nd December 2015 Accessed 2nd December 2015. 
http://www.diariodepernambuco.com.br/app/noticia/vida-
urbana/2015/12/02/interna_vidaurbana,613842/homicidios-do-estado-ja-
superam-total-do-ano-passado.shtml - .VmAHdUd-SUo.twitter. 
DP, Diário de Pernambuco. 2015c. "Tenente é condenado a 150 anos e seis meses 




DP, Diário de Pernambuco. 2016. "Sindicato diz que mais de cem detentos fugiram e 
dois detentos foram mortos." Diário de Pernambuco, 23rd January 2016. 




Dreyfus, Pablo, Benjamin Lessing, and Julio C. Purcena. 2005. The Brazilian Small 
Arms Industry: Legal Production and Trade. Viva Rio/ISER. 
Drybread, K. 2014. "Murder and the Making of Man-Subjects in a Brazilian Juvenile 
Prison."  American Anthropologist 116 (4):752-764. doi: 
10.1111/aman.12147. 
Drybread, Kristen. 2009. "Rights-Bearing Street Kids: Icons of Hope and Despair in 
Brazil's Burgeoning Neoliberal State."  Law & Policy 31 (3):330-350. doi: 
10.1111/j.1467-9930.2009.00304.x. 
Economist. 2013. "The Curious Case of the Fall in Crime." The economist, 20th July 
2013. Accessed 16th August 2015. 
http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21582004-crime-plunging-rich-
world-keep-it-down-governments-should-focus-prevention-not. 
Emerson, Robert, Rachel Fretz, and Linda  Shaw. 1995. Writing Ethnographic 
Fieldnotes. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. 
Engstrom, Par. 2012. "Brazilian Foreign Policy and Human Rights: Change and 
Continuity under Dilma."  Critical Sociology 38 (6):835-849. 
Engstrom, Par, and Andrew Hurrell. 2010. "Why the Human Rights Regime in the 
Americas matters." In The Human Rights Regime in the Americas: Theory and 
Reality, edited by Mónica Serrano and Vesselin Popovski. Tokyo: United 
Nations University Press. 
Estadão. 2015. "Caso Isabela Nardoni: duas testemunhas acusam o avô paterno." O 
Estado de São Paulo, 13th April 2015. Accessed 3rd August 2015. http://sao-
paulo.estadao.com.br/noticias/geral,caso-isabella-nardoni-duas-testemunhas-
acusam-o-avo-paterno-imp-,1668504. 
Fagan, Jeffrey A. , and Deanna L. Wilkinson. 1998. "Guns, Youth Violence and 
Social Identity in Inner Cities " In Crime and Justice: Annual Review of 
Research, edited by M. Tonry and M. Moore, 105-188. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press. 
Falbo, Gilliat H, Roberto Buzzetti, and Adriano Cattaneo. 2001. "Homicide in 
children and adolescents: a case–control study in Recife, Brazil."  Bulletin of 
the World Health Organization 79 (1). 
Roxana Pessoa Cavalcanti 
 250 
Farrington, David P. 1986. "Age and Crime."  Crime and Justice 7:189-250. doi: 
10.2307/1147518. 
Feeley, Malcolm, and Jonathan Simon. 1992. "The New Penology: Notes on the 
emerging strategy of corrections and its implications."  Criminology 30:449-
474. 
Felson, Marcus. 2002. Crime and everyday life. 3rd ed. Thousand Oaks: Sage 
Publications. 
Feltran, Gabriel de Santis 2008. "O legítimo em disputa: As fronteiras do “mundo do 
crime” nas periferias de São Paulo."  Dilemas 1 (1):93-126. 
Feltran, Gabriel de Santis 2011. Fronteiras de Tensão: Política e Violência nas 
Periferias de São Paulo. São Paulo: Unesp. 
Fernandes, Fernando Lannes. 2013. "Youth Gang Members in Rio de Janeiro: The 
Face of a ‘Lost Generation’ in an Age of Fear and Mistrust."  Bulletin of Latin 
American Research 32 (2):210-223. doi: 10.1111/blar.12030. 
Fernandes, Fernando Lannes. 2014. "The Construction of Socio-Political and 
Symbolical Marginalization in Brazil: Reflecting the Relation between Socio-
Spatial Stigma and Responses to Violence in Rio de Janeiro "  International 
Journal of Humanities and Social Science 4 (2):52-67. 
FolhadeS.Paulo. 2008. "Veja a repercussão do seqüestro da menina Eloá na imprensa 
internacional." Folha de S. Paulo, 19th October 2008. Accessed 3rd August 
2015. http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/2008/10/457923-veja-a-
repercussao-do-sequestro-da-menina-eloa-na-imprensa-internacional.shtml. 
FolhadeS.Paulo. 2014. "Comissão Nacional da Verdade propõe desmilitarização da 
polícia." Folha, 10th December 2014. Accessed 16th February 2016. 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2014/12/1560275-comissao-nacional-da-
verdade-propoe-desmilitarizacao-da-policia.shtml. 
Foucault, Michel. 1979. Discipline and punish: the birth of the prison. Translated by 
Alan Sheridan. Harmondsworth: Penguin. 
França, Fábio Gomes, and Janaína Letícia de Farias Gomes. 2015. "“Se não aguentar, 
corra!”: Um estudo sobre a pedagogia do sofrimento em um curso policial 
militar."  Revista Brasileira de Segurança Pública 9 (2):142-159. 
Freitas, Alexandre Simão de 2005. "Fundamentos para uma sociologia crítica da 
formação humana: Um estudo sobre o papel das redes associacionistas." PhD 
Sociology, CFCH, Universidade Federal de Pernambuco. 
Frühling, Hugo. 2009. "Recent Police Reform in Latin America." In Policing 
insecurity: Police reform, security, and human rights in Latin America, edited 
by Neils Uildriks. Lanham and Plymouth: Lexington Books. 
G1-PE. 2012. "Em PE, tem início julgamento de grupo de extermínio de Jaboatão." O 
Globo PE, 29th October 2012. Accessed 15th July 2015. 
http://g1.globo.com/pernambuco/noticia/2012/10/em-pe-tem-inicio-
julgamento-de-grupo-de-exterminio-de-jaboatao.html. 
G1-PE. 2013. "No Recife, líder do 'Thundercats' é condenado a 29 anos de prisão." O 
Globo. Accessed 15th May 2015. 
http://g1.globo.com/pernambuco/noticia/2013/07/no-recife-lider-do-
thundercats-e-condenado-29-anos-de-prisao.html. 
G1-PE. 2015. "Três PMs são presos por integrar grupo de extermínio no Sertão de 
PE." O Globo PE. Accessed 15th July 2015. 
http://g1.globo.com/pernambuco/noticia/2015/05/tres-pms-sao-presos-por-
integrar-grupo-de-exterminio-no-sertao-de-pe.html. 
Roxana Pessoa Cavalcanti 
 251 
Garland, David. 1996. "The limits of the sovereign state - Strategies of crime control 
in contemporary society."  British Journal of Criminology 36 (4):445-471. 
Garland, David. 2001. The culture of control: crime and social order in late 
modernity. Oxford: Clarendon. 
Garland, David, and Richard  Sparks. 2000. "Criminology, Social Theory and the 
Challenge of our Times."  British Journal of Criminoly 40 (2):189-204. 
Garmany, Jeff. 2011a. "Drugs, Violence, Fear, and Death: The Necro- and Narco-
Geographies of Contemporary Urban Space."  Urban Geography 32 (8):1148–
1166. 
Garmany, Jeff. 2011b. "Situating Fortaleza: Urban space and uneven development in 
northeastern Brazil."  Cities 28:45-52. 
Garmany, Jeff. 2014. "Space for the State? Police, Violence, and Urban Poverty in 
Brazil."  Annals of the Association of American Geographers 104 (6):1239-
1255. 
Gay, Robert. 2015. Bruno: conversations with a Brazilian drug dealer. Durham; 
London: Duke University Press. 
GEPE, Governo do Estado de Pernambuco. 2013. Governo de Pernambuco recebe 
prêmio da ONU pelo êxito do Pacto Pela Vida. 
Gledhill, John. 2013. "The production of insecurity in Brazil and Mexico." SLAS 
2013 Annual Conference, University of Manchester, 11th-12th April 2013. 
Goertzel, Ted, and Tulio Kahn. 2009. "The Great São Paulo Homicide Drop."  
Homicide Studies 13 (4):398-410. 
Goldstein, Donna M. 2003. Laughter out of place : race, class, violence, and sexuality 
in a Rio shantytown, California series in public anthropology. Berkeley, Calif. 
; London: University of California Press. 
Gomes, Karina. 2015. "Brasil vai na contramão mundial ao debater redução da idade 
penal." Carta Capital, 29th April 2015. 
González, Yanilda María. 2014. "State Building on the Ground: Police Reform and 
Participatory Security in Latin America." PhD, Politics, Princeton University. 
Goodman, Anthony, and Vincenzo Ruggiero. 2008. "Crime, punishment, and ethnic 
minorities in England and Wales."  Race/Ethnicity: Multidisciplinary Global 
Contexts 2 (1):53-68. 
Gregori, Maria Filomena. 2010. "Violence and gender: Political paradoxes, 
conceptual shifts."  Vibrant - Virtual Brazilian Anthropology 7 (2):216-235. 
Gupta, Akhil. 2006. "Blurred Boundaries: The Discourse of Corruption, the Culture 
of Politics, and the Imagined State." In The Anthropology of the State: a 
Reader, edited by Akhil Gupta and Aradhana Sharma, 211-242. London: 
Blackwell. 
Hagedorn, John. 2007. Gangs in the global city: alternatives to traditional 
criminology. Urbana, Ill.: University of Illinois Press. 
Hagedorn, John, Mike Davis, and Inc Ebrary. 2008. A world of gangs: armed young 
men and gangsta culture, Globalization and community series. Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press. 
Hall, Anthony. 2008. "Brazil's Bolsa Família: A Double-Edged Sword?"  
Development and Change 39 (5):779-822. 
Hall, Steve. 2014. "Book Review: Penal Culture and Hyperincarceration: the revival 
of the prison." Prison Service Journal (216):58-59. 
Hall, Stuart. 1978. Policing the crisis : mugging, the state, and law and order, 
Critical social studies. London: Macmillan. 
Roxana Pessoa Cavalcanti 
 252 
Harig, Chritoph. 2014. "Title." http://strifeblog.org/2014/07/11/the-paradox-of-
brazils-militarised-public-security/. 
Harkin, Diarmaid. 2015. "Simnel, the police form and the limits of democratic 
policing."  British Journal of Criminology:730-746. 
Haubert, Mariana, and Natália Cancian. 2015. "Redução da maioridade penal avança 
na Câmara após manobra." Folha de São Paulo, 2nd July 2015. Accessed 23rd 
July 2015. http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/2015/07/1650544-reducao-
da-maioridade-avanca-na-camara-apos-manobra.shtml. 
Hautzinger, Sarah. 2002. "Criminalising Male Violence in Brazil's Women's Police 
Stations: From flawed essentialism to imagined communities."  Journal of 
Gender Studies 11 (3):243-251. doi: 10.1080/0958923022000021278. 
Hautzinger, Sarah J. 2007. Violence in the city of women : police and batterers in 
Bahia, Brazil. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Hayward, Keith. 2007. "Situational Crime Prevention and its Discontents: Rational 
Choice Theory versus the ‘Culture of Now’."  Social Policy & Administration 
41 (3):232-250. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9515.2007.00550.x. 
Hemmings, Clare. 2011. Why stories matter: the political grammar of feminist theory. 
Durham: Duke University Press. 
Herbert, Steven Kelly. 2006. Citizens, cops, and power : recognizing the limits of 
community. Chicago, Ill. ; London: University of Chicago Press. 
Herrnstein, Richard J., and Charles A. Murray. 1994. The bell curve : intelligence and 
class structure in American life. New York, N.Y. ; London: Free Press. 
Hesse-Biber, Sharlene Nagy, and Patricia Leavy. 2006. The Practice of Qualitative 
Research. London: Sage. 
Hinton, Mercedes. 2006. The State on the Streets: Police and Politics in Argentina 
and Brazil. Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner. 
Hirschi, Travis, and Michael Gottfredson. 1988. "Towards a General Theory of Crime 
" In Explaining criminal behaviour: interdisciplinary approaches, edited by 
W. Buikhuisen and Sarnoff A. Mednick, vi, 260 p. Leiden; New York: E.J. 
Brill. 
Hobbes, Thomas. 1651/2009. Leviathan: or the matter, forme and power of a 
commonwealth ecclasiasticall and civil. Washington, DC: Regnery Pub. 
Hobsbawm, Eric J. 2000. Bandits. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson. 
Hoggart, Keith, Loretta Lees, and Anna Davies. 2002. Researching human 
geography. London: Arnold. 
Holloway, Thomas H. 1989. ""A Healthy Terror": Police Repression of Capoeiras in 
Nineteenth-Century Rio de Janeiro."  The Hispanic American Historical 
Review 69 (4):637. 
Holloway, Thomas H. 1993. Policing Rio de Janeiro : repression and resistance in a 
19th-century city. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press. 
Holston, James, and Teresa P.r. Caldeira. 1998. "Democracy, Law, and Violence: 
Disjunctions of Brazilian Citizenship." In Fault Lines of Democracy in Post-
Transition Latin America, edited by Felipe Aguero and Jeffrey Stark. Florida: 
North South Centre Press, University of Miami. 
Huggins, Martha K. 2010. "Systemic Police Violence in Brazil." In Police Use of 
Force: A Global Perspective, edited by Joseph B Kuhns and Johannes   
Knutsson. Santa Barbara, Denver and Oxford: Praeger. 
Huggins, Martha K, Mika Haritos-Fatouros, and Philip G Zimbardo. 2002. "Violence 
Workers: police torturers and murderers reconstruct Brazilian atrocities." In. 
Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press. 
Roxana Pessoa Cavalcanti 
 253 
Huggins, Martha K, and Myriam Mesquita. 2000. "Civic invisibility, Marginality, and 
Moral Exclusion: The Murders of Street Youth in Brazil." In Children on the 
Streets of the Americas: Globalization, Homelessness and Education in the 
United States, Brazil, and Cuba, edited by Roslyn Arlin Mickelson. London: 
Routledge. 
Huggins, Martha K. 1997. "From bureaucratic consolidation to structural devolution: 
police death squads in Brazil."  Policing and society 7 (4):207-234. 
Huggins, Martha Knisely. 1998. Political policing: the United States and Latin 
America. Durham: Duke University Press. 
Husain, Saima. 2009. "On the Road to Demilitarization and Professionalization of the 
Police in Brazil." In Policing insecurity: Police reform, security, and human 
rights in Latin America, edited by Neils Uildriks. Lanham and Plymouth: 
Lexington Books. 
IBGE. 2010. Censo Demográfico: Aglomerados Subnormais. IBGE. 
IPEA. 2013. Duas décadas de desigualdade e pobreza no Brasil medidas pela 
Pnad/IBGE. Comunicados do IPEA: Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica 
Aplicada. 
Iqtidar, Humeira. 2011. Secularizing Islamists? Jamaat-e-Islami and Jamaat-ud-
Dawa in Urban Pakistan. Chicago, IL: Chicago, IL: University of Chicago. 
Jackson, Jonathan, Ben Bradford, Betsy Stanko, and Katrin Hohl. 2013. Just 
Authority? Trust in the Police in England and Wales. London and New York: 
Routledge. 
JC, Jornal do Comercio. 2013. "Estudante de direito acusa policiais civis de sequestro 
e tortura: Vatsyani Marques Ferrão, 43 anos, fez as acusações em sua página 




JC, Jornal do Comércio. 2015. "Morre menina de 3 anos baleada durante festa de 




Jones, Gareth A., and Dennis Rodgers. 2009. Youth violence in Latin America 
[electronic resource]. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Jones, T, and Tim Newburn. 2007. Policy Transfer and Criminal Justice. 
Maidenhead: Open University Press/McGraw Hill. 
Jones, Trevor , Tim Newburn, and David John Smith. 1994. Democracy and policing. 
London: Policy Studies Institute. 
Jones, Trevor, Tim Newburn, and David J. Smith. 1996. "Policing and the Idea of 
Democracy."  British Journal of Criminology 36 (2):182-198. 
Kahn, Tulio. 1998. "Pesquisas de vitimização."  Revista do Ilanud 10. 
Kahn, Tulio. 2011. "Exploring the Relationship Between Crime and Economic 
Performance in Brazil after 1994 Using Time Series Econometric Technique." 
Workshop, Pathfinder PBR5 Network Project. 
Kant de Lima, Roberto. 1989. "Cultura Jurídica e Práticas Policiais: A Tradição 
Inquisitorial. Revista Brasileira de Ciências Sociais. Vol. 4, n. 10, pp. 66-84. ."   
4 (10):66-84. 
Kant de Lima, Roberto, Michel Misse, and Ana Paula Mendes de Miranda. 2000. 
"Criminalidade, Violência Urbana, Justiça Criminal e Segurança Pública: uma 
Roxana Pessoa Cavalcanti 
 254 
bibliografia. ."  BIB – Revista Brasileira de Bibliografia em Ciências Sociais 
50:45-96. 
Katz, Jack. 1988. Seductions of Crime: Moral and Sensual Attractions in Doing Evil. 
New York: Basic Books. 
Kawaguti, Luis. 2013. "Como desmilitarizar a polícia no Brasil?" BBC Brasil, 22nd 
August 2013. Accessed 16th February 2016. 
http://www.bbc.com/portuguese/noticias/2013/08/130813_sub_desmilitarizaca
o_lk. 
Kingstone, Peter R, and Alvaro A Comin. 2013. "The Limits to Brazilian 
Development." Democratic Brazil Ascendant, King's College London, 21st-
22nd February 2013. 
Koster, Martijn. 2009. "In Fear of Abandonment: Slum life, community leaders and 
Politics in Recife, Brazil." PhD, Wageningen University, Netherlands. 
Kruijt, Dirk, and Kees Koonings. 1999. "Introduction: Violence and Fear in Latin 
America." In Societies of Fear: The legacy of civil war, violence and terror in 
Latin America, edited by Kees Koonings and Dirk Kruijt. London: Zed. 
Kupchik, Aaron. 2016. "Why are police inside public schools?" The Conversation, 
07th September 2016. 
Lea, John. 2002. Crime and Modernity: Continuities in Left Realist Criminology. 
London, Thousand Oaks, California: Sage Publications. 
Lea, John, and Jock Young. 1993. What is to be done about law and order? Crisis in 
the Nineties. London: Pluto. 
Leeds, Elizabeth. 1996. "Cocaine and parallel polities on the Brazilian urban 
periphery: Constraints on local level democratization."  Latin American 
Research Review 31 (3):47-84. 
Leeds, Elizabeth. 2013. "Civil Society and Citizen Security in Brazil: A Fragile but 
Evolving Relationship." WOLA Accessed 3rd August 2015. 
http://www.wola.org/sites/default/files/downloadable/WOLACivilSocietyand
CitizenSecurityinBrazil.pdf. 
Leeds, Elizabeth. 2014. "Police Militarization: Similarities Between Ferguson and 
Brazil." WOLA, Washington Office on Latin America Last Modified 29th Sep 
2014 Accessed 24th June 2015. 
http://www.wola.org/commentary/police_militarization_similarities_between_
ferguson_and_brazil  
Levitt, Steven. 2004. "Understanding why crime fell in the 1990s: four factors that 
explain the decline and six that do not."  Journal of Economic Perspectives 18 
(1):163-190. 
Liebow, Elliot. 1967. Tally's corner; a study of Negro streetcorner men. 1st ed. 
Boston,: Little. 
Lima, Renato Sérgio de, and José Luiz Ratton. 2011. As ciências sociais e os 
pioneiros nos estudos sobre crime, violência e direitos humanos no Brasil. 
São Paulo: Fórum Brasileiro de Segurança Pública; Urbania; ANPOCS. 
Loader, Ian. 1996. Youth, policing, and democracy. London: MacMillan. 
Loader, Ian, and Richard Sparks. 2015. "Más allá de la lamentación. Hacia una 
política sobre el delito y la justicia democrática e igualitaria."  Delito y 
sociedad 39 (24):15-49. 
Loader, Ian, and Neil Walker. 2007. Civilizing security. Cambridge ; New York: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Lyng, Stephen. 1990. "Edgework: A Social-Psychological Analysis of Voluntary 
Risk-Taking."  American Journal of Sociology 95 (4):851-886. 
Roxana Pessoa Cavalcanti 
 255 
Lyon, Juliet, Catherine Dennison, and Anita Wilson. 2000. Tell them so they listen: 
focus group research with young people in custody. London: Home Office. 
Macaulay, Fiona. 2007. "Knowledge Production, Framing and Criminal Justice 
Reform in Latin America."  Journal of Latin American Studies 39 (3):627-
651. doi: 10.2307/40056546. 
Macaulay, Fiona. 2012. "Deepening the Federative Pact? The Dilma Government’s 
Approach to Crime, Justice and Policing."  Critical Sociology 38 (6):823-834. 
Macaulay, Fiona. 2013. "Modes of prison administration, control and governmentality 
in Latin America: adoption, adaptation and hybridity."  Conflict, Security & 
Development 13 (4):361–392. 
MacDonald, Robert. 2006. "Social Exclusion, Youth Transitions and Criminal 
Careers: Five Critical Reflections on ‘Risk’."  The Australian and New Zeland 
Journal of Criminology 39 (3):371-383. 
MacDonald, Robert. 2010. "Paths of exclusion, inclusion and desistance: 
Understanding marginalized young people’s criminal careers." In Escape 
routes: Contemporary perspectives on life after punishment, edited by 
Stephen; Sparks Farrall, Richard; Maruna, Shadd; Hough, Mike. London: 
Routledge. 
Macedo, Andreia de Oliveira. 2012. ""Policia, quando quer, faz!” Analise da 
Estrutura de Governanca do “Pacto pela Vida” de Pernambuco." Masters, 
Instituto de Ciencias Sociais, Departamento de Sociologia, Universidade de 
Brasilia. 
Machado da Silva, Luís Antonio. 1995. "Um Problema na Interpretação da 
Criminalidade Urbana Violenta."  Sociedade e Estado 10 (2):439-451. 
Machado da Silva, Luís Antônio. 2010. "Title." 
Machado da Silva, Luiz Antonio. 1993. "Violência urbana: representação de uma 
ordem social." In Brasil Urbano: cenários da ordem e da desordem, edited by 
Elimar Pinheiro do  Nascimento and Irlys Alencar F BARREIRA. Rio de 
Janeiro: Notrya. 
Machado, Eduardo. 2011. "Porrete é achado no setor de disciplina do Aníbal Bruno: 
Em vistoria realizada, ontem, representantes de ONGs encontraram bastão de 
madeira com a inscrição "direitos humanos". Eles vão denunciar à OEA a 




Maciel, Ayrton. 2015. "Aumento da violência se deve à não implantação de todas as 





Magaloni, Beatriz. 2015. Police Violence and Crime in Rio de Janeiro: Evaluating the 
Pacifying Police Units. Ash Center, Cambridge, MA, U.S.A. 
Maguire, Edward R. 2010. "Conclusion: A Journey Through the World of Police Use 
of Force." In Police Use of Force: A Global Perspective, edited by Joseph B 
Kuhns and Johannes Knutsson. Santa Barbara, California; Denver, Colorado 
and Oxford, England: Praeger. 
Roxana Pessoa Cavalcanti 
 256 
Maguire, Mike. 2000. "Policing by risks and targets: Some dimensions and 
implications of intelligence-led crime control."  Policing and Society 9 
(4):315-336. 
Malone, Mary Fran T. 2012. The rule of law in Central America: citizens' reactions to 
crime and punishment. New York, NY: Continuum International Pub. Group. 
Manning, Peter K. 2010. Democratic Policing in a Changing World. Boulder, CO: 
Paradigm Publishers. 
Marschner, Murillo 2013. "New Trends or Old Persistence? Fifty Years of 
Educational Stratification in Brazil." II OXBRIDGE CONFERENCE: 
BRAZIL, RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT, University of Cambridge, 1st 
June 2013. 
Maruna, Shadd. 2001. Making good: how ex-convicts reform and rebuild their lives. 
1st ed. Washington, D.C.: American Psychological Association. 
McAra, Lesley, and Susan McVie. 2005. "The usual suspects? Street-life, young 
people and the police."  Criminology and Criminal Justice 5 (1):5-36. 
McCann, Bryan. 2008. The throes of democracy: Brazil since 1989, Global history of 
the present. Halifax, N.S.; London: Fernwood; Zed Books. 
Meirelles, Fernando. 2002. City of God. Brazil: Miramax Films (US) 
Buena Vista International. 
Mendonça, Renata. 2015. "Violência doméstica: 5 obstáculos que mulheres enfrentam 
para denunciar." BBC Brasil. Accessed 11th December 2015. 
http://www.bbc.com/portuguese/noticias/2015/12/151209_obstaculos_violenci
a_mulher_rm. 
Menezes, Palloma Valle. 2014. "Os rumores da ‘pacificação’: A chegada da UPP e as 
mudanças nos problemas públicos no Santa Marta e na Cidade de Deus."  
Dilemas: Revista de Estudos de Conflito e Controle Social 7 (4):665-684. 
Mesquita, Myriam. 1993. "Assassinatos de Crianças e Adolescentes."  Revista Crítica 
de Ciências Sociais 36:81-102. 
Mesquita Neto, Paulo de Mesquita. 2006. "Paths toward Police and Judicial Reform 
in Latin America." In Toward a Society under Law: Citizens and Their Police 
in Latin America, edited by Joseph S. Tulchin and Meg  Ruthenburg, 153-170. 
Washington D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press. 
Mesquita Neto, Paulo de Mesquita. 2011. Ensaios sobre segurança cidadã. São 
Paulo: Quartier Latin; Fapesp. 
Migdal, Joel S. 2001. State in society : studying how states and societies transform 
and constitute one another, Cambridge studies in comparative politics. 
Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Mills, C. Wright. 1959. The sociological imagination: New York, Oxford University 
Press. 
Mingardi, Guaracy. 2000. Tiras, gansos e trutas: segurança pública e polícia civil em 
São Paulo (1983-1990), Coleção Estado e sociedade. Porto Alegre, Brazil: 
CORAG. 
Misse, Michel. 1995. "Crime e pobreza: Velhos Enfoques, Novos Problemas." In O 
Brasil na Virada do Século (O Debate dos Cientistas Sociais), edited by M. A.  
Gonçalvez and G. Villas-Boas. Rio de Janeiro: Relume-Dumará. 
Misse, Michel. 1997. "As Ligações Perigosas: Mercado Informal, Narcotráfico e 
Violência no Rio de Janeiro."  Contemporaneidade e Educação 2 (1):93-116. 
Roxana Pessoa Cavalcanti 
 257 
Misse, Michel. 2011a. Crime e Violência No Brasil Contemporaneo: Estudos de 
Sociologia do Crime e da Violencia Urbana. 2 ed. Rio de Janeiro: Lumen 
Juris. 
Misse, Michel. 2011b. "Crime organizado e crime comum no Rio de Janeiro: 
diferenças e afinidades."  Revista de Sociologia e Política 19 (40):13-25. 
MJ, Ministério da Justiça. 2015. Relatórios Estatísticos/Analíticos do Sistema 
Prisional do Estado do Pernambuco. 
MNMMR, Movimento Nacional de Meninos e Meninas de Rua (Brazil), Instituto 
Brasileiro de Análises Sociais e Econômicas IBASE, and Universidade de São 
Paulo Núcleo de Estudos da Violência USP-NEV. 1991. Vidas em risco: 
assassinatos de crianças e adolescentes no Brasil. Rio de Janeiro 
São Paulo: MNMMR; IBASE; USP-NEV. 
Molyneaux, Maxine. 2008. "The ‘Neoliberal Turn’ and the New Social Policy in 
Latin America: How Neoliberal, How New?"  Development and Change 39 
(5):775-797. 
Monteiro, Rodrigo. 2013. "Changes and uncertainties in public security at Rio de 
Janeiro." SLAS 2013 Annual Conference, University of Manchester, 11th-
12th Aprl 2013. 
Mooney, Jayne. 2000. Gender, violence and the social order. Basingstoke: 
Macmillan. 
Moore, Hollis. 2015. ""Do you have my son?" Criminalization and the Producstion of 
(Un)Relatedness in Brazil." In Criminalized Mothers, Criminalizing 
Mothering, edited by Joanne Minaker and Bryan Hogeveen, 264-291. 
Bradford, ON, Canada: Demeter Press. 
Muniz, Jacqueline, and Domício Proença Júnior. 2006. "Os rumos da construção da 
polícia democrática."  Boletim IBCCRIM Ano 19 (164). 
Nagin, Daniel S. 2012. "Deterrence: Scaring Offenders Straight." In Correctional 
theory: context and consequences, edited by Francis T. Cullen and Cheryl 
Lero Jonson, xiii, 244 p. Thousand Oaks, Calif.: SAGE. 
Nagin, Daniel S. 1998. "Criminal deterrence research at the outset of the twenty-first 
century."  Crime and Justice 23:1-42. 
Naudé, Wim, Adam Szirmai, and Alejandro Lavopa. 2013. Industrialization Lessons 
from BRICS: A Comparative Analysis. IZA - Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft 
der Arbeit Institute for the Study of Labor. 
Neocleous, Mark. 2000. The fabrication of social order : a critical theory of police 
power. Sterling, VA: Pluto Press. 
Neri, Marcelo. 2009. "Income Policies, Income Distribution, and the Distribution of 
Opportunities in Brazil." In Brazil as an Economic Superpower?, edited by 
Lael   Brainard and Leonardo Martínez-Diaz, 221-269. Washington, D.C.: 
Brookings Institution Press. 
Newburn, Tim, and Trevor Jones. 2007. "Symbolizing crime control: reflections on 
zero tolerance."  Theoretical Criminology 11 (2):221-43. 
Nóbrega, José Maria Jr. 2012. Homicídios no Nordeste: Dinamica. Relações causais e 
desmistificação da violência homicida. Campina Grande: EDUFCG. 
Nolasco, Anabel Guedes Pessoa. 2010. "Adolescentes em cárceres contemporâneos 
invisíveis, quem se interessa? Um estudo da FUNASE - Unidade Jaboatão dos 
Guararapes-PE." Mestrado Profissional em Gestão Pública para o 
Desenvolvimento do Nordeste (MA in Public Management to the 
Roxana Pessoa Cavalcanti 
 258 
Development of the Northeast), Centro de Ciências Sociais Aplicadas, 
Universidade Federal de Pernambuco (UFPE). 
O'Malley, Pat. 1992/2013. "Risk, power and crime prevention." In Criminological 
Perspectives: Essential Readings, edited by Eugene McLaughlin and John 
Muncie, 524-530. London, California, New Delhi, Singapore: Sage. 
O’Donnell, Guillermo. 1993. "On the State, Democratization, and Some Conceptual 
Problems: A Latin American View with Glances at Some Postcommunist 
Countries."  World Development 21 (8):1355-1369. 
Oliveira, Wagner. 2014. "Title." Blog Segurança pública, 20th June 2014. 
http://blogs.diariodepernambuco.com.br/segurancapublica/?p=7115. 
Oliveira, Wagner. 2015a. "Pacto pela Vida da sinais de fracasso." Diário de 
Pernambuco, 2nd March 2015. Accessed 23rd March 2015. 
http://blogs.diariodepernambuco.com.br/segurancapublica/?p=8014. 
Oliveira, Wagner. 2015b. "Title." Segurança Pública - Diário de Pernambuco, 7th 
October 2015. 
http://blogs.diariodepernambuco.com.br/segurancapublica/?p=9132. 
Oliveira, Wagner. 2015c. "Title." Segurança Pública, 11th August 2015. 
http://blogs.diariodepernambuco.com.br/segurancapublica/?p=8790. 
Onwudiwe, Ihekwoaba D, Jonathan  Odo, and Emmanuel C Onyeozili. 2005. 
"Deterrence Theory." In Encyclopedia of prisons & correctional facilities, 
edited by Mary Bosworth. Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage Publications. 
Padilha, José. 2007. Elite Squad. Brazil: Universal Pictures (Brazil), IFC Films 
(United States). 
Paixão, Antônio Luiz. 1982. "Crimes e Criminosos em Belo Horizonte: Uma 
Exploração Inicial das Estatísticas Oficiais da Criminalidade." In Violência e 
Cidade, edited by R. Boschi. Rio de Janeiro: Zahar. 
Paixão, Antônio Luiz. 1983. "Sociologia do Crime e do Desvio: Uma Revisão da 
Literatura."  Mimeo. 
Penglase, Ben. 2005. "The shutdown of Rio de Janeiro: The poetics of drug trafficker 
violence."  Anthropology Today 21 (5):3-6. 
Penglase, Ben. 2008. "The Bastard Child of the Dictatorship: The Comando 
Vermelho and the Birth of “Narco-culture” in Rio de Janeiro."  Luso-Brazilian 
Review 45 (1):118-145. 
Pereira, Anthony. 2005. Political (In)justice: Authoritarianism and the Rule of Law in 
Brazil, Chile, and Argentina. Pittsburgh, Pa: University of Pittsburgh Press. 
Pereira, Anthony W. 2000. "An Ugly Democracy?: State Violence and the Rule of 
Law in Post-Authoritarian Brazil." In Democratic Brazil: Actors, Institutons, 
and Processes edited by Peter  Kingstone and Timothy J.  Power, 217-235. 
Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press. 
Pereira, Anthony W. 2008. "Public Security, Private Interests, and Police Reform in 
Brazil." In Democratic Brazil revisited, edited by Peter R. Kingstone and 
Timothy J. Power, 185-208. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press. 
Perlman, Janice E. 2010. Favela [electronic resource] : four decades of living on the 
edge in Rio de Janeiro. Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press. 
Perlman, Janice Elaine. 1976. The myth of marginality : urban poverty and politics in 
Rio de Janeiro, Campus. Berkeley ; London: University of California Press. 
PESP-PE. 2007. Plano Estadual de Seguranca Publica: PACTO PELA VIDA. Recife. 
Petit, Philip. 1987. "Towards a Social Democratic Theory of the State."  Political 
Studies XXXV:537-551. 
Roxana Pessoa Cavalcanti 
 259 
Pinheiro, Paulo Sergio. 1982. "Policia e Crise Politica: O Caso das Policias 
Militares." In Violencia Brasileira, edited by R. et al DaMatta. São Paulo: 
Brasiliense. 
Pinheiro, Paulo Sergio. 1999. "O passado não está morto: nem passado ainda é." In 
Continuidade autoritária e construção da democracia, edited by Paulo Sergio 
Pinheiro. São Paulo: NEV/USP. 
Pinheiro, Paulo Sergio. 2006. World Report on Violence Against Children. In United 
nations secretary-general’s study on violence against children. Geneva: 
United Nations - UNICEF  
Pino, Nathan, and Michael D Wiatrowski. 2006. "The Principles of Democratic 
Policing." In Democratic policing in transitional and developing countries, 
edited by Nathan Pino and Michael D Wiatrowski. Hampshire, UK; 
Burlington, USA: Ashgate Publishing Company. 
Pita, Antonio. 2012. "A cada mil adolescentes do País, três morrem antes de 
completar 19 anos: Taxa, fruto de pesquisa da UFRJ, teve um crescimento de 
14% em relação a 2009 e é a maior desde o começo do levantamento, há cinco 
anos." O Estado de São Paulo, 13th December 2012. Accessed Accessed 18th 
December 2012. http://www.estadao.com.br/noticias/cidades,a-cada-mil-
adolescentes-do-pais-tres-morrem-antes-de-completar-19-anos,973161,0.htm. 
Polk, Kenneth. 1994. "Masculinity, honour and confrontational homicide." In Just 
boys doing business? men, masculinities and crime, edited by Tim Newburn 
and Elizabeth Anne Stanko, xii,290p. London ; New York: Routledge. 
Portella, Ana Paula, and Marília Gomes do Nascimento. 2014. "Impactos de Gênero 
na Redução da Mortalidade Violenta: Reflexões sobre of Pacto pela Vida em 
Pernambuco."  Revista Brasileira de Segurança Pública 8 (1):48-68. 
Possas, Mariana Thorstensen. 2012. Introdução. In 5º Relatório Nacional sobre os 
Direitos Humanos no Brasil (2001- 2010). São Paulo: Núcleo de Estudos da 
Violência NEV - USP. 
Rangel, Antônio B, and Josephine Bourgois. 2005. Armas de Fogo: Proteção ou 
Risco? Guia Pratico – 100 Perguntas e Respostas. Rio de Janeiro: Viva 
Rio/ISER. 
Ratton, José L, Valéria Torres, and Camila Bastos. 2011. "Inquérito policial, Sistema 
de Justiça Criminal e políticas públicas de segurança: dilemas e limites da 
Governança."  Revista Sociedade e Estado 26 (1):29-58. 
Ratton, José Luiz. 2012. Apresentação Seminário Políticas Locais de Prevenção da 
Violência. In A Segurança Cidadã em debate. Cadernos sobre Segurança e 
Prevenção da Violência na América Latina, edited by José Luiz Ratton, Gino 
Costa, Carlos Romero and Luiz Eduardo Soares. Recife: Provisual. 
Ratton, José Luiz, Clarissa Galvão, Rayane Andrade, and Nara Pavão. 2011. 
"Configurações de Homicídios em Recife: um estudo de caso."  Segurança, 
Justiça e Cidadania Ano 3 (6):73-89. 
Ratton, José Luiz, Clarissa Galvão, and Michelle Fernandez. 2014. "Pact for Life and 
the Reduction of Homicides in the State of Pernambuco."  Stability: 
International Journal of Security & Development 3 (1):1-15. 
Raymen, Thomas. 2015. "Designing-In Crime by Designing-Out the Social? 
Situational Crime Prevention and the Intensification of Harmful 
Subjectivities."  British Journal of Criminology. doi: 10.1093/bjc/azv069. 
Recife, Prefeitura da cidade do. 2013. "A cidade." Accessed 13th February 2015. 
http://www2.recife.pe.gov.br/a-cidade/perfil-dos-bairros/rpa-3. 
Roxana Pessoa Cavalcanti 
 260 
Reiner, Robert. 2010. "Citizenship, Crime, Criminalization: Marshalling a Social 
Democratic Perspective."  New Criminal Law Review: An International and 
Interdisciplinary Journal 13 (2):241-261. doi: 10.1525/nclr.2010.13.2.241. 
Reiner, Robert. 2011. Policing, Popular Culture and Political Economy: Towards a 
Social Democratic Criminology, Pioneers in Contemporary Criminology. 
Surrey, England: ASHGATE. 
Reiss, Albert J. Jr. , and Jeffrey A. Roth. 1993. Understanding and preventing 
violence. Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press. 
Ribeiro, Ludmila, Igor Machado, and Klarissa Silva. 2012. "Tempo na ou da justiça 
criminal brasileira: uma discussão metodológica."  Opinião Pública 18 
(2):355-382. 
Ribeiro, Ludmila Mendonça Lopes. 2014. Modelo de Gestão por Resultados do 
programa Pacto pela Vida, Pernambuco, Brasil. In GobernArte: Categoria 
Governo Seguro, edited by Gustavo Béliz, Ana Inés Basco, Ludmila 
Mendonça Lopes Ribeiro, Enrique Andrés Font and Fernanda Bestetti de 
Vasconcellos: Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo. 
Rizzini, Irene. 1997. Olhares sobre a criança no Brasil: séculos XIX e XX Edited by 
Irene Rizzini. Rio de Janeiro: Ed. Universitária Santa Úrsula/Amais. 
Rocha, Sonia 2003. Pobreza no Brasil: Afinal de que se trata? . Rio de Janeiro: FGV. 
Rodgers, Dennis. 2009. "Living in the Shadow of Death: Gangs violence and Social 
Order in Urban Nicaragua: 1996-2002." In Youth Violence in Latin America, 
edited by Gareth A. Jones and Dennis  Rodgers. New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan. 
Rose, Nikolas. 2000. "Government and Control."  British Journal of Criminology 40 
(2):321-339. doi: 10.1093/bjc/40.2.321. 
Rosenblatt, Fernanda Fonseca. 2012. "A Youth Justice Approach to the Street 
Children Phenomenon in Brazil: A Critical Review."  Youth Justice 12 
(3):229-244. 
Ryan-Flood, R, and R Gill. 2010. Secrecy and silence in the research process: 
feminist reflections. London: Routledge. 
Salla, Fernando. 2012. Sistema Prisional no Brasil: Balanço de uma Década. In 5º 
Relatório Nacional sobre os Direitos Humanos no Brasil 2001-2010. São 
Paulo: NEV - Núcleo de Estudos da Violência da USP. 
Sapori, Flávio Luís. 2007. Segurança Pública no Brasil: Desafios e Perspectivas. Rio 
de Janeiro: FGV. 
Saunders-Hastings, Katherine. 2013. "“Los códigos de antes”: Insecurity, nostalgia 
and community experience in mara territory." LASA, 2013 Congress of the 
Latin American Studies Association, Washington D.C., 29th May - 1st June 
2013. 
Scheper-Hughes, Nancy. 1993. Death without weeping : the violence of everyday life 
in Brazil. 1st paperback ed. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Scheper-Hughes, Nancy. 2004. "Dangerous and Endangered Youth: Social Structures 
and Determinants of Violence." In Youth violence: Scientific approaches to 
prevention., edited by John Devine, James Gilligan, Klaus A. Miczek, Rashid 
Shaikh and Donald Pfaff, 13-46. New York, NY US: New York Academy of 
Sciences. 
Schuler, Fernanda Rangel. 2015. "Entre of proposto e o executado: Uma análise da 
execução do plano de reordenamento do sistema socioeducativo do estado de 
Pernambuco nas unidades de intervenção da FUNASE/PE nos anos de 2012 a 
Roxana Pessoa Cavalcanti 
 261 
2014." Masters in Human Rights, Centro de Artes e Comunicação, 
Universidade Federal de Pernambuco (UFPE). 
Scott, James C. 1985. Weapons of the Weak. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. 
SDS, Secretaria de Defesa Social. 2015. Boletim Trimestral da Conjuntura Criminal - 
Documentos. Online. 
Shepherd, Joanna M. 2005. "Deterrence versus Brutalization: Capital Punishment’s 
Differing Impacts among States."  Michigan Law Review 104 (2):203-256. 
Shiner, Michael. 2016. Drug Policing: What is it Good For? In After the Drug Wars: 
Report of the LSE Expert Group on the Economics of Drug Policy, edited by 
John Collins. Online: London School of Economics. 
Sibley, David. 1995. Geographies of exclusion : society and difference in the West: 
London ; Routledge. 
Silveira, Andréa Maria, Renato Martins Assunção, Bráulio Alves Figueiredo da Silva, 
and Cláudio Chaves Beato Filho. 2010. "Impact of the Staying Alive Program 
on the reduction of homicides in a community in Belo Horizonte."  Rev Saúde 
Pública 44 (3):1-6. 
Silverman, David. 2010. Doing Qualitative Research: a practical handbook. 3rd ed. 
London: Sage. 
Silverman, Eli B., and Jo-Ann Della-Giustina. 2001. "Urban policing and the fear of 
crime."  Urban Studies 38 (5/6):941-57. 
Silvestre, Giane. 2008a. "O impacto socioeconômico das unidades prisionais no 
interior paulista: o caso de Itirapina."  Anais do XIX Encontro Regional de 
História da ANPUH - Seção Poder, Violência e Exclusão:1-14. 
Silvestre, Giane. 2008b. "O rastro da indústria penal: A interiorização penitenciária e 
novo paradigma dos municípios paulistas."  LEVS, Revista do Laboratório de 
Estudos da Violência e Segurança 1:94-99. 
Silvestre, Giane. 2016. "Local consequences of the prison policies in state of São 
Paulo, Brazil: a case study of the town of Itirapina."  Crime, Law and Social 
Change 65 (3):269-285. doi: 10.1007/s10611-015-9583-5. 
Simon, Jonathan. 1997/2013. "Governing through crime." In Criminological 
Perspectives: Essential Readings, edited by Eugene McLaughlin and John 
Muncie, 531-546. London, California, New Delhi, Singapore: SAGE. 
Simon, Jonathan. 2007. Governing through crime : how the war on crime transformed 
American democracy and created a culture of fear, Studies in crime and 
public policy. Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press. 
Singer, Helena. 2000. "Discursos Desconcertados: Linchamentos, Punições e Direitos 
Humanos." Doutorado em Sociologia, FFLCH, USP   
Skeggs, Beverley. 1997. Formations of class and gender : becoming respectable. 
London: SAGE. 
Skeggs, Beverley. 2004. Class, self, culture. London: Routledge. 
Soares, L. E, and R Balestreri. 2012. "Title." 
http://www.luizeduardosoares.com/?p=903. 
Soares, Luiz Eduardo. 2000. Meu casaco de general : 500 dias no front da segurança 
pública do Rio de Janeiro. [São Paulo, Brazil]: Companhia das Letras. 
Soares, Luiz Eduardo. 2008. "Pausa para reflexão como um convite à ação." In É 
Possível: Gestão sa Segurança Pública e Redução da Violência, edited by 
Fernando Veloso and Sergio Guimarães Ferreira, 9-15. Rio de janeiro: Contra 
Capa/Instituto de Estudos de Política Econômica (IEPE). 
Roxana Pessoa Cavalcanti 
 262 
Sousa Silva, Eliana. 2016. "Reflections on Favelas and Public Security: Maré as a 
point of reference." Dialogues on Public Security: Experiences in Brazil and in 
the UK, Queen Mary University of London, 26th February 2016. 
Souza, Edinilsa Ramos de, Adalgisa Peixoto Ribeiro, and Fabiana Castelo Valadares. 
2012. "Informações sobre os homicídios no Brasil: uma ferramenta para a 
consolidação da democracia e da cidadania." Núcleo de Estudos da Violência 
NEV - USP Accessed 01st February 2013. http://www.usp.br/imprensa/wp-
content/uploads/5%C2%BA-Relat%C3%B3rio-Nacional-sobre-os-Direitos-
Humanos-no-Brasil-2001-2010.pdf. 
Spivak, Gayatri Chakravorty. 1988. "Can the Subaltern Speak?" In Marxism and the 
Interpretation of Culture, edited by Cary Nelson and Lawrence Grossberg. 
London: Macmillan. 
Spradley, James P. 1980. Participant observation. New York: Macalester College. 
Squires, Peter. 2000. Gun Culture Or Gun Control?: Firearms and Violence: Safety 
and Society. Abingdon, UK and New York, US: Routledge. 
Squires, Peter, and Carlie Goldsmith. 2010. "Bullets, Blades and Mean Streets: Youth 
Justice and Criminal Justice Failure." In Children behaving badly? Peer 
Violence between Children and Young People, edited by Christine  Barter and 
David Berridge. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell. 
Squires, Peter, and Dawn E. Stephen. 2005. Rougher Justice: Anti-Social Behaviour 
and Young People. Devon: Willan. 
Stanley, Liz, and Sue Wise. 1993. Breaking Out Again: Feminist Ontology and 
Epistemology. London: Routledge. 
Steinert, Heinz. 2003. "The indispensable metaphor of war: On populist politics and 
the contradictions of the state's monopoly of force."  Theoretical Criminology 
7 (3):265-291. 
Storch, Robert D. 1976. "The Policeman as Domestic Missionary: Urban Discipline 
and Popular Culture in Northern England, 1850–1880."  Journal of Social 
History 9 (4):481-502. 
Suska, Marta-Laura. 2014. "Policing “Hellcife”: The Pact for Life in Recife, 
Pernambuco." LASA 2014, Chicago, IL, 21st-24th May 2014. 
Tavares dos Santos, José Vicente. 2009. "The dialogue between Criminology and the 
South Sociology of Violence: policing crisis and alternatives." ISA 
Conference of the council of National Associations, March 23-25. 
Taylor, Ian R., Paul Walton, and Jock Young. 2013. The new criminology: for a 
social theory of deviance. Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge. 
Tilly, Charles. 1992. Coercion, Capital and European States: AD 990 - 1992. Oxford: 
Wiley-Blackwell. 
Torresan, Angela, and Neiva Vieira da Cunha. 2013. "Pacifying the poor: the effects 
of Rio de Janeiro's public security policy." SLAS 2013 Annual Conference, 
University of Manchester, 11th-12th April 2013. 
Trebilcot, Joyce. 1988. "Dyke Methods."  Hypatia 3 (2):1-13. 
Tulchin, Joseph S., and Meg Ruthenburg. 2006. Toward a Society under Law: 
Citizens and Their Police in Latin America. Washington D.C. : Woodrow 
Wilson Center Press. 
Turollo, Reynaldo, and Thiago Guimarães. 2013. "Homicídios crescem em Estados 
que mais aumentaram gasto com segurança." Folha de S. Paulo, 12th 
November 2013. Accessed 12th November 2013. 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/2013/11/1370172-homicidios-




Uildriks, Neils. 2009. Policing insecurity: Police reform, security, and human rights 
in Latin America. Lanham and Plymouth: Lexington Books. 
UN Women, United Nations. 2011. "Women’s Police Stations in Latin America Case 
Study: An Entry Point for Stopping Violence and Gaining Access to Justice 
(Brazil, Peru, Ecuador and Nicaragua)." 
http://www.endvawnow.org/uploads/browser/files/security_wps_case_study.p
df. 
UNESCO. 2013. "Peace and Human Security in Brazil." Accessed 01st November 
2013. http://www.unesco.org/new/en/brasilia/social-and-human-
sciences/peace-and-human-security/  
Ungar, Mark. 2009. "Police reform in Argentina: Public Security versus Human 
Rights." In Policing insecurity: Police reform, security, and human rights in 
Latin America, edited by Neils Uildriks, 169-196. Lanham and Plymouth: 
Lexington Books. 
UNICEF. 2015. ECA 25anos: Estatuto da Criança e do Adolescente: Avanços e 
desafios para a infância e a adolescência no Brasil. Online: UNICEF. 
Velho, Gilberto. 2000. "Individualismo, Anonimato e Violencia na Metropole."  
Horizontes Antropológicos, Porto Alegre 6 (13):15-29. 
Veloso, Fernando, and Sergio Guimarães Ferreira. 2008a. "Introdução." In É 
Possível: Gestão sa Segurança Pública e Redução da Violência, edited by 
Fernando Veloso and Sergio Guimarães Ferreira, 17-21. Rio de Janeiro: 
Contra Capa/Instituto de Estudos de política Econômica (IEPE). 
Veloso, Fernando, and Sergio Guimarães Ferreira. 2008b. "Mecanismos de Gestão na 
Segurança Pública." In É Possível: Gestão sa Segurança Pública e Redução 
da Violência, edited by Fernando Veloso and Sergio Guimarães Ferreira, 25-
77. Rio de Janeiro: Contra Capa/Instituto de Estudos de política Econômica 
(IEPE). 
Ventura, Zuenir. 1994. Cidade Partida Sao Paulo: Companhia  de Letras. 
Wacquant, Loïc. 1999. "How penal common sense comes to europeans: Notes on the 
transatlantic diffusion of the neoliberal doxa."  European Societies 1 (3):319-
352. 
Wacquant, Loïc. 2012. "The wedding of workfare and prisonfare in the 21st century: 
responses to critica and commentators." In Criminalisation and advanced 
marginality: Critically exploring the work of Loïc Wacquant, edited by Peter 
Squires and John Lea. Bristol: The policy press. 
Wacquant, Loïc J. D. 1996. "The rise of advanced marginality: Notes on its nature 
and implications."  Acta Sociologica 39 (2):121-139. 
Wacquant, Loïc J. D. 2003. "Toward a dictatorship over the poor? Notes on the 
penalization of poverty in Brazil."  Punishment & Society-International 
Journal of Penology 5 (2):197-205. doi: Doi 10.1177/146247450352004. 
Wacquant, Loïc J. D. 2008. Urban outcasts: a comparative sociology of advanced 
marginality. Cambridge; Malden, MA: Polity. 
Wacquant, Loïc J. D. 2009. Prisons of Poverty. Vol. 23, Contradictions Series. 
Minneapolis, London: University of Minnesota Press. 
Waddington, P.A.J. 2006. "Preface." In The Value of Foot Patrol: A Review of 
Research, edited by Alison Wakefield. London: The Police Foundation. 
Waiselfisz, Julio Jacobo. 2004. Mapa da Violencia IV: Os Jovens do Brasil. Brasília: 
UNESCO; Instituto Ayrton Senna; Secretaria Especial dos Direitos Humanos. 
Roxana Pessoa Cavalcanti 
 264 
Waiselfisz, Julio Jacobo. 2011. Mapa da Violência: Os Jovens do Brasil. Online: 
Instituto Sangari and Ministério da Justiça. 




Waiselfisz, Julio Jacobo 2013. Mortes Matadas por Armas de Fogo: Mapa da 
Violencia. Online: FLACSO Brasil and CEBELA – Centro Brasileiro de 
estudos Latino-Americanos. 
Ward, Heather H. 2006. "Police Reform in Latin America: Brazil, Argentina, and 
Chile." In Toward a society under law: citizens and their police in Latin 
America, edited by Joseph S Tulchin and Meg Ruthenburg, 171-205. 
Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press. 
Weber, Max, Hans Heinrich Gerth, and C. Wright Mills. 1946. From Max Weber: 
Essays in sociology. New York,: Oxford university press. 
Welle, Deutsche. 2014. "Cresce o debate sobre desmilitarização da PM." Carta 
Capital, 6th August 2014. 
Westmarland, Nicole. 2001. "The Quantitative/Qualitative Debate and Feminist 
Research: A Subjective View of Objectivity."  Forum Qualitative 
Sozialforschung / Forum: Qualitative Social Research 2 (1):art 13. 
Whyte, William Foote B. 1955. Street corner society: the social structure of an 
Italian slum. 2nd ed. Chicago: Chicago University Press. 
Wilding, Polly. 2010. "‘New Violence’: Silencing Women's Experiences in the 
Favelas of Brazil."  Journal of Latin American Studies 42 (04):719-747. doi: 
doi:10.1017/S0022216X10001343. 
Wilkinson, Deanna L., and Jeffrey Fagan. 2001. "A Theory of Violent Events." In The 
Process and Structure of Crime: Criminal Events and Crime Analysis, edited 
by Robert Frank Meier, Leslie W. Kennedy and Vincent Sacco, 169-196. New 
Brunswick, NJ: Transaction. 
Wilkinson, Richard, and Kate Pickett. 2010. Spirit level: why greater equality makes 
societies stronger. New York: Bloomsbury Press. 
Wilson, James Q. 1983. Thinking about crime : Rev ed. N.Y.: Basic Books. 
Wilson, James Q., and George L. Kelling. 2013. "Broken Windows: The police and 
neighbourhood safety." In Thinking about crime, edited by James Q. Wilson, 
xxviii, 281 pages. New York: Basic Books, A Member of the Perseus Books 
Group. 
Wolff, Michael J. 2014. "Criminal Authorities and the State: Gangs, Organized 
Crime, and Police in Brazil." PhD, Political Science, University of New 
Mexico, U.S.A. 
WorldBank. 2006. Brazil – Inputs for a Strategy for Cities: A Contribution with a 
Focus on Cities and Municipalities (In Two Volumes) Volume I: Main Report. 
WorldBank. 2013. WB/BRAZIL: Pernambuco’s New Inclusive Growth Program will 
Benefit Nine Million Residents. 
Yin, Robert K. . 2009. Case Study Research: Design and Methods 4th ed. London: 
Sage. 
Young, J. 1998. "Zero tolerance: back to the future." In Planning Safer Communities, 
edited by A Marlow and J Pitts. Lyme Regis: Russell House Publishing. 
Young, Jock. 1999. The exclusive society: social exclusion, crime and difference in 
late modernity. London: SAGE. 
Young, Jock. 2011. The criminological imagination. Cambridge; Malden, MA: Polity. 
Roxana Pessoa Cavalcanti 
 265 
Zaluar, Alba. 1994. A máquina e a revolta.  As organizações populares e o 
significado da pobreza. 2nd ed. São Paulo: Editora Brasiliense. 
Zaluar, Alba. 1998. "Para não dizer que não falei de samba: os enigmas da 
violênciano Brasil”." In História da vida privada no Brasil: contrastes da 
intimidade contemporânea, edited by L. M. Schwarcz, 245-318. São Paulo: 
Companhia das Letras. 
Zaluar, Alba. 1999. "Crime e Violência." In O que ler na ciência social brasileira, 
edited by Sergio Micelli. São Paulo: ANPOCS/Editora Sumaré. 
Zaluar, Alba. 2004a. Integração Perversa: Pobreza e Tráfico de drogas. Rio de 
Janeiro: FGV. 
Zaluar, Alba. 2004b. "Urban Violence and Drug Warfare in Brazil." In Armed Actors: 
Organised Violence and State Failure in Latin America, edited by K Koonings 
and D Kruijit. London: Zed Books. 
Zaluar, Alba. 2010. "Youth, drug traffic and hypermasculinity in Rio de Janeiro."  
Vibrant - Virtual Brazilian Anthropology 7 (2):7-27. 
Zaluar, Alba. 2013. "Warrior ethos and cruelty among drug dealers in favelas of Rio 
de Janeiro." SLAS 2013 Annual Conference, University of Manchester, 11th-
12th April 2013. 
Zaluar, Alba, and Marcos Alvito. 2006. Um século de Favela. 5th ed. Rio de Janeiro: 
Fundação Getulio Vargas. 
Zaverucha, Jorge. 2000. "Fragile Democracy and the Militarization of Public Safety 
in Brazil."  Latin American Perspectives 27 (3, Violence, Coercion, and 
Rights in the Americas):8-31. 
Zaverucha, Jorge. 2004. Policia Civil de Pernambuco: O Desafio da Reforma. Recife: 
Editora Universitaria UFPE. 
Zimring, Franklin. 2007. The Great American Crime Decline. Oxford: OUP. 
Zubillaga, Veronica. 2009. "‘Gaining Respect’: the Logic of violence among young 
men in the Barrios of Caracas, Venezuela." In Youth Violence in Latin 














Roxana Pessoa Cavalcanti 
 266 
NOTES 
                                                
1 See Diário de Pernambuco (DP 2016). 
 
2 See Carvalho (2013).  
 
3 See Costa (2015) and Soares and Balestreri (2012). 
 
4 I have refrained from using italics for the term favela because it has become internationally 
used and widely known. 
 
5 I adopt the dichotomy Global North/Global South as a metaphor to the contested and 
debatable categories that depend on the context of use. While the metaphor relates to some 
extent to geographical areas, the countries included in each category are not necessarily 
located in the south or north hemisphere. For instance, with the exception of Japan, Asian 
countries tend to be included in the ‘Global South’ category. GDP and per capita income are 
not necessarily the defining and dividing specification of categories either here, since the 
Asian tigers (Singapore, Taiwan and South Korea) are economically rich. The metaphor 
focuses more on development and on a post-colonial critique of the European and North 
American (the Global North) dominance in knowledge production in the social sciences. Thus 
‘Global South’ relates to what is subaltern, marginalised, invisible or other. As Carrington et 
al (2016, 6) put it, deploying the north/south metaphor needs not to ignore or neglect that 
‘there are enclaves of the south within the north and unresolved North/South tensions within 
many societies.’ 
 
6 Examples of studies and theories considered part of the mainstream branch of criminology, 
also known as orthodox, establishment and managerial Criminology, are most notably 
observed in the works of Herrnstein and Murray (1994), Hirschi and Gottfredson (1988), 
James Q. Wilson (1983), John DiIulio (1996), Clarke and Felson (2004), and David 
Farrington (1986) among others known as the ‘technocratic mainstream’ (Currie 1998). These 
studies do not only deploy technocratic discourses but they also tend to be uncritical by 
maintaining rigid definitions of what is science and what is not, without questioning how 
those demarcations came to being or questioning who makes those demarcations. Some 
theoretical examples are works that build on rational choice theory, routine activity theory, 
situational crime prevention (Clarke and Felson 2004), Broken windows theory and zero 
tolerance policing (Bratton 2005, Wilson and Kelling 2013), all of which inform the new 
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public security policy developed in Pernambuco since 2007. Deconstructionist critical theory 
has presented challenges to the rigid and narrow definitions proposed by rational choice 
theory and to the limitations of deterrence theory. Nonetheless, these theoretical frameworks 
have regained life in the work of neoclassical criminologists such as Clarke and Felson, and 
Farrington. The positivist school of criminology shares the rigid definitions and demarcations 
of classical criminology. This conservative field of criminology is deterministic and 
essentialist by failing to allow for agency, minimalising social structural issues and denying 
meaning to the relational aspects of human interaction. Furthermore, it fails to engage with 
the theorisation of methods social control or with a critique of the apparatus or institutions of 
control.  
 
7 This is of course not an exclusively criminological phenomenon. The social sciences in 
general have initially tended to use the Global South as a data mine for theories that portrayed 
the global periphery, the marginalised as primitive, tribal and pre-modern and thereafter, this 
hegemonic pattern has focused on the exportation of Global North theories to the Global 
South (Carrington et al 2016, Connell 2007).  
 
8 Here state building refers to the development of the State, or of a legitimate organisation 
that can govern or command authority over a territory. 
 
9 Rather than being marginal, the urban poor perform key and integral roles in society and in 
the economy within an unequal context embedded in asymmetrical power relations. They take 
on the least secure, hardest and least paid jobs. They deliver a number of services for the city, 
they are consumers and also contribute culturally. They aspire to improve their lives and the 
lives of their children through education. They build their own homes and communities and 
are socially organised under the most arduous conditions. They are also acutely conscious of 
how politics affects their lives within and outside their communities. They cooperate with 
clientelistic politicians and bargain with candidates to mitigate the hardships of poverty. The 
favelas afford a low-cost solution to insufficient affordable housing and sometimes, they 
provide proximity to jobs.  
 
10 The resolution of cases of homicide in Brazil is very low, thus it becomes difficult to 
establish even the most basic causal factors or the culprits. Some studies have correlated the 
rising death toll with the availability of firearms (Rangel and Bourgois 2005, Nobrega 2012), 
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although that alone cannot explain why some countries with even more firearms (e.g. the 
USA) have lower homicide rates than Brazil. 
 
11 The work of criminologist David Garland (2000; 2001) can be helpful in this debate. 
Garland explained that wealth and inequality are the key factors in societies with high crime 
rates, rather than poverty per se. Various phenomena, he argued, have all contributed to a 
complex vicious circle of expanding crime rates and extensive punitive punishment: 
increasing opportunities for crime, caused by booming consumption and the availability of 
desirable goods such as cars and mobile phones, coupled with the abandonment of the 
rehabilitative model of punishment; increasing fear of crime; the growing politicisation and 
populism associated with crime, whereby counterproductive punitive policies are endorsed in 
an attempt to appear ‘tough on crime’ and gain votes; and the amplification of the 
privatisation and commercialisation of crime control.  
 
12 Violent crime trends tend to rely on homicide rates as a guideline for measuring violence in 
Latin American because governments lack standard vocabulary and data-collection methods 
about different types of crime. Cadavers are easily countable in comparison to other types of 
violent crime, such as non-lethal violence and torture, which are often hidden and unreported 
in Brazil.  
 
13 Campos was a candidate in the presidential elections of 2014 but he died in an airplane 
accident during the campaign. 
 
14 Ratton maintains the claim that PPV was a ‘success’, but recently publicly criticised the 
programme, arguing that its successful aspects had been derailed and pointing to the many 
failures of the programme: its lack of attention to the prisons and youth offender institutions, 





15 Such as, security guards, alarms, locks, private transport and built-environment design. 
 
16 Garland has argued that the marginalisation of offenders is often ignored and they are 
‘depicted instead as culpable, undeserving and somewhat dangerous individuals who must be 
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carefully controlled for the protection of the public and the prevention of further offending’ 
(Garland 2001, 175). 
 
17 Note that these figures refer only to homicides committed with firearms, and consequently 
do not represent the rate of all homicides (e.g. those committed with knives or other means). 
 
18 In line with the university’s ethical guidelines, I decided to interact with participants that 
were aged 16 years and above, that is the age at which participants are considered to have 
capacity to give consent to participate in the research. Further studies that obtain approval by 
ethics committees could expand this enquiry and consider the views of children below the age 
of 16. 
 
19 Central to this thesis is the State’s role in the provision of security and its aim to 
monopolise legitimate force. While organised criminals and private security companies play 
significant roles in this field, the former is illegitimate and the latter is subjected (at least in 
theory) in some way or another to the State’s predominance. The state institutions entitled to 
deploy legitimate coercion – the police and the armed forces – have a prevalent role and 
authority over other organisations involved in the distribution and containment of force.  
  
20 It is significantly noticeable that state repression, in the form of police brutality in Brazil, 
does not tend to make news or raise vocal and organised opposition, unless it is directed at 
those perceived as deserving respectable citizens, namely white middle- and upper-class 
victims. This makes the study of poor young people’s experiences of security even more 
urgent, an issue that will be examined in more detail in chapter seven. 
 
21 Note that many projects were proposed, but not necessarily implemented. The 138 projects 
originally proposed in Campos’ Plano Pernambucano de Segurança Publica (Pernambucan 
Public Security Plan) were divided into six lines of action:  
(1) Qualified crime repression: focusing on improving the work of criminal 
justice institutions, especially the level of responsiveness to victims and 
on improving police investigations; 
(2)  Institutional improvement: focusing on integrating the work of criminal 
justice institutions; 
(3) Management and information management: focusing on planning, 
managing and evaluating projects and the actions of PPV; 
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(4) Training public security staff; 
(5) Social prevention intervention: including 42 projects such as ‘protection 
of victims of violence’, ‘disarmament’, ‘treatment of drug users’. 
(6) Democratic management: 4 projects to promote mechanisms of public 
participation in safety policies and the dissemination of information 
about PPV, including the creation of the Conselho Estadual de 
Segurança Publica (Council to oversee PPV) – this was one of the 
projects that was proposed but not implemented.  
 
22 See Macedo (2012) for a detailed description of other police operations, such as: (1) 
Contra ameaça: monitors the number of intimations registered in police stations. (2) 
Autoria CVP: monitors investigations about violent property crime. (3) Quadrantes de 
segurança: monitors the reduction of violent crimes, illegal carrying of weapons and drug 
trafficking offences in each area. (4) Transporte seguro: monitors the reduction of crimes 
against property conducted in means of public transportation. (5) Autoria IP: Monitors the 
number of completed and conclusive police investigations relating to heinous crimes (other 
than homicide). (6) Carrossel de Fogo: monitors the number of firearms apprehended and 
flagrant arrests relating to intentional lethal crimes in hot spots. (7) Risco Zero: monitors the 
number of firearms apprehended and flagrant arrests relating to intentional lethal crimes in 
and near bars and nightclubs. (8) Sossego: monitors the issuing of police legal terms 
(Termos Circunstanciados) emitted to combat environmental crimes, traffic crimes and 
sound pollution. (9) Resgate de vidas: monitors the work of fire-fighters in partnership with 
the public health system (Sistema Único de Saúde, SUS), considering the speed of the 
treatment of victims of violent crime with high risk of death in the metropolitan area of 
Recife, by monitoring the number of rescued survivors. 
 
23 There are some fluctuations in homicide rates (e.g. in the state of Bahia) and there was a 
mild decline in homicide rates from the year 2011 to 2012 in the states of Paraiba and 
Alagoas, however, over the entire ten-year period (2002-2012) those states present an upward 
trend in homicide rates. 
 
24 This was not far from a typical year in terms of numbers of homicides, considering that the 
average number of homicides from 1998-2007 in Pernambuco was 4,342. 
 
25 Author interview with Delegada, civil police, Imbiribeira DHPP, 7th October 2013. See 
also Wolff (2014). 
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26 Another way of measuring police killings is to compare it as a percentage of the total 
number of homicides (Bueno et al 2013, 119). For example, in Pernambuco, in 2012, police 
killings are 1.54% of the total number of homicides, while in Rio they are 13.53% and in São 
Paulo 7.71%. The average percentages over the six-year period between 2007-2012 would be 
1.73% for Pernambuco, 32.13% for Rio and 6.37% for São Paulo. These calculations were 
made using Bueno’s (2013) data. 
 
27 Police killings in the state of Pernambuco are still high in comparison to the US and the 
UK. Police in the entire US killed 607 civilians in 2011 and the UK police kill on average 2 
civilians per year (Wolff 2014, 89). 
 
28 See Carvalho (2013) for a more comprehensive review of these issues and international 
comparisons of the Brazilian prison population. In South America, Brazil ranks fourth in 
number of prisoners per 100,000 inhabitants, after French Guiana (316), Suriname (356) and 
Chile (313). In comparison to European countries, Brazil’s rate is also considered high: Spain 
(160), France (102), England (153) and Germany (88). In absolute numbers, Brazil has the 
fourth largest prison population, after the US (2,266,832,157), China (1.65 million) and 
Russia (864,197) (International Centre for Prison Studies, 2012). 
 
29 In March 2008, the five-year-old Isabela Nardoni was found after being thrown from a 
sixth floor apartment, while under the care of her father Alexandre Nardoni and his partner 
Ana Carolina Jatobá. Isabela Nardoni died of her injuries while she was taken to hospital by 
the Brazilian corpo de bombeiros (firefighters). Nardoni and Jatobá were sentenced to 31 
years and 26 years, respectively, for Isabela’s death. In the same year, Eloá, a 15-year-old 
student, was kidnapped and kept hostage for 100 hours by her ex-boyfriend Lindmberg Alves. 
Alves shot Eloá, who later died in hospital. He was originally sentenced to 98 years and 10 
months imprisonment, however the Brazilian penal code permits a maximum sentence of 30 
years. Both these cases gained extensive national and international coverage (FolhadeS.Paulo 
2008, Estadão 2015). 
 
30 Marquinhos, 18 years old mulato male, Tourinho, 29th October 2013. 
 
31 Chapter 8 discusses some of the difficulties associated with militarised police hierarchy and 
demilitarising the police. 
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32 Deterrence theory, part of the classical school of criminology, can be traced back to the 
works of Cesare Beccaria and Jeremy Bentham in the 18th century who posited (quite 
intuitively) that proportionate punishment deters crime (Nagin 2012). Classical criminology 
deploys 18th century concepts (such as deterrence, free will and rational choice) to make 
criminal punishment intelligible. Both neo-classical Deterrence theory and Situational Crime 
Prevention theory assume criminals to be rational actors who calculate their offences and act 
in self-interested ways (O'Malley 1992/2013). Crime is seen simply as opportunistic and 
therefore methods of crime control must reduce these opportunities through changes in the 
physical environment. Under these frameworks, the role of emotions, impulses and cultural 
aspects (such as bravado) and the irrationality associated with committing certain offences, 
are all neglected.  
 
33 During the fieldwork in 2013 I attended a protest event in a community in Recife that was 
under pressure from Real Estate Developers to sell its properties and relocate, because its 
location was ideal for wealthy commuters who worked in the city’s large business and health 
sector, as well as being close to the downtown city centre and to upper-class neighbourhoods 
on the seaside. It is difficult and perhaps impossible to establish whether the securitisation of 
the community through PPV had been a step towards these pressures or whether they would 
have existed even without securitisation. However, it is undeniable that Recife’s Real Estate 
and property developers have visibly increased, with sprawling sky scrappers around the city. 
The data from this research suggest a parallel phenomenon of securitising the city through 
policing the poor, who often complained of being unfairly criminalised and under-protected 
by security agents. 
 
34 In 2000, a UN representative, Nigel Rodley, visited Recife to collect data for a world report 
about torture, his visit was communicated in advance by the superiors of the civil police to 
delegados (chiefs of police), and yet two delegados failed to take precautionary measures 
(Zaverucha 2004, 34). In the police stations of Ibura and Cavaleiro, Rodley found tools used 
to torture suspects. The police simply claimed that they had been there ‘for a long time or 
belonged to those imprisoned’, which does not explain why they had not been thrown away.  
 
35 ROCAM-PMPE stands for ‘Rondas Ostensivas com Apoio de Motocicletas’ 
 
36 Lourdes, 29 years old, mulata, Tourinho, 20th October 2013. 
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37 Neither does this thesis focus on theorising this topic, which is beyond the scope of this 
research. Other scholars have begun to investigate questions related to this issue (e.g. Denyer-
Willis, Graham ‘Police Violence and the Internet in Brazil: New Visibilities of Historical 
Patterns’ Lecture at UCL, London, 2nd March 2016).  
 
38 Author interviews with Lourdes and Luther, Tourinho, 4th August 2013. 
 
39 In the words of Samuel (resident of Tourinho, white, local teacher) ‘Ah ‘o tráfico’ (drug 
trafficking) is everywhere. Today a rock [of crack cocaine] is R$5 (under £2). It is easy 
money, easier than sweating to build a home. But there is no territorial dispute like you see in 
other places, because each community has its ‘dono’ (owner/drug lord) and the bandidos 
(ordinary criminals rather than bandits) are more united than the community as a whole. 
There is little rivalry in the trade here; most of the rivalry is over women. They send messages 
out through ‘aviões’ when there is a large cargo being transported saying ‘don’t walk on this 
street’. This is not when 5 or 6 little rocks are being sold.’ 
 
40 Extracts from an interview with Samuel (25 years old, resident of Tourinho, white) 
illustrate the point that policing remains ‘distant’ despite the implementation of PPV. Roxana 
– ‘Have you noticed any changes at all in the kind of work the police does?’ Samuel – ‘Not 
really. Like I say they just drive past occasionally in their car but don’t really do much.’ 
Roxana – ‘Have you heard of Pacto pela vida?’ Samuel – ‘Yes but that doesn’t mean much 
for us. I have seen their advert on TV and the stickers on the police car, but that is all really.’ 
Roxana – ‘So how present would you say the State is here?’ Samuel – ‘My only connection 
with the State is that I have a temporary contract to work for a State school as a teacher. But 
they don’t even offer a decent working environment. We haven’t got appropriate access to 
health, or education or sanitation. The government created some programs but it does not 
maintain them.’ 
 
41 A police investigation document (Oficio 052/2001-DIR, of 23rd January 2001) about the 
death of Helio Jose Muniz on 14th January 2001 in the Prison Anibal Bruno revealed that the 
directors of the prison were fully aware and supported Helio's role as chaveiro. His case and 
death of highly publicised in the media as he was known for admittedly killing over sixty 
people in Camaragibe, a municipality in the outskirts of Recife’s metropolitan region, 
including thirteen members of the police and an ex-mayor. Helio was became a central 
character in a documentary entitled ‘O Rap do Pequeno Principe contra as Almas Sebosas’, 
translates as ‘The Little Prince's Rap Against the Wicked Souls’ (Caldas and Luna 2000). 
Roxana Pessoa Cavalcanti 
 274 
                                                                                                                                      
 
42 I asked how he knew whether someone was a thief or a matador. He said, they could tell by 
the prison number, but sometimes they could tell by a piece of paper on their cell which states 
what crimes the inmate has been convicted for. 
 
43 According to Alice, neither the police or drug traffickers were able or willing to control 
violence against women. Traffickers were not as organised or in control of the community 
and social order in the community as in Rio de Janeiro (see Arias, 2006).  
 
44 Bourgois’ (2003) study of crack dealers in Harlem, USA, showed that drug gangs 
accommodated uneducated poor young men who would otherwise likely be employed in 
poorly paid service sector work considered feminised. Involvement in the drug trade and 
access to firearms provided these men with an unconventional setting to enact a certain form 
of masculine identity and bravado. 
 
45 The issue of death squads is perhaps hidden to the middle and upper-classes but not to the 
communities that bare the brunt of their actions and that are extorted by these groups. 
 
46 The suicide category is an interesting one. The 2014 Mapa da Violência, for example, 
shows that the numbers and rate of suicides have been growing in most of Brazil. The country 
shows an upward variation of 15.3% between 2002-2012 in number of suicides and a 20.3% 
increase in the rate of suicides per 100,000 inhabitants in the same period. Pernambuco also 
shows increasing suicides, with a 18.7% increase in rates of suicide (per 100,000 inhabitants) 
between 2002 and 2012 (Mapa da Violência 2014). 
 
47 While researchers working in Rio (e.g. Leeds 1996, Arias 2006) have argued that drug 
groups have compromised the autonomy of political community associations, and that they 
can coerce residents to vote in a certain way and control access to the community allowing 
only some politicians to campaign in the area (e.g. those that had made deals with traffickers), 
the situation in Recife is different. Drug groups were far less organised and smaller and did 
not have such strong control over community access. 
 
48 The following example will illustrate the point. A locally well-liked NGO and social 
movement in Tourinho organised festivities for children’s day in October. They collected 
donations in the form of cash, food and toys for the children in the community and 
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surrounding communities. The festivity turned into a lively street party with over 300 people 
attending. There were performances by local dance groups, food, a bouncy castle and live 
music. One local charismatic vereadora (city councilor) made a large donation, provided the 
bouncy castle and attended the party. As a result, residents and a large community engaged 
with the NGO made comments that they had decided to vote for that particular politician 
because she was perceived as so ‘nice’ having provided this one off contribution. The 
material circumstances of the communities, the divisive and unequal spatiality of the city, 
required residents to be versatile and innovative in their approaches to mitigate hardship. 
 
49 None of the participants earning the minimum wage thought that what they earned was 
enough for a decent living. 
 
50 For a discussion of the limitations of ‘democratic policing’ see Harkin (2015). 
 
51  Many scholars have made their views public, through the media, on the topic of 
demilitarisation, for instance, Ignacio Cano, Luis Eduardo Soares, Fabio Gomes França, 
among others.  
 
52 According to a study by NEV-USP (the 5th National Report on Human Rights in Brazil), 
between 1993 and 2011 at least 22.5 thousand people were killed in conflict with the police in 
Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo, on average 1,185 people per year or three each day (Possas 
2012, 16). Given that Brazil does not legally support the death penality or exterminations, 
these figures are exceedingly high.  
 
53 The first three proposals – by politician Chico Lopes (from Brazil’s communist party, PC 
do B), senator Blairo Maggi (from the PR party) and Celso Russomano (PRB party) – divert 
in some aspects, see Kawaguti (2013). There is a further demilitarisation proposal to amend 
the constitution (PEC 51/2013) by senador Lindbergh Farias (from the worker’s party, PT-
RJ), which essentially proposes the unification of the police forces and the autonomy for each 
federative state to establish their force’s structure (see Welle 2014). 
 
54 Interview with a senior member of staff of GACE-PE on 27th January 2016 and discussion 
with Regina Miki, Brazil’s national secretary of public security on 26th February 2016. Miki 
confirmed that the national level homicide reduction program (Pacto Nacional de Redução de 
Homicídios) based on PPV is ready to be rolled out with some alterations. According to her 
Roxana Pessoa Cavalcanti 
 276 
                                                                                                                                      
the changes would address gaps in PPV, however, she did not specify in much detail exactly 
how this would be done. She explained that the national plan would include some elements of 
the UPPs program in Rio de Janeiro, insofar as the establishment of permanent and 
continuous policing would come alongside permanent access to social assistance. She also 
indicated that the national plan addresses the issue of prison overcrowding, since PPV had not 
thought of any strategies for this problem. 
 
55 Situational Crime Prevention refers to three main criminological theoretical frameworks: 
environmental criminology, rational choice and routine activity theory. Some practical 
examples of this frameworks are: making changes to spaces to make them safer (e.g. lighting, 
changes in the built environment, using security cameras); police work; using neighbourhood 
groups to address crime problems; interagency working and sharing responsibility for crime 
prevention. 
 
56 This is not to say that quantitative methods are not needed in the social sciences. But rather 
that attempts to measure behaviours and effects, or qualitative data, can be imprecise, messy 
and even dangerous by neglecting qualitative aspects of research problems. Some data are 
necessarily quantitative. For instance, figures such as data on mortality, age, imprisonment 
and homicide rates and economic indicators are all important. But that does not mean that 
quantitative data cannot be manipulated for particular ends and interpretations. 
  
57 Despite the increasing punitive-ness – insofar as zero tolerance implies more emphasis on 
incarcerating suspects of drug-related crime (but also of violent inter-personal crime), and 
disregarding any potential mitigating circumstances of the accused (e.g. material inequalities, 
social injustice) – the very idea of zero tolerance is contestable since there seems to be a lot 
of tolerance among government officials, in their narratives and actions, and even denial of 
other forms of crime and violence, such as state crime and police violence.  
 
58 Homicide rates have been increasing since 2014 again, coinciding with the period since 
Brazil entered a new economic downturn. 
 
59 The British Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC) could offer an interesting 
model for independent oversight, although, the scale of the work of such an institution would 
be far greater in Brazil than in Britain.   
 
